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General
Introduction

General Introduction
This volume is part of a larger study.1 The present volume and its projected companions are about the control of jurisdiction in the English legal system from the later 16th century to the middle of the 17th. It is
almost, though not quite, equivalent to say that the study is about one legal procedure -- the writ of Prohibition. That writ was the main means by
which the managing courts -- the King's Bench and Common Pleas -kept other courts within their jurisdictional bounds. In the period I am
concerned with, though not at earlier stages of its history, the Prohibition
was a judicial writ. That means a party applied to the King's Bench or
Common Pleas for a writ and obtained it only if he convinced the court
that there was cause. Judicial writs contrast with de cursu Chancery writs,
which could be had for the asking and a fee and were merely the ordinary
way of starting a suit at common law. If someone wanted to stop a suit in
another court on the ground that it was beyond that court's jurisdiction, he
went to the King's Bench or Common Pleas with his statement of cause;
if he was successful, a Prohibition was granted forbidding the subject
court and the plaintiff there from proceeding; the suit could be resumed
only if the Prohibition was reversed. I shall explain this more fully and
technically below, but the simple formulation is sufficient for a basic understanding of the writ.

1

I do not give citations for the points in this General Introduction. Many of them come to no
more than common knowledge rearranged. Much of what is said could be found here or there in
the standard literature on early modern English legal history. I have not, however, derived it
from that literature, but from my mere experience with the hundreds of cases in the body of the
study. The reader who has seen a substantial amount of that material will, I believe, see that the
General Introduction presents a safe-enough, though rough, statement of the material's setting. It
is intentionally rough. Technical polish is avoided as an obstacle to reading for the general
impression one needs to start with. Here, for example, I will only say that there was a statute to
such-and-such effect. There will be plenty of technicality anon, including citation of statutes and
explanation of their exact (or uncertain) meaning. The purpose of the General Introduction is to
give the reader a feel for where the subject "fits in" and some information that needs to be in
hand before entering a maze of particularities that would be hard to follow without premonition.
The style is adapted to that purpose. With respect to some of the general matters touched on
here, such as Prohibitions in politics and the climate of jurisprudence in the period of the study,
the reader is referred to the bibliographical note following the Introduction to Vol. I later in this
volume.
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Jurisdiction and the Prohibition make a significant study because the
English legal system, down to its radical reform in the 19th century, was a
congeries of quite distinct courts. The common law was most of the law.
Although its administration was remarkably centralized in the King’s
Bench and Common Pleas, there was a considerable distribution of common law jurisdiction among lesser tribunals. The boundaries of those
lesser courts sometimes came in question, and they were sometimes regulated by Prohibition. There were, however, no serious and persistent
problems about such courts’ jurisdiction. Prohibitions curbing minor
common law tribunals might merit a footnote; jurisdiction control is a
substantial topic of legal history, represented by innumerable controverted cases, because the congeries of courts included three sorts traditionally and correctly described as non-common law.
These were certainly “real courts,” with power to compel attendance
and apply sanctions as against all the King’s subjects and all sojourners
within the reach of his authority. They were forums for the practice of
professional lawyers, operating with bodies of formulable, “learned” law.
The matters they dealt with were important for the everyday lives of
many people. The law of these courts is distinguishable, however, from
the common law -- from the body of national custom, often restated or
modified by statute, that was applied in the King’s Bench, the Common
Pleas, and other members of the common law sub-set within the English
legal system.
The three classes of non-common law courts controlled by Prohibition
were: (1) Ecclesiastical courts, consisting of a large number of individual
tribunals, including lower and higher courts in an appellate hierarchy; (2)
Equity courts, of which the Chancery was the chief -- but only lesser
members of this class were in practice regulated by Prohibition; (3) Admiralty courts -- for practical purposes a class of one, the civil court of the
Lord Admiral. I shall explain below what these courts did and the different senses in which their procedures and their substantive rules were noncommon law.
In this Introduction, my main purpose is to set out an analytic map of
the field of Prohibition law (or, a bit more generally, of the topic “common law control of non-common law jurisdiction”) as it was in the late-
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Elizabethan and early-Stuart period. I shall also explain why that period
is distinctive and deal with various features of the law which one needs to
understand before entering any segment of the map.
My analytic map is not the analytic map. There are no treatises on jurisdictional law contemporary with the cases discussed in this study, and
none covering the whole subject has been written after the fact. The territory is unmapped; there is no traditional scheme for dividing it up, to be
used or dissented from. I shall propose here a way of sorting out the
problems and decisions in the field as a whole, explaining the reasons,
sometimes of principle, sometimes of convenience, for the divisions. The
map is primarily of issues or problems. It will perhaps be useful first to
present it in tabular form (main divisions only).
I. Procedural issues in Prohibition law (the present volume.)
II. Control of judicial conduct by Prohibition. (“Conduct” means how
the non-common law court handled cases properly before it. That contrasts with “jurisdiction”in the sense “whether a case or issue of a certain sort belongs before the non-common law court.”)
III. The range of jurisdiction-control (in the above sense, opposed to conduct-control.)
IV. Enforcement of statutes by Prohibition.
V. Prohibitions to the Admiralty.
VI. Prohibitions to courts of equity.
VII. Prohibitions and ecclesiastical defamation.
VIII. Common law issues and collateral infringement of common law interests.
IX. Prohibitions and tithe law.
X. Miscellaneous ecclesiastical Prohibitions.
XI. Historical cross-survey and post-Civil War Prohibitions.
I shall presently explain what the titles in the table mean, why they are
arranged in this order, and what some major sub-divisions of the eleven
topics are. Before elaborating the map, I shall discuss four preliminary
matters:
1. Conception, sources, and limitations of the study.
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2. Basic procedure in Prohibition cases--beyond the brief indication
above, but short of the problematic cases under
Title I.
a. Procedures other than the Prohibition connected with jurisdictional
law.
3. Character and activities of the non-common law courts regulated by
Prohibition.
4. Prohibitions in politics and constitutional law.
Conception, sources, and limitations of the study
The study is case law with a vengeance. All I have really done is to
collect a large number of reported cases on jurisdiction, mostly Prohibition cases, and analyze them. “Analyze” has three senses:
1. I have evolved the map outlined above and placed the cases on it.
2. With what may seem excessive persistence, I have taken each report and tried to articulate the issues in the case, the arguments on both
sides, the opinions of the judges, and the outcome with its implications.
This familiar process is always one of construction. The best law reports
(including the modern type consisting of opinions written by the judges)
do not speak for themselves. Just what was in question, what could have
been and was argued, what precisely the decision was, is inevitably what
some interpreter says it was; the next interpreter may have grounds for
disagreeing. To say what a 16th-17th century case was about and how it
was resolved requires more radical and more dubitable construction. The
best reports from that period rarely approach the completeness and clarity
of more modern ones, and many are so fragmentary and confusing that
they have long since lost legal authority (as citable precedents). They are,
however, the historical sources, no worse and often better than other
kinds of sources for other kinds of relatively remote history. Reconstructing the cases by detailed analysis will not yield an unchallengeable picture of past legal problems and views of how they should be solved, but it
is necessary in order to have any picture at all. (I should perhaps say any
picture except for the kind that is almost sure to be misleading -- one
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gathered from odds and ends of comment out of court. Anglo-American
law is irreducibly what the courts hold it to be in response to the problems
contingency puts before them. Evidence of the courts’ activities from
other sources than reports and judicial records can of course be informative about those activities, as well as about contemporary impressions of
and attitudes toward them. Such evidence is likely, however, to be selective and colored by interest or political predilection.)
3. Typically, though not uniformly, I preface the discussion of the
cases under particular topics and sub-topics with essays on the main issues presented by the topic following. When going through the cases, I
try to say how the issues were perceived and responded to. In the prefatory essays I take greater liberty to suggest how the issues ought to have
been or might have been perceived, and what the best arguments for alternative answers would have been. History, no doubt, is only concerned
with the “were.” As I have already suggested, however, one cannot simply read off from the sources how the question was understood and what
the responses were. Construction is pervasively necessary. Two levels of
construction are distinguishable, and it is in my judgment desirable to keep
them apart. The one starts from the individual source -- the words of the
lawyers and judges if the report is in direct discourse, otherwise from the
reporter’s representation of the case. The other starts, not from an impossibly a priori knowledge of the issues, but from a general feel for them
derived from reading a number of related cases and reflecting on what
seems to be involved. I have conducted this reflection, embodied in the
prefatory essays, without worrying too much as to whether I see more or
something else (anachronistic visions perhaps) than the contemporary actors in the cases saw. Its purpose, however, is to suggest what the actors
may have seen; one cannot expect to know from direct evidence all of
what they saw, for even if the reports were more complete than they are,
there would be a residue of unarticulated and vague perceptions.
The study is based on the reports in print and on those in manuscript in
the British Library. I cannot guarantee that I have overlooked no printed
cases, and still less that I have missed none in the manuscript collections,
but I have tried not to. I have gone through the printed reports page by
page (reliance on primitive indices and on leads and references would not
turn up a significant fraction of the relevant cases). Similarly, I have gone
through all the British Library manuscripts that appear from the cata-
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logues to consist of law reports from the period of the study, transcribing
all Prohibition and jurisdictional cases. There are law reports in manuscript elsewhere; searching those would no doubt produce more cases. I
have stopped where I have because my collection of cases is already
large, and because I think that making sense of the corpus I have is a better investment of energy than further searching. I am quite sure that looking for more unprinted cases would produce mainly duplicate reports.
When more are found, they are likely to affect only details on the map I
present; having a map to locate new material on seems to me more important than having all possible data in hand before mapping it.
Legal historians now recognize the quantity and importance of unprinted early modern reports, but they have not been very extensively
used, and the difference they can make is not generally recognized. It
will be evident from almost any sub-section of the study that the picture
would be quite different if it depended on printed reports alone. To start
with, there would simply be fewer cases; once in a while, very important
cases of the sort I am concerned with exist only in manuscript. Manuscript versions of cases that also appear in print are sometimes superior in
clarity and completeness; sometimes they are supplementary in the sense
that they report the arguments made on one occasion in the history of a
protracted case while the printed version reports another; sometimes versions contradict each other. Reporting was substantially an unofficial and
individualistic activity, as well as a fashionably ubiquitous one, prompted
by early modern methods of legal education and by the exigencies of
practice in a litigious age. Every printed report was once the manuscript
report of some lawyer, judge, or student; some manuscripts reached print
by the initiative of the author, some by that of a publisher who got possession of a collection and brought it out. Although the printed reports
gained legal authority by virtue of their availability (and sometimes the
prestige of the reporter) -- that is, by being used as precedents -- they
have no advantage in historical authority over the reports that have remained in manuscript. One can rarely judge by external evidence how reliable an unprinted, usually anonymous, report is, but there is no reason to
doubt that any given manuscript report is as likely to be accurate as any
given printed one. Poor reports (garbled, fragmentary, semi-intelligible)
occur in both media, as do reports which, to judge by appearance, are
careful records or summaries of what the reporter heard in the courtroom.
When suspicion can be cast on reports that on their face seem convincing,
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it is because other reports disagree. The only ones I suspect at large are
the most famous, Sir Edward Coke’s, for conflicting reports in several instances suggest what common sense might surmise -- that the deliberately
edited and published product of a strong personality bears the stamp of
his predilections.
The study is based on reports, occasionally supplemented by miscellaneous materials, including manuscripts. It is not based on Plea Rolls and
other official court records. A study based on the latter would have to
deal with the staggering volume of the material. Once that challenge was
overcome, such a study would probably correct impressions conveyed by
this one. It would also illuminate questions I make no pretense of reaching. By and large, reports from the early modern period are informative
enough about the issues and outcome of reported cases. But even about
those the official record might always add information beyond procedural
details. There is never a guarantee that the court ultimately did what the
report suggests it was going to, no certainty that the case was not dropped
or compromised, was not reconsidered, did not contain issues beyond
those discussed in the report which in the end proved dispositive. But
such a guarantee is not vital if one is primarily interested, as I am, in judicial opinion and the perception of issues by lawyers, to which reports
alone testify directly. A map of the field, once again, -- an orderly sense
of the “lawyers’ law’’ -- is a prerequisite for work that may eventually be
done with official records. Such work would illuminate “legal realist’s
law” as a report-based study cannot, especially because it would get at the
incidence and outcome of routine litigation in various categories -- the occasions when a non-common law suit was so obviously prohibitable that
it would not have been worthwhile for the prohibitee to oppose the Prohibition (he might nevertheless have brought a non-common law suit in the
hope that his adversary would acquiesce in the jurisdiction), the occasions
on which a Prohibition could plausibly have been opposed on legal
grounds but was not, and those on which the dispute was purely factual
and resolved by a jury verdict. (The procedural structure that permitted
cases of these sorts will be explained below.)
Perhaps the largest limitation of this study lies in the fact that it explores a by-way in considerable technical detail. It is appropriate to ask:
Why would one want to know about this? Is the subject’s long-run importance for legal history or general history sufficient to justify the trouble?
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I shall not make an elaborate apologia. In summary, I think there are
three main reasons for pursuing the slice of legal history I have chosen in
the rather relentless manner I have adopted:
1. The subject is not uncelebrated. Legal problems about jurisdiction
were politicized (see below for further explanation). Having entered the
stream of political history, Prohibitions have made their way into general
history books and common knowledge. They are known in that medium,
however, through political sources and, highly selected examples of the
case law. By looking at the cases extensively and closely, I hope to show
what no lawyer or legal historian will find surprising: that the legal problems actually confronted by the courts were complex and tangled, their
resolution often uncertain, ambiguous, and deficiently related to general
principles cutting through many particular situations. To the degree that
the common reader of 17th century English history is made more aware
than existing books permit of the rich legal background behind the politics of the law, he will be better attuned to the reality of the past. I do not
think it is too strong to say that familiar understanding of the modest slot
in general history occupied by jurisdiction and Prohibitions is extremely
simpleminded, laden with vague and misleading assumptions about the
courts’ activities.
2. The sense in which my subject is a by-way partly constitutes its significance. Legal history is often teleological or evolutionary. I do not
mean those words pejoratively. The point of investigating past law may
well be to discern phases on the way from somewhere to somewhere -frequently from a legal universe remote in its intellectual habits and economic bearings to law that is vital today. There is to be sure a sense in
which the subject of this study can be placed on a developmental line. In
those terms, it is about a middle stage in the history of jurisdictional regulation, between the medieval dispensation and that of the mature common
law. (By the mature common law I mean the English system shortly before it was recast by the legislature and the judiciary in the 19th century
and beyond -- “the law Blackstone summarized” is a reasonable description.) In the pre-Reformation era, the law of jurisdiction was largely concerned with defining and protecting the sphere of English secular courts
as against the organs of the international Church. In the “mature common
law” period, compared to the middle stage, the credit of ecclesiastical
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courts was considerably eclipsed, the structure of the whole non-common
law system had been revised by legislation coming out of the mid-17th
century revolutionary period, and the dominance of the common law
throughout the English legal order was conceived in subtly different
terms.
How the middle stage was working toward the final one is an implicit
question in this study, but the major focus is not on broad historical tendency. I want primarily to clarify the law of a delimited period, including
its internal tendencies and fluctuations. Evolutionary mechanisms cannot
be understood without fairly precise anatomies of the organism at successive stages; without those, developmental explanation is apt to turn into
mythology. In one way, the study is prolegomena1 to better explanation
that I believe we possess of how the common law redefined its relationship to its rivals and supplements over a lengthy span of early modern
history, from the later 17th century into the 19th, and prepared for their fusion later on.
In another way, however, I would like to direct attention to the antithesis of developmental pattern -- to lost causes, roads not taken, by-ways
that do not lead into the future except as they are forgotten, misinterpreted, or co-opted by historical movements more alien to them than may
appear in retrospect. Possibly the most striking light in which to see the
jurisdictional law of the late 16th and early 17th century is the light that
exposes the period’s singularity.
It was singular because it was more deeply federalistic than earlier and
later periods. Jurisdiction was taken more seriously, its problems handled
more delicately, because the mixed character of the system was perceived
as an essential and legitimate feature of it. The common law was in a
sense only part of the system, though with a special trust to keep all parts,
including itself, in proper channels.
This situation came about mainly because the Reformation incorporated the ecclesiastical component into a national galaxy of courts and
laws. A case in a Church court was no longer made over to a literally foreign authority, which required, even on the most loyally Catholic assumptions as to its legitimacy, to be watched and contained. At the same
time, the other non-common law components gained prominence in re-
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sponse to practical needs. Hostility ran between different members of a
legal system more unified than before and less homogeneous than later,
and interested motives entered into their attitudes and conduct toward
each other -- as is well known, perhaps too well known; over against that
hostility was a set of assumptions shared by people with different views
on particular jurisdictional questions and on the approach to such questions in general -- simply that the system was a complex mixture, whose
correct proportions were discoverable in the law by the lawyer’s art.
Formalistically, that common ground persisted as long as a fundamental diversity of jurisdictions did (which is to say, until the 19th century reforms). Its spirit, I suspect, was a casualty of the mid- 17th century crisis
-- of the political revolution and its aftermath, of altered constitutional
premises, and perhaps of economic, cultural, and legal changes that cannot be directly linked to the action on history’s center stage. “Suspect” is
the intended word: I shall not argue here for what is only an hypothesis.
The scope of the main body of this study is to clarify what was going on
before the middle of the 17th century -- to lay the basis for asking, not to
decide, whether jurisdictional problems retained the same inner shape and
comparable acuteness as problems in later times, and if not, why not. (I
shall explain below a projected extension of the study that to a degree
qualifies this self-denying ordinance.)
3. I have done the study as I have partly for its by- products. The subject permits one to observe the late-Tudor and early Stuart judiciary dealing with many related yet different questions (different in both formal
structure and practical stakes, but all involving in some way debate about
the same set of legal values.) A basis is perhaps provided for some tentative generalization about judicial behavior in the period -- broader generalization than simply concerns the constants, diversities, and tendencies
of judicial opinion on jurisdiction and Prohibitions. The fact that the subject is “public law” of a sort, and that it was tinged with politics, is in
some ways an advantage, though I intend the category “judicial behavior”
to be comprehensive. Such differences as those between cautious, selfrestraining judges and more adventurous ones -- more moved by principle
or more willing to act from a general sense of value and likely practical
result -- as well as such phenomena as alignments and leadership on the
Bench, are perhaps easier to see when the issues have a public or political
cast than when private law alone is involved. Yet, subject to the dangers
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of projection, there may be possibilities for seeing beyond or abstracting
from the particular subject and its peculiar flavor. Judges are never simply the victims of their predilections for particular outcomes in particular
areas; they are also “victims” of their approach to legal problems and
their conception of good judging, whatever the context.
I should say in this connection that I got into Prohibitions by way of a
different and larger question: What kind of judge was the most famous of
all English judges, Sir Edward Coke? What would a thorough study of
his judicial career reveal? How would the picture derived from such a
study compare with that gathered from tradition, miscellaneous sources -too many of them from Coke’s own pen -- and monographic investigation
of a few of the many areas of law to which he contributed?
I quickly concluded that a thorough study of Coke the judge -- by the
standard of thoroughness that the analysis of Prohibition cases here represents, which I believe necessary to avoid deceptive appearances -- cannot
be done by a single hand, unless by an extraordinarily able one with a
great deal of time. The picture must be built up gradually. I turned to
Prohibitions as a fairly wide subject which by reputation (justified so long
as it is not exaggerated) Coke had major role in shaping. My next quick
conclusion was that Coke in Prohibition cases could not be studied apart
from Prohibition cases at large over the period of his career and rather
more.
It is a substantive conclusion of this study that Coke was not, as an exaggerated tradition tends to assume, “Mr. Prohibition.” His positions, on
many separable issues, make a complex pattern, complexly related to
those of other judges. Some others were as ready as Coke or readier to
prohibit non-common law courts. Some were judicial predecessors,
whose work Coke followed in some contexts and revised in others, not always in a more interventionist or “prohibiting” direction. For the purpose
of observing judicial behavior both within and beyond jurisdictional law,
I allow Coke and his interaction with other judges a certain special prominence throughout the study. Other judges, however, emerge as objects of
interest in their own right.
Another kind of by-product concerns the interests at stake in jurisdictional cases -- the “realist” underside of a study focused on legal issues
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and judicial behavior, aspects of Tudor-Stuart society that one might hope
to understand a bit better through a close inspection of the range of cases
considered here. I keep the pure legal history in the foreground, however,
for the use of legal sources for non-legal purposes requires close inspection of those sources in their own terms; using them loosely, with a view
only to gross results, is likely to lead to so inaccurate a picture of the law
that the tricky and inherently limited process of reasoning from the law to
realities beyond it cannot be carried out significantly.
Procedure
I have explained briefly above the rudiments of procedure in Prohibition cases. The first part of the study is on controverted points of procedure, the courts’ handling of which is significant for their attitude toward
the writ (whether they were inclined to ease the procedural path for seekers of Prohibitions or to insist on procedural nicety and thereby deny Prohibitions due on the merits.) Here I shall go into more detail on largely
uncontroversial points in order to assist visualization of the litigative situations that occur throughout the study. It will only occasionally be necessary to anticipate cursorily matters dealt with in Vol. I.
The Prohibition was a judicial writ issuable by the King’s Bench, or
Common Pleas on a showing of cause. (There was controversy as to
whether the Common Pleas had the same comprehensive power to grant
the writ as the King’s Bench, but in the upshot it did.) The written statement of cause submitted to the court was called a “suggestion” or “surmise.” It was in English and not subject to any requirements of mere
form, though there were some in the nature of “supporting documents,’’
and some substantive rules as to what surmises must contain or show
(these are discussed in Vol. I.) I refer to the party who submits a surmise
and thus commences a Prohibition suit as “plaintiff-in- Prohibition.”
Plaintiff-in-Prohibition was almost always defendant in an ecclesiastical
suit (I often, when there is no reason to do otherwise, use “ecclesiastical”
per synecdochen for “non-common law” generally -- Prohibition cases involving ecclesiastical courts greatly outnumbered all others.) In uncontroverted principle, any person generally eligible to bring a lawsuit could
be plaintiff-in-Prohibition; one did not have to be defendant to the ecclesiastical suit one sought to arrest, or to have any sort of interest. The idea
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behind this principle was that there was a public interest in stopping suits
brought in the wrong jurisdiction. In practice, however, as one would expect, plaintiff-in-Prohibition was almost always someone hoping to stop a
suit against himself. (The nice question whether, in certain circumstances
where a motive for doing so existed, plaintiff in an ecclesiastical suit
could seek to prohibit his own suit is treated in Vol. I.)
What plaintiff-in-Prohibition hoped to accomplish if he got a Prohibition varied with circumstances. The following objectives may be distinguished:
1. To escape liability entirely. A. sues B. for something which, if recoverable at all, must be recovered in an ecclesiastical court; stopping the
ecclesiastical suit frees B. from liability for that. E.g.: A. sues B. for
tithes of a certain product; the suit is prohibited because the common law
court takes the view that that product is not subject to tithes. (Some products were not subject to that tax; whether they were was for the common
law to decide; an ordinary suit for tithes must be brought in an ecclesiastical court.)
2. To force the ecclesiastical plaintiff to sue de novo at common law
(or -- a few cases suggest -- to sue in another non-common law court,
such as a court of equity.) A simple example would be a non-common
lawsuit on a contract actionable at common law.
A party who could escape liability by getting a Prohibition had an obvious motive to seek one. A person who might not ultimately escape liability -- but only make sure he was pursued in the court of his choice, or
else hope that his opponent would give up rather than go to the trouble of
a new suit, or fail to catch him by the time a new suit could be started -had a less obvious motive.
3. To secure trial by the common law method of a jury or decision of a
legal question by the common law judges with respect to an issue or the
issue in an ecclesiastical suit.
To understand this option fully, one has to go a bit further into procedure pursuant to Prohibitions (below), but the idea can be grasped
through a common example: A. sues B. for tithes; B. claims that tithes
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(an in-kind tax, l/10th of the crop) in the place in question had been commuted by custom into a fixed payment. Once it got settled, the law was
clear that B. was entitled to a Prohibition merely by so claiming. What he
was really entitled to, for most practical purposes, was a jury trial on
whether the alleged customary commutation existed. If the jury decided
against plaintiff-in-Prohibition, the case would go back to the ecclesiastical court; if it decided in his favor, plaintiff-in-Prohibition escaped liability for tithes in kind. Tithe-payers wanted to escape such liability because
in a time of monetary inflation and relatively high agricultural prices,
tithes in kind were worth more than dated commutations. But a tithepayer claiming a commutation would not automatically seek a Prohibition; it would depend on the strength of his case and his estimate of his
chances with a jury as compared with his chances in the ecclesiastical
court, where claims to commutations were not rejected out of hand, but
where the trial method and various legal standards were different.
Beyond this and a few other clear-cut situations, the propriety of prohibiting suits properly commenced in ecclesiastical courts in the first instance, in order to achieve common law resolution of issues arising, was
often debated. Those debates are considered at various places in the
study. Although the matter was never firmly settled in general terms,
many Prohibitions were in fact granted on the ground that issues coming
up in proper ecclesiastical suits were for this reason or that appropriate
for common law decision, factual or legal. For an ecclesiastical defendant who preferred common law resolution, or who was looking for ways
to vex and delay his opponent, it could be a good bet to seek a Prohibition
on the ground that the ecclesiastical court was asked to decide something
a common law court or jury could better decide. (A variant on this category -- essentially the subject of Vol. II of the study -- arose when an ecclesiastical court had allegedly misdecided an issue before it in an initially
proper suit. Note also that the category explains the oddity mentioned
above of persons seeking to prohibit their own suits: A. sues B. in an ecclesiastical court because that is the only place A. can sue for the object
he seeks; pleading leads to an issue which A. claims a common law court
or jury should decide and which he prefers to have so decided.)
After plaintiff-in-Prohibition had put in his surmise, various sequences
were possible. Frequently there was open-court debate as to whether a
Prohibition should be granted (whether the surmise stated good cause on

xx

General Introduction
its face.) Often both plaintiff-in- Prohibition and the opposing party, defendant-in-Prohibition, were represented by counsel. Sometimes debate
was ex parte -- i.e., defendant-in-Prohibition did not appear, but plaintiffin-Prohibition’s counsel argued for his surmise and the judges debated
with him and among themselves; it was the court’s duty to grant a writ if
due and deny one if not, regardless of whether defendant-in-Prohibition
appeared to contest it; he was not as a matter of law entitled to notice. A
majority of the reports discussed in this study are about debates on the initial motion for Prohibition. The results reported are initial decisions to
grant or deny Prohibition. Denial meant the end of the case (in the absence of such occasional moves as the court’s permitting amendment of a
surmise; the degree to which denial of an application barred reapplication
was a rather tricky question, touched on in Vol. I.) The granting of a Prohibition was sometimes the end of the story, sometimes not, sometimes
the end so far as the evidence of reports shows but not necessarily in reality (see below.)
Prohibitions could, however, be granted without debate, both in court
and by judges in chambers. Two types of case can be distinguished here:
1. The open-and-shut case, so far as initial grantability of the Prohibition is concerned. Claims to tithe commutations are a good example:
there would be no debate on the suggestion and no report, so long as
standards for correctly stating a claim to a commutation were met, but at
later stages (explained below) a case launched by the automatic granting
of a Prohibition might present legal issues and be reported.
2. The case in which one or more judges thought they saw sufficient
reason to grant a writ and went ahead and did so with little or no discussion. When this happened, defendant-in- Prohibition was ordinarily permitted to make what amounted to a motion for reconsideration, pursuant
to which the merits of the surmise would be debated, usually by counsel
on both sides. The technical term was “motion for Consultation.’’ A writ
of Consultation was the inverse of a writ of Prohibition: the Prohibition
ordered the ecclesiastical court and the party (defendant-in-Prohibition) to
stop proceedings; the Consultation authorized them to resume a once-prohibited suit. As will appear in Vol. I, there was a scintilla of doubt about
the general legitimacy of motions for Consultation, but in practice they
were usually permitted.
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Let us now assume Prohibition granted and motion for Consultation
not made, not permitted, or denied. Many cases stopped here, but no case
had to. Some common cases routinely went on to further stages. The
next step, if defendant-in-Prohibition wanted to go on litigating, was for
him to disobey the Prohibition, or pretend to. There is no sign in the reports that prohibited parties ever really disobeyed and persisted with their
ecclesiastical suits, nor that ecclesiastical courts, whose cooperation
would have been necessary for continuation of prohibited suits, ever
joined in disobedience. What happened in reality was that defendant-inProhibition signified his intention to contest the Prohibition in the formal
or full-dress way that the law allowed him as of right (as opposed to contesting it informally by arguing against the initial grant or moving for
Consultation, technically by the court’s grace and favor.) Plaintiff-in-Prohibition had no choice but to cooperate; were he not to, defendant-in-Prohibition and the ecclesiastical court could ignore the Prohibition with
impunity.
Plaintiff-in-Prohibition then complained that the Prohibition in his favor had been disobeyed. This complaint, in contrast to the informal or
“natural language” surmise, had to observe the form and rules of common
law pleading. It was to the Prohibition what the count was to the writ in
straightforward common law litigation -- the plaintiff‘s first formal statement of his case, in full particularity and subject to the peril that he might
lose the case by committing a logical blunder by the standards of art. In
other words, plaintiff-in-Prohibition said again, repeating the effect of his
surmise but in a more deliberate style and in Latin, why he should have
had a Prohibition. Defendant-in-Prohibition proceeded to answer in the
form and by the rules of common law pleading; his options were to deny
material facts, or admit plaintiff’s facts and introduce new ones claimed
to defeat the legal effect of the former, or admit plaintiff‘s facts and maintain that as stated they failed to justify a Prohibition, or delay the game on
a technicality of form. Pleading would eventually reach issue, of fact for
a jury or of law for the court. Whether the Prohibition should finally
stand or be reversed by Consultation depended on the verdict or the
court’s legal judgment, as the case might be.
It will be evident that the formalistic idea behind all this was that a
Prohibition did not have to be obeyed, as a matter of law, unless it was
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justifiably granted in the first place. Whether it was could only be ascertained by verdict or legal judgment pursuant to proper pleading. The
name for these steps beyond the initial grant of Prohibition was “Attachment on Prohibition,” a form of contempt proceeding. (If after judgment
in Attachment, defendant-in-Prohibition and the ecclesiastical judge
should actually disobey the Prohibition, they would be punishable for
contempt.) The procedure descended from the middle ages, when the
Prohibition was a Chancery writ rather than a judicial one. By the period
of this study it was a rigmarole; I shall ordinarily finesse the machinery and
refer simply to cases that “proceeded to formal pleading.”
The important thing to understand is the motives of defendants-in-Prohibition for carrying litigation on to the formal pleading stage. Again, it
was defendant-in-Prohibition’s right to do so. He was not obliged to acquiesce in the Prohibition even if he had been allowed to argue elaborately against the initial grant and to try again by moving for
Consultation. But few litigants, except for those who might feel their initial effort was inadequate in relation to the merits of their case and perhaps those who merely hoped to wear down their opponents, would want
to reopen a sufficiently argued legal issue. To do so would incur the expense of formal proceedings with little hope of success and the judges’ irritation as well. Defendant-in-Prohibition might, however, want to
challenge his opponent to a jury trial on the facts, even after losing a vigorous attempt to make out the legal insufficiency of the surmise. (In effect,
the
Prohibition
procedure
as
a
whole
allowed
defendant-in-Prohibition to fight on both fronts, fact and law, an opportunity common law defendants, including defendant-in-Prohibition at the
formal pleading stage, were denied.) In many cases, on the other hand,-the open-and-shut kind as to initial prohibitability--there was no point in
opposing the grant of Prohibition; defendant-in-Prohibition’s defense
would be entirely factual; he would not resist the Prohibition, but make
plaintiff-in-Prohibition plead formally and reply by taking issue on the
facts. Verdicts ordinarily concluded cases taken to an issue of fact, but
sometimes the courts would entertain motions in arrest of judgment raising questions of law after the facts were settled by verdict, and special
verdicts (the jury, on its own initiative or at the trial judge’s behest, finds
the facts conclusively, but refers their legal meaning to the court) were
common in Prohibition cases as in other kinds of lawsuit.
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In contrast to the cases in which the formal pleading stage was only a
step to a jury trial were those in which the parties or the court preferred to
resolve a legal issue in the “full-dress” way. If defendant-in-Prohibition
thought he had a strong legal case against the grant of a writ, it would be
cheaper and more convenient to argue against the initial grant, but those
advantages might be outweighed. Defendant-in- Prohibition might want
time to prepare a careful case; he might have an interest in a once-andfor-all settlement -- a formal judgment in his favor on the record, with res
judicata effect, and a judicial precedent strictly so-called. The two parties
could share such an interest in a firm settlement and go to formal pleading
by agreement. The judges, for their part, sometimes thought desirable the
more deliberate argument entailed by formal pleading and preferred to
reach a formal resolution of record--an appropriate attitude when a case
presented an especially important or novel problem. The judges might
then grant a Prohibition in the face of admitted uncertainty as to whether
they ultimately ought to, in order to draw formal pleading and reargument. They might also so proceed as a way of dealing with sharply divided opinion among themselves. On occasion their motives were less
clean, though perhaps statesmanlike--to put off a hard or divisive question by saying to defendant-in-Prohibition in effect, “If it is really worth
your while to dispute this Prohibition, you are free to-- you may have a
good case, but we doubt it and do not owe you the time and trouble to unravel it now.” Conversely, irritated judges can occasionally be heard saying to defendants-in-Prohibition whose cases at initial hearings they
thought hopelessly weak, “Go ahead and force formal pleading if you feel
so strongly about it, but for the moment stop trying to persuade us that
black is white.”
This is, I believe, as much as one needs to follow reported Prohibition
cases that are uncomplicated by procedural fine points and to understand
those in Vol. I which turn on such points or involve elements of procedure
beyond those outlined here.
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Note on non-Prohibition cases and procedures encountered in the
study
Jurisdictional questions occasionally arose by other routes than Prohibition. These are included in the study, but except for the first, Habeas
corpus, their place was extremely peripheral.
1. Habeas corpus. Habeas corpus cases occurred mainly in one context -- the jurisdiction and powers of the High Commission, a special ecclesiastical court which to a degree overlapped the ordinary Church
courts. The High Commission claimed a much-controverted power to
imprison, which ecclesiastical courts generally did not have. Whatever its
rightful power, it did in fact commit people to prison. Therefore questions
about its substantive jurisdiction and powers, including the power to imprison, often arose by way of Habeas corpus.
The Habeas corpus, like the Prohibition, was a judicial writ, but in fact
its issuance was more nearly automatic. For practical purposes, anyone
imprisoned could get a writ from the King’s Bench (and from the Common Pleas, subject to some limitations.) The writ commanded the jailer
to produce the prisoner in person, together with a statement (“return”) explaining why he was held. The court proceeded to judge the adequacy of
the return as a matter of law -- whether it explained enough and, assuming it did, whether it stated good cause for imprisonment. The factual
truth of the return was not examinable. If it was untrue, the prisoner’s
remedy was a common law action for false imprisonment. The court had
three decisional options in Habeas corpus: to send the prisoner back to
jail, to free him absolutely, or to bail him (for the obvious case, when
someone was imprisoned because he was accused of a bailable common
law offense, but bail was often used as a middle way in other circumstances, including High Commission cases.)
In the case of High Commission prisoners, if the return said no more
than that the prisoner was held by High Commission warrant it raised the
question whether the Commission had power to imprison at all. Such a
return, however, would almost certainly be held insufficiently detailed
merely as to form. If the return said with reasonable particularity what
the prisoner was held for, it raised the question whether the alleged mis-
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conduct was within ecclesiastical jurisdiction of any sort and, if so,
whether it was within the Commission’s arguably narrower jurisdiction.
Apart from the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, such a return always
raised the question whether the Commission had power to imprison,
either for all or for some of the things within its jurisdiction; questions
about other powers could also arise. E.g., does the Commission have
power to fine -- another claimed power not shared by other ecclesiastical
courts -- and then to imprison to enforce payment, even if it may not imprison as a punishment?
A prisoner in a position to use the Habeas corpus was as a rule also in
a position to help himself by Prohibition, but the former remedy was the
more straightforward way to release from jail. That is why the sorts of issues normally raised by Prohibition were more often than not raised by
Habeas corpus in the narrow range of cases in which someone complaining about abuse of jurisdiction was imprisoned -- usually by the High
Commission, once in a while by a court of equity or the Admiralty.
2. Praemunire It was a vaguely defined statutory offense, subject to
serious sanctions and prosecutable by indictment, to act in such a way as
to infringe certain rights and powers of the King. The offense was created in the 14th century to protect various secular authorities and interests
(symbolically expressed by “the King”) against the international Church.
One might suppose that bringing, and the court’s entertaining, any prohibitable suit in an ecclesiastical court would constitute one form of Praemunire. That was not the law, however. A small sub- section of this
study takes up the question: When is bringing a prohibitable suit an instance of Praemunire and when is it not? The answer, roughly, was that
only a few especially inexcusable ecclesiastical suits fell within the criminal offense -- suing in an ecclesiastical court for an object notoriously recoverable at common law or in flat defiance of a clear statutory ban.
Praemunire also appears in the study in connection with Prohibitions
to courts of equity. This is owing to a famous and anomalous episode -- a
none-too-plausible attempt by Coke to make out that one form of “especially inexcusable” resort to equity was within the Praemunire statutes,
despite their original anti-ecclesiastical purpose.
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Procedurally, Praemunire needs no particular explanation. It was
simply an indictable crime like others, though sui generis in the sense that
it rested entirely on statute, occupied a middle rank between felony and
misdemeanor, and was very uncertainly defined. It was of no real practical importance for jurisdictional law. Jurisdictional boundaries, one
might say, were enforced by Prohibition, with Praemunire a vague threat
in the background, rarely invoked even when it may have been invocable
in theory.
3. Tort and misdemeanor liability for suing in the wrong jurisdiction.
If A. sues B. in an ecclesiastical court when he should have sued at common law, or should not have brought an ecclesiastical suit simpliciter,
does B. under any circumstances have a common law action for damages
against A. or the ecclesiastical judge? Could A. or the ecclesiastical
judge be prosecuted for a misdemeanor, leaving aside the much graver
possibility of Praemunire liability?
The most important point to make in connection with these questions is
that tort and low-level criminal law played no significant role in enforcing
jurisdiction. People who thought they were improperly sued almost always sought Prohibitions. There are, however, a few reports suggesting
that tort and misdemeanor liability was an available supplementary resource. A few discuss the scope of the tort liability. They will be taken
up in the study.
In some circumstances bringing a non-common law suit was subject to
a statutory penalty or to punitive or multiple damages by statute. When
these statutes were relevant they raised a rather difficult question, which
is encountered in a few cases: If I may recover a statutory penalty for being sued in a non-common law court, may I have a Prohibition to stop
the suit? Did Parliament intend to cut off Prohibitions when it provided
the penalty?
4. Incidental presentation of jurisdictional questions. I shall discuss
a few cases in which the scope of non-common law jurisdiction arose in
litigation not as such concerned with that. The following example is an
important case in schematic form: An action of Trespass was brought for
wrongful entry on the property attached to an ecclesiastical living. The
case turned out, by way of a special verdict, to depend on whether the
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High Commission was within its jurisdiction when it deprived a one-time
holder of the living of his benefice, thereby enabling the appointment of a
new clergyman, who took possession of the property.
There is nothing to be said about such cases generally. I could not
search systematically for cases in which a jurisdictional issue might be
buried. Those discussed are ones I have come across, but they are mostly
in fact important cases discoverable from references or hard to miss. I do
not think it likely that much jurisdictional law was made off the beaten
track of Prohibitions, significantly supplemented by Habeas corpus and
scantily by the other categories mentioned here. I have always tried to
note the supplements when going through the reports.
Character and Activities of Non-Common Law Courts Regulated by
Prohibition
In principle any court that exceeded its jurisdiction was subject to Prohibition. Once in a while minor or special common law courts -- e.g.,
courts of Palatinates, such as Chester -- were prohibited, but those Prohibitions are of little practical importance in the history of the writ. The
King’s Bench and Common Pleas never prohibited each other, though
both had jurisdictional limits. There are some speculative dicta that the
King’s Bench could prohibit the Common Pleas if it had occasion to. The
converse would presumably be unthinkable, owing to the King’s Bench’s
nominal superiority, which was to a degree embodied in real institutions - e.g., an appeal by writ of error could be taken from the Common Pleas
to the King’s Bench, while appeals from the King’s Bench went to a
statutory court consisting of the Common Pleas and Exchequer judges
through most of the period of this study (earlier there was no resort but
Parliament.) Whatever jealousy or competition there may have been between the two great courts of common law (it is often exaggerated), one
should not be surprised that a tightly knit group of senior judges avoided
overt clashes over jurisdiction. Prohibiting each other would have been a
scandalous manifestation of disharmony.
Another court never prohibited was the Star Chamber. Its rank as the
King’s Council in the judicial aspect and the regular participation of the
Chief Justices of the King’s Bench and Common Pleas sufficiently ex-
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plain its immunity. There were clearly recognized limits on the Star
Chamber’s jurisdiction, but it was institutionally unlikely that they would
be exceeded. In addition, the Star Chamber’s territory fell within the
common law system. It administered and developed a slice of the law of
misdemeanor and tort, which the ordinary common law courts reabsorbed
after the Star Chamber was abolished in 164 1. It was not a non-common
law court in the sense that the frequently prohibited courts were, though it
did share their procedure -- the Roman-canon mode, without jury trial and
common law pleading rules. The rationale for a specialized criminal and
tort tribunal using non-common law procedure was that some kinds of offense and kinds of offender required a suspension of procedural due process, as it were, for the sake of law and order.
We need, then, only take account of the three categories of true noncommon law courts to which Prohibitions were often addressed: ecclesiastical, Admiralty, equity.
1. The ecclesiastical system.
A vast majority of all Prohibitions
went to ecclesiastical courts. The writ was originally devised to contain
the courts of the medieval Church, and it continued to be employed
against those of the Church of England. There are books about the ecclesiastical legal system before and after the Reformation. I shall confine
myself to a brief sketch, giving only the information one needs to follow
Prohibition cases.
There were three types of ecclesiastical courts:
a. Primarily first-instance courts, where most ecclesiastical suits
started. The courts of the bishop of each diocese were the main members
of this class. The picture was complicated in local ways from diocese to
diocese by the existence of archdeacons’ courts below the bishop’s and
so-called “peculiars” (courts governing particular places in a diocese
whose jurisdiction was on a par with the bishop’s, not subject to him but
to the appellate courts above.)
b. Primarily appellate courts. Generous appeals (applicable to factual
findings as well as legal holdings) were a feature of the ecclesiastical system, often a significant one for the law of Prohibitions. A losing party at
the diocesan or equivalent peculiar level could appeal to the archbishop’s
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court; one losing there could appeal to the court of Delegates, which was
constituted by statute at the Reformation to replace Rome. Besides their
appellate jurisdiction the archbishops had first-instance jurisdiction in
some special circumstances and some pretense, which was controverted,
to preempt cases from lower courts.

c. Extraordinary courts constituted by royal commission and outside
the regular appellate structure. For practical purposes, this means the
High Commission.
Practitioners and judges in the ecclesiastical courts were civilians -lawyers trained at a university, English or foreign, in Roman or civil law.
The civilian contrasts to the common lawyer, who was trained at the Inns
of Court. He contrasts also to the medieval canon lawyer, for canon law
training as such was abolished in the English universities at the Reformation; the role once played by canonists was taken over by graduates in the
closely related civil law field. It probably catches the feel of the matter to
say that civilians were a somewhat inferior caste compared to common
lawyers, but thoroughly respectable as a learned profession. They were
organized into a guild or professional society, analogous to the common
law Inns, known as Doctors’ Commons.
Civilians quite frequently appear in Prohibition cases in a capacity between that of the expert witness and that of the advocate. To dispose of
cases before them, the common law judges sometimes needed to be informed of just what the ecclesiastical law was; although they would take
notice of elementary features of that law, its position on fine or controverted points was of course not within their “art” or putative knowledge.
Sometimes the judges consulted with civilians informally, but sometimes
they admitted or invited civilians to argue before them as advocates representing the adversary parties. The jurisprudential premise behind this
procedure would seem to be that non-common law rules are a species of
“fact” determinable by common law judges (not juries) upon hearing of
rival interpretations argued by experts.
In addition to the ecclesiastical courts, the regular arenas of civilian
practice were the Admiralty and the Court of Requests (one of the equity
courts.) Practitioners moved freely among these arenas, and judicial careers sometimes included judgeships in more than one. The nominal
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holders of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the bishops and archbishops (and by
the same token the Lord Admiral), were not active judges, as the King
was not; they acted through professional civilian judges, as the King did
through the common law judges, the Lord Chancellor, and other judicial
officers.
The substance of ecclesiastical law was not greatly altered by the transition from canonist to civilian, nor by the 16th century upheavals in
Church history generally. There were ambitious plans at the time of the
Reformation for a thorough overhaul and codification of ecclesiastical
law, but they did not come to fruition. As a result, the law of the Church
came to traditional, inherited canon law modified by local custom, adaptation to the new ecclesio-political situation, Parliamentary legislation
here and there, and, in the 17th century, some new intra-ecclesiastical legislation.
The regular ecclesiastical courts had both civil and criminal jurisdiction, taking those terms to signify procedures undertaken to make someone do a legal duty owed to, or directly benefiting, another specific
person, ordinarily at that person’s suit (civil) versus procedures undertaken to procure someone’s punishment, or at least his “admonition and
correction” (criminal). The High Commission, by contrast, was essentially a criminal court, but that is a rough truth reflective of what the common law courts in the upshot allowed it to be. There was controversy
both as to whether it was authorized to invade the civil field and whether
it lawfully could be by royal commission.
Civil suits and criminal prosecutions in ecclesiastical courts were
equally within the scope of Prohibition. Apart from High Commission
cases, however, relatively few Prohibitions aimed at stopping criminal
prosecutions. Interests valuable enough to warrant investment, and people substantial enough to invest, in Prohibition litigation were usually
those involved in civil suits. The High Commission tended to draw off
the more important criminal cases -- those in which the prosecuted were
likely to have motives of honor or politics to oppose the Church, to have
the means, to have a good chance of success, owing to vexed questions
and unsettled law about the Commission, and to be discomfited by doubtfully legal imprisonment, or by fines in good money, also doubtfully legal. Paucity of Prohibitions is not a reliable index of inactivity in
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criminal matters on the part of regular ecclesiastical courts. There was
not much controversy about the criminal jurisdiction of the Church in
general, as opposed to the specific jurisdiction of the High Commission.
Sanctions on conviction in regular courts, which lacked so much as a pretense of power to fine and imprison, came to an institutionalized scolding
and a demand for acknowledgment of repentance (penance in principle,
but painful penitential performances were not exacted--treating the court
with respect and saying you were sorry were the practical sum of it most
of the time). One would not expect many Prohibitions in run-of-the-mill
criminal cases.
The pure criminal jurisdiction of the Church boiled down to:
1. Offenses against religious orthodoxy. At the level of heresy or
schism the High Commission was likely to get involved, as well as parts
of the secular law devised to back up the ecclesiastical establishment.
There is little left in this category that does not merge into the next two.
2. Offenses against religious discipline: This included failure to attend
the services of the established Church (recusancy, where also secular law
lent a considerable helping hand) and various forms and degrees of misconduct on the part of clergymen (e.g., breach of a duty of the office,
such as refusing to use or criticising the authorized Prayer Book; mere
scandalous behavior, not necessarily in a form that would constitute an
offense in a layman).
3. Disrespect for ecclesiastical persons and places and the objects of
religious reverence. Examples would be blasphemy, sacrilege, creating
an unseemly uproar in church, verbal or physical abuse of a clergyman,
and the like.
4. Moral offenses that were not as a rule secular misdemeanors. There
was, however, a limited area of concurrence, as with some religious offenses. Sexual offenses predominated (incest, adultery, fornication -- not
rape and sodomy, which belonged to the common law), but such things as
usury, drunkenness, sorcery, and merely violating the law of charity by
making a nuisance of oneself were also included.
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There were three ways to prosecute an ecclesiastical crime: private
prosecution, prosecution on presentment (at the bishop’s or archdeacon’s
regular visitation to a parish, usually by the churchwardens), and prosecution formally at the initiative of the ecclesiastical court itself (ex officio -the ex officio prosecutor of course depended on rumors, tips, and professional or amateur tipsters to learn about alleged crimes, and was of course
expected to sift such information through a scrupulous conscience). The
procedural distinction has some importance in the two sections of the
study that significantly involve criminal law (on self-incrimination and
on the High Commission).
In some contexts, criminal and civil elements tended to be intermixed
in one suit. Prohibition cases reflect that situation more frequently than
the pure criminal business of ordinary ecclesiastical courts. In marital
litigation, for example, a criminal complaint of adultery might be combined with a suit for separate maintenance on grounds of adultery. In
principle, complaints of ecclesiastical defamation were classified as
criminal, but they were as a rule functionally civil in the sense that a defamed complainant was looking for the private satisfaction of being
cleared of an aspersion and apologized to. One criminal sanction of ecclesiastical courts, apart from the controversial secular sanctions of the
High Commission, carried a severe material cost: deprivation of a clergyman of his living. Analytically, a prosecution leading to that would be
criminal, but someone in danger of the sanction could be expected to
fight, and the common law to take a protective attitude toward so substantial an interest.
We may now turn to the main heads of ecclesiastical civil jurisdiction:
1. Tithes. Tithe suits generated by far the most Prohibitions. Basically, a tithe suit meant a suit by the holder of an ecclesiastical living
against an occupier of land in the parish, claiming that defendant had not
paid tithes in kind. The “holder of an ecclesiastical living” meant in
strictness a rector -- either the incumbent clergyman or the owner of an
impropriate living. The latter could be anyone generally eligible to own
property (a corporate institution, lay or ecclesiastical, or a lay individual).
In the case of an impropriate living, the incumbent clergyman was a
vicar, normally endowed with part (the less valuable part) of the tithes.
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Vicars suing for such tithes as were payable to them could be plaintiffs in
tithe suits.
Impropriation came about by two steps. In the middle ages, monasteries owning advowsons (the right to nominate a clergyman-rector to a living upon a vacancy) were commonly given the privilege of not exercising
the right, but keeping the rectorship and entitlement to the lion’s share of
the tithes in their own hands, so long as a vicar was installed and endowed with a smaller share. At the dissolution of the monasteries, these
special rectorships formerly belonging to monastic houses were preserved
by statute. I.e., they were counted among the monastic assets that were
confiscated by the government and subsequently, in most cases, conveyed
to others. The effect was that a considerable fraction of tax-income supposedly for the benefit of the Church went to the private owners of an
anomalous kind of property. When in this study we encounter tithe-payers trying to avoid the tax, it is important to remember that they might not
be shirking their Christian duty, but a mere charge or quasi-rent on all
productive land in the parish. Conversely, to the degree that the law disfavored the tithe recipient, it often disfavored, not the Church, but lay impropriators, who usually belonged to the class of large landowners.
The occupier of land -- the direct producer of a crop, however shortterm or exiguous his interest in the land -- was liable for tithes; the owner
was not unless he cultivated the land himself or by hired employees. Inhabitants of a parish who derived income from other sources than producing crops and other agricultural operations were supposed to pay tithes
(so-called personal tithes). Those were notoriously under-realized, however. If one were to judge from the hundreds of Prohibition cases on
tithes, one would come close to doubting their existence, though they
come up very occasionally in such forms as suits to tax rents received by
owners of houses unconnected with agricultural land. (The rentier owners of agricultural land and the buildings attached to it were taxed through
the occupier-producer; avoiding or mitigating tithes was as much to their
advantage in rental value as to the occupier’s in ready income.)
Practically all crops in the straightforward acceptation, including hay,
were subject to tithes. So were the offspring of animals and their recurrent products, such as milk, eggs, and wool. So was grass pastured by
meat-producing animals. So was the lighter sort of wood harvested for
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fuel and other uses. Depletable assets -- timber trees that take many years
to replace and minerals -- were not, though there was some legal controversy, reflected in Prohibition cases, about these exceptions, as about
various crops and products off the main track of English agriculture. For
the agricultural producers really taxed as they were meant to be, tithes
were a tax on gross income, in the sense that the occupier paid 10% of his
crop whether he was a subsistence farmer who would eat and use as seed
all he grew or a commercial one who would sell his whole crop. The system of tithe law did, however, make some kinds of allowance for the
maintenance of working capital and the avoidance of double taxation.
Paying tithes of the most important and most manageable kinds -- on
cereals and hay -- consisted in setting a visible 1/10th of the cut crop apart
from the other 9/10ths in the field. The tithe-payer had no duty to transport the produce to the recipient, only to allow him access. Once separated or “severed” in the field, the produce became the recipient’s
property, and the risk of losing it to accident, trespass, or theft was his. If
he thought that less than an honest 1/10th had been set out for him, his
remedy was to sue for partial non-payment.
Other products than grain and hay obviously required more elaborate
law on just when and how the tithe should be rendered. Although ecclesiastical law contained universal or de jure rules on that, the matter was
typically governed by locally variable custom. Indeed, the whole subject
of tithe law was heavily glossed by custom. I have already discussed the
money commutations by custom that generated so many Prohibitions.
Custom could also subject to tithes products free of them de jure or otherwise add to the payer’s burden. It could define exactly what the payer
must do to satisfy his duty, provided it did not cut the recipient’s entitlement in one respect without adding to it in some other respect. Custom
could not simply free a lay tithe-payer from the duty to pay; if tithes on a
given product had never been paid since the beginning of time, it remained tithable if it was so de jure. Customs exempting one product in
consideration of extra duty in connection with another (e.g., transporting
it, insuring it against damage prior to collection) were, however, generally
valid.
On the other hand, land owned by ecclesiastical institutions could be
flatly exempt from tithes by custom, though it was not exempt de jure
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(i.e., land belonging to the Bishopric of X located in the Parish of Y owed
tithes to the holder of the parish living, barring a custom; customary exemptions could be invoked by tenants of the ecclesiastical owner). In the
middle ages, land owned by monasteries commonly enjoyed tithe exemptions by custom or Papal grant; at the dissolution these exemptions were
preserved by statute to subsequent owners, so that in practice lay occupiers, whether owners or tenants, were sometimes exempt.
Customs affecting tithes could vary in their ambit. One could claim a
parish-wide custom (e.g., throughout the parish hay-producing land customarily pays 6d. per acre in lieu of tithes in kind). It was equally valid to
claim a custom affecting only a particular piece of land or a unit, such as
a manor or farm, with a continuing identity (the owners of Greencroft
have customarily given money instead of tithes in kind, or have over-performed one tithe-paying duty in consideration of exemption from another).
In the eyes of the common law, a custom was an immemorial practice
-- something that could have been done continuously from the beginning
of time and which a jury was therefore entitled to conclude had been so
done. (It is obviously impossible for knowledge really to extend to infinity and for evidence to testify to facts extending back forever and ever,
but logic and common knowledge can sometimes compel the conclusion
that a practice could not have obtained at some time in the past, or before
a certain point, and evidence can prove it did not obtain.) Customs not
disputed as to their factual existence or immemorialness could be challenged as to their reasonableness. Whether an admitted custom was reasonable was a question for the judges; the criteria by which they decided,
constitute a puzzling topic of English jurisprudence, of which decisions
on the reasonableness of tithing customs are a chapter. Ecclesiastical theory was different, but the category of custom was recognized in Church
law. It is hard to imagine tithe law getting along without it, owing to the
awkwardness of collecting all tithes in de jure form and the convenience
of trade-offs, even had the inflation and price trends that devalued straight
commutations in the 16th century been anticipated when the law took
shape.
The rules stated here were generally agreed on and not in conflict as
between secular and ecclesiastical law. Which legal system was to decide
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the cases and interpret the rules, on what rationale in this and that situation, was the question and the source of conflict.
The routes from a tithe suit in an ecclesiastical court to a controverted
Prohibition case were numerous. Many issues collateral to tithe law itself
arose from this most frequent type of litigation. The issues about Prohibition procedure in Vol. I are a good example. For another common category: Ecclesiastical suits were usually prohibited when a party being
sued for tithes claimed that his land was not located in the ecclesiastical
plaintiff‘s parish. That is to say, the boundaries of parishes were as a rule
taken to be a common law issue, triable by jury.
I have already suggested some of the routes to Prohibition proper to
tithe law. Let us sum those up and note a few additions: Common law
courts often decided pursuant to Prohibition whether a product was legally subject to the tax and--via jury verdict -- whether, in fact, a product
fell in a taxable category (e.g., whether wood cut by a parishioner was
non- taxable timber or taxable inferior wood). In some cases the issue
was whether a product not subject to the tax de jure legally could be, or
factually was, taxable by custom; how “customary tithes” should be classified and where they should be recovered was occasionally a problem.
In the innumerable Prohibition cases arising from alleged customary
commutations, the question was often a straight jury issue: Does the custom exist in fact? Sometimes the issue was legal: Does the commutation
as surmised or pleaded state a “considerate exchange” and therefore meet
the criterion for a reasonable custom? I.e.: Is it unmistakably claimed
that the recipient has customarily received something of value in lieu of
his tithes, or is the alleged commutation a concealed claim to total exemption?
As surmising a customary commutation in valid form would lead to a
Prohibition, so would surmising a perpetual commutation by formal
agreement concurred in by the bishop and the patron of the living. These
commutations were known as compositions-real; the common law was
the judge of their existence, validity, and meaning; this was owing to the
patron’s interest. Tithe suits were usually held not prohibitable if the
payer claimed that the recipient had merely agreed -- by himself and so as
to bind only himself -- to accept a money payment or other substitute per-
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formance in place of his tithes. Such agreements were naturally commonplace, and they were perfectly valid ordinary contracts. The argument against Prohibition on surmise of such an agreement was that
prohibiting amounted to enforcing the contract specifically: Assuming
the ecclesiastical court refused to recognize the agreement, the tithe-payer
compelled to pay in kind, or to pay full assessed value, should sue the recipient for damages if he had suffered any, like other victims of breach of
contract. Nevertheless, many attempts were made to stop tithe suits by
claiming such agreements; there are debates in the cases about the propriety of prohibiting, and outcomes are not entirely consistent.
The common law courts generally took the view that they should not
intervene when the underlying dispute was over whether a vicar or rector
was entitled to particular tithes. But here again attempts to get Prohibitions occurred: parties surmised that they were being sued by the rector,
say, when they had paid or should pay the tithes in question to the vicar.
Again, the policy was not entirely easy to apply, and there were disputes
about it.
The rule that ecclesiastical land could be wholly exempt from tithes
was the source of much complex Prohibition litigation. This was essentially because the Statute of Monasteries, whereby ancient exemptions
were preserved to the post-dissolution owners of former monastic land,
presented formidable problems of interpretation. Other statutes touched
on tithe law in various ways. E. g.: Newly reclaimed land was temporarily exempted from tithes by statute. Prohibitions could be obtained by
claiming this exemption; it belonged to the common law to settle any
doubts about the statute’s meaning and to try factual disputes as to
whether the produce in question actually came from land reclaimed
within the statutory time-limit. For another example: As one would expect, a person sued for tithes could not obtain a Prohibition simply by surmising that he had paid his tithes -- ecclesiastical courts were perfectly
competent to try that claim; if they mishandled it, the remedy was by ecclesiastical appeal. Matters were complicated, however, by a statute
which in general effect made it non-payment to “sever” the tithes and retake them before the entitled recipient could haul them away. There were
numerous disputes in Prohibition cases about the precise operation of the
statute and its fit with the common law rule that tithes once “severed” become the recipient’s property, for the taking of which by anyone -- either
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the payer or a stranger -- the recipient could maintain an action of Trespass.
The right to receive non-impropriate tithes could of course not be permanently alienated by the holder of a living. It could, however, be leased
up to the limit of the incumbent’s life, and impropriate livings could be
leased as well as conveyed in greater estate. Lessees of tithes could sue
for them in ecclesiastical courts. Tithe suits sometimes led to Prohibitions because the common law courts usually took the position that any
dispute about the legality or construction of a lease was theirs to decide.
This much will suffice to make the vast majority of cases arising from
tithe litigation intelligible as to general form. When I discuss such cases, I
shall usually, for convenience, refer to the recipient of tithes as Parson,
unless there is legal significance in the fact that he was a vicar; I shall refer to the tithe-payer as Parishioner.
2. Testamentary Suits. Many Prohibitions came out of testamentary
suits in ecclesiastical courts. Ecclesiastical jurisdiction in testamentary
matters was an English eccentricity -- an immovably entrenched one by
the time of this study -- rather than a function of Church courts throughout Europe. It had three main branches:
a. Probate jurisdiction. By English law chattels (including some interests in land classified as chattels, notably leaseholds) could be passed by
will. Land in general could not be, except by custom, until the Statute of
Wills of 1540. A will of chattels had to be proved or authenticated in an
ecclesiastical court after the testator’s death. This step was necessary before legacies were payable and before any executor named in the will
could act as such (even to most intents for purposes classified as secular,
such as suing at common law for debts due to the testator). The executor’s duty was to seek probate promptly; when he did so an opportunity to
come forth was afforded to anyone wanting to challenge the will (on
grounds of form, the testator’s sanity, or whatever). A will solely of land,
whether warranted by custom or pursuant to the Statute of Wills, did not
have to be proved. It was simply a conveyance from devisor to devisee -i.e., it gave the devisee power to take possession of the land, subject to
any better title; if someone was in a position to claim the land if he could
successfully challenge the will, he must find a way of litigating with the
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devisee at common law--oust him, trespass on him, or, if in possession,
refuse to give the land up to him; the will’s authenticity would be decided by the judges or a jury, depending on whether the challenge involved a legal or a factual dispute.
Wills both bequeathing chattels and devising land caused difficult interjurisdictional problems and produced numerous attempts to stop probate proceedings by Prohibition. Otherwise there were rarely grounds for
common law interference with probate.
b. Intestacy. It was the power and responsibility of the locally appropriate ecclesiastical court to appoint administrators of the estates of persons who died intestate and to supervise administration, in order that it be
done conscientiously and that goods remaining after payment of the intestate’s debts be properly distributed. Many Prohibitions came out of intestacy cases, primarily because a 16th century statute--encroaching on the
independence and discretion ecclesiastical courts had formerly enjoyed-regulated how they were to proceed. The common law courts were often
called on to interpret the statute and enforce it by Prohibition.
c. Legacies. These were exclusively recoverable in ecclesiastical
courts. Legacy suits often led to Prohibitions, by various routes. The underlying reality was that two sorts of claims on estates, enforced by different legal systems, stood in an inherently tense relationship. An estate’s
creditors had to sue the executor at common law if he did not satisfy them
voluntarily; legatees must sue in an ecclesiastical court. The two systems
had no disagreement on legal principle: debts prevail over legacies; a
legatee is only entitled to be paid when all legally recoverable debts have
been paid or clearly can be; if an executor is too lavish about paying legacies and runs out of assets to satisfy debts, he is liable out of his own
pocket. Creditors, however, have a motive to delay payment of legacies
until they themselves have been paid, or until their claims have been rebuffed at the last litigative ditch; executors have every motive to put off
legatees until they are sure the estate is sufficient to satisfy all debt claims
that may turn up; meanwhile legatees will be clamoring for payment and
starting ecclesiastical suits. One can begin to imagine the complications
that could arise from this situation. Numerous cases will illustrate the
point.
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3. Marital Law. The marital jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts produced fewer Prohibitions than the classes above, but it was important in
itself. Ecclesiastical courts had exclusive authority to determine whether
a man and woman were legally husband and wife (essentially by the
standards of ecclesiastical law, though there was some statutory encroachment on its free hand). They also had authority to award civil relief from an abusive marriage. Apart from criminal complaints of marital
or sexual misconduct, the standard marital suit in an ecclesiastical court
was a “divorce” suit in one of two senses in which the word was once
used:
a. A suit for annulment--a judgment that an apparent marriage was
never really contracted, on any of several invalidating grounds recognized
by ecclesiastical law.
b. A suit to terminate the right and duty of cohabitation and to provide
for the wife’s separate maintenance (“alimony” in the sense the word then
had), on grounds of abusive behavior by the husband. (Wives were not,
so far as I know, ever defendants in such suits. Serious misbehavior on
the wife’s part could defeat her attempt to get alimony, if the husband
simply abandoned or ejected her.)
There is no standard category of Prohibitions arising from marital
cases, and there would have been relatively few openings for the common
law courts to concern themselves with them had the High Commission
not existed. Numerous marital suits were brought before the Commission, which probably testifies that it was the advance guard of civilized
marital law in the early 17th century, readier than ordinary ecclesiastical
courts to punish abusive husbands, especially if they were of superior social rank, and to give civil relief to their wives. Such suits invited Prohibitions because the Commission’s jurisdiction to entertain them was
subject to grave doubt. Otherwise, marital suits usually begot Prohibitions by way of some legal problem incidental to their substance.
4. Defamation. Defamation constitutes a separate topic in the organization of this study (Title VII in the table on p. ix.) The reason for this is
that the field of defamation was shared between the common law and ecclesiastical systems in a sense that holds for no other area of law. By and
large, the tracts of human relationships governed by law were assigned to
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one system or the other -- to begin with, so to speak; innumerable problems of course arose from the difficulty of making such an assignment
work smoothly. By contrast, some acts of defamation were remediable in
one system, some in the other; acts very similar in character and suits motivated by much the same impulse for vindication and satisfaction might
fall on one side or the other of a finer line. (The Star Chamber was a
third sharer in this field, by way of its civil and criminal jurisdiction over
written libels, but its role does not figure in any direct way in Prohibition
law.)
The basic rules about jurisdiction in defamation were as follows: Utterances accusing a person of a temporal offense or (though not necessarily imputations of a legal offense) bringing specifiable and provable
temporal loss on someone were actionable at common law by Trespass on
the Case. Utterances accusing someone of an ecclesiastical offense were
indisputably the proper subject of ecclesiastical suits and not actionable
per se at common law -- only in some instances when consequential pecuniary loss could be made out. Since fornication et similia were ecclesiastical offenses, many of the scurrilities people are most apt to hurl at
each other constituted ecclesiastical defamation. It was problematic
whether ecclesiastical courts were ever free to treat as defamatory aspersions that were neither actionable at common law nor imputations of definite ecclesiastical offenses.
Resort to ecclesiastical courts was clearly common in circumstances
such that jurisdictional complaints could be made if the ecclesiastical defendant wanted to make them. That can be explained in part by the fact
that ecclesiastical law was equipped to provide what people who go to
law over their verbal quarrels often want, or at any rate can reasonably
expect to get: settlement of who was in the right, apology and retraction if
the defendant indeed said something uncalled for and offensive to the
plaintiff's honor and reputation, a nominal but embarrassing punishment
for the defendant by virtue of the criminal character of ecclesiastical defamation. Resort to the common law offered the prize or satisfaction of
damages, but in the period of this study the common law courts were inclined to find reasons against holding utterances actionable when they
could -- to the end of discouraging people from burdening the legal system with their mere quarrels and speculating on a pecuniary recovery
when they had probably suffered only offense. In any event, persuading a
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jury that one is entitled to damages worth the having involves risks and
costs. “When in doubt try the ecclesiastical court first” may have been a
common attitude among those whose hurt feelings goaded them to litigative war.
Of the Prohibition cases arising from defamation suits, a large number
raise issues collateral to the law of defamation itself, but many others are
squarely on the terms of the “sharing arrangement.’’ Typical issues: Are
the alleged words in fact actionable at common law and therefore out of
bounds for an ecclesiastical court? Are the ecclesiastical courts strictly
confined to the imputation of ecclesiastical offenses, or should they have
some scope to treat other words as defamatory so long as no common law
action would lie for them? To what extent are ecclesiastical courts bound
to apply to their defamation cases standards which the common law applied to its? (E.g., to treat language as non-defamatory if it can be construed in an innocent sense, whether or not the speaker’s intention or the
words in their ordinary employment were innocent; to permit a husband
to release his wife’s defamation claim; to treat truth as a defense in all circumstances.)
5. Rates. Ecclesiastical suits were often brought to recover parish
rates levied for Church purposes. The holder of the living had a limited
responsibility for maintaining the church building. Beyond that, the inhabitants of the parish were responsible for the upkeep of the church and
adjacent grounds, for which they sometimes had to tax themselves. The
churchwardens were usually the collectors of such taxes and therefore appear as plaintiffs in ecclesiastical suits against delinquent rate-payers.
Various defenses were recurrent: the rate was not fairly assessed, or not
by the customary method; the plaintiffs were not entitled to sue because
they were not properly elected, usually meaning not by the customary
procedure; the defendants were exempt from rates to maintain the parish
church because they customarily contributed to the upkeep of an outlying
chapel. Defendants often sought Prohibitions, almost always on the theory that when one asserted a customary right against a claim based on ecclesiastical law one was entitled to stop ecclesiastical proceedings until a
common law jury said there was no such custom -- the essential theory
behind tithe commutation cases. Both tense local feeling and higher political conflict are reflected in litigation of this sort, the latter because in
the 17th century the Church hierarchy attempted to reorganize some as-
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pects of parish management, mainly election of churchwardens. The policy of the national Church ran afoul of what local people regarded as customary and due, and what wider legal and ecclesiological opinion
regarded as due if customary.
6. Pews. Ecclesiastical courts had limited jurisdiction over claims to
the exclusive use of pews in churches. The extent of that jurisdiction and
how it should be fitted with limited common law jurisdiction over the
same subject was legally problematic, as numerous Prohibition cases
show. Going to law to assert such claims tends to reflect quarrels, jealousies, and disputes over local pecking order -- foibles that often reached the
courts in defamation cases as well.
7. “Spiritual” incomes. Some ecclesiastical litigation had to do with
intra-Church claims to various payments. The well-observed rule was
that common law courts had nothing to do with these and would not prohibit ecclesiastical proceedings. Disputes between rector and vicar over
their tithe split exemplify this sort of properly ecclesiastical suit. Some
payments, however, were difficult to classify, notably pensions claimed
by clergymen from ecclesiastical institutions. If they met certain criteria
they were ordinary annuities recoverable at common law; if not, they
were “spiritual pensions,” which the ecclesiastical courts, so far as the
common law was concerned, could enforce if they saw fit. Controversies
over the right to hold certain Church offices and draw the income therefrom are another instance in which ecclesiastical jurisdiction obtained in
principle, but a common law interest could sometimes be made out on the
ground that the holder of the office had a secular freehold in it. Official
positions in the ecclesiastical legal system are typical of this category.
They must be distinguished from the Church’s central “office,” the parish ministry, which had special characteristics (see below). They must
also be distinguished from parish offices, such as churchwarden and parish clerk, which were classified as essentially secular: Title to them often
came in question in ecclesiastical cases, but Prohibition would usually be
employed to see that such disputes were in effect resolved at common
law.
8. Livings. Prohibitions occasionally came out of ecclesiastical litigation over title to be the incumbent of a parish living. The subject was a
technical one, in which secular and ecclesiastical rules and jurisdictions
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were tangled. The advowson, or right to nominate to the living, was secular property pure and simple; title to it was only disputable at common
law. There was also a common law remedy (the action of Quare impedit)
for interfering with the exercise of advowson rights, which could serve as
a check on the power the Bishop had to turn down a nominee with cause.
Once the nominee was accepted, he had to be installed in several things at
once. I.e., he did not occupy the living merely by being nominated and
accepted, but only after three distinct ceremonies or conveyancing acts.
Two of them, classified as secular and within common law jurisdiction, in
effect made the clergyman representative of a corporation sole and lifetenant as a natural individual of the property and incomes of the benefice;
the third made him the holder of a spiritual office, the ministry of a particular parish. (I have already noted that the incumbent’s tenure, in both
the spiritual and the temporal interests, was subject to disciplinary deprivation by ecclesiastical due process, and that the common law courts had
a duty of vigilance over that process in virtue of the temporal side.)
These observations must be altered for impropriate parishes, where the
advowson was not exercised, but permanently joined to the rectorship,
passing with it to the heirs or successors of the owner like any piece of ordinary property. In such parishes, however, appointment and installation
of a vicar was substantially parallel to the process of installing a rector
elsewhere. Litigation in ecclesiastical courts over the ecclesiastical aspect
of all this could sometimes lead to Prohibitions because it arguably impinged on the temporal.
A word on the civil sanctions of ecclesiastical courts: In effect, those
courts gave injunctive relief backed by excommunication. Often they ordered the payment of money (e.g., rates owed, so much alimony to a “divorced” wife, the sum left as a legacy). Tithes are a peculiar case in this
respect, because the basic duty was to render produce in kind. But when
tithes had to be sued for, they were of course not usually renderable in
kind by the time it had been determined that they were due. It was accordingly necessary for the court to assess the money value of the unpaid
tithes and order payment of the assessed sum. (There is, I believe, no evidence of common law interference with that process of assessment, perhaps surprisingly.) This was probably the only context in which
ecclesiastical courts did something like “assessing damages,” or compensating in money a wrong that does not itself consist in breach of a duty to
pay a definite sum of money. Otherwise, they by and large ordered spe-
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cific performance of a non-pecuniary duty and enforced the order by excommunication; they did not award damages for breach of the order.
(E.g., a husband might be ordered to stay away from his divorced wife, or
to abstain from abusive behavior toward his wife. The same principle
holds for the “penances” appropriate on criminal conviction. Apology
and retraction, in the quasi-criminal field of defamation, is one kind of example. Orders to abstain in the future from a type of criminal activity one
had been convicted of were also common -- e.g., from cohabitation with
an illicit partner or from incontinent behavior generally). Orders to losing
parties to pay money in the name of litigative costs were routine and intrinsically lawful. Prohibitions often came out of costs awards for collateral reasons, however. (E.g., pardons, both royal and statutory, tended to
complicate the law of costs, because costs might be incurred in privately
prosecuting an offense before the offense was pardoned. It was the common law courts’ responsibility to construe pardons and work out their
precise application in complicated circumstances.) I am not convinced
that compensatory damages were not sometimes awarded under cover of
costs, but that is uncertain. There is a further small penumbra where I am
not sure of the law and the practice with respect to “damages,” for Prohibition cases are not informative. (E.g., would an executor by whose fault
a physical object bequeathed as a legacy was lost or destroyed be forced
to pay the legatee an assessed equivalent in money?) On the whole, however, “specific injunctive relief enforced by excommunication” is a safeenough formula. (Private settlement of ecclesiastical disputes for money
of course occurred. This was usually not a factor in Prohibition law, because the settlement would be an ordinary temporal contract. There is no
sign that parties tried to enforce such contracts in ecclesiastical courts, or
that ecclesiastical courts would generally have disputed the bindingness
of one side’s promise to refrain from suing or to drop a commenced suit.
Problems and Prohibitions did sometimes arise from the shadowiness of
the border between civil and criminal. E.g., private parties to a defamation suit purport to settle for money: it was problematic whether this was
binding on either the ecclesiastical plaintiff or the ecclesiastical court, because the matter was in principle criminal. By recommending a settlement, or perhaps very nearly coercing one, the ecclesiastical court had a
certain scope to award damages in effect, and this opportunity may sometimes have been used.)
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Excommunication was not only the ecclesiastical courts’ ultimate
weapon -- the sanction behind its remedial orders. It was also an interlocutory sanction, the means of coercing attendance and cooperation on
parties. There is evidence from Prohibition cases that default judgments
were sometimes given against ecclesiastical defendants who simply did
not show up when summoned. A correct statement of the law and the
practice with respect to default judgments is hard to come by. It was, I
believe, at least much more common not to give sentence by default, but
rather to excommunicate the defaulter for non- appearance and then,
when he did turn up, to absolve him quoad his failure to appear and proceed to try the merits.
There are jokes and anecdotes to the effect that cutting off worldly men
from communion with the Church was not always a reliable way to make
them conform to its law. Being excommunicated did have worldly costs,
however. They might take time to catch up with the sinner, but they
pinched when they did. A number of temporal legal disabilities attached
to excommunicated persons, if the excommunication was discovered and
an adversary had motive to take advantage of it. The most important temporal consequence of excommunication was that it could be translated
into imprisonment via the writ De excommunicato capiendo. There were
some ifs and buts about that writ -- the bare fact that one was excommunicated did not guarantee that one could be taken and imprisoned. By
way of the temporal writ, common law courts got a look at the legality of
the excommunication, and such factors as its timing relative to a pardon
could affect its “translatability” into jail. Normally, however, jail threatened if one allowed oneself to stay excommunicated very long. Prohibition cases supply some evidence that imprisonment on De
excommunicato was not an extreme rarity.
2. The Admiralty. The Admiralty had clear jurisdiction over matters
arising on the high seas. The jurisdiction was originally both civil and
criminal, but the latter was in effect taken away by an early-16th century
statute. (Crimes committed at sea were nominally left under the Admiralty, but they were required to be tried by special commissions using
common law procedure, most notably jury trial.)
A court with the Admiralty’s function would have been hard to do
without for a country situated as England is, so long as the common law
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had no way of trying events that did not occur in one or another of the
English counties (or in several, in the case of some complex events). For
a long time the common law was prevented from trying disputes about
events outside the country by the theory of jury trial and the venue rules
that followed from it. Jurors were conceived as people who lived in the
vicinity where the disputed event occurred and who would themselves
know what had happened -- or at any rate might know, or have ways of
finding out on their own accord; therefore, they would not be dependent
on evidence presented by the parties at a trial, even if they were assisted
by it. Obviously jurors of this description could not be found to try what
happened at sea; such events would become triable by jury only when the
jury was reconceived as a neutral body assessing evidence -- as the judge
was conceived under the civil law method used in the Admiralty and elsewhere. (Whether the trier of facts is or is not thought of as a judge of evidence is probably a more critical difference than whether the trier is a
single professional or a committee of laymen, and whether the roles of
determining facts and deciding legal questions are united or separated.)
Events in foreign countries were equally unreachable: Though French
neighbors can observe as well as English ones what goes on in their
neighborhoods, they could of course not be compelled to serve on English
juries. Within England itself, venue rules were originally strict; the triers
of whether something happened in Hampshire must be Hampshire men,
and even the narrower neighborhood (the hundred) must be represented
on the panel of jurors. I shall explain below how relaxation of the domestic venue law and partial reconception of the jury complicated problems
about the Admiralty’s role in the period of this study.
The substantive law of the Admiralty was Roman law overlaid with a
body of international maritime and commercial usage embedded in the
traditions of the court. (Roman law in the sense that parties were allowed
to argue from the general principles, doctrines, and authorities of Roman
law insofar as the specific rules of the Admiralty and supranational custom were not clear or dispositive.) As I have already noted, the Admiralty was a major arena for civilian practice and careers.
Admiralty cases led to Prohibitions in three main ways:
(1) There were doubts and frequent disputes about exactly what constituted “high seas,” on the one hand, and “land within an English
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county,” on the other. As one would suppose, the questionable places
were rivers, harbors, and the sea immediately off shore, including places
covered by water only at high tide. Statutes from the 14th century appeared to define the border between literal land and places literally on
water which nevertheless counted as “legal land” rather than “high seas.”
When people being sued in the Admiralty sought Prohibitions on the
ground that they could and therefore should have been sued at common
law, with the venue placed in a given county, the rather tricky interpretation of these statutes was often in question.
(2) The events relevant in lawsuits obviously do not have to occur exclusively on land or at sea. E.g., suppose a contract is made in Norfolk
and calls for something to be done at sea, which is allegedly not done,
causing a suit for breach of contract; conversely, a contract made on shipboard at sea calls for something to be done at a particular place in England (or anywhere in England--or anywhere in the world, but the party
alleged to have broken the contract claims to have fulfilled it in England.)
or suppose A. takes goods at sea which B. claims as his goods, and suppose A. then brings the goods to Yorkshire and is possessed of them
there; or, for further suppositions, A. conveys the goods to C. at sea, who
brings them to Yorkshire; or A. himself brings them into England and
there transfers them to C. by one of the possible transactions (sale, deposit, etc.).
Complex Prohibition cases arose from such mixed situations: a contract or tort suit in the Admiralty on the plausible ground that acts at sea
were involved; plaintiff-in-Prohibition claiming that the significant element, or a sufficient element, in the suit was such that it could and should
have been brought at common law.
Mixed situations can be further complicated by introducing foreign
land. (E.g., contract made in London for performance in Paris; contract
made on land at Lisbon, by which one of the parties agrees to sail directly
to London, observing normal standards of good seamanship, and to deliver goods carried on the ship to a specific place on dry land in London.
The latter contract can of course be broken in several ways: never leaving Lisbon, going to London by way of Brazil, never going to London,
negligent seamanship on the high seas, failure to unload and deliver the
goods though the ship arrived near London and anchored in the Thames.)

il

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
In other words, this category can cross with (3) below--and for that matter
with (1) above, as the second example suggests.
(3) I say above that the Admiralty had clear jurisdiction over the high
seas. Many suits were brought in the Admiralty, however, and many attempts made to prohibit them, in which the sea was in no way involved,
but a foreign country. A simple case, avoiding any “mixture” problems,
would be a contract made in Paris and calling for something to be done
there. It is of course perfectly imaginable that a party to that contract
would want to sue for its breach in England. Suppose both parties are
English merchants who formerly lived and traded in Paris but have now
returned home, so that even if the prospective plaintiff were to undertake
the inconvenience of bringing a suit in the French courts he would not be
able to catch the defendant within their reach. (I think it is safe to say, by
the way, that a man holding a default judgment, or any other kind, from a
French court would be little more likely to get his money in England than
if he had not gone to the trouble of obtaining the judgment.) Of course
there could be less extreme cases -- any case in which the defendant was
at present reachable in England, especially if he was in possession of mercantile goods or other property there, regardless of whether he or the
plaintiff was a long-term resident (and foreigners count, since they were
eligible to sue in English courts for anything except real-estate).
So long as the old jury and venue theories were in real force, common
law suit was out of the question, and resort to the Admiralty became
usual. By the period of this study, however, the old theories were in practical collapse, though they retained a considerable indirect hold on English jurisprudence. Domestically, by a slow and tortuous process, the law
had come to be that some kinds of question (called “transitory”) could be
tried by a jury that did not come from the proper county by traditional
standards and could thus be decided merely on the basis of evidence. In
effect, all questions were transitory except those connected with real
property and questions of criminal guilt. By a concurrent and related development, foreign issues that met the criteria for transitoriness became
triable at common law by pretending that they were about events in England: The plaintiff alleged fictitiously, e.g., that a contract was made “at
Paris, France, in the county of Kent”; the defendant was not allowed to
plead that the contract was in fact made in the real France, or that there
was no such place in Kent as Paris, France, and the judges shut the eye of
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judicial notice to the realities of geography; a jury drawn from Kent
would try the case on evidence. After this development, it became possible for someone sued in the Admiralty on a foreign contract or the like to
seek a Prohibition on the ground that his opponent could, under current
law, perfectly well have sued him at common law and therefore should
have.
That ground was not, however, a good ground by universal consent.
Some judges were reluctant to prohibit when a common law remedy was
only available by fiction, even if they would probably have indulged the
fiction in an original common law suit. There was some feeling that it
was good policy to let the Admiralty handle the kinds of suits that were
typically brought there -- mercantile suits -- because the court had an expertise in commercial matters and international usage. There may have
been lingering doubts as to whether the fiction was part of the law beyond
all possibility of challenge. Meanwhile, a different ground for prohibiting
all foreign-land suits in the Admiralty was pressed: the theory that the
14th century statutes mentioned above simply enacted a positive ban on
Admiralty suits not arising on the high seas, whether they arose on land in
England or in another country. In other words, the statutes were not enacted only to prevent the Admiralty from encroaching on the common
law and to define where encroachment would begin in ambiguous cases,
but to confine the Admiralty to the sea absolutely. The antiquarian view
was advanced that the foreign-land cases that now often went to the Admiralty had at one time belonged to another (now virtually obsolete) special English tribunal, the court of the Constable and Marshall. Tangled
differences over the meaning of the statutes developed, and there was perhaps another level of difference over which was the better approach: to
look at the de facto modern availability of a common law remedy and decide whether to prohibit in the light of that, or to come to a resolution that
the statutes did or did not exclude the Admiralty. Such complexities
made for a particularly difficult branch of Prohibition law and left a haze
of irresolution over it.
One might ask whether the fiction applied in foreign-land cases could
also be used to bring matters that actually occurred at sea under common
law jurisdiction. Could one allege without risk of contradiction that
something happened, “100 miles NW of the Azores on the high seas in
the county of Middlesex”? I can only say that I have seen no signs of it,
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though some commentary later than the period of this study suggests it
was possible. In any event, Admiralty suits about matters entirely located
at sea would not have been prohibitable, for the affirmative proposition
that the Admiralty does have jurisdiction in those cases was unquestioned, and was unmistakably confirmed by the debated statutes.
It should be noted that prohibiting an Admiralty suit against oneself
was almost never a way to escape legal liability altogether, in contrast to
some ecclesiastical and most equity Prohibitions. One might seek a Prohibition to put off and burden one’s opponent, or because one thought
one’s chances better with a jury than with civil law trial, or because one
preferred common law adjudication of an expected legal issue -- from
greater trust in the lawyers and judges, on account of some possibly advantageous technicality under common law rules of procedure and pleading, or owing to substantive rule-conflict between the common and civil
laws that might affect liabilities in the specific case. Judging by the evidence I have investigated, I do not think the last and most interesting possibility was very usual. Most Admiralty suits that led to Prohibition cases
seem straightforward -- mostly claims which, if factually true, would
bring liability on the defendant if he were sued at common law. I am not
sure about predictable differences in the execution of judgments, but presume that one would scarcely be better off with a common law judgment
against one than an Admiralty judgment. There is reason to believe that
the Admiralty was popular in the mercantile community, and so to suppose that many litigants who might have obtained Prohibitions accepted
Admiralty jurisdiction voluntarily. Unfairly or not, Church courts must
have been suspected of bias in favor of Church interests (e.g., the tithe-recipient’s); between the party of the first part and the party of the second in
routine commercial litigation the Admiralty would have no bias. Seeking
Prohibitions for vexatious purposes in litigation between merchants
would be a poor way for a business man to maintain his reputation among
those he must deal with. For all these reasons, I am inclined to guess that
the typical motive for seeking a writ in Admiralty cases was the weak defendant’s propensity to gamble on a jury. Notoriously in foreign-land
cases and sometimes in mixed ones (since finding a common law foothold was sometimes the basis for Prohibition, even when the actual issue
for trial did not relate to events in England), the jury was a trier of evidence -- not typically the kind of evidence jurors can check against their
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own knowledge; jurors could have been easier to fool than Admiralty
judges.
3. Equity. It is harder to say what a court of equity is than to define
ecclesiastical and Admiralty courts by their subject- matter and local jurisdictions. The best operational definition of equity is what the Chancery
did. The Chancery was the preeminent court of equity; it was never prohibited, though a few dicta suggest it could be in principle. Three other
courts were often prohibited, all of them recognized by contemporaries as
courts with equitable powers: the Council of Wales, the Council of the
North, and the Court of Requests. (Once in awhile another body with
those powers, such as the court of the Duchy of Lancaster, was prohibited
from entertaining an equitable claim.) Prohibitions were issued to these
courts to cut off attempts to get equitable remedies which the common
law judges did not think ought to be granted, or did not consider within
the scope of courts of equity generally. Sometimes explicitly and more
often implicitly, the criterion for what was within the scope of courts of
equity was the Chancery’s practice.
The matter is more complicated, however, for the nature of equity was
not such that once could say quite simply, “If the Chancery has never
granted relief in this situation, it cannot be a suitable situation for equitable relief.” If the Chancery were known to have considered allowing a
remedy in given circumstances and to have decided against doing so,
there would be excellent grounds for not letting a lesser court of equity
reconsider. (In a few situations this model was approachable; there were
some maxims familiarly voiced and applied in the chancery that could be
taken as general rules of equity.) That would be to treat the Chancery as
the equitable supreme court, which it morally was, although the equity
courts were not formally organized as a hierarchy with appellate and
preemptive powers at the top. The argument, however, that equitable relief in a certain situation had never been granted by the Chancery, never
having been sought, could be no more than a rule-of-thumb argument -- a
basis for saying to a minor equity court, “We common law judges do not
know this is a good claim to equitable relief, for we have never heard of
such a claim in the Chancery. We cannot let you go ahead when we are
unsure of your authority. The plaintiff had better go to the Chancery if he
wants his claim considered.” In fact, though some judges may have responded that way sometimes, this position has more conservative impli-
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cations than are borne out in the judges’ handling of Prohibition cases.
They were not so very restrictive toward the minor equity courts, did not
insist that they confine themselves to the beaten track of Chancery practice in the literal sense that they allowed only those claims that were routinely familiar in the Chancery to be pursued. Rather, the judges thought
about the generally proper scope of equity in the light of their interpretation of the Chancery’s historical and theoretical role, and when they
thought the minor courts were within that scope they allowed them to decide for themselves whether to grant relief.
This approach was entailed by the nature of equity in the period of this
study. Later in its history, the Chancery (which survived the lesser equity
courts) became more precedent-bound and otherwise closer to the common law, in feel and in cooperative habits, though its substantive and procedural law remained distinct. In the 16th-early 17th centuries, equity
was still open-ended. It was thought of as holding a theoretically wide
(though in practice cautiously used) warrant to entertain complaints of
this form: “Application of the general rules of the common law (in some
cases), or (in others) the absence of any common law remedy, in the particular circumstances of my case will result in injustice. Please, therefore,
order my opponent not to take advantage of his strict rights under the general rules (or, in the other type of situation, order him not to behave in the
way he could do with legal impunity, owing to the lack of a common law
remedy”). Theories were advanced, and still enjoy a certain currency,
that granting relief to such complainants did not contradict the common
law but fulfilled it -- by merely mitigating the hardships which the best
possible general rules will sometimes cause. Such theories are unconvincing in the light of the Chancery’s historic practice. The Chancery routinely gave remedies in situations where the common law simply
recognized no rights and provided no remedies (enforcement of trusteeship being the most important example.) It routinely vetoed certain rules,
which therefore operated as rules only for those who did not get around to
seeking equitable intervention in time or could not afford the litigation
(e.g., certain rules requiring written evidence--the party who lacked the
evidence could bring a suit in equity, prove his case by oral testimony,
and enjoin the other party from pursuing the certain victory he would win
at common law). The Chancery did not, and could not legally, intervene
in the one situation that is paradigmatic for “general rules working hardship in particular circumstances” -- where a statute in general language
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has presumably unintended results, in a situation the legislature did not
think of and make an exception for; “mitigation” there was left to the
common law courts by way of construction.
In sum, equity supplemented the common law and rendered parts of it
inoperative in a round-about way (which sometimes could be arguably
better than changing it outright. Cf. the written-evidence example above:
so long as getting out of the requirement involves the trouble and risk of
legal proceedings in a special tribunal, people will be motivated to “demand a receipt,” to have the written evidence that will protect them and
will further the public good by diminishing litigation). The common law
was not by its nature, or by virtue of some valuable property worth preserving at a cost in unjust results, stuck with unamendable general rules
and an unexpandable repertoire of remedies. As is commonplace in modern celebrations of it, its “nature” as a system of case law -- not even
constrained by the later doctrine of binding precedents -- favored flexibility, which it not infrequently achieved in practice. In addition, there was
a legislature perfectly capable of revising the common law. (The notion
that there was a conceptual barrier to the very idea of Parliamentary legislation in the later middle ages, a theory that has enjoyed considerable currency in historical literature, has little merit. Of course legislative activity
can be repressed by various kinds of political advantage in refraining
from it, by structures of interest and perceived need, and by generally
conservative attitudes -- including the belief, or need to believe, that inherited, unlegislated law has a good chance of approaching perfection.)
There did not have to be an equity system supplementing and checking
the common law; there simply was. It can be called an accident of 14th15th century English history, provided “historical accident’’ is taken as
shorthand for a complicated turn of events for which there is not yet an
adequately articulated explanation. The meaningful sense in which equity
fulfilled, mitigated, or avoided contradicting the common law was that the
specific forms of equitable supplementation and correction that developed
in the later middle ages were on the whole accepted as benign by the
community and the legal community. What must, from an analytic point
of view, be acknowledged as contradiction or frustration of the rules the
common law professed to have was not perceived as such as long as some
rules -- mainly ones connected with real property -- were left alone.
What the Chancery did had acquired a kind of prescriptive title to be
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thought appropriately limited; beyond that, however, the door was not
closed, in the period of this study, to applications for new equitable remedies. The belief that equity is addressed to the exceptional or hardship
case caused the judges to consider whether attempts to secure results at
variance with the common law beyond the familiar Chancery round were
in effect benign amendments of outlying features of the common law or
threats to its core. Prohibition suits directed at the minor equity courts
were the forum for that kind of judicial inquiry. The upshot of the
judges’ deliberations reveals a considerable degree of non-commitment to
every jot and tittle of the common law in such fields as contract, offset by
a strong protectiveness toward the common law of property beyond the
ambit of certain well-established Chancery remedies altering rights in that
area.
It will be clear from this analysis that Prohibitions to courts of equity
cannot be introduced by reviewing the established heads of equitable jurisdiction and indicating the entrée for Prohibitions. There are no statements analogous to “claims to tithes belong to ecclesiastical courts, but
suits for tithes are prohibitable if....,” or “complaints of breach of contract
do not belong to ecclesiastical courts.” The reasons equitable remedies
were sought, and the reasons for which the common law courts allowed
and disallowed the pursuit of such remedies, have to be inspected through
specific cases. (I should add that the substance, though not all the refinements, of my analysis of the Prohibition cases on courts of equity is
available in published form.)2
Of the three frequently prohibited minor equity courts, one was almost
exclusively a court of equity: the Court of Requests. That means it did
little, if anything, else than carry an overload of cases that might have
gone to the Chancery. It was especially vulnerable to Prohibitions because its very legitimacy was widely doubted. There was well-based and
often- discussed doubt among lawyers that this body--which derived its
authority from the King’s Council, but did not consist of members of the
2

Charles M. Gray, "The Boundaries of the Equitable Function," American Journal of Legal
History, 1976. This article is reproduced as an Appendix to Vol. III, where courts of equity
figure to a larger degree than elsewhere.
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Council--had any de jure or prescriptive title to function as a court properly so-called (to compel people to appear before it and award remedies
backed by sanctions.) Its history was known to be short-run (to extend back
only to Henry VII’s reign), and the King’s authority to create new courts
or farm out the inherent powers of the Council, while not the most deeply
explored constitutional topic in cases or in carefully argued public controversy, was clearly not infinite. Notwithstanding these misgivings, the Requests was indulged as a court of equity -- i.e., prohibited only for
exceeding what the judges thought the appropriate function of such
courts. The practical usefulness of an auxiliary Chancery was probably
recognized. By the Requests’ vulnerability to Prohibitions, I mean only
that any reluctance that might have been felt if attempts had been made to
prohibit the Chancery itself -- any feeling that the Chancellor was, after
all, the historic arbiter of equitable claims, who, even if prohibitable in
the last resort, would deserve every courtesy if the last resort were
reached -- did not extend to a suspect tribunal. (The courtesy would have
been to put off Prohibition, pending negotiation and an attempt to persuade the Chancellor to disallow the objectionable claim to relief.) It is
relevant that the Chancellor was almost always a senior common lawyer
and the Chancery the scene of big-league practice by common lawyers
exclusively. A serious clash with the Chancery would be a state affair;
the Requests practically existed by the common law’s grace and had no
claim on delicate treatment.
This point is borne out by the serious clash with the Chancery that did
occur in the early 17th century. It was not over the substance of equitable
remedies, but over when they are opportune. The prevailing common law
view was that a party substantively entitled to equitable intervention must
seek it before a common law judgment (based on the rules that equity was
allowed to frustrate) went against him. Among the reasons for this position was its symbolic tendency to uphold the pretense that equity does not
contradict the common law -- i.e., it ought not to block execution of a
common law judgment, with the implication that the judgment was unjust, but may prevent a party with a valid but unjust claim under common
law rules from pursuing a judgment. The view of at least the strongminded contemporary Chancellors, Lords Ellesmere and Bacon, was that
equitable relief may be sought after judgment as well as before, subject
only to the Chancellor’s discretion as to the excusability for the party’s
delay, in the light of the seriousness of the injustice he would suffer if left
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remediless. Significantly, the Chancery was never prohibited even from
intervening after judgment. (The Requests was several times prohibited
from doing just that, when in substance the suit before it was perfectly appropriate to equity.) Instead, Coke embarked on a doubtful, though arguably valid, attempt to stop Chancery intervention after judgment by
encouraging a grand jury to indict under the Praemunire statutes a lawyer
who had pursued an equitable remedy for his client in the face of a common law judgment. The indirection -- going after the erring lawyer, not
the Chancellor -- is ironically parallel to the indirection Coke thought it
important to insist on: the principle that equity may restrain the unconscionable party who might try to make good on his common law rights,
but may not suggest that a common law court has decided a case by unconscionable rules. Perhaps the real point of Coke’s attempt was to stir
up a “state affair.” That was in any event the effect: the rights and
wrongs of intervention after judgment, and whether it was within the
scope of Praemunire, were argued out of court between the judicia1 officers concerned and before the King. In the end, the King purported, with
dubious legality (for the argument that only a statute could settle the question so as to bind the common law courts is very strong), to decide the debate in the Chancery’s favor. The common law judges proceeded to
ignore his decision in the one judicial context in which it was really possible to: they continued to prohibit the minor equity courts from intervening after judgment. The Chancery won the “state affair,” however; it
continued to be Prohibition-proof, and the Praemunire offensive died.
Coke was dismissed from the Bench on account of that offensive as well
as for other reasons, but even if he had not been, the project of chastening
the Chancery by making criminals of lawyers serving their clients under
accepted law would probably not have survived a major demonstration of
the Chancery’s political weight.
The regional Councils were only partly courts of equity. They also had
common law jurisdiction over relatively small claims and Star Chamber
jurisdiction. The Council of Wales had a statutory basis, the Council of
the North rested on royal authorization. Both courts were sometimes prohibited from exceeding their other jurisdictions, as well as the equitable.
As courts with express and limiting instructions from the King and Privy
Council, and one of them ultimately limited by the statute behind it, they
were, so to speak, natural objects of Prohibition, even though they were
not under the kind of cloud the Requests suffered from. I.e., they were
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bound to provoke some Prohibitions merely to enforce explicit limits on
their commissions, and although those did not in terms go to their equitable powers, it must have seemed presumable that they were at any rate
limited to the generally legitimate business of courts of equity. Any generalized doubt as to whether controlling courts of equity was a proper use
of Prohibitions would probably not have been much felt with respect to
special, mixed, limited tribunals such as the Councils. There are some
signs of such doubts, though they were discussed and dispelled. The Prohibition was after all historically an anti-ecclesiastical instrument. Its extension to minor common law courts and the Admiralty can be seen as
enforcement of the internal rules of the common law, in the one case, and,
in the other, protection against direct encroachment on business the common
law could handle, together with enforcement of statutes. Equity had a higher
rationale than courts merely permitted to perform special jobs under well-known
bodies of law distinct from the common law, for it purported to see that natural
justice was done, and theory held that that function was a necessary check
on any system of positive law. The practical immunity of the Chancery from
Prohibition probably reflects this sense of its difference from the ordinarily prohibited courts and respect for the Chancellor as the institutionalized
expert on what the demands of natural justice are. The nature and status arof the minor equity courts, on the other hand, probably catalyzed the general view that even equity is a “jurisdiction” amenable to control by Prohibition, as well as providing a realistic entrée for the exercise of that
control.

* * *
All equity courts proceeded basically by injunction backed by contempt powers. They ordered losing defendants to act in some way that
amounted to not taking advantage of their common law rights; if the defendant disobeyed, he was liable to coercive imprisonment -- i.e., to be
imprisoned until he did obey or agreed to. In consequence, questions
about substantive equitable powers sometimes arose on Habeas corpus.
Sometimes too issues arose, by Prohibition or Habeas corpus, about the
details of the equity courts’ enforcement powers and the propriety of their
exercise in particular cases. The deep question whether coercive imprisonment by courts reliant on it may continue forever was occasionally
broached.
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In other respects, equity procedure conformed to the same basic civilcanon model as that of the ecclesiastical and Admiralty courts. Pleading
was more permissive that at common law -- i.e., a choice between pleading to a factual or a legal issue was not demanded. Trial was by a judge,
in practice on written interrogatories rather than at an open-court, viva
voce hearing. Appropriate issues in equity cases were sometimes farmed
out to the common law for jury trial, but this practice was less usual in the
period of this study than later. In contrast to the ecclesiastical system, the
equitable lacked an appellate structure. This feature was sometimes cited
as a justification for Prohibitions -- if the common law courts did not keep
the equity courts in bounds, there was little prospect of their being kept
there (the only other recourse being an appeal to the King’s grace for a
special review commission). In dealing with ecclesiastical courts, it was
often a good argument that mistakes at one level could be corrected on
appeal. (With respect to appeals, the Admiralty was in the same position
as the equity courts, but, as I have argued, there was nothing seriously
problematic about the generic justification for prohibiting it.)
Prohibitions in Politics and Constitutional Law
I have already indicated that Prohibitions have a place in familiar accounts of 17th century English history because they became a political issue. I need now to say a bit more about that in order to put the detailed
legal history in its setting. What I shall say here is general, and with respect to any real interpretation of the political spin-off from the law it is
non- committal. I hope eventually to attempt such an interpretation with
the help of a great deal of manuscript material relating to the out-of-court
chapter of the subject, but I am not ready for that. The first step toward it
is the cases. A controversy about what courts are and should be doing
can hardly be seen in a clear light without first getting it as straight as
possible what they were actually doing, and how in actual cases they debated what they should be. This is only the first step, for when law becomes controversial outside the courtroom perceptions of the “is” and
opinions of the “ought” unconstrained by the immediacies of particular
cases tend to become the dominant reality. Manuscript material coming
out of the controversy over Prohibitions helps to get at those perceptions
and opinions, and at the tactics of the partisans. The material is itself
technical; it is hard to see in its terms, as well as to see in perspective,
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without prior immersion in the legal issues through the cases. While the
outlines of the politics are not obscure, their inner life is, I believe, open
to reexamination. That presupposes getting on top of the technical law
the politics were concerned with -- by the steps this study as a whole represents and the further one of taking apart the detailed documentation of
the public controversy. I shall confine myself to the outlines here, by
which I mean the apparent shape of the problem and the feel of the way it
was handled, rather than the high points of the narrative. For telling the
story well enough to pick out the high points is just what I have to defer.
Already late in Queen Elizabeth’s reign, the ecclesiastical authorities
began to complain that their courts were being excessively prohibited.
Complaints from that quarter continued under James I and were eventually joined by those of other frequently prohibited courts. There was
manifestly a serious issue as to whether the chief common law courts
were applying the law correctly in Prohibition cases. That issue merged,
as large differences on legal policy tend to, into an issue about the suitability of current law, technically correct or not, to current situations and
needs. It may seem equally manifest that the questions demanded a legislative solution. There is no sign, however, that a statute defining the scope
of Prohibitions was considered by the contemporary actors (except in an
oblique way by the common law judges, who probably saw no need for
legislation, but who had an obvious rhetorical opening to say, “If you do
not like our decisions, change or redefine the law by statute -- until then
we must do our duty by our best lights.”) It is easy -- and persuasive -- to
suggest that legislation capable of satisfying the non-common law
authorities and the King, who sympathized with them, would have had no
chance of passage. Lay interests in such practical things as tithe-avoidance and sentimental identification with the common law would have
been too strong in Parliament. But perhaps one should not jump to that
exclusive explanation too unreservedly. Hope of finding a quicker and
easier solution to the problems than a legislative one, and mistaken but
plausible assumptions on the part of King James and his advisers as to
the propriety of proceeding otherwise, may have diverted the government
from the less-than-hopeless prospects of a Parliamentary course. It is
probably right to suppose that the prospects would have been dim, at any
rate without a good deal of compromise, but it may be inadvisable to assume too much about public attitudes at the level reflected in Parliament
toward the competing values in a complex legal area.
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The course taken, at any rate, was to call the judges to account, to try
persuading them they had gone wrong and procuring their agreement to a
change. It is anachronistic to think of this as scandalous on its face.
Evolution of the standards that make it seem scandalous was catalyzed,
perhaps critically, by judicial resistance to the government’s proceedings.
The resistance owed a great deal, perhaps nearly everything, to the force
of character and the ideas of Sir Edward Coke.
For seeing the proceedings in the mildest light -- the opposite of the
light in which infringement of judicial independence and an attempt to
change the law without legislative process are the prominent appearances
-- one might imagine in the modern world a conference or convention of
high-ranking judges. I mean one of those get-togethers that have no official status, but merely assemble people with common problems, who
must in one way or another work together, for the purpose of discussing
their shared concerns and getting to know each other’s points of view.
Suppose some serious differences and bitter feelings come out in such
discussion: The second-rank judges are sharply critical of certain decisions by the Supreme Court, to which they must defer when they are sitting judicially. Not only are the highest judges made aware that senior
fellow lawyers, who are entitled to respect merely as such, and who express their objections in a reasoned way, strongly disagree with them;
they are also made to see that the subordinate judges consider their own
judicial lives made difficult by the law that comes down from above, their
authority weakened and effective discharge of their duty to handle the
cases that come before them obstructed. Suppose that a brotherly spirit
prevails. Instead of going home in sadness or anger, the judges decide to
have it out in vigorous but fair-minded debate. The superior judges defend themselves, but in the end the subordinate judges make a dent. Perhaps the Supreme Court cannot simply reverse itself when it returns to the
courtroom, but a subtler change of direction occurs. When new cases of
the controverted sort come up, the art of distinguishing is used to move
the law closer to the critics’ position, and when there are openings for discretion it is used in a new way. The Supreme Court judges do not sign a
contract when they depart from the conference, but they let it be understood that they will try to avoid the behavior that has caused trouble, and
so they do.
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This fantasy may not be so far removed from what King James envisaged. His ideal project may have been to assemble the common law
judges and their judicial critics from the non-common law courts -- in the
mediating presence of himself and his law officers -- for searching and
brotherly debate to occur, and for reason and peace to prevail. There
were three flaws, three main departures from the picture above: the judicial convention was not voluntary, was not on genuinely neutral ground,
and was not among peers.
The King could order his judges before him, insist that they explain
themselves to him and answer their fellow-judge critics. Not only was he
King; he was titular head of the judicial system. Though by firmly rooted
usage he was foreclosed from sitting judicially in person, he was very
plausibly entitled to concern himself with disharmony among his own
judges. There was no denying the King what he wanted externally -- not
simply because of the aura and power of kingship, but because it would
be hard to dispute legalistically his interest in the Prohibitions controversy. The judges must and did appear, argue, and submit briefs in defense of their conduct. But being compelled to answer, they were in a
good position to cry interference and undue pressure -- indeed, to blur the
distinction between a problem of inter-judicial relations and mere royal
meddling with the professional work of the courts. The possibilities of
political tact are nearly boundless; it is not inconceivable that the King
could somehow have maneuvered the judges into a voluntary-seeming
discussion of Prohibitions. Political tact was not James I’s strong suit; he
had a gift for using the heavy hand of royal office on the wrong occasions.
Partly just by involving himself heavy-handedly, and partly by things
he said in discussions with the judges, the King raised a further spectre:
the theory that in a matter of inter- jurisdictional relations the monarch
had dispositive powers he would never have claimed in the sphere of ordinary law. I do not know how well-articulated such a theory was in the
minds of the King and his legal advisers, much less how committed to it
anyone was. It was in any event neither outrageous nor unthreatening. It
is reasonable to distinguish between legislation and an administrative
level of rule-making within the legal system. To make law in the sense of
changing or defining the rights and liabilities of the subject so as to bind
the courts was of course not in the King’s power except with Parliamen-
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tary assent. Neither, in a jurisprudential universe that had no place for judicial legislation, was lawmaking within the judges’ scope. On the other
hand, whether settling a dispute among judicial bodies about their respective shares in the common enterprise of interpreting and enforcing the law
counts as legislation depends on one’s angle of vision. It is at least arguable that the distribution of responsibility within the legal system as a
whole does not touch the interest of the subject so as to require his consent through Parliament to a specification of it beyond that given in the
existing legal sources and traditions, even though the specification be at
variance with certain controverted opinions about their meaning. (My
language here is deliberately circumspect. One might need to preserve a
distinction between grossly altering that distribution by overturning very
well-based, virtually uncontroverted understandings and relatively marginal “specification.”) Could the mutually interested judicial authorities,
at odds about jurisdiction, discuss their differences and arrive at a mutual
agreement on future conduct, which they would then be obliged to respect? Would they escape the aspersion that that process amounted to
covert legislation? If the answer is “Yes,” the King’s title to impose a settlement in the absence of agreement -- a settlement within the same constraints as would apply to any spontaneous internal rule-making and
border-defining activity on the judges’ part -- seems hard to deny. To
make the King a total figurehead with respect to the judicial system operating in his name is difficult against the background of the 16th-17th century conception of the royal office in general. Reserving him an
administrator’s and arbitrator’s position in the judicial sphere, in recognition of his interest in efficient law-administration and in harmony among
his agents, seems a modest addition to the list of royal powers.
From the opposite angle of vision, the suggestion that the King might
lay down standards for the issuance of Prohibitions can be seen as unconstitutionality dressed in sophistry. In what sense is deciding whether a
Prohibition should be granted not like other questions of law, within the
expertise of those on whom the law casts the decision and within their responsibility to construe the law? In what sense is a non-statutory attempt
to direct such decisions different from purporting to direct other legal decisions without due legislative process? The distinctions above of course
claim to specify a sense. But do they do so cogently? Even conceding
some difference between “ordinary law” and “intra-judicial matters,” -such that the judges with prohibiting power could be said to have a right
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or a moral duty to be especially mindful of “policy” as well as “law,” and
to take account of the interests and opinions of other courts in the total
system and of an efficient division of labor -- it remains arguable that
royal interference with mandatory intent would be improper. Any mandate laid down would arguably be unbinding and for that reason extremely inadvisable. Coke exploited this angle of vision effectively in
opposition to the King.
Thus royal intervention in the Prohibitions controversy, unless by subtle indirection, would have been invidious, partly by raising gratuitous
constitutional issues, even if it had been even-handed. It was not, despite
the element of good intentions in King James’s mixture of motives. In
other situations as well, he had trouble fulfilling the role of honest broker
he sometimes saw himself in. He entered the Prohibitions controversy as
the partisan and protector of the non-common law courts and showed his
bias. He may have acted from honorable and sincere convictions as to
how the legal system should be operated and unseemly disputes avoided,
but his style was not designed to serve his cause.
The final blight on the Jacobean out-of-court debate over Prohibitions
was the disparity of the antagonists. The common law judges would simply not regard the non-common law authorities as fellow judges in the
full sense of sharers of a common enterprise. In this frame of mind there
was an element of sociology. The non-common law judges were mostly
of the separate and rival civilian profession; the cream of the common
law bar, from which the common law judges came, was a social élite,
oftenby origin and in any case by self-enriching achievement; I do not
think it is entirely misleading to say that the common lawyers looked on
the civilians as a doctor does on, let us say, something in the range of
dentists, veterinarians, osteopaths, and chiropractors; wealth, snobbery,
training at the “best institutions” (the Inns of Court in the heyday of their
prestige, in a way outranking even the ancient universities, which in any
event many of the common lawyers bad passed through enroute to the
more exclusive professional club) contributed to the perspective. Its
deeper source, however, was jurisprudential. In the Introduction to Vol. I,
I discuss the ideas and attitudes in virtue of which, from the point of view
of many or most common lawyers, the non-common law systems were
not really “part of the law as a whole” (as well as the ideas informing the
opposite point of view). I do not want to repeat that discussion by antici-
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pation. It attempts to catch something of the mentality in which the rival
systems appeared as merely tolerated, as subordinate in a much deeper
sense than is implied in the plain legal fact that their jurisdiction was subject to common law control -- as if they were truly foreign enclaves, that
had somehow, almost unaccountably, been suffered to spring up, but were
indeed like tenants at sufferance of the law, the “common custom of the
realm,’’ which ultimately represented all that could strictly be meant by
law. (The non-common law courts, with an exception of sorts for the equity system, were often spoken of as “foreign,” without necessarily any
further sense than “non-common law,” but the very currency of the word
was an invitation to hear its wider, more unfriendly connotations. Of
course the Papalist history of the ecclesiastical system made the invitation
all the harder to resist.) On the other hand, much of the burden of this entire study is to show that in everyday working reality -- the process of deciding cases -- such difference and distance between the common law and
the non-common law systems is not so apparent. The rights and roles of
the non-common law courts -- what I have called the federalistic character of the legal system as a whole -- were respected; jurisdictional problems as they arose in practical cases were perceived as real problems; it
was hardly regarded as inconsequential whether the courts subject to Prohibition were ousted from their jurisdiction or forced to conform to common law preferences, like tenants at sufferance when he who suffers
decides, as arbitrarily as he pleases, to suffer only so much. As the study
unfolds, especially in Vol. II, it will come out that giving a real sense to
the common law’s superiority over the rival systems beyond the obvious
sense in which it was procedurally in the driver’s seat and responsible for
keeping jurisdictional lines straight was a tortuous and tenuous business.
My immediate point is that the political controversy over Prohibitions
brought out the perspective in which radical distance between the common law and its rivals is the most prominent appearance. Wrenched from
the context of deciding cases, in which they thought they should be left
undisturbed, forced to argue on ground they considered improper, the
common law judges tended to fall back on the attitudes that deprived their
rivals of respectability and prevented regarding them as peers of a sort.
Again, it is very much a question how far Coke, with his peculiar pride
and pugnacity and his superior intellectual grasp of the point of view I am
talking about, was responsible for that perception. I hope that the Introduction to Vol. I will justify my calling the attitudes that made it hard for
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the common law judges to dispute with the non-common law judges as
equals “jurisprudential” -- the product of serious thinking about law and
English law, especially on Coke’s part, sharpened and catalyzed by serious contrary thinking, rather than a set of mere prejudices.
Subject to the reticence I consider advisable in representing the story
of the political controversy, I think it is safe to say that it was inconclusive in outcome. It rather petered out than issued in a firm agreement on
future practice, a purported royal decision, or a decisive refusal by the
common law judges to pay the least attention to the fact that out-of-court
disputation and negotiation had occurred. The immediate question for
this study is whether effects of the controversy can be seen in the cases,
either in the form of direct references to it or of shifts in direction which it
might explain. (The same question arises for another episode of out-ofcourt discussion early in Charles I’s reign, when the judges seem to have
been more compliant about listening to criticism and undertaking to
watch their steps in the light of it -- whether or not this had any significant effect on decisions.)
I want now to refer back to the outline of the study on p. ix and explain
briefly the meaning of the several topics and the rationale of my organization. Much of this is evident from the titles and the information about the
setting of jurisdictional cases I have just conveyed. In some instances, a
little more explanation will make it easier to follow a presentation that inevitably moves slowly through a plethora of cases on many distinct problems. Readers without a special interest in the whole subject may prefer
to read the detailed portions selectively or to concentrate on the more general discussions of underlying principle that preface most sections. Some
of the detailed topics have a stronger bearing on general questions of history and jurisprudence than others. It will assist the process of selection
for the reader to have at the outset a somewhat fuller picture of how the
study is put together than a bare list of headings can communicate. At the
beginning of sub-sections of the detailed discussion, I almost always put a
summary of the law as it emerges from the cases analyzed in the adjoining text. (The only exceptions are a few short sub-topics where the summary is comprised in the opening paragraphs of the text.) It will be easier
for the reader who wants to know the upshot of the cases to find the relevant summaries if he starts with some notion of the problems covered in
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the various parts. More specific guidance is provided by the table of contents at the beginning of each major part.
The significance of the procedural issues in Vol. I is explained in the
Introduction to Vol. I. That Introduction, more than others, is concerned
with the climate of opinion surrounding the Prohibition cases, outside as
well as inside the legal community. It is accordingly relevant for everything in the study, not only the material in Vol. I. One reason for putting
procedure first is that the cases thereon are in a sense the best measure of
the courts’ attitude toward the importance of jurisdiction and of how seriously in practice they took the undisputed theory behind the writ of Prohibition. Another reason is that points of procedure are of course involved
in many cases on substantive law. The refinements of procedural law
taken up in Vol. I, as opposed to the basic picture given above in this Introduction, are usually not essential for understanding substantive cases,
but familiarity with them can be helpful.
Vols. II and III are the most important
sections of the study for historical jurisprudence. They raise the most fundamental questions about what
the Prohibition was for and what the proper role of the central common
law courts in controlling the non-common law ones should be. Sometimes whether a Prohibition should be granted, though perhaps problematic enough as technical law, was not very deeply problematic. That was
so (a) when the end of the Prohibition was to prevent a non-common law
court from encroaching directly on the business of the common law -providing a remedy which could just as well be pursued at common law -or (b) when there was a positive rule of law, common or statutory, limiting what some non-common law court could do. By contrast, there were
four situations in which whether to grant a writ was “deeply problematic.”
(a) I have already said that some issues arising in originally proper
non-common law suits were grounds for Prohibition, because those issues
were considered the common law’s to determine. In the end, some “common law issues” were firmly recognized, and whether a Prohibition
should be granted when one of them came up was not very doubtful. But
a certain puzzlement always surrounded this sort of Prohibition. When it
was argued that some issue other than the well-recognized few was exclusively fit for common law determination, the courts tended to be troubled
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and divided. Was the Prohibition really meant for preventing non-common law courts from deciding the questions they needed to in order to
dispose of suits properly before them? Was that function essentially the
same as, or implicit in, what Prohibitions were manifestly for -- preventing the non-common law courts from taking cases they ought not to ab
initio?
(b) Suppose there is no pretense that an initially proper non-common
law suit should be prohibited merely because a certain issue has arisen.
May the suit ever be prohibited because of the way the non-common law
court has handled the case or an issue in it? Can a non-common law
court ever mishandle something it is admittedly free to determine so that
the common law courts are entitled to prevent or correct such mishandling? (Obviously the non-common law courts, like any court, could err,
but why should their errors not be solely correctable by appeal? As we
have seen, appeal was generously available in the ecclesiastical system,
where alone the present situation arose in practice.)
The practical answer to the questions was a tentative, “Yes.” In fact,
common law courts were often invited to intervene because an ecclesiastical court had made a certain ruling or followed a certain procedure; not
infrequently they did intervene. The search for a theory to justify such intervention, however, produced much trouble and little clear resolution.
The existence of the Prohibition, which in its simpler uses seems a mere
instrument of traffic-control -- a way of saying, “This case (or sometimes
this issue) belongs in Court A, that one in Court B” -- forced the judges to
consider whether parts of the common law had virtually the status of constitutional law, a set of standards which all courts in England must observe, whether or not they are administering the common law in its
everyday sense. The problem was probably too deep to be solved satisfactorily, but it is of greater interest for general jurisprudence than anything else in this study.
(c) Suppose a suit brought in a non-common law court does not encroach on the common law’s monopoly over some kinds of litigation.
Suppose it does not violate any specifiable rule to the effect that such a
suit may not be entertained by that court. The suit is novel or unusual, not
immediately recognizable as a kind of suit which the court in question
customarily handles. Nothing has happened -- no issues have yet arisen
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within the suit, there is nothing the non-common law court can be said to
have mishandled; the suit has merely been brought. Could there be any
basis for prohibiting it? Why should the non-common law court not be
free to decide whether or not the novel claim is from its point of view a
good cause of action, as common law-courts would be free to do if an
analogously novel claim were advanced before them? 3
Again, there are a few Prohibitions which seem to be issued only because such non-common law suits appeared to the common law judges to
extend what I shall call "the ambit of remediable wrong" too far. Again,
there is some discussion in the cases of the common law judges' title to
3

Lest it be objected that old-style common law courts operating under the writ system did not
have authority to consider the actionability of "novel claims": That is in an abstract sense true.
Indeed, the formal concept expressed in the writ system, and mentalities conditioned by it, tend
to explain why some judges did not think non-common law courts could be altogether free to
consider entertaining new claims appropriate to no other tribunal. By the "formal concept" I
mean the idea that there is a limited supply of valid causes of action embodied in the writs,
beyond which the scope of wrongs remediable at common law simply does not reach -- as it
were, if there is no writ in the Register whereby you can complain about my doing x, I may do it
with legal impunity so far as the common law is concerned.
The realistic picture is rather different. For one thing, the action of Trespass on the Case was
open-ended. By means of that writ, one could claim that any act allegedly causing damage to
oneself was tortious, and it was for the common law courts to say whether it was, subject only to
appellate and Parliamentary correction. More generally, the courts were free, subject only to
those controls, to hold that any given statement of facts (in pleading terms, any declaration) fell
under the writ which the plaintiff employed. Of course, the courts were "not supposed" to make
outrageously inappropriate judgments to that effect. but notoriously they stretched the language
of some writs beyond the letter. Arguably, analogous scope in non-common law courts not using
a writ system would consist in the kind of freedom modern courts generally have -- to judge
whether any purported cause of action is good, not by asking whether it fits a particular writ or
fails to, nor by asking whether it is strictly precedented (which a "novel claim" is not by
definition), but by considering its compatibility or continuity with recognized causes of action.
I stop short of "asking whether the complaint is sound as a matter of natural justice" and "asking
whether it is a complaint that should be made legally valid by virtue of legislative authority
delegated to the court." It is not necessary to go that far, where no judge could be expected to go
without either (a) the recognition of judicial legislation that is an incident of legal positivism, a
jurisprudence of later vintage than the period we are concerned with or (b) the doctrine that every
court is ultimately a court of equity, entitled to enforce the requirements of natural justice as the
court construes them. The latter doctrine, to the best of my knowledge, was held by only one
person in the 17th century, Thomas Hobbes (in his Dialogue between a Philosopher and a
Student of the Common LaW of England --modern ed. by Josephy Cropsey, Chicago, 1971).
Hobbes was a self-conscious enfant terrible vis-a-vis the common lawyers, a radical iconoclast
with respect to all their jurisprudential beliefs.
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control that “ambit,” but ambiguity and uncertainty abound. Under (b)
above, we ask, “Are there some standards binding on all courts which it is
the common law courts’ duty to enforce outside the common law system?” We now ask the distinguishable but related question, “Do the common law courts have a kind of supervisory authority over the whole
English legal system such that they may control what is to be recognized
as a valid cause of action outside the common law system proper?’’
(d) Suppose a suit is brought in Ecclesiastical Court A when there is
reason to say it should be brought in Ecclesiastical Court B, but there is
no objection to it as an ecclesiastical suit. Or suppose a suit is brought in
an ecclesiastical court when there are grounds for thinking it should be
brought in a court of equity (or vice versa). May a common law court prohibit it? Most of the Prohibitions of this sort seriously considered or
granted were a matter of enforcing a particular statute regulating intra-ecclesiastical traffic. But there are a few cases outside the statute or in
which the statute was not relied on. Questions similar to those under (c)
arise: Are the common law courts the traffic directors for the legal system as a whole? Is it their business to see that non-common law jurisdiction stays in order, when there is no question of encroachment on
common law jurisdiction? Again, there is express discussion in the cases,
divided opinion, and irresolution.
Vol. II is principally about situation (b). Situation (c) and (d) are
treated directly in Vol. III. The more routine and straightforward aspects
of situation (a) are deferred until later in the study (Part VIII4) for reasons
of expository convenience, but owing to overlap with the issues under (b)
some of the most difficult and important problems under (a) are treated in
a section of Vol. II. Vol. III develops the contrast between the least questionable kind of initial-jurisdiction-controlling Prohibition (prevention of
direct encroachment on the common law) and the most questionable -- ( c )
and (d) here. In other words, Vol. III is not exclusively about situations
(c) and (d), but they are the heart of it.
Part IV is about the enforcement of statutes by Prohibition. The introductory essay will deal with another jurisprudential problem of considerable
depth: By what warrant are the common law courts the exclusive final interpreters of the statutes? In other words, why should non-common law
courts not have standing to construe and apply to themselves statutes
4

See table on p. ix. 'Part' refers to continuations of the study not yet ready
for publication. The present three Vols. correspond to Parts I-III on the table.
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which are surely addressed to them as much as to the King’s common law
judges? In contrast to the problems in Vols. II and III, this one was in
practice cleanly resolved: Whether it is warrantable in theory or not, the
common law courts did in fact take it upon themselves to enforce by Prohibition their interpretation of statutes concerning what non-common law
courts should and should not do. The theoretical warrant is nevertheless
worth reflecting on, not only because the doubts -- and the practical resolution in favor of a common law monopoly -- are informative about the
jurisprudential climate in which Prohibition law was made, but also because the issues of theory do to a degree hover over the cases. They are
occasionally mentioned; occasionally the common law monopoly is expressly defended. Just because the monopolistic power was asserted
without serious dissent among the common law judges themselves, and
was repeatedly used, its legitimacy was a more visible object for the noncommon law courts and their political partisans to oppose than the tenuous and tangled common law powers dealt with in Vols. II and III.
The body of Part IV is about a number of particular statutes whose
complex judicial gloss was largely written through Prohibition cases and
cases involving related jurisdiction- controlling instrumentalities, mainly
Habeas corpus. Other statutes are dealt with in other parts of the study,
according as they bear on various subject-matter categories. The large,
politically delicate matter of the jurisdiction and powers of the High
Commission is located in Part IV because that was essentially a question
of what authority a statute -- the Elizabethan Supremacy Act -- intended
to give the Commission.
Most of the rest of the topics in the table are self- explanatory. The
Prohibition cases bearing on “subject-matter categories” are brought together -- e.g., the jurisdiction of Admiralty and equity courts, the boundaries of ecclesiastical jurisdiction over defamation. To some extent, my
ordering is influenced by the analytic categories developed in Vol. III.
E.g.: The bulk of Admiralty Prohibitions conform to the simple “paradigm” of Prohibition law, as I shall call it--preventing non-common law
courts from doing in effect what common law courts were prepared to do
themselves. Cases on ecclesiastical defamation are a good illustration of
the range of Prohibitions -- “paradigm” cases on the one hand and, on the
other cases in which the common law judges undertook to say to ecclesiastical courts, “You simply may not treat these words as defamatory -- it
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extends ’the ambit of remediable wrong’ unduly.’’ Most Prohibitions to
courts of equity by their nature restrict non-common law courts from
overextending that ambit -- i.e., from judging for themselves that suchand-such is a valid claim to equitable relief.
By and large, jurisprudential interest declines in the later parts of the
study, though there is no decline in difficult problems of ordinary law nor
in the real-world importance of the judges’ decisions. Part VIII is something of an exception, requiring a little explanation.
In some ways the best answer to the question raised in Vol. II (“When
is common law interference with the handling of a case in non-common
law jurisdiction justified?”) is “Only when the cases’ outcome might have
a de facto impact on interests in the common law sphere, such as prejudicing potential common law litigation.” This answer is a negation of
more portentous claims for the common law. I.e., it comes to saying that
there is not some set of common law standards that must be adopted as a
model by courts not applying the common law. All it gives the common
law courts is an extended form of the self-protective function served by
“paradigmatic” Prohibitions. The cases in Vol. II flirt with “more portentous” theories. They do not agree that the more modest “extended selfprotective function” exhausts the common law’s power. They do, however, pretty well establish its legitimacy, and as a whole they can be read
as concluding that it is the best bet among theories.
In Part VIII, under the rubric “collateral infringement of common law
interests,” I deal with the main substantive topic dominated by the “extended self-protective function.” The topic is mixed wills, which I have
already introduced briefly. The common law courts were often invited,
sometimes successfully, to block probate because otherwise unexceptionable ecclesiastical proceedings might prejudice litigation over the real-estate portion of a mixed will -- e.g., by finding the testator insane, so that a
jury trying a case concerning the land might be disposed to conclude he
was insane, a conclusion it might not reach if there had been no prior ecclesiastical action nominally concerned only with the personal estate.
It would clutter Vol. II unduly and distract from the major jurisprudential issues central to it to deal there with the rather large and complex
“subject-matter category“ of mixed wills. In Part VIII, I so to speak re-
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turn to an off-shoot of Vol. II, the least controversial product of the Vol. II
cases. Having done so, I also deal in Part VIII with another off-shoot -the residue of the analytic category “common law issues.” Again, it
would burden Vol. II with distracting detail to treat aspects of that category that are not intimately connected with the cases on control of noncommon law conduct. They are relegated to Part VIII, but because of the
link with Vol. II there is more of the deeper sort of jurisprudential interest
in that section than in the other parts of the study.
It remains to explain the anomalous Part XI. That section will have
two main sub-divisions:
(a) I have emphasized that the form of the study is intensely legal.
That does not mean the tone is abstractly doctrinal, for the focus is entirely on individual cases, and cases cannot be discussed without an eye
on the real-life situations they present and the judges’ responses to that
reality. I do, however, approach and organize the material as a lawyer
does with cases relevant for his practice. I try to figure out how the
judges saw particular cases and how their decisions (and dissents) add up
to generalizations about related lines of cases -- generalizations that
would predict judicial reaction to new cases in the same line if one were a
contemporary engaged in practice. (Sometimes, of course, chaos is the
only generalization.) Although the study is sprinkled with historical commentary and speculation, it is not geared to history in a broader sense than
the history of problems, and complexes of related problems, about the law
of jurisdiction over a relatively short span of time. I do not try in the
process of the study to make a systematic approach to historical questions
of a higher order. This is deliberate, for I do not think they can be approached intelligently, save for incidental impressions, until the returns,
in a more limited legal sense, are in. The commentary, or “historical
cross-analysis‘‘ I foresee in Part XI will attempt to supply the further element.
The legal material of course points beyond the law in a narrow sense.
For example, many areas of jurisdictional law, different from each other
in legal structure, have to do with tithes. It is possible to cut through all
these and say something beyond the immediate suggestions of common
sense about how the payer and the recipient of tithes fared at the hands of
the law -- and were likely to fare in practice, since the principal social
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function of litigation and legal pronouncement is to fix the background
against which people are well-advised to conduct their affairs, including
the decision to litigate. Are tendencies in the treatment of payers and recipients over the period of the study perceptible? Are there nice points -the grosser ones can hardly fail to be evident--about the lay view of the
church and of its interests and agencies to be gathered from a vast number
of diverse encounters between lay and ecclesiastical courts? My intention
is to cross-analyze my topics and to count outcomes, with questions of
this order in mind, in as many ways as seem profitable; I cannot anticipate fully what ways will turn out to be.
I have the same intention with respect to a second type of question,
more internal to the law. I have already indicated my interest in these
questions; to say anything systematic about them will again require looking across the many analytic and subject-matter topics of jurisdictional
law. I refer to what I call above “judicial behavior” -- the coherence of
individual judges’ decision-making over a diversity of issues (Sir Edward
Coke’s above all); the existence of schools or parties among the judges,
with respect to jurisdictional law but also to the general canons of judging; (Can one, for example, perceive through the Prohibition cases as a
whole, in the decade or so before the Civil War, the “royalist Bench” of
tradition?); the small-group sociology of the Bench and Bar -- what personalities were dominant, which intellects impressive, what habits of
smoothing disagreement and what signs of its aggressive expression are
evident; the practical indicia of jurisprudence, such as the propensity to
argue from precedent and to respect it; trends and changes within the period in these and other regards.
Finally, it is my expectation that once Prohibition law in the cases is
worked out through the body of the study, and cross-analysis of various
sorts has put it in perspective, the context will exist in which the story of
the political controversy over Prohibitions can be significantly retold. As
I have indicated, there is a good deal of manuscript material on the controversy, which I would expect to use for that narrative, but the most important prerequisite for it is a command of the case law. Part XI will
include a retelling and analysis of the controversy such as seems necessary and possible after the preliminary operations have been completed.
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(b) The law of Prohibitions did not of course come to an end with the
Civil War, which marks the approximate terminus of my detailed study.
(1640 comes close to marking it. I do deal with a few cases falling between 1640 and 1660, including some from the Interregnum. But that is a
badly reported period, so that the additional material it supplies is scanty.
By the same token, though 1580 is my approximate terminus a quo, because the abundance of reported cases starts about then, I discuss such
cases from the earlier post-Reformation decades as I have found. The
medieval law of Prohibitions is outside my province, though it comes into
the picture to the limited degree that the 16th and 17th century lawyers
and judges cited medieval cases. The reasons why the flood of Prohibitions started in the later Elizabethan years, in so far as that is not a trick of
surviving evidence, will be among the concerns of the historical commentary I have just described.) I have, however, collected and classified
the printed cases (closer to the whole body than in the earlier period) from
the later 17th century -- roughly through the Stuarts or to 1714. I anticipate a follow-up section in Part XI on how Prohibition cases were handled after the great disruption of the mid-17th century, in subtly but not
grossly altered circumstances. The basic components that made for a law
of Prohibitions remained in place. The ecclesiastical, Admiralty, and equity systems were still in business, though altered by the abolition of the
High Commission and minor equity courts; the principal common law
courts were still called on to regulate their jurisdiction, by Prohibition and
sometimes otherwise, in most of the old litigative contexts. It would beg
the question to say strongly that there was a subtle change in the approach
to jurisdictional problems, in addition to marginal changes in their institutional setting. For the purpose of extending the study in an afterword on
the later 17th century is to determine how much change there was, first on
all the substantive points that came up again in later cases and then in a
general or “cross-analyzed,’ way.
Nevertheless, speaking in a tentative tone, I think that breaking the
continuity of this continuing chapter of legal history at the Civil War is
justified, as I have to a degree already suggested. Judges after 1660 were
looking back to law mostly made before 1640, interpreting it in attempting to follow it (with, I believe, a rather more conscious impulse to base
decisions on precedent than characterized the earlier jurisprudence). It
may even be possible to say that they were looking back on what they re-
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garded a something of a Golden Age, with Coke cast in a larger role as its
hero and spokesman -- thanks in part to the impressiveness of his publications -- than he actually occupied in his time. Their decisions tend to present a version of the law shaped before 1640, a version that does not
always agree with my analysis, from a more distant and more neutral perspective, of what the Elizabethan, Jacobean, and Caroline courts held. Of
course the later Stuart courts saw the law whose continuity they tried to
maintain through the incomplete information they had (tending to dependence on the cases that had reached print) and through the moods,
fashions, and perceived needs of the Restoration period--a time, after all,
of quite conscious new beginnings, when a terrible national trauma had
been weathered. The disruption seemed at once to warn against old habits of mind and to have resolved old problems by bitter experience. My
impression is that there was a good deal of specific legal change in the jurisdictional field after 1660, though on routine matters there was a good
deal of consistency with earlier law too. But that, as well as my general
observations here, is impression and hypothesis. The purpose of the extension in Part XI is to test the suggestions I have made, and indeed to ask
in a systematic way whether the periodization I adopt in confining the
study to the pre-Civil War section of the post-Reformation period is justified.
Note on Technical Procedures
The MS. reports used in this study are all in abbreviated Law French.
My practices are:
(a) To translate into English when quoting from the reports, save at a
very few points where there could be doubt as to what translation catches
the meaning. Because Law French is not a natural language -- but a professional jargon used by lawyers who thought in English and in legalese, - translation is virtually automatic. The printed reports were originally in
Law French (in their MS. form and sometimes in the earliest printed version), but nearly all of them have been so long available in English that
their original condition is easily forgotten.
(b) To rely substantially on paraphrase in stating cases and opinions,
quoting the reports directly only when there is a purpose to be served. A
purpose is served when, say, the report itself gives a judge’s words in di-
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rect discourse and the words have some particularity (i.e., are not in the
nature of “Justice A said: In my opinion Prohibition should be denied”).
By and large, for the basic structure of a case the step from original to
paraphrase is nearly as safe as that from Law French to English. Full
quotation of MS. reports in the notes, though perhaps an ideal desideratum, would swell an already large work with a great deal of repetitious
and idle verbiage. The British Library MSS. used in the study are not terribly inaccessible, and my representations of many printed cases in paraphrase can easily be checked against the ipsissima verba of the reports.
In my discussion of the cases, I often go beyond “basic structure” and
what the report unmistakably says in effect. I project from the visible
part of the iceberg to what I think a spelled-out version of the judge’s or
lawyer’s argument would probably be. (It bears emphasizing that the reports are often very succinct note-taker’s documents. The degree of articulation that readers of modern reports expect is rarely there.) There is
nothing sure-fire about the projections, though I believe their spirit is conservative enough. I believe also that readers will have no trouble distinguishing, by context and manner, when I am simply stating what the
report certainly says and when I am stepping beyond that.
Printed reports are cited by the reporter’s name. I have in effect used a
modified form of standard legal citation -- modified because the standard
system, with its abbreviations, may be confusing to readers who do not
regularly consult old-fashioned legal sources and literature. E.g., “Godbolt, 171” means p. 171 of Godbolt’s Reports, and for nearly everyone
the straightforward way to look up Godbolt’s Reports is to find the appropriate volume of the standard Full Reprint of the English Reports. All the
printed reports used in this study are contained in the handful of volumes
in the Reprint representing the earliest King’s Bench and Common Pleas
reports. The early modern reports are also available in older editions, easily located by looking under the reporter’s name in law libraries that possess them. Pagination is standardized.
Medieval reports -- i.e., the Year Books -- come up only occasionally
in the study. When they do: e.g., “Y.B. 31 Edw. 3, 17” = P. 17 of the
Year Book for the 31st year of Edward III’S reign. Year Books are usually most likely to be available in the “full reprint” of 1688, though there
are also earlier editions. At their most convenient -- in the late-17th century consolidated reprint -- they are unfortunately only available in abbre-
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viated Law French and Gothic print. Translations are sporadic; I believe
none exist for any of the Year Book cases actually discussed in this study.
Nearly all relevant MS. reports in the British Library are from four collections. These are abbreviated as follows: Lansd. = Lansdowne MSS;
Harl. = Harleian MSS; Harg. = Hargrave MSS; Add. = Additional MSS.
E.g., “Add. 20,203, f. 97” = folio 97 of Additional MS. #20,203 [97b=the
back side of folio 97].” Folio numbers are those penciled in by the collectors, not the page numbers which the original bunches of reports sometimes have. When MSS. other than these four are used the name of the
collection is spelled out.
All cases are dated when possible by term and regnal year. The terms
are abbreviated as follows: M. = Michaelmas (autumn term); H. = Hilary
(winter term); P. = Easter (spring term); T. = Trinity (early summer term).
All cases directly discussed, down to the extension of the study in Part
XI, are from three reigns: Elizabeth I, James I, and Charles I. These are
abbreviated: Eliz., Jac., and Car. respectively. When other monarchs are
referred to in citing statutes or earlier cases used in argument in the main
body of Elizabethan and early Stuart cases, analogous but more self-evident abbreviations are used. E.g., “23 Hen. 8, c. 9” = chapter 9 of the statute of 23 Henry VIII.
Separate indices covering all three of the volumes here published comprise (a) judges and counsel who appear in the cases and also miscellaneous personnel of the legal system who so appear (such as civil
lawyers and clerks of the courts); (b) statutes referred to; (c) cases treated
in the study, by name; and (d) the substantive contents of the three
volumes, in the 'General Index.' The indices should permit the reader to
carry out partially the kind of "cross-analysis" of the material ultimately
intended to be done in Part XI.
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PROCEDURE
Introduction
I propose first to look at cases which test in a general and relatively
simple way how much "favor in law" the Prohibition enjoyed. These
cases turn on points of procedure. They can be expected to suggest one or
the other of two attitudes on the part of the courts: (a) The courts might
tend to make things as easy as possible for parties suing Prohibitions by
fashioning and interpreting procedural rules in a liberal spirit. (b) They
might tend to insist on strict observance of such rules and allow the adversary party the advantage of technicalities. Those alternative attitudes
are of course always open in the administration of law. Courts may see it
as their duty to help people vindicate their substantive rights with as little
waste motion as possible and therefore to minimize the effect of the procedural mistakes litigants will inevitably make. They may, on the other
hand, set a high value on correct procedure and spare little pity for parties
who by bad advice or negligence stand in danger of losing what they are
entitled to. Either attitude may be generally characteristic of the courts in
a given period. On the other hand, the courts may widen or narrow the
gates of procedure according to the context. Some rights may seem so important that procedural rules and other technical habits of the courts-such
as rules of construction-should not stand in the way of their enforcement.
Other rights may seem so relatively inconsequential that high standards of
"art" should not be sacrificed to them. As the maxim had it, the common
law favors life, liberty, and dower. On the other side, there were claims
which the common law would prevent from being asserted to the limit of
the judges' ability to pick holes in them. For example, the courts of the
16th and 17th centuries sought to discourage actions for defamation by
construing away the slanderous sense of scurrilous utterances when
schoolbook logic and grammar permitted. A pedantic chapter of the law
was written for the worthy end of repressing vexatious litigation. "Actions
on the Case for words," having gained enough favor to get in the door,
were rather disfavored when they threatened to overwhelm the courts
with fishwives' quarrels. The "favor in law" enjoyed by Prohibitions will
be subject to various tests, among which the strictness of procedural requirements is perhaps the most straightforward.
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In general, one does not expect a free and easy attitude toward procedure from the common law courts. Common law procedure was a complex inheritance of time and practice, in which the profession took pride
and in whose mazes it won profit. The fine art of pleading was a monument to lawyerly skill and judicial conservatism, if also to pedantry and
the greed of clerks paid by the page. Tenderness toward clumsy litigants
was not typical. The Prohibition raises some special considerations, however.
In the normal run of life, a legal right may be seen as primarily a thing
of value to the individual to whom it belongs. If one approves of a legal
system, one presumably desires on the whole to see individuals assert the
rights which the system gives them to the extent they desire. The social
interest is in a general way identified with the successful vindication of
rights. But if reasonable procedural rules (or other enabling rules, such as
those prescribing the form in which a will or conveyance must be made)
sometimes stand in the way of an individual's assertion of his rights, the
loss is ordinarily thought of as falling on that person alone. The loss is a
consequence of his failure to use skillfully the instrumentalities the law
provides for him. It is not thought of as particularly harmful to society at
large. Sometimes, however, more will seem to be at stake than the individual's advantage. In a liberal society, for example, "civil rights" might
almost be defined as those rights considered to be especially tied up with
the moral welfare of society as a whole. A judge who stretches the rules,
say, to review the fairness of a criminal trial on Habeas corpus after ordinary opportunities for appeal have been allowed to pass may seem justified, whereas analogous stretching of the rules in everyday civil litigation
would seem unduly lax. One could describe the difference between the
two situations simply by saying that some rights are more important than
others, but it would also be appropriate to refer to the wider scope of the
interests involved, saying, perhaps, "The moral credit of the state and
every good citizen's capacity to identify with his government will suffer
if men are condemned to prison without a fair trial, whatever technical
reasons there are against letting this man raise objections to his trial."
From one point of view, the rights asserted by the Prohibition are a
straightforward example of rights in whose vindication society at large
was thought to have a special stake. In theory, a man who sought a Prohi-
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bition was conceived as calling attention to an infringement of the "royal
dignity." For practical purposes, infringing the royal dignity meant infringing the jurisdiction of the common law. In post-Reformation circumstances, that meant infringing the jurisdiction of one branch of the King's
judicial system. In a practical mood, one might ask whether the general
interest of society was especially involved with the jurisdiction of one set
of courts, except in the sense that it is involved with the observation of
the law as a general rule. I.e.: One might think it important for the lines of
jurisdiction prescribed by the law to be upheld on the whole, but consider
their occasional breakdown unimportant.
There is indeed a sense in which jurisdictional rules may be regarded
as especially safe in the hands of individual litigants: If a plaintiff sues in
the wrong court and the defendant makes no objection, society loses nothing in letting that court decide their case, no more than if the parties had
resorted to an arbitrator by agreement. There is therefore nothing objectionable per se about a court's deciding questions which the general rules
of law say are outside its competence. Therefore, one may argue, jurisdictional rules exist primarily for the benefit of such individual litigants as
choose to take advantage of them and take the trouble to do so correctly.
If a defendant is neglectful to claim his advantage in proper form, fairness to the plaintiff arguably requires that the latter be allowed the advantage of suing in the court of his preference.
This line of argument becomes less persuasive when the judges of one
court have some sort of expertise that those of another lack. Within limits,
that was true of the system we shall be dealing with. The ecclesiastical
courts, Admiralty, and Court of Requests were manned by civilians -i. e., men trained in the universities in Roman law, as opposed to the Innsof-Court products who manned the common law. Owing to the existence
of two separate legal professions, questions raised in the wrong court
could come before judges without the appropriate technical training.
But several qualifications must be put on that objection to the argument that jurisdiction is a relatively indifferent matter from a public point
of view. (a) Much litigation requires no special expertise because it depends on the ascertainment of facts. (b) Lack of expertise must not be
confused with ignorance of another jurisdiction's law. We have asked:
What does it matter if an ecclesiastical court, say, decides a given case or
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issue, considering that one party wants it to and the other has not properly
taken the steps available to him to prevent it? Of course it matters if the
case should be decided by common law rules. If the ecclesiastical judge
presumptively does not know those rules and cannot discover them, then
of course he should not be handling the case. But that begs the question.
We assume that ecclesiastical judges may decide issues before them by
their own law. We ask: So what?
There is a limited answer to that, a residuum of validity in the argument from the danger of inexpert judges. Suppose there is a subject-matter field in which the judges of one court have no training or experience.
Their law has no such topic, nothing from which to draw a solution. Perhaps it would not be so bad, in that case, if the judges went by the law of
nature. The trouble is, that is unlikely to happen. The judge confronted
with a strange situation is likely to draw consciously or unconsciously on
what he takes to be the relevant law of another jurisdiction. If the law is
technical enough and the judge inexpert enough, a botched job may ensue. There is something a little worse --a little more unfair to even a negligent party -- about an intended, but misconceived, application of
positive law than about a decision honestly based on common sense and
fairness alone. To apply this point realistically to the old English system:
The English law of real property -- to some extent other fields, but preeminently property in land - was a very special kettle of fish. An inexpert ecclesiastical judge faced by a property question of any complexity
would have to be a strong man not to try to apply the common law and a
quick study to do it right. (The other side of the realistic coin is that the
chance of a complex property question’s coming before an ecclesiastical
court was slight. But we shall have enough of realism anon.)
(c) The danger of the inexpert judge diminishes if there are facilities
for supplying his deficiencies. Actually, the old English system was rich
in such facilities. Common law courts often decided cases dependent on
questions of ecclesiastical law. Insofar as they believed that correct solution to such questions was necessary for their purposes and beyond their
legal control (i.e., that they had no choice but to follow the ecclesiastical
law as “given”), they took steps to inform themselves. They did not
plunge recklessly into waters beyond their expertise. In some circumstances, ecclesiastical courts supplied definitive certification of a case’s
standing so far as it involved ecclesiastical law; in others, civil lawyers

4

Procedure
were consulted informally; in still others, they were admitted to appear as
adversary-advocates on points of ecclesiastical law, informing the inexpert judges as to where the ambiguities or disagreements in ecclesiastical
law lay and what authorities could be urged both ways. With that much
help, non-experts can do pretty well. For another example: The Chancery
--though in our period manned by common lawyers at the top --was habitually careful to refer points of law arising in equity cases to the common law judges. In short, the system we are dealing with had practiced
ways of dealing with the inexpert judge.
Our argument for the "public indifference" of strictly enforced lines of
jurisdiction obviously loses power proportionately as greater public value
is given to uniformity throughout the legal system. A party perhaps has
no complaint if, owing to his own negligence, his case is decided in Jurisdiction A differently than it and analogous cases would be decided in Jurisdiction B. But it is possible to see societal ill in anomaly as such - i.e.,
apart from whether A's rule is better or worse than B's, and apart from
whether the source or tradition from which the one rule is drawn (common law, ecclesiastical or civil law, natural law) has a higher claim to
general prevalence than that from which the other is drawn. Interjurisdictional anomaly as such may seem a vague threat to the cohesion or "oneness" of a society. (For an analogy: Is it bad, or less-than-optimum, if
Ohio has a different rule than Kentucky on some point of law? If the legislature or courts of a given state are presented with the opportunity to
create new law or resolve an ambiguous or unsettled point, ought they to
have a high regard, relative to other considerations, for the law of other
states where the law is better settled on the point in question? Is there a
duty, ceteris paribus, to strive towards an "American law," partly in the
interest of the metaphysical, but perhaps important, "national identity"?)
Such "metaphysical" concerns quickly fade into practical ones. We
must adhere to our hypothesis: An individual who suffers the wrong court
to decide his case has no complaint. If an ecclesiastical court says his
lease is invalid, and in another suit a common law court says it is valid well, the anomaly is his fault. But will other people, "innocent bystanders," perhaps be injured? Yes, they may be, though in somewhat subtle
ways. The accumulation of anomalous results may have a deleterious effect on legal predictability. Grant that "the law of the jurisdiction" is the
proper basis for projection. I.e.: If one is trying to design his conduct by
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estimating what the common law courts are likely to do, he should leave
out of consideration what ecclesiastical courts are likely to do in comparable situations. But when confronted by complex or ambiguous problems, people may be tempted into irrelevance: "Leases of this sort have
been held invalid by ecclesiastical courts. What a common law court is
likely to do with one looks like anybody's guess. Well, I'll sue anyhow.
Perhaps we can use the ecclesiastical results persuasively even though
they are not strictly relevant." If this way of figuring is wrong -- i.e., if the
common law court would adamantly refuse to listen to argument from
the ecclesiastical results -- then someone has been led into a miscalculation. It could perhaps have been avoided by seeing to the enforcement of
jurisdictional lines without regard for the behavior of individual litigants
(i.e., by minimizing the chance that ecclesiastical courts would ever be invited to pass on leases -- a realistic example of the sort of thing that was
often prevented by Prohibition.)
If the calculation above is not flatly wrong, there is still a disutility.
The presence of avoidable anomalies -- and of multiple lines of cases in
different jurisdictions, some clearer and fuller than others -- at least raises
problems for the courts. Should they allow some persuasive influence to
results outside the jurisdiction? If so, how much? If not in general -- in
mere "like cases" - does the identical case raise a special problem? E.g.:
A particular lease was found invalid by an ecclesiastical court, and now
the very same lease comes in question in a common law case. Should the
decision outside the jurisdiction be given a res judicata or estoppel effect? If not, should the court at least be disposed to produce a concordant
result if possible? If not in principle, is there danger of its doing so unconsciously? Whether or not these questions seem especially hard to answer,
and whatever the right answers, they are problems. Multiplication of jurisdictions deciding the same sorts of questions, insofar as it can be
avoided, creates openings for litigants and their lawyers who might otherwise be persuaded to settle. For the courts, it creates legal problems of
such an order of abstraction that they may be hard to resolve consistently.
The gravity of those problems partly depends, however, on the strength
of the offsetting institutions discussed above in the context of the "inexpert judge": i.e., the effectiveness of communication within the legal system. In addition to the examples of intercommunication above, and better
for immediate purposes, is the situation presented by the principal courts,
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the King's Bench and Common Pleas (to a lesser degree the Exchequer,
because it was a more specialized court). Historical accident and competition produced two courts with very nearly concurrent general common
law jurisdiction. The King's Bench and Common Pleas each looked to its
own precedents and usage-to "the law of the jurisdiction". There was
some risk that one court would insist on its own usage in the face of explicit conflict with the other. But the risk was minimized by prevailing
habits and institutions. Decided cases in the other principal court were
highly persuasive-perhaps,at a time before stare decisis was a strict principle, virtually as persuasive as cases within the jurisdiction-andthe mere
clerical and procedural usages of one court could also be influential on
the other. In addition, the judges of one court often consulted with those
of the others in doubtful cases-eitherinformally or by adjournment into
the Exchequer Chamber for definitive decision by all the common law
judges. Communication and cooperation among the common law courts
was of course relatively easy. The judges shared one allegiance to the
common law and one profession, saw one another all the time through
their highly collegial societies (including the "judges' club," Serjeants'
Inn), and exercised jurisdiction in error over each other (which put an obvious premium on avoiding conflicts that could lead to reversal). Avoiding conflict de facto would not have been so easy as between common
law and non-common law courts, had the latter been freer to create it than
they actually were. But the very existence of channels for conflict-avoidance within the common law system would have served as an example
and a pressure, an emblem of a frame of mind much readier to say "Get
together" than "Go your own way, come hell or high water." The model
of cooperation within the common law system probably had a beneficent
influence on relations with the Chancery. So with the Star Chamber,
whose peaceful coexistence with the major common law courts through
most of its career was based on the role of the Chief Justices as advisers
to the court.
The civilian courts were farther removed from the professional milieu
of Westminster Hall and the Inns of Court. Even so, it is hard when one
comes down to it to imagine their developing much law of their own on
common law subjects, assuming they had had greater nominal opportunity than they did. The examples above are deliberately unrealistic. The
chance of ecclesiastical courts' leading the way with respect to the validity of a certain kind of lease would have been extremely slight. Given
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common sense preference for avoiding conflict, reinforced by habits of
cooperation in analogous contexts, ecclesiastical courts left free to pass
on leases from time to time would probably have looked to the common
law for advice. Aside from all else, there was where the relevant, persuasive law on ordinary secular relationships was to be found. On subjects of
that sort, most of the traffic would have been one-way. Other subjects,
principally ones with a distinct ecclesiastical flavor, such as the law of
tithes, are a different story. There were true conflicts between ecclesiastical and common law-cases in which to prohibit was to cause an issue to
be resolved one way, and not to prohibit was to allow it to be decided otherwise. My point here is only that opening the way to more parallel caselines than there were would not necessarily have added significantly to
the incidence of legal conflicts.
In the limited areas where non-common law courts regularly decided
the same sorts of questions as the common law courts, there is little to
suggest disturbing substantive "static". For example, the Admiralty decided a lot of contract cases, having unexceptionable jurisdiction if the
contract was made on the high seas. It clearly entertained many suits on
contracts not made at sea, simply because the defendant had no motive to
bring a Prohibition. No one would have disputed the Admiralty's general
right to go its own way, and it presumably did so to a degree, as by giving
allowance to mercantile custom in ways the common law would not.
There are contexts, however, in which objection to the law of contracts
applied in the Admiralty on the ground that it violently conflicted with the
common law would tend to come out if it existed. (E.g.: The courts were
inclined to see acquiescence in the Admiralty's jurisdiction when a defendant did not seek a Prohibition on local grounds --"not on the high seas
as alleged" -- as soon as possible. That inclination suggests basic faith
that the Admiralty would settle the case as the common law would.) I am
inclined to infer that the Admiralty maintained fairly satisfactory working
contact with the common law. In many ways the mixed English system of
laws and jurisdictions conditioned to avoid the conflicts it invited.
From one angle, the ecclesiastical and other civilian courts may be
seen as wanting full membership in the "club," including participation in
its channels for minimizing conflict. In the controversies over Prohibitions, they tended to suggest that they were less likely than the common
lawyers assumed to run off in their own direction. The suggestion was
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only half-ingenuous, for of course they wanted jurisdiction primarily because certain bread-and-butter interests would prosper better in their
hands-the parson’s interest in his tithes, the hierarchy’s interest in its
authority. To some degree, such interests would do better in ecclesiastical
hands for incidental reasons --because ecclesiastical procedure would
tend to favor parties asserting them, because common law juries unfriendly to ecclesiastical interests would not get the chance to subvert
them by unfavorable verdicts. Part of the point, however, was to enable
ecclesiastical courts to apply substantive rules that did conflict with the
common law. On the other hand, as I have argued, there were areas in
which the possibility of creating new conflicts by giving non-common
law courts wider scope was probably more theoretical than real. There is
a sense in which the idealized or propagandistic case for fuller acceptance
of non-common law jurisdictions -- i.e., for fewer Prohibitions - could
take advantage of that point.
Idealistically or propagandistically (both modes figure in the picture),
defenders of the non-common law courts wanted the mixed legal system
to be conceived as a mere division of labor. The system should be seen as
an organic totality. All courts were agents of one king, partners in a common enterprise of governance. Of course each court should stay within its
bounds, each member discharge its own special function and only that.
Jurisdiction is certainly not unimportant. In controversy, both sides accepted its importance, disagreeing as to who failed to perceive and stay
within his proper bounds. On the other hand, the purpose of dividing a
common task --and insisting as a general rule that each participant stick
to his special function --is only to get it done as well as possible. The
end presupposes more than an efficient division of labor and self-restraint
by separate participants. In presupposes trust that each part can and will
have regard for the welfare and purpose of the whole. An aspect of that is
trusting all parts to cope with moments of disequilibrium, as it were -when one part is a little freer than usual to follow its own bent or operate
without the supervision of the part whose function is to supervise.
The point to be made here is that this way of thinking acquired a certain color from existing institutions of collaboration and from assumptions so basic to the English legal system that they hardly required stating.
There is a sense in which being opposed for practical purposes to the interests and point of view of the common law was almost never a matter
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of being flatly "anti-common law." It testifies to the common law's
strength that most rivalry with it started by conceding its seniority,
copiousness, and right to lead the way. There is a very basic sense in
which the common law was the law of England, by everyone's consent.
Rivalry with it tended to take the form of claiming that the common law
was not really threatened by other jurisdictions --that its rules would be
followed by other courts when cases to which they were straightforwardly
appropriate came up, and that its "spirit" would in any event be respected.
The most striking example of this comes from the common law's relationship with the Chancery. Although practical habits and mechanisms
helped keep conflict down, there were episodes of trouble. There was also
an element of persistent doubt as to the legitimacy of separate courts of
equity. In consequence, there is a certain amount of literature in defense
of the Chancellor's equitable jurisdiction. The significant point about it is
that before Hobbes and a few other Interregnum writers there is no such
thing as a real defense of equity -- i.e., a frank argument for the superiority of the style and assumptions of equitable jurisprudence over the
custom- and precedent-oriented jurisprudence of the common law. From
St. German in the early 16th century on, "defense" was a matter of playing down the appearance of conflict between equity and the common law;
of struggling to make good on the pious platitude that equity "follows"
the law and fulfills it; of making out that the common law's supremacy
was unchallenged by its equitable supplement. In that line, there was a
good deal of double talk and cloudy thinking. It contained wishful thinking, and also realistic thinking --for it amounted to the clumsy theoretical
counterpart of many working arrangements, whereby equity not only consulted with the common law, but treated a core of common law rules as
immune from equitable scrutiny.
To conclude: What the ecclesiastical-civilian courts wanted was not innocent. It cannot be reduced to "full membership in the club," to being
trusted to follow the common law whenever the opportunity not to occurred and whenever common law rules were straightforwardly applicable. (Neither was equity in fact innocent of overriding some common law
rules.) But there was an implicit theory on the non-common law side
which said two things: (a) predictively, or wishfully, less stringently prohibited courts would not permit multiplication of conflicts with the common law; (b) ideally, all courts ought to be expected so to work together
that their shared end would be fulfilled --affirmation of well-settled and
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important common law rules, and hence basic. consistency within the system, being part of that end. With respect to our immediate question -Does the public interest in consistency throughout the system justify enforcement of jurisdictional lines even in favor of procedurally negligent
parties? - subscription to the "ideal" part of the theory arguably ought in
itself to influence conduct. I.e.: Even if one were not sanguine about
avoiding conflict de facto, one ought perhaps to take a certain risk for the
sake of affirming the ideal and giving it a chance to work on judges' consciences. The risk might pay off in the evolution of a modus vivendi comparable to that obtaining between the common law and equity -- not
perfect absence of conflict, but delimitation of conflict such as to encourage the myth that it did not exist at all. In a real sense, the Chancery belonged to the club. It enjoyed the benefit of a clubby spirit - the
imputation of harmonious intentions in spite of a certain amount of illwill among the members. Should one try to bring the ecclesiastical-civilian courts under the umbrella of that spirit, as they wished? Should an
effort be made, even in the face of dubiety, to recognize the community
of interest and intent that ought to prevail among all the King's courts in
these latter days? (In these latter days, remember, the Church was integrated with the state, so that the ecclesiastical courts were no longer instruments of a foreign power -- an imperialistic, usurping power, all
right-thinking English Protestants believed.)
We have now considered two objections to the thesis that there is not a
very strong public interest in 100% enforcement of rules on the distribution of jurisdiction within a mixed legal system --(a) the argument from
inexpert judges; (b) the argument from the inconvenience of multiple case
lines. Both have merit, but both are subject to qualification in application
to the particular mixed legal system we are concerned with. A third argument is less precise and more portentous.
Everyone has an interest in "good justice," or the best possible justice.
Even those who neglect to insist on it for themselves should enjoy it. "Bystanders" should be able to believe that the society they are members of
does its best to insure it to all who become involved in justiciable controversies. The best reason to enforce the lines of jurisdiction, even for the
benefit of parties who neglect to insist on their enforcement in proper
form, would be the belief that justice according to the law is really less
likely to be obtainable in one jurisdiction than in another. But the best of
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reasons is also the hardest to be frank about. Waiving the special problem
of the inexpert judge: The morale of a mixed legal system depends on
trust in the basic capacity of all courts to supply equally competent justice
--to ascertain disputed facts as reliably as possible, to weigh legal arguments with care and informed rationality, to observe impartiality. Different courts may have different rules, procedures, and methods. People may
argue academically that one way is better than the other. But if the mixedness of the system is to retain its legitimacy, there must be confidence that
all routes lead to substantial justice, subject to the randomly distributed
human failings of the judges and lawyers who travel different ways.
Things are bad if it is widely believed that some courts with an unquestionable "positive" place in the system are in fact very poor instruments of
justice. If one believes that, one can only believe that those courts are degenerate heirs of institutions that once had value, or true heirs of an irrelevant past --unless they are usurpations of the seat of justice in some still
simpler sense. If offending members cannot be immediately cut off or reformed, they ought at least to be restricted by such means of jurisdictioncontrol as are available.
In the community at large, such beliefs are dangerous to social cohesion, but there is no preventing their being held if they happen to be, however justifiably.
The legal community -- those responsible for
administering some particular sector of the mixed legal system, those
charged with the control of the jurisdiction -- is in a special position. Distrust in the basic availability of justice in some parts of the system may
exist de facto within that community, but it cannot be admitted. At any
rate, feelings must be very strong to be acknowledged openly. Their truth
and fairness must be very strongly believed in. For administrators of law
in a mixed system have a clear duty to do what they can to foster confidence. If you like, they have a duty to pretend, if necessary, to what they
do not believe. The duty is partly owed to the people they immediately
serve. It does no good to say or seem to say, "I must regrettably remit
your case to Jurisdiction X. I wish I did not have to, for I have very little
confidence that you will get a fair trial there." Pious fraud it may be, but
it does the addressee no good to undermine whatever naive faith he may
have that the arcane zigzags of the law pursue the contours of justice. To
subvert the same faith in "bystanders" is at best to play politics from the
Bench.
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Nor should the Judge's own reputation be put in jeopardy. "I must unfortunately dismiss you to an unjust fate in another court" passes quickly
to "I am the sort of judge who cares about the letter of the law, justice be
damned," or "I am a judge who is generally capable of cynicism -- capable of believing that what we do here is something less than the closest attainable approximation to justice." Pious fraud it may be, but surely it is
desirable that judges be believed to believe that there is no better justice
than intelligent dispensation of the law they administer.
Finally, the legal community owes a duty to the legislative process. In
one way, that duty qualifies the faith or profession of faith a judge owes
to the law. In another way, it is part of it. The judge has scope to say,
"The road of the law seems to me to end somewhere short of attainable
justice. Nonetheless, I must follow it, for extending or redesigning the
road is the legislature's business." Yet the tone in which he says that
should not imply a grudging positivism. "This is a terrible rule, but, alas!
I must consign you to an unfair trial." For not only are the facilities for
law-amendment part of the law to which faith is due -- so that belief in
the correspondence between existing law and justice acquires part of its
justification from the law's openness to change. (As if to say: "Insofar as
the law is not optimally just, yet it is potentially juster. It is a thing being
tried out, the object of no final commitment -- as a good man is good
partly because he stands "under correction." Needless to say, a man detracts from his goodness by being as bad as he can imagine, subject to
correction. He may also detract from it by trying too hard to improve
himself -- not abiding the intervention, whether of mature conscience or
an external authority, on which he has let his experiment in a manner of
life depend.)
Not only is the law's openness to change part of the law -- and part of
its righteousness. In addition, the legislature's silence, its acquiescence in
what may seem less-than-optimum justice, is an important check on private judgement, an important reason for the judge to doubt, qualify, and
repress his own sense of discrepancy between the law "as is" and as it
might ideally be. One need not say that the voice of the whole community represented by the legislature is right, though perhaps one should be
ready to entertain the possibility that it is righter than oneself. The clearer
duty is to take that voice as an indication of the community's available
sense of justice -- if you like, of its tolerances, compromises and imper-
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fection. If the legislature leaves the law in a given state, some level of
satisfaction with the law is implied -- positive satisfaction, rough or
grudging satisfaction, absence of the kind of consensus that legislated
change tends to require, or absence of such passion for reform in some
sector of the community that change can emerge from the trading-off
among sectors and interests that is intrinsic to the legislative process. As
the courts have a duty to foster confidence in the law's basic concordance
with justice, so they have a duty to encourage people's acceptance of the
legislative voice. "It is just because the legislature suffers it to be" is at
weakest shorthand (or pious fraud) for "whether or not the treatment you
receive is really optimum justice , your membership in the community estops you to claim a more perfect form of justice than your community can
bring itself to demand."
To apply the last point to the system we are immediately concerned
with: Parliament had unquestioned power both to define the lines of jurisdiction and to regulate the law applied in the several jurisdictions. With
specific regard to the ecclesiastical courts, the Reformation had insured
that statutes could impose on those courts any substantive and procedural
rules Parliament saw fit. Although there were special problems as to how
it should be done, statutory restrictions on the freedom of ecclesiastical
courts were enforced by Prohibitions. The same points apply equally to
other non-common law courts, including courts of equity. In short, there
was no basis for contending that the quality of justice outside common
law jurisdiction failed to enjoy the approval or sufferance of Parliament -whether or not it was optimum. Moreover, the theory of Parliament was
precisely such as to give sanction to the ideas stated abstractly above.
The idea that justice is what the legislature says it is a "Hobbist" idea (not
held in an unqualified sense by Hobbes). It was not part of the legal culture of 1600. But the proposition that an act of Parliament is every man's
act was an ingrained platitude of that culture. Its function was to say
what I say above: Men cannot be allowed to divorce themselves from the
body of the community by holding up a standard of justice the community is unable to embrace. If judges in a democratic society owe a certain
"positivism" to democracy (i.e., the duty to commend people to the processes of democratic politics if they would change the existing law), the
judges of an undemocratic society permeated with a corporate, communitarian ethos owed and acknowledged a duty to reinforce men's identification with the community. The mixedness of the legal system was part of
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England's inheritance from the ancestral community. It enjoyed the continuing approbation of the living community. It provided justice up to the
standard those communities were able to embrace. So, I think, the judges
we are concerned with were bound to hold -- by their situation, their
ethos, and their "faith." As I have been arguing, however, these ideas can
be given a special backhanded application to problems of jurisdiction; if it
is benign for Jurisdiction X to handle the cases the rules of the system
unquestionably assign to it, it cannot be too unbenign for Jurisdiction X to
handle a few more. Allowing a court any jurisdiction at all implies faith
in its basic capacity to do justice. Therefore any cases which "spill over"
to it (by virtue of such arguably valid principles as insisting on procedural
correctness and making a certain presumption in favor of the plaintiff
who chooses a given court) must be supposed to be in good hands. The
very beneficence of the system militates against the necessity of 100%
enforcement of rules defining the internal division of labor.
There is, however, one important countervailing argument. Suppose
that in the non-legal community there really is strong and widespread lack
of confidence in one part of the judicial system. As I have argued, the legal community has a duty to work against such feelings so long as the law
provides a mixed system and the legislature takes no note of inadequacies
in any part. But perhaps there comes a point at which the stronger duty is
to accept incorrigible public opinion, hence to take advantage of every
opportunity to prevent parties from being remitted to what will be widely
regarded as inferior justice. At that point, the lesser evil is to forget about
maintaining the integrity of the whole system and do what one can to prevent breakdown of confidence in the jurisdiction-controlling part of the
system. Better, that is to say, to acquiesce in the public's disbelief in the
non-common law courts than to endanger the common law's reputation
for caring about justice. It would be understood that turning cases over to
the non-common law courts could often not be helped; the pretense that
there was no public interest in keeping as many cases and issues as possible out of those courts would not be accepted.
Was there then in fact "strong and widespread lack of confidence" in
the non-common law parts of the system? As a question about public
opinion, I can only answer it impressionistically. The degree to which the
common law courts shared or acknowledged such lack of confidence, or
the degree to which mistrust entered into their judicial behavior, at least
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in principle lends itself to a more precise approach through all the cases
following. We must reserve judgment on that. All we can do here is adumbrate the attitudes that probably were in the air, part of the atmosphere
in which the courts had to perform their delicate tricks of balancing value
against value. The following claims to be nothing more than my best
guess.
Three non-common law jurisdictions were subject to Prohibition: ecclesiastical courts, minor equity courts, and the Admiralty. I can see
practically nothing to suggest that the Admiralty was suspect on the score
of its basic capacity to do justice. Its heavy users, merchants and shippers, including many foreigners, probably considered it a fair and expeditious court, comparing favorably to the common law. Apropos of ail the
non-common law courts, one must beware of inferring mistrust of the
quality of justice from the mere occurrence of Prohibitions. Parties will
inevitably maneuver for advantage -- if not to wear the other party down
by sheer maneuvering, then to get their case to a court where for all sorts
of reasons they think they will fare better. People frequently prohibited
the Admiralty, without necessarily distrusting it. Per contra, the Chancery was never prohibited, yet by 1600 there was certainly a vein of opinion to the effect that Chancery procedure was abusively long-winded and
expensive (which may, of course, mean "over cautious in the interest of
fairness"). The lesser equity courts that were frequently prohibited -- the
Requests and regional councils -- were probably not models of procedural
rectitude and high judicial standards, but they were valued by plaintiffs as
supplementary agencies of a heavily burdened legal system (as the neverprohibited Star Chamber was). Popularity with plaintiffs is a symptom of
people's basic trust in a court's brand of justice, though not a sure-fire
test. (Plaintiffs with weak cases have a motive to gamble on low-quality
courts -- the worst they can do is lose on claims that would be more likely
to lose in a better court. If low-quality courts -- say the Requests as compared to Chancery -- are considerably cheaper, people have a motive to
go there even if the court's reputation is not spotless.) On the whole, subject to the great uncertainty that surrounds these matters, I doubt that the
secular non-common law courts suffered from pervasive dislike and distrust -- from dislike and distrust going so straight to the quality of justice
that many would have said, "It were better if those courts were abolished."
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The ecclesiastical courts were at least the object of much more complex attitudes. We may distinguish three main ways of seeing them in an
unfavorable light: (a) They had certain objective strikes against them.
Most important, they were not, as it were, "formally" impartial courts,
however fair they may have been between party and party in practice. In
the last resort, they were courts of a privileged franchise -- privileged to
protect the corporate interests of the church by way of their jurisdiction
over ecclesiastical persons and so-called "spiritual claims." To take the
most typical of cases: When a parson sued for his tithes in an ecclesiastical court, he was in one sense suing for himself. For all we know, ecclesiastical courts on the average were scrupulously fair between parson and
parishioner in disputed tithe cases. Nevertheless, the suspicion of bias in
practice was inevitable because bias of a kind was built in. The church
had a corporate interest, across the board, in seeing that claims to tithes
succeeded and defenses failed. For thereon depended the Church's collective capacity to support its ministry and perform the work of God.
When one man sued another in the Admiralty, the court had no interest in
who won. If the Court of Requests was sloppy about fact-finding and
over-eager to provide equitable remedies (I do not assert it was either, but
if it was), still the court had no interest in anything but justice by its imperfect lights (unless one counts the interest in attracting business by providing relief, a temptation to which any court is open). In many cases
within its undisputed jurisdiction, though by no means all, the Church had
a long-run interest in the outcome, however successful its judges were in
ignoring that interest. (The best modern analogy is a regulatory agency
with judicial powers. However scrupulous between party and party such
tribunals are, they are usually identified with some sector of the public interest deemed worthy of special protection -- as the Church was with
what in its time was the most undisputed of public interests: providing for
the ministration of religion. No such agency can quite enjoy the putative
indifference of a court of general jurisdiction -- the supposed concern for
nothing but "calling the shots" in cases of many varieties, which, as it
were, appear out of nowhere, stated for decision as the parties plead. It
should be noted that the Church was not the only judicial authority in the
old English system with a "special interest" orientation. Franchises, manorial courts, "courts" that were also administrative agencies -- including
the Exchequer and Court of Wards: such bodies were also ambiguously
bound to do justice between party and party and to look out for corporate,
private, or royal interests. The system made demands on people's capac-
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ity to trust the interested to be indifferent. We should speculate on their
attitude toward the Church in awareness that they were not conditioned
to a "liberal" preference for courts of general jurisdiction, as modern people heavily dependent on bureaucratic justice are not. On the other hand,
the Church courts may have served as the main archetype for what emergent "liberal" attitudes were coming to question.)
A second problem for the ecclesiastical courts derived from the Reformation's failure to reform them. The intention of doing so in a thorough
way sprang from the Supplication against the Ordinaries, persisted
through Cranmer's lifetime, and failed to get off the ground again under
Elizabeth. It is not at all easy to say what the consequences of neglect
were for the objective quality of justice in the ecclesiastical courts. However that may be, the failure to carry through a conscious remodelling
must in itself have had an adverse effect on the courts' reputation. How
much reforming in the sense of changing they needed is an open question.
But their legitimacy under the new Anglican order surely needed to be established by a comprehensive act of codification and reemphasis. That
was the proposal when the Reformation was young: to go over the ecclesiastical law systematically; to decide what parts of it should be retained,
dropped, or amended; to come forward with a code for the future which
would enjoy the sanction of the state and represent a consistent system for
the whole realm. As things turned out, the Church courts were left to find
their own way, drawing on their pre-Reformation tradition, subject to the
considerable body of new legislation that impinged on them and to such
shake-ups of tradition as the abolition of formal university training in
canon law. Under these conditions, the courts could hardly escape the
stigma of heirs of the "Popish" past -- in some measure, of guilt-by-association, of being "up to no good" in all the unspecified ways the prejudices of a Protestant culture were disposed to assume. In addition, the
absence of "codification and reemphasis" left ecclesiastical law open to
the imputation of uncertainty and inconsistency from court to court.
However much practice belied the suspicion, it is probable that people felt
less sure of where they stood in the ecclesiastical courts than in the secular, that they warrantably or unwarrantably felt that to become involved in
litigation there was to be plunged into a world where black-letter guidance and informed advice were less forthcoming than in the environs of
Westminster Hall. Such feelings are not equivalent to distrust in the
courts' "basic capacity to do justice," but they trench close to it.

18

Procedure

(b) De facto, apart from the built-in disadvantages to which they were
subject, ecclesiastical courts obviously did not enjoy a brilliant reputation
with the man in the street. Let us put it that way and soon surcease, for
this topic -- the sheer mass of popular prejudice -- is too large to deal with
properly here. It is hard to discriminate the justified from the unjustified
in that mass of prejudice, hard to discount the element of mere interestedness. People who got in trouble with ecclesiastical courts were going
to find reasons for disliking the treatment they received. Many of the
functions of ecclesiastical courts were intrinsically invidious -- e.g., their
role as tax-courts deriving from jurisdiction over claims to tithes; their
criminal jurisdiction over moral offenses, including the defamatory imputation of such offenses, whereby people were called in question about intimate aspects of their lives. Apart from the more articulate religious
objections (discussed below), ecclesiastical courts stood directly in the
line-of-fire of all those attitudes we vaguely label "anti-clerical." Perhaps
the tap-root of "anti-clericalism" is the inevitable discrepancy between
pretense and performance when men of God get involved with the world.
If the Church does not withdraw to some safe Sion -- if it aspires to make
its authority felt in the Cities of the Plain -- it is hard to put to escape the
grubby roles of cop and tax-gatherer. At best, one cannot stay clean in
those roles. Coercive authority must make decisions in ambiguous cases
and be satisfied with the rough procedural justice of this world. It cannot
be above reproach, and yet churchmen cannot expect to be judged by
standards no higher than those which concede a grudging acceptance to
the imperfections of secular justice. Their flesh and blood shortcomings
are magnified. Every failure to furnish justice at least as good as temporal courts supply looks larger than it perhaps is, for churchmen should aspire to do better. A tradition of cynicism develops, passes from
generation to generation, from the pre-Reformation world to a world less
evidently reformed than it is cracked up to be. An inheritance of "anticlericalism" colors men's encounters with the Church's courts. What
one experiences or witnesses is filtered through "negative expectations" -through the image of meddlesome and greedy bishops; authoritarian clerics, puffed-up, readier to snare and fleece their sheep than lead them beside still waters; parasitic laymen -- the civilian crowd -- taking their
corrupt price for doing the clerics' dirty work. In short, there was a fund
of ready-made responses available to anyone with reasons of his own to
object to the ecclesiastical courts. It is accordingly difficult to evaluate
the hostile expressions that occur in the 16th and 17th centuries, as they
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had before. How widespread, how serious, how freshly responsive to real
experience, how disengaged from private grudge or party purpose were
such expressions? Was "you'll never get fair treatment there" a really
pervasive attitude, however conditioned by prejudice? Or was it more
typical to think of ecclesiastical courts as no better or worse than officialdom generally -- to be borne, as likely as not to treat people as they more
or less deserved? It is hard to say. My guess would be that complaints
occurred enough to signify something -- that there was enough ingenuous
experience of venality, delay, unfair procedure, and legal uncertainty to
reinforce the fund of prejudice, and enough reiteration of stock complaints to reinforce their credit. On the other hand, one should not be too
hasty to infer massive distrust of ecclesiastical justice from even a considerable body of hostile talk.
(c) Puritanism was opposed in principle to ecclesiastical jurisdiction in
anything like its traditional form. That is to say, there was an articulate
minority position which took off from, but transcended, stock misgivings
about churchmen in the world. Insofar as Puritan propaganda influenced
people outside the movement, it reinforced the fund of "negative expectations." Insofar as Puritans were objects of public hostility, they may have
given the reputation of the bishops and their courts a helping hand. I suspect the first flow of forces was the more important, just because the
"fund" was there to be augmented.
It is a mistake to suppose that Puritans objected to ecclesiastical courts
only because they tended to be in trouble with them. They certainly complained for that reason, the more effectively because they were equipped
to take every just and unjust offense against themselves as a malevolent
stroke at God's people. But they also had purer objections. The original
and controlling idea of orthodox English Puritanism (orthodoxy must be
carefully distinguished from the Independent, sectarian, and proto-liberal
offshoots of Puritanism that became so prominent in the revolutionary
decades of the 17th century) was that true doctrine deserved and demanded true "discipline." "Discipline" -- the government and rites of the
Church, the whole mode of organizing the opera of the Church of Christ
in and on the real world (as distinct from its naked fides) -- meant different things in different contexts. It persistently meant, I think, wholehearted refusal to accept ecclesiastical jurisdiction as inherited from the
Catholic past (partly, of course, because its ancestry was "Popish") and as
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domesticated under English Erastianism. As the word "discipline" suggests, the Puritans certainly did not propose giving up the coercive powers and state backing that the Church already enjoyed. Their essential
dialectical formula may be stated this way: To be effectually disciplinary
-- to coerce to some purpose, to "make a difference," save souls and glorify God -- the Church must liberate itself from the forms of ordinary
secular coercion. The existing form of "discipline" -- the judicial system
of the Church of England--was both too weak and too strong. It was perverted both ways because it was not sui generis -- the Church of Christ
working on the world for its unique ends, by its unique means. The existing system was a mere simulacrum of temporal justice. In one direction,
it abused the awful and unique powers of the Church by using them for
ends that could just as well be accomplished by secular law. In another
direction, it abused the sanctions of the Church -- especially its ultimate
weapon, excommunication -- for workaday purposes. Lacking other
sanctions and condemned to a misconceived role, the ecclesiastical courts
cut men off from Christian communion to enforce process. Like other
mere courts, they would let a sinner off on a technicality. They would
punish a man for a trivial offense without exhausting the resources of admonition. Having punished him by sanctions which for the submissive
were very mild, they would send him hence to sin again, caring nothing
for his "rehabilitation." For ordinary temporal courts, it was enough to
care abut a man's "body" -- acquit him if he's innocent as charged, convict him if he's guilty; if you don't hang him, lock him up or flog him,
and when he has paid his price let him go. The ecclesiastical courts,
charged with men's souls, were institutionally unequipped to care about
anything but "outward flesh," plus costs.
The Puritans were not precise by lawyerly standards about what they
would substitute. Perhaps they were starry-eyed to put their trust in the
general alternative they had in mind -- reinvigorated local congregations
that would bear down both hard and mercifully on local sinners; local
authority checked and kept on its toes by a Presbyterian hierarchy; the
new ecclesiastical system meshed with the state more effectively than the
old -- less overlapping in functions, methods, and personnel; supplementing temporal law by spiritual discipline, instead of adding "more of the
same"; better able to call on the State for necessary Christian purposes because less mixed up in its temporal business. Right or wrong, the Puritans levelled a real attack on "misplaced ecclesiastical legalism."

21

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
Traditional "anti-clericalism" aimed vaguely at the same thing, but the
Puritans were much more precisely on target, much abler to conceive a
concrete alternative to "the King's spiritual jurisdiction," if not quite to
come down from the clouds of idealism and deliver a blueprint. At least
some people in the England we are concerned with were beyond commonplace trust or distrust in the ecclesiastical courts. At least some people, with an indeterminate influence on others, were so disposed to see the
whole system of ecclesiastical law as illegitimate that nothing the ecclesiastical courts did would be favorably, or perhaps fairly, judged. I suspect
that this disposition among Puritans was constant and cumulative -- i.e., that
it did not fluctuate with the ups and downs of the overt "Presbyterian movement."
I doubt that the dwindling of hell-bent Presbyterianism and the achievement
of something of a modus vivendi with the Establishment in the pre-Laudian
17th century imply a diminution of the hope that someday, somehow, ecclesiastical legalism would give way to a Gospel modus operandi.
Over against negative attitudes toward non-common law courts, at
least the ecclesiastical system, we should consider notably affirmative
ones toward the common law itself. On the one hand, there was a body of
feeling, however pervasive, that would tend to distrust the quality of ecclesiastical justice, or, short of doing that quite pointedly, at least to see a
strong public interest in keeping the churchmen and their minions in the
narrowest possible room. Was there on the other hand a pervasive disposition to prize and celebrate the common law, even to overrate it? Was
there a tendency in the larger community, if not necessarily to doubt the
non-common law courts' basic capacity to do justice, at least to think that
the common law provided consistently superior justice? When they were
confronted with jurisdictional problems, did the judges hear voices telling
them that every effort should be made, even in behalf of negligent parties,
to allow men the special blessing of common law determination?
Here again, one must deal cautiously with appearances. It seems to me
that there are three main clusters of attitude to be considered: (a) In a
general sense, the reputation of the common law undoubtedly took on a
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new glow towards the end of the 16th century. For that irridescence, Sir
Edward Coke was largely responsible, though, as with all key intellectual
figures in history, it makes a question how much Coke contributed from
the idiosyncratic resources of his own mind and personality and how
much he formulated and reflected a point of view that was becoming
commonplace in his culture. This is not the place to deal with the huge
complexities of the phenomenon. In very sketchy terms: I think there was
a coalescence, in the first instance, between an extremely high-level (or
vague) shift in the "cultural mood" outside the legal world and changes
within that world. In the second instance -- though this only happened
slowly, in cumulative response to the unhappy experience of Stuart government -- the product of that coalescence passed into politics. There was
something of a "nativist revival" in late-16th century England, something
of a reaction away from the more cosmopolitan orientation of Renaissance humanism and the original Protestant movement (the dominant
themes of earlier Tudor culture). The trend can be seen on the level of
"vulgar patriotism": -- in consciousness of England as a "Chosen Nation"
(essentially because she was the major Protestant nation-state), reinforced
by her role as successful champion of the Cause of Light in the great war
against Spain. It appears in Anglicanism's heightened sense of itself
from Hooker on, in the British mythology of the Faerie Queene, in growing interest in national antiquities and topography. In the legal world, the
spread of printing made the sources of medieval English law more accessible to the profession just as its members became more generally educated and its collective prestige crested. The Inns of Court came into
their heyday -- reflecting the status-value English legal studies already
had, and throwing some of the lustre of new social fashionableness back
on the serious lawyers. "The third university of England" (i.e., the Inns)
is a meaningful phrase: Studying Gothic law in medieval French (or at
least ostensibly poring over Littleton) could hold its own -- as intellectual
discipline and gentleman's pursuit -- with the international learning of the
Schools and the classics.
It was in the light of such a cultural reshuffling, inside and outside the
law, that Coke could seriously call Littleton's Tenures "the most perfect
and absolute work that was ever written in any human science." Lawyers
achieved a sharper, better-informed consciousness of their distinctive tradition, and a pride in it that was both more exaggerated and more intelligent than their ancestors'. Such consciousness and pride were not new.
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The distance that divides Sir John Fortescue's 15th century Laudes of
English law from the "legal nativism" of Coke's generation (like that between Littleton and Coke-on-Littleton) is distance on a single road. By
and large, the road ran straight in the 16th century, cumulating toward the
accretion of knowledge, sophistication, and business that gave common
lawyers and their art the unique prestige and confidence that called forth
Coke. That is to say, it did not go underground to avoid "Tudor despotism." The Tudors were careful to stay on the right side of the common
law, and the increased dependence of a magnified state on the technical
services of lawyers was a major factor in the accumulation of professional prestige. The true story of "English law and the Renaissance" is
not a melodrama -- a narrow escape from reception of Roman law and
displacement of traditional courts by new prerogative agencies. It is
rather the story of steady development of the native legal tradition, offset
in reality and obscured to the eye by the competition of new intellectual
interests, new career-paths, and preoccupation with foreign and religious
politics (as distinct from constitutional issues). Saving our reverence for
the middle ages: Fortescue praised English law (and Littleton wrote his
practical primer on land-law) in a thin culture -- the old-fashioned world
of international Catholicism, clerical universities, an aristocracy still civilized primarily by the European ethos of chivalry. The "discovery of
England" implied in Fortescue's realization of the distinctiveness and
greatness of the common law is very significant. The rediscovery in
Coke's generation is significant in a very different context. The consciousness and pride of "legal nativitism" reemerged on top of a much
more crowded scene. If the lawyers furnished a "third university," it was
over and above two others doing a big business in lay-gentry education.
In Fortescue's day, legal education for the well-born (to which he pointed
with pride) stood more nearly alone as a layman's path to book-learning.
Littleton wrote a craftsman's manual, reflecting the high development of
a native English craft; Coke exaggerated its "scientific" virtues because
for him the common law had portentous claims as against its cultural
competitors; the commentary outweighs the text in proportion to the distance in self-consciousness between "legal nativists" a century apart.
In sum: On the vague but important plane of attitude/association/reputation, the common law ca. 1600 had acquired the status of Good Thing to
an especially acute degree. The profession's sense of itself and its subject
matter fed into the lay community with exceptional ease, owing in signifi-
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cant measure to the institution of sub-professional legal education at the
Inns and the contact with the law to which an active lay magistracy was
exposed. Reinforcement came from a diffuse "nativism." As the century
went on, further reinforcement came from political feeling. The sense in
which the common law was a Good Thing was enriched by association
with the English political tradition that embraced it -- the English political
tradition that was increasingly perceived as threatened. Nothing could
have given "nativism" a bigger boost than the accident of a foreign King.
James I's specific quarrels with the lawyers helped focus patriotic attachment to the common law he failed to understand. His larger political infelicities forwarded the alienation of a substantial part of the community -most notably participants in the local and legal power-structures which
the Central government could not effectively control -- from the King and
his courtiers. The disastrous acceleration of that process under Charles I
produced a revolution. In the mentality the Great Rebellion hatched from,
loyalty to the common law as a portentous Good Thing was profoundly
and confusedly intermixed with political phobia. The English political
tradition was perceived as threatened, both justly and paranoically; the
common law and its mythic offspring Fundamental Law were seen as the
ground of an English "inheritance" beset by alien and "innovative" forces.
These large phenomena have a clear bearing on our immediate concerns. In some degree, the judges must have felt a pressure -- from within
their professional souls and from the attitudes of the public -- to favor
common law jurisdiction just because the operations of the common law
were wrapped in favorable associations. Ironically, the stigma of foreignness may have adhered the more stubbornly to the non-common law
courts the more native they became in fact. The very ambiguity of the
word "foreign" is indicative. The non-common law courts were sometimes spoken as "foreign" jurisdictions in a neutral sense -- "extrinsic,"
courts which were over-and-above and distinct from those which administered the main body of English law, "outside supplements" whereby the
legal system dealt with some special relationships and was able to handle
a wider range of matters than the common law was equipped to take up.
But the other sense of "foreign" was close at hand, perhaps the more so as
consciousness of the common law as an invaluable native possession was
heightened -- "un-English," "imported," unavoidably or at least lawfully
present, like a resident alien, but not really congenial to the English way
of doing things. The sense in which the ecclesiastical courts, in particu-
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lar, could be seen as an import from Rome and a leftover from "Popish
times" was obviously available. Giving a man over to "foreign" justice
could be deplored without much realistic regard for the quality of justice
he would receive. Yet it was such associations of "foreignness" that defenders of the non-common law courts most reasonably resented. With
the passing of time, they became evermore settled native institutions.
Owing no allegiance except to the King and such aspects of the public interest as came within their protection (including, of course, common justice according to the law), what difference did it make that the historic
roots of their procedures and doctrines were extra-English? In the case of
the ecclesiastical courts, the very "nativism" that reflected glory on the
common law ought to have shed a portion of radiance on another peculiar
institution -- the judicial organs of a church which, in addition to being
stubbornly different from any foreign model, defended the national community's right to fashion the outward or "indifferent" aspects of the
Church (including its organs of discipline") in accord with its unique history and "genius." Alas! Reality and perception, "is" and "ought," can
move in different directions and into terrible tangles. When they do, the
sense of alienation or "foreignness -- and plain distrust -- dividing antagonistic interests may grow exacerbated.
One must, however, put a caveat on the considerations above. Especially before the prestige of the common law got mixed in with the passions of a deteriorating political scene, there were of offsetting forces.
(After the political heat intensified, the judges were under pressure -moral and otherwise -- to check any tendency they may have had to indulge a
mere preference, in themselves or in the public, for common law jurisdiction.) On the high level of articulate thought, the Cokean proclivity to
make extreme claims for the common law encountered definite resistance. I do not refer here to the resistance of those who understood little
of the matter except that their interests were offended by arrogant lawyers. It is a little insulting to put a foreign, eccentric, fantasy-ridden, obstinate, but highly intelligent monarch in that category, but I do not refer
primarily to James I. The most significant resistance to the excesses of
"legal nativism" came from within the professional community.
It is explicit in Francis Bacon, who came close to a fully articulated realization of what was happening in his generation: absolutization of the
provincial perspective of the prestigious legal caste. Bacon was an ex-
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tremely able lawyer. It was his advantage to have a much more
inclusive and balanced intellect than most lawyers, but there is no serious
sense in which he betrayed the "faith" of his profession. He was unquestionably an ambitious royalist politician and personal rival of Coke's in
the politics of the law, but I can see no sign that he fulfilled one kind of
possibility implicit in such a situation -- the possibility of becoming one
of those lawyers who ceases to care about the vales and traditions of the
law, who comes to regard his skill in it as a mere instrument for personal
or political ends. Though a great critic of established assumptions, Bacon
was no legal iconoclast in the manner of Hobbes or the Levellers or Bentham. Generally, indeed, the critical impulse in Bacon was not very revolutionary. "Everything's been done wrong -- Let's forget it and start over
right" was not his fundamental theme, though something like it occurs in
some contexts. Much more fundamentally, he was the high priest of intellectual "jurisdiction." The intellectual flaw he most consistently jumped
on was "absolutizing": the tendency of particular disciplines, methods, interests, points of view, or traditions to claim too much for themselves, to
exceed the "jurisdictions" within which each has a limited but valuable
contribution to make. Bacon saw how the literary humanism that so
dominated the horizons of the educated in his time had long since flooded
the real world with undue reverence for idle words. He criticized the Platonists for projecting the mathematical mind onto realities that would not
obligingly submit to it. By precisely the same token, Bacon the intellectual General Surveyor observed the urge to excess in his own profession - as if statesmanship required nothing beyond the training and experience
of a lawyer; as if the law did not need sometimes to be considered from
the outside, as one instrumentally among others for the preservation and
improvement of civilized life; as if, so regarded from the outside, it could
never need formal amendment or informal flexibility in order to serve
ends whereof it was not the only servant; as if the built-in conservatism of
the law -- its necessary insistence on standing by its rules and the inherited valued they incorporate -- were the key to an inclusive social wisdom; as if all social wisdom boiled down to the faith that institutions
which have resisted change deserve the immunity from it that tried legal
rules -- qualified in many cases and made the basis for private expectations -- in some measure do deserve.
Ex hypothesi, Bacon's critique of overreaching particularism was affirmative of particularistic viewpoints within their several "jurisdictions."

27

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
Ultimately, he was syncretistic. To see real, but limited, good in many
ways of thinking and doing was the beginning of wisdom. Many "jurisdictions" pulling together, each pulling only the weight it was capable of,
was his ideal. Bridled particularists would learn to appreciate the value of
each other's understanding of the same object, and hence the valid possibility of abstractifying and simplifying knowledge. The false abstraction
that consists in imposing a limited category on material too complex for it
would give way to the patient search for truly informative analogies -- for
the "footprints" which nature leaves in different media, for the level of
abstraction at which different approaches to knowledge employ a common conceptual alphabet and in a sense "say the same thing." The parallelism between Bacon's thought and his experience as a lawyer is so
striking that one wonders which was the cart and which the horse. In fellow lawyers, he encountered an example of "overreaching particularism."
As a lawyer in the thick of controversy over jurisdiction -- and a representative of the royalist-ecclesiastical-civilian-equity interest -- it is perhaps not too fantastic to suggest that he encountered an "informative
analogy": antagonism among courts and lawyers reflective of men's general unwillingness to accept the limits of their own "arts" and professions,
to appreciate the community of purpose that would enable different jurisdictions to work together if each could contain its self-esteem.
Intra-professional reaction against extreme claims for the common law
is beautifully illustrated at another level by Lord Chancellor Ellesmere's
concurring opinion in Calvin's Case. (2 State Trials, 659.) On straight legal matters, Ellesmere, rather than Bacon, was Coke's sharpest critic. In
Calvin's Case, he found himself in complete practical agreement with
Coke, i.e., they favored the same resolution of the case for largely the
same reasons. Ellesmere went out of his way, however, to prepare (and
publish) an elaborate separate opinion. His doing so was technically appropriate. The situation was that substantively identical suits were
brought at common law and in the Chancery (i.e., In order to allow the
Lord Chancellor to participate, and by way of totally "wrapping-up" the
case -- a case contrived for political reasons, to get a judgement that Scottish post nati were capable of maintaining actions for land in England and
thus were not aliens -- a routine equity suit for discovery of deeds was
brought alongside a novel disseisin at common law. The equity suit depended entirely on the common law suit and was not argued separately at
the Bar: if Calvin could maintain the common law writ even though born
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in Scotland of Scottish parents -- the point to be established -- it followed
virtually automatically that he could maintain a Chancery suit to recover
evidences relating to the land in England which he claimed). As Lord
Chancellor with an equity suit to be decided solely by him, Ellesmere had
perfectly proper occasion to discuss the case in full. But it is manifest
from the content of his opinion that his motives were not routine. In the
form of a highly concurring opinion, he wrote a critique of the tone and
general ideas in Coke's elaborately stated opinion on the common law
side. Ellesmere's opinion is not concurring in the ordinary sense -- sameresult-for-quite-different-reasons. In terms of the reasoning leading directly to a solution in the case, Coke and Ellesmere were virtually at one.
The issue between them was philosophical.
Ellesmere wrote his opinion to put down dangerous doctrine. In part, it
was aimed at the politically charged legal ideas urged against the resolution of the case which the government badly wanted and all but two of the
common law judges favored (let it be said, lest political prostitution seem
imputed, for perfectly sound, if not necessarily conclusive, legal reasons.)
In his argument for the majority position, Coke too attacked that sort of
"dangerous doctrine." Ellesmere's other target was the unbalanced estimation of the common law written into Coke's opinion. I cannot do justice here to the complex encounter of two great lawyers that the two
opinions represent. In brief: Calvin's Case gave Coke a golden opportunity to glorify the common law. (For his opinion, 2 State Trials, 607.)
The government had resorted to a trumped-up lawsuit to naturalize the
post nati because it was unable to do so through Parliament. The technique was widely and justly criticized. It was widely believed that there
was no ordinary legal solution to the unprecedented problem that the case
raised. No foreign King had ever inherited the English throne before.
Consequently English law had never had to ask whether subjects of the
King's foreign crown born after his accession to England are naturalized
in England. This new question only admitted of a legislative solution. If
a judicial solution was demanded, the judges could only do what judges
ought not to do -- viz., legislate in effect; fetch a solution out of such
sources as "mere reason" or natural law, not from the precedents and usage that ought to determine the common law. To the refutation of that
line of reasoning, Coke devoted a major share of his energy.
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He began by accepting its premise: The courts ought not to legislate.
They can never justifiably say, "there is nothing in the common law's
storehouse from which a solution in this case can be drawn, therefore, let
us decide it by common reason." Having conceded that, Coke turned
around and asserted the "copiousness" of the common law in highly general terms. He came very close to saying that there is no such thing as a
case incapable of ordinary common law solution. The common law represents so infinite a fund of experience and wisdom that it is next to inconceivable for an actual case to be put to it which it cannot solve by its
own canons of problem-solving, its own "art," without resort to the natural reason no special "art" can claim as its own. To the degree that cases
do not admit of absolutely straightforward solution by common law canons -- simple deduction from well-known rules or inference from obviously similar cases -- they ought not and need not be decided by natural
reason. They always should be and always can be solved by the "artificial reason" of the law. That is to say, a solution can be drawn out of the
common law fund by those trained to use it right -- to see the less obvious
sort of analogy; to appreciate, and hence extend to unfamiliar territory,
the general ideas and values implicit in well-known rules and concrete
cases. The lay or "natural" mind cannot do that. Its tendency is to "vulgar rationalism," which supposes there is no legal solution when there is
not a patent one. Supposing that, "vulgar rationalism" will come up with
its own superficial answer to problems which in fact admit of better resolution through the time-tested standards implicit in the law and accessible
only to trained lawyers.
These ideas were the heart of Coke's jurisprudence. Calvin's Case
was a golden opportunity to state them, first because they had been
doubted by critics of the government's resort to a lawsuit, and secondly
because they could be demonstrated in the case itself. Doubters said the
problem in the case was not appropriate to judicial solution; Coke would
show them. In fact, there were reasonably good legal sources for solving
the case. Although England had never been inherited by a foreign King
before, problems of naturalization had occurred in analogous circumstances (in the latter days of the Plantagenet empire, when Gascons could
be born subjects of the person who was King of England -- like the Scottish post nati -- without being born in England, since Gascony -- like
Scotland -- was not incorporated into England or subject to its laws).
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There was some judicial authority fairly directly in point (i.e. suggesting
that Gascons in a position arguably analogous to Calvin's were not aliens
in England). Coke by no means rested his argument on the narrow
grounds he claimed were sufficient. He in fact ranged far and wide, arguing, inter alia, from natural law, though with a carefully emphasized
common lawyer's twist: the common law takes notice of the law of nature
-- cases cited to provide the same -- therefore to show that a certain rule is
required by nature is at least to establish the presumption -- confirmed by
"cases directly in point" -- that it is a rule of the common law. But though
Coke did not confine himself to the straightforward kind of authority, he
had some. Quod erat demonstrandum -- the common law was perfectly
up to this seemingly novel case, no judicial legislation or natural law adjudication required. For the rest, Coke demonstrated "artificial reason" at
work -- the trained legal intelligence finding all kinds of support for the
truth the common law revealed and "vulgar rationalism" could too easily
miss: that allegiance is a personal tie between king and subject, and "citizenship" depends on allegiance.
Lord Ellesmere took no exception to Coke's positive legal reasoning,
much less to the conclusion. He took precise exception to the overreaching generalization -- not to saying that this case was well-covered by relevant precedents, but to maintaining that the common law cornucopia is
adequate to any case. In the jurisprudential fight waged under the surface
of concurring opinions, Ellesmere took the more modern position, for he
defended judicial legislation as inevitable and therefore legitimate: Common sense and common morality are sometimes the only basis for deciding cases. Every case was once a new case. The first time a problem
occurs, there are no "artificial" resources to draw on. Let the courts not
deceive themselves as to what they do in fact, let them not blush to do
what they sometimes must and always in some degree may. It is fatal to
the court's authority for judges to doubt their title to resolve a truly novel
case. The courts are indeed up to any case that comes before them, but
not for Coke's reason -- not because the common law is infinitely "copious," but because it's the judges' duty and right to solve the case with whatever
resources are available and relevant. Common sense and common morality are always relevant and sometimes exclusively available. Let there be
no shame about relying on them exclusively if need be, and let them not
be represented as something else than the natural faculties they are.
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Ellesmere went as much out of his way to say these things as Coke did
to say the opposite. He did not consider the instant case a novel one. He
did not need to fall back on "natural reason" to solve it. (Though having
asserted natural reason's claims, he applied it in ways that "artificial reason" would probably have to frown on. If the instant case had been
novel, Ellesmere said in effect, sources extraneous to the books, records,
principles, and traditions of the law would have perfectly respectable relevance -- e.g., the King's own opinion and the Council's; extra-judicial
opinions of the judges. As it were: When -- as to some degree it always
is -- the question is simply "What is reasonable?," the opinions of responsible, rational, authoritative men are always relevant.) I think there can
be no doubt that Ellesmere in Calvin's Case wrote a conscious "antiCoke." Both men saw an opportunity to take up the big current issues of
jurisprudence. Each had his eye on the other. Both spoke to persuade -Coke to explain and demonstrate his "legal nativism" and the extended
claims he made for the common law as the vehicle par excellence of social wisdom; Ellesmere to oppose just that, in a practical legal context,
with ideas gained from a lifetime in the law.
I have dwelt at some length on the high-level, classic encounters -Coke versus Bacon and Ellesmere -- to make a point that leads back to
our immediate concern. The general reputation of the common law was
undoubtedly at a high pitch around the end of the 16th century. Associations of special beneficence surrounded it, tending no doubt to favor its
claims to jurisdiction and to put competing courts in a second-class light.
But the prestige of the common law was not unchallenged. There were
forces pulling the other way, forces evoked by the very semblances of exaggeration, of overreaching professional particularism, that attended the
concentration of prestige -- intellectual, moral, social-fashionable -- in the
law and its practitioners. The reaction did not all come from outside the
law. Exaggeration was opposed by experience of the common law's limitations gained by men who spent their lives inside. Of course Bacon and
Ellesmere were King's men and equity judges. They had experience and
commitments which gave them perspectives on the law different from
those that experience solely in common law practice would conduce to.
But it trivializes the thinking of such men about the law itself to see it as
merely political, merely expressive of their devotion to the King's interests and the equity courts. There were serious issues among serious men.
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Their practical positions and interests influenced what they thought about
the law, but their minds were all too large to be bounded by their immediate perspectives. Coke, for his part, was a government lawyer for most of
has pre-judicial career, a Privy Councillor, a courtier-politician with the
rest of them. He had experience enough of life outside the law. If he
tried to make the values and mentality of the law carry a great deal of
weight, perhaps more than they would bear -- to absolutize the law, exalt
a native tradition over against its intellectual competitors, depose Reason
herself and set "art" upon the throne -- it was because he thought his way
through the diverse materials of experience to that mode of organized belief. So, to different conclusions, did his opponents. Coke was not a provincial who knew no better, an insular mind, literally and figuratively,
who by some half-comic extravagance of personality managed to impress
a ludicrous overestimation of the common law on other provincials. I
hope that in sketching his approach to Calvin's Case I have given some
sense that he had a jurisprudence -- not just a mind piled deep with curious legal erudition, but a theory as to how such a mind was conditioned
and equipped to solve problems more wisely than other kinds of mind.
That his theory was wide open to criticism does not detract from its seriousness. On the contrary, because there was such a thing as "Cokeanism"
-- because claims for the special status of the common law were impressively advanced; because new, distinctive, serious, and profoundly dubious ideas in jurisprudence were on the floor -- equally distinguished
lawyers and lawyer-philosophers felt the need to challenge it. There were
serious issues among serious men.
There is no more jejune belief in English history that the tendency to
think of common lawyers as an intellectual and political monolith -- a
bloc allied with an equally imaginary fixed quantity called Puritanism
against Stuart monarchy. The element of truth in that picture is vitiated
by oversimplifying it. Not only were lawyers divided against each other
politically. Their political differences were partly reflective of, and partly
independent of, divergent strains of jurisprudence provoked by an intensified level of awareness and debate. When one descends from the peak
occupied by very great men, modesty is the most useful attitude to take
along. We do not and cannot know a great deal about the general thinking of the legal profession as a whole and the parts of the lay world that
caught ideas more or less directly from the legal. The relatively small
group of successful practitioners at the Bar, it is worth noting, was in an
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intrinsically ambiguous situation. On the one hand, such men belonged to
the official world. The cursus honorum to which their ambitions looked
ran into various paths of officialdom. If the common law judiciary was
the chief prize, positions in the equity system, government law, and numerous posts in the half-legal, half-administrative departments of government were eligible objects of aspiration. Many lawyers were exposed to
the kinds of experience that helped such especially gifted men as Ellesmere and Bacon appreciate the limitations of the common law and the excesses of "Cokeanism." It is quite possible that lawyers as a social group
were less liable than the "Country" community -- the gentry whose fora
were local government and Parliament -- to fall into the looser modes of
exalting the common law -- exalting it into a political symbol, an "inheritance" calling forth the responses of ancestor-worship and visceral nativism, a portentous Good Thing. On the other hand, common lawyers were
anything but a bourgeois-official caste, a noblesse de la robe. They took
ideas and attitudes from the "Country"-J.P.-Parliamentary-gentlemanly
world to which they intimately belonged, as well as imparting ideas and
attitudes to it. In the end, there is probably no reason to doubt that
"Cokeanism" was stronger than "anti-Cokeanism," that the ties between
the legal community and the "Country" community were stronger than
those binding lawyers as a group to the government. But any such reality
is only a net reality -- a prevailing pattern in a very complex tapestry, or
better, a sequence of patterns increasingly influenced by the dynamics of
political history.
Our immediate question is whether highly general attitudes about the
common law constituted a pressure on the judges -- a de facto pressure
and for reasons discussed above a legitimate one -- to favor common law
jurisdiction in problematic situations -- e.g., when liberal application of
procedural rules in Prohibition cases was necessary to give a party the
benefit of common law adjudication. My best guess is "yes" -- in an indeterminately "net" sort of way. En route to that conclusion, we have
been looking at the body of attitudes most ready-to-hand as an influence
on judicial behavior -- attitudes in the legal profession and the part of the
lay community that traded ideas with the profession. If we look toward
popular attitudes in a wider sense, another set of cross-currents and uncertainties will come into view. On the one hand, there are signs of popular
interest in the law, indeed enthusiastic faith in its arcane virtues. The
complicated phenomenon of litigiousness, of whose virulence ca. 1600
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there are plenty of signs, probably has one root in the sheer prominence
of law on people's cultural horizons. Suing is one way to deal with conflicts. Inter alia, the propensity to sue may reflect a half-conscious wish
for the self-importance of involvement in the impressive career of a lawsuit. For modern people, the law is usually remote -- part of a businessgovernment world presided over by experts whose language one does not
pretend or care to understand and whose services one hopes and expects
to call on rarely at most. Litigation tends to be thought of as "bad news"
and the last resort. Of the contrary phenomenon, "the sheer prominence
of law on people's cultural horizons," American history up to relatively
recent times provides good examples: rural societies where the courthouse was a social center and the trial a form of entertainment; where a
man saw jury service and sometimes, literally or vicariously, found himself in the shoes of the party-plaintiff or -defendant; where the learned
man who crossed one's path, save for the preacher with his Bible, was the
lawyer with his Blackstone; where the lawyer's role as "culture hero" reflected his mastery of an art with whose lingo the laymen had picked up
some familiarity, of whose virtuosity he fancied himself a judge.
Comparable experiences were available to people in rural and small-scale
urban England. They were more apt to be made something of by the late16th and early-17th centuries than ever before, owing to the undoubted,
though hard to measure, cultural progress of middling people -- the prosperity, literacy, and constant hunger for knowledge and status which, in
one dimension, created a market for the sermonizing and lay participation
in religious affairs that Puritanism tended to furnish or agitate for furnishing. Legal knowledge and attitudes of vicarious loyalty to the law fed
into the same market. Those products were enjoyed by the upper-class
participants in subprofessional legal education, lay magistracy, and a legalistic brand of politics. Thus invested with status-value, they were accessible to lesser men as well. As the sermon was an oral, collective,
relatively inexpensive vehicle of divine knowledge, so a certain familiarity with a useful and highly touted species of secular lore -- at least with
the vocabulary of the law -- could be acquired by an ordinary man of observant habits in the everyday run of experience. Law, like divinity,
could be had after a fashion this side of the barrier between "English" and
"Latin" culture that separated the upper orders from the respectable-aspiring. In both of those spheres, from several upper-order points of view, a
little knowledge was all-too dangerously acquirable.
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For this side of the coin I can do no better than quote a 17th-century
character-speech by a "common yeoman": "...I have a verie great desire
to have some understanding of Lawe, because I would not swim against
the streame, nor be unlike unto my neighbours, who are so full of Lawpoints, that when they sweat, it is nothing but Law; when they breath, it is
nothing but law; when they neese [sneeze] it is perfite law; when they
dreame it is profound law. The book of Littletons Tenures is their breakfast, their dinner, their boier, their supper, and their rere-banquet: Everie
ploughhswayne with us may bee a Seneschall in a court Baron: He can
talke of Essoines, Vouchers, Withernams, and Recaptions: And if you
control him, the booke of the Groundes of the Law is his portresse, and
readie at his girdle to confute you. Surelie, sir, my neyghbours are full of
sension and tention, and so cunninge, that they will make you beleeve that
all is gold which glistereth:" (from William Fulbecke, A Parallele or
Conference of the Civill Law, the Canon Law, and the Common Law of
this Realme of England, 1601 -- Part II, unpaginated.)
As for the other side of the coin: for every yeoman who was proud of
knowing what a Withernam was, for every plain man who "identified"
with the strange and potent lore of the common law, how many suffered
the law's delay? How many experienced law and lawyers as mystifying
and greedy? For every happy litigative warrior, how many people were
dragged into litigation by the law's frightful obscurity and their society's
incapacity to provide alternative devices for avoiding and resolving conflict? How many perceived their own ruin as the correlative of some lawyer's enrichment? How much of the visceral resentment of a class
society was focused precisely on common lawyers -- the worst of the
worse, a close, monopolistic band of upper-class scions conspiring to
frustrate justice and engross power by keeping the law as needlessly complex in substance as it was unintelligible in Law Franch? We should look
ahead to the Leveller and Evangelical onslaught on the common law in
the middle decades of the 17th century. There was little in that critique
that had not in some form been said before. Old veins of explicit popular
hostility to common lawyers, as to the ecclesiastical courts, must have
been underlaid by deeper funds of inchoate feeling. The Levellers had
something to draw on and give coherence to. We should take note of the
high incidence of non-common law litigation, some of which may reflect
people's desire to avoid the common law or belief that better justice was
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obtainable elsewhere. One must be very careful about ascribing that significance to use of non-common law courts. Often one had no choice
about where to sue, and even when one does, choosing the court that for
one reason or another seems likely to serve one’s turn need not imply
very far-reaching general attitudes. But it is possible that part of the motive behind some suits in the Admiralty, Star Chamber, Requests, and regional councils was express feeling that delay, expense, mystification,
and dubious justice were more likely to accompany common law litigation. The justifiability of such feeling insofar as it existed is a further
question, concerning which we should not jump to conclusions, for the
real workings of the non-common law courts are still largely uninvestigated. Use of the Privy Council as a subjudicial organ for avoiding litigation or expediting it is another practice of indeterminate significance for
attitudes about the regular legal channels. The ecclesiastical courts were
the part of the non-common law system most likely to be denigrated as,
and because, the common law was exalted, but even in that case the mix
and relationship of attitudes is hard to know. If we take the more neutral
sorts of ecclesiastical business, such as probate jurisdiction, did average
experiences and presuppositions make for hostility to the Church courts?
Would people who were free from any religious inclination to disapprove
of clerical involvement with worldly things have thought it a good idea to
turn all testamentary jurisdiction over to the common law (a measure that
would have had some advantages for legal simplification, but one that
was not taken when episcopacy was abolished, a special court being created to handle the civilian specialties)? In their jurisdiction over defamation, the ecclesiastical courts provided a clearly popular facility -- a place
for the offended and the quarrelsome to go when the common law would
not listen to them (and sometimes, by choice, when it would.) Piety untouched by Puritanism may have furnished a good deal of affirmativeness
toward the ecclesiastical courts in principle, which many people’s experience may have done nothing to undercut. To some degree, in some contexts, using the ecclesiastical courts may signify happy expectations, even
relative to the common law. The comparative expense of litigation as between the non-common law and common law courts (including the
courts’ handling of costs) would furnish an important clue to attitudes if
we had any precise information about it. Rough impressions, predominantly of the ruinous costs of common law litigation (plus some early intimations of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce with respect to the Chancery), can be
very misleading because of the immense variety in types of litigation and
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circumstances and "stakes" of particular cases. Even so, there is probably
a reminder on the non-common law side -- a body of thankfulness that
there were places to sue less costly than Westminster Hall.
Once again, on the level of popular feeling, my guess would be that net
prejudice ran in favor of the common law. For example, I would be inclined to discount the argument from Levelling and the mid- 17th century
reform movement. Even apart from the large question as to how many
people were really convinced by the radical critique of the law, there are
important senses in which that critique was forged in the exceptional heat
of revolutionary experience. In the thought of the Leveller intellectuals
themselves, hostility to the law developed in some degree from disillusionment and from a dialectical or "transvaluing" tendency in their mentality, whereby the native legal tradition that was once an object of loyalty
came to be seen as a part of a pattern of "usurpation" upon a still more
primordial and authentic "English way." But once again, any net tendency was only a net tendency, offset by cross-currents and uncertainty.
(b) Apart from highly general attitudes bearing on the acceptability of
consigning people to non-common law justice, we should consider attitudes toward jury trial specifically. Insofar as facts were in issue, to let a
case out of common law hands was to let the disputed facts be tried by interrogation of witnesses and judicial determination thereupon. To keep a
case in common law hands was to insure trial of disputed facts by verdict
of twelve. If we discount all partisan feelings -- i.e., parties' or prospective parties' belief that they will do better with jury or non-jury trial -was there a residuum of pro-jury prejudice? If people would not typically
have doubted the non-common law courts' capacity to do basic justice,
including fair and accurate fact-finding, would they still have said that
non-jury trial is second best, that where there is any option the value of
giving a man a trial by jury outweighs all or most competing values?
Here let us sound a note of skepticism and surcease. There are of course
good grounds for answering the questions affirmatively. To defend the
common law as against foreign systems means first of all celebrating the
superiority of the jury. It was praised by Fortescue in the 15th century
and defended in a much more sophisticated and closely reasoned way by
Sir Mathew Hale after the middle of the 17th (History of the common
Law, Ch. 12). Fortescue was not really capable of technical comparative
law. When he came down to it, the jury was about the only specific fea-
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ture of English law he could make a case for. Hale's capacities were
much greater, but even his concentration on the jury testifies to its abiding
status as Exhibit A.
On the other hand, the history of the jury mystique is complex and obscure. The jury system can be valued for many different reasons, some of
them entirely practical, some quite mystical. There is a difference, for example, between considering juries the optimum device for judging the
truth on the basis of specific evidence and valuing them precisely because
their function is more complex and less rational than that (e.g., because
they can represent the norms of the community, because they cannot be
entirely prevented from violating the evidence and the law in the interest
of rough justice.) The history of attitudes toward the jury must be correlated with another complicated story -- the history of the practical workings of the institution (e.g., the amount of informal and legalized control
over juries exercised by trial judges) and ways of conceptualizing it (essentially, as between the poles of "judges of fact" and "those who know.")
It is not easy to say where the period ca. 1600 stands on the historical
spectrum of attitudes toward the jury. The spectrum as a whole is too illunderstood. To some degree, I suspect, the embalming and sanctification
of trial by jury came after the period we are concerned with here. Latemedieval experience of corrupt juries must have had a deleterious effect
on the vague reputation of the institution, over and above its specific effects: legal and legislative efforts to control corruption, attempts to evade
jury trial by resort to the Council and Chancellor. People no doubt continued to have bad experiences with juries an the 16th and 17th centuries,
and the evasion motive probably still figured in the election of non-common law courts, especially the Star Chamber. Whether their experiences
with non-jury trial were good or bad, people were likely to have some experience with it in the heyday of the ecclesiastical and "prerogative"
courts. That is to say, trial by jury could not be taken for granted to the
extent that was possible after the Great Rebellion. Perhaps it came to be
more valued as a touchstone of the "English way" after it came closer to
being the only form of proceeding people were likely to encounter. (It
was not, of course, literally the only form, since equity, Admiralty, and
ecclesiastical courts continued to function and to use the civil law, interrogatory method of fact-finding.) In sum: Though trial by jury was undoubtedly valued -- as part of a diffuse "nativism," but the most focused
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part -- there is some reason to be skeptical as to the weight of feeling on
that specific score.
In connection with the jury trial, we should raise one further question:
Was consigning a man to a non-common law court giving him over to
something worse that trial without a jury? Was it perceived as relegating
him to fact-finding methods less rational or less fair than a non-jury system need be? The full answer to these questions depends on matters to be
considered at large in this study. In brief: (1) Ecclesiastical courts were
to a degree prevented by Prohibitions from enforcing certain evidentiary
rules which the common law judges considered unduly rigid and formalistic. The judges sometimes saw to it that parties being tried without a
jury were not subjected to hurdles which they would not encounter if they
were tried by jury at common law. (2) Abuse of "inquisitorial procedure"
by ecclesiastical courts was also controlled by Prohibitions, though it was
not entirely banned. To hand a man over to an ecclesiastical court was to
expose him to involuntary interrogation in some cases. It is possible to
object to every form of involuntary interrogation, even in a purely civil
dispute. The common law jury system avoided it. Insofar as that system
served as a norm, people may have regarded the inquisitorial system,
even in its most neutral applications, as inherently unfair. Involuntary interrogation is much more objectionable when the effect is to force a man
to betray himself to criminal liability. Ecclesiastical courts were not fully
preventable from using it to that effect quoad purely ecclesiastical crimes.
They were effectively prevented from exposing people to common law
criminal liability by interrogating them in ecclesiastical causes. For our
present purposes, therefore, there was little reason to fear that relegation
to ecclesiastical justice meant relegation to fishing expeditions and secular self-incrimination. If a civil litigant was handed over to an ecclesiastical court lacking jurisdiction in principle, only because he failed to claim
a Prohibition in proper form, he could almost certainly get a Prohibition
later to stop interrogation tending to incriminate him at common law.
In the loose realm of attitudes, however, it is possible that ecclesiastical use of inquisitorial technique in criminal cases left a black mark on
ecclesiastical courts and procedures generally. Almost all questions
about the power to expose people to self-incrimination arose in connection with the High Commission -- an extraordinary court, and primarily a
criminal court (exclusively one, with jurisdiction only over "high" eccle-
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siastical crimes, according to the prevailing common law view. If the
High Commission had not existed, the reputation of the ordinary ecclesiastical courts might have been different. It was the High Commission,
not the Star Chamber, that first got associated with what have come to be
pejoratively called "Star Chamber methods." The strength of that association and the emotions connected with it are hard to gauge. I am inclined to think that the High Commission gained itself a generous
measure of unpopularity on account of its procedures in legal and non-legal circles wider than the Puritan circles with self-interested grievances
against the court. Such feeling may have reflected on ecclesiastical jurisdiction generally, and may have tended to focus the virtues which Englishmen were disposed to see in the common law. The presence of the
controversial High Commission may have heightened the generalized
contrast between the common law--where protection against self-incrimination was built into the system of fact finding-- and "inquisitorial procedure" with the Torquemadan associations it can have.
(c) One further special aspect of pro-common law feeling requires notice. In discussing the general prestige of the common law, I have not
dwelt as specifically on the historico-prescriptive dimension of attitudes
toward the law as its importance requires. The native legal tradition was
not valued only because it was native; it was valued because it was reputedly immemorial. Coke's conception of the law's "copiousness" and of
an "artificial reason" capable of exploiting the reserves in the cornucopia
was a manifestation of a larger frame of mind. That frame of mind comprehended beliefs about the realities of history and about the legitimating
power of time. The law was copious because it was the creation of "infinite ages." The product of boundless time was guaranteed to be a repository of such qualities of experience and reflection as could not possibly
be accessible to any given generation of the living, however well-endowed with "natural reason." Objectively, the law itself was "artificial
reason": a body of normative truth superior to that which any living individual or group could arrive at by inherent human powers of intuition, or
by reflection on a limited fund of experience. To refer to the law -- to inquire after its solution of problems -- was to employ a superior substitute
for reason, an "artifice," a man-made supplement to man's naked faculties. (The sense is perilously and ironically similar to what Hobbes was
to mean by an "artificial animal": A sovereign state erected upon man's
surrender of the right to judge for himself, whereby he breaks the dead-
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locks of "mere nature" and gains not only peace but civilization. It is no
accident that Hobbes was implacably hostile to common lawyers. To enthrone one Leviathan it was necessary to depose another.) Subjectively,
the "artificial reason" of trained lawyers was the one way living men
could take advantage of the resources of wisdom history supplied and
guaranteed.
These ideas depended on a mixture of positive historical awareness-much of which was of course very inaccurate -- and legal concepts which
exalted the value of usage in a distinctly ahistorical way. Knowledge of
English antiquities, especially legal antiquities, had grown considerably
by the early 17th century. The basis for actually seeing a continuous tradition of impressive extent, for noticing that features of English Law had
in fact weathered long ages, was greatly expanded. Fortescue in the 15th
century believed that English law had "always been there," was primordially and "constitutionally" implanted in the national identity. But he
could not say how that was so except by positing a "social contract," "in
the beginning," when Brutus first set foot upon this other-Latium. Coke
had both the means and the need to say a great deal more. He was far
from content with abstract generalities, to the effect that English law must
be an old and continuous tradition because there was no sign of its having
begun at any specifiable time. That is to say, Coke was truly interested in
history -- not out of idle curiosity, but because his claims for the common
law seemed to him to depend on actual demonstration of its remarkable
age and continuity. He had no interest in "social contracts" (and no faith
in Brutus.) He had great interest in making the case that the essential
characteristics of English law were observable in Anglo-Saxon times, and
even earlier, in combing Caesar's Commentaries for evidence of common law institutions (which of course he found.) Of course he convinced
himself of a great deal of nonsense. Very real knowledge of medieval
law was projected backwards into make-believe. But the impulse was
historical -- no less for being uncritical and wishful. Coke believed that
the common law was in fact what it ought to be. His positive history was
not accurate, but that does not mean the "ought" simply drowned the "is."
It does not mean that Coke failed to study the evidence available to him-available to an extremely busy practitioner and judge who knew about
some sources by accident and in the way of business and did not know
about others, available also to the preconceptions with which the material
was approached.
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The historical beliefs spread by Coke and others found acceptance.
(Like "Cokeanism" generally, they found resistance too. The better-informed, more critical vein of legal history that runs from Spelman
through Selden to Hale was destructive of Coke's certainties even when,
as with Hale, it was ultimately affirmative of his jurisprudence.) The
prestige of the common law was in part its reputation, sustained by positive historical beliefs, for antiquity, survival, and the chastening wisdom
of gigantine ancestors. In point of pedigree, English law was the peer of
civil law. (Its correspondence with the primal law of the Jews was one of
Coke's themes. God gave His judgements, Moses, "the first reporter,"
wrote them down. So Lord Justices continued to pronounce and Inns-ofCourt men to record. The Twelve Tables, of course, were a respectably
ancient record of foreign law.) In England, foreign imports might have
their limited place--strangers, guests, peregrini --entitled to hospitality, to
tolerance in their place. But they could not be said to supply any deficiency in English law, to represent for any purpose a higher or more universal standard of right, to be anything but latter -day imports whose
inevitable role was to occupy such space as the old and all-sufficient English system chose to make for them. To be judged by the common law
was to be judged in the old English way. The natural prejudices of an
innovation-fearing, traditionalistic society were supplied with confirmatory facts and fictions from history toward the end of the 16th century.
Patterns perceived in history affected perceptions in everyday life-- manifestly in politics. They may also have borne upon the relative acceptability of common law and non-common law adjudication that concerns
us here.
On one side, historical awareness was extended. If you like, it was extended just enough to go wrong, to furnish prejudice and myth with a servant. In part, it was extended -- and patterned as it was -- because of
legal ideas which "sounded in history" but were in fact quite ahistorical.
Usage legitimated in English law. That is a legal "fact" with specific applications -- viz., to the establishment of prescriptive rights. A prescriptive right is in essence an exception to the common law founded on usage
-- local usage (i.e., obtaining throughout a recognized local unit, a county,
parish, manor, or whatever) or private usage (as between the owners of
Blackacre and the owners of Whiteacre). There were limits on the power
of usage to carve out exceptions to the common law, most notably: (1) the
rule that an exceptional custom must be "reasonable" in the eyes of the
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judges; (2) Nullum tempus occurit regi -- the most important practical effect of which was that usage could not make an exception to statutory
law. Subject to such limits, usage could establish local rules and private
rights at variance with the common law (some extreme forms of variance
failing by the reasonableness test.) The only kind of legitimating usage
contemplated by English law was immemorial usage. That is to say, usage extending over a specifiable period, however long, did not establish
rights. It must be shown to have continued "from time whereof memory
runneth not to the contrary." The negative meaning of that expression,
however, was much more important than the positive. Evidence going to
show that an exceptional practice obtained at some remote time was conducive to the conclusion that it was immemorial; evidence showing that a
practice started at some specific time in the past, however remote, or that
it did not obtain at some specifiable time, was fatal to the conclusion.
Applying these ideas sometimes produced terrible legal knots, but such
were the principles, Whether an alleged custom was in fact immemorial
was a jury question. Elaborate historical research was hardly called for to
convince a jury. A man trying to establish a prescription would want to
gather some witnesses or documents testifying to condition a while back.
If the other party produced no evidence of the fatal kind, there was little
to prevent the jury from concluding that the custom was indeed immemorial. Judges exercised a degree of control over irresponsible juries, but it
is doubtful that a skeptical judge could do very much in this context. The
archaic conception of the jury -- "those who know," local men familiar
with local facts -- was appropriate when the question was "What is the
immemorial usage of this locality?"
These legal doctrines bear on our present concerns in two ways. (1)
Custom as a technical category influenced the conceptualization of the
common law itself. Immemorial usage legitimated exceptional local customs. What else so essentially gave the law of the realm its authority?
The common law was routinely defined as "the common custom of the
realm." I suspect that the phrase had accumulated rather more meaning
by the beginning of the 17th century than it had earlier. A highly professionalized national legal system could not really be reduced to the model
of customs technically so-called. There were difficulties, certainly, in the
implication that a rule of the common law was the peer .of some humble
borough custom -- authoritative for the same reason, on a par because
coeval -- save for the wider prevalence of the common law rule. Not the
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least difficulty was that the common law judges passed on the reasonableness of customs proved or admitted to be immemorial "facts," drawing to
some extent on the common law itself (as opposed to mere common sense
and fairness) for criteria of reasonableness. I suspect, however, that the
difficulties tended to be suppressed and the model more insistently relied
on as "Cokeanism" organized one side of the legal thinking of an increasingly sophisticated age. As "What is law?" came to worry people more,
"Law is essentially custom" took on weight as one serious answer (disputed as a much too simple one by such as Lord Ellesmere.) As more historical information came in to suggest that the presumption of the law's
immemorialness corresponded to fact, there was the more reason to dwell
on the legitimating power of immemorialness. Conversely, looking into
the past was stimulated by the need to verify what was presumed, and
what was seen was profoundly colored by presumption.
To the extent that the common law was more sharply perceived as custom, and to the extent that immemorial usage was more credited with the
power to make law valid and valuable, contrast between common law and
non-common law jurisdictions was heightened in still another way. If a
man's case stayed in common law hands, it would be decided by law that
was intelligible and good because it amounted to custom; if the case escaped common law hands, it would be decided by rules whose title to be
law was less clear. In this way, insofar as they penetrated ordinary people's consciousness, general ideas about the law's source of authority, as
well as about its de facto antiquity, may have affected the acceptability of
non-common law adjudication and prevailing notions of the public interest in jurisdictional lines.
(2) There is another more specific effect to consider. Many Prohibition cases actually involved prescriptive claims, customary tithe-commutations being the leading example. Speaking abstractly (we shall worry
later about practical complications of this subject), there is no necessary
reason why an ecclesiastical court could not adjudicate such a claim well
enough. Ecclesiastical rules on prescription were different from common
law rules (they avoided the common law concept of immemorialness), but
they were not on paper less favorable to the establishment of prescriptive
rights. In any case, if the ecclesiastical courts had been allowed to entertain prescriptive claims, they would probably not have been allowed to insist on their own substantive rules. In principle, a prescriptive claim can
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be tried without a jury, inconvenient though that may be for a man whose
hopes rest heavily on a friendly jury. But in another way, there, perhaps,
is the rub. A man claims a right based on the immemorial usage of his
community. Can the truth of the claim really be judged by anyone but
members of the community? In cold theory, the evidence can be evaluated by any "judge of fact." But is there not something missing without
the actual testimony of the community that only a jury can supply? As it
were, an outside judge can say what appears to be the custom, but a jury
can say what it is. In short, non-jury trial may have been especially unacceptable in cases involving prescription, for more-than-partisan reasons.
More generally: A man claims a right based on immemorial usage -- one
little custom in the vast structure of customs that includes the common
law itself, in a sense as good as any other, as sacrosanct, if usage above
all else points to right. In cold theory, of course, anyone can judge the
"fact" of the custom, and perhaps any reasonable man can judge its reasonableness. But can a court that is not essentially beholden to custom really handle a case of custom as well as a court that thinks custom and
breathes custom, applies custom and protects it because the law to which
it owes faith amounts to custom? In sum: The high incidence of prescriptive claims in cases raising jurisdictional problems may have created
a greater bias in favor of common law adjudication that would otherwise
have existed, for there are special reasons why non-common law determination of such claims would have been hard to accept.
In the preceding pages, we have asked whether a strong public interest
in the strict maintenance of jurisdictional lines is likely to have been perceived. Did it very much matter if a case fell into the wrong court?
Ought it to have mattered a great deal to the judges if they were to serve
the expectations of the community that employed them? Was the perceived public interest sufficient to justify relatively loose procedural policies, with the effect of enforcing the lines of jurisdiction in favor of
litigants who neglected to take the proper steps to enforce them for what
they conceived to be their private benefit? I do not make the slightest
pretense of having answered these questions. They do not admit of
straightforward answers except by much deeper research and analysis at
every point than I have carried out, or, to many intents, than anyone else
has. Insofar as the questions go to the "public opinion" of a remote time,
they cannot possibly be answered except by elaborately inferential means.
Insofar as there are possibilities, such as I have to a degree adumbrated,
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for projecting from intellectual history to what considerable numbers of
people may have thought and felt, they must always be tentative, not least
because the intellectual history itself -- the process of working out what
articulate thinkers "really meant" -- can never command consensus. The
well-known gross facts of institutional and political history provide a kind
of basis for getting at the experiences that were available to people and
the features of their environment that were taken for granted, but even
those kinds of history are still often too grossly known to permit the sort
of projection that would be most valuable for the purposes intimated here.
This study is about the "cases and resolutions of the law," to which we
must now turn. The considerations above are meant to suggest the large,
vague, complex worlds of reality and perception that might conceivably
be reflected in innumerable grains of sand, in "actual cases and controversies" of the various types that arose on Prohibitions. The extent to which
those large worlds can actually be seen in the grains of sand, and the extent to which studying the cases is a useful indirect approach to the general problems we have raised, are implicit questions in all that follows.
For the rest, we shall be concerned with what the courts did in Prohibition
cases and with the immediate implications of their decisions for legal
doctrine.
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A synthesizing and speculative essay such as this Introduction owes a
diffuse debt to many historical writings and historical sources. The best
path to the jurisprudential climate in which the cases in this study were
decided is to read a modest “canon” of original texts. (I use “jurisprudential” here to signify generalized thought about the law and of lawyers, expressed in something like literary form and capable of confluence with
wider intellectual culture. That contrasts with the mere generalizable implications of the practice of law, one of the horizons of this entire study,
elements of which figure in the present Introduction.) My interpretation
of that climate is mainly the product of reflection on the texts. There is
secondary comment on them, some of which I shall mention, but it does
not approach substitutability for the sources. It could not, in the way that
literary criticism cannot dispense from reading the literature it is about.
That truism aside, it remains, in my opinion, manifest that the tradition of
English jurisprudential writing has not accumulated around it a very significant body of criticism and intellectual history. The corpus of important sources is small and accessible; any reader whose interest or
skepticism is provoked by this Introduction should think of going directly
to it.
Sir John Fortescue (referred to on page 24) is seminal for the tradition of self-conscious affirmation of English law against its rivals, as well
as for some ideas and attitudes within that tradition: De Laudibus Legum
Angliae (modern edition and translation by S. B. Chrimes, Cambridge,
1942.) The text at page 24 notes how the work of Fortescue’s contemporary, Sir Thomas Littleton, Tenures, seemed in 17th century retrospect to
be a landmark -- one might say half-seriously a monument of Phidian perfection showing that English law had attained its classical epoch. Littleton’s book has no express jurisprudential content, however; for that,
Fortescue is the landmark.
The peaks of the tradition after Fortescue are Sir Edward Coke, Sir
Matthew Hale, and Sir William Blackstone. The essence of my interpretation of Coke’s jurisprudence is conveyed in this Introduction. It is much
more fully developed in my essay “Reason, Authority, and Imagination:
The Jurisprudence of Sir Edward Coke” (in Perez Zagorin, ed., Culture
and Politics from Puritanism to the Enlightenment, Berkeley, 1980). The
reader is referred to that essay for the primary sources beyond the central

49

Prohibition: Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
Calvin’s Case. (Coke’s general ideas are hopelessly scattered over his
writings. The prefaces to his Reports are the best primary sources to go to
after Calvin, then here and there in the four volumes of Coke’s Institutes-regrettably here and there, amid a great deal of mere law.) I have said in
the “General Introduction” that this study as a whole is meant to contribute to a fuller reconstruction of Coke’s career than is yet possible. For
secondary comment on Coke, my recommendations would be: (1)
Stephen D. White, Sir Edward Coke and “The Grievances of the Commonwealth, 1621-1628 (Chapel Hill, 1979) -- the only book-length example (and an excellent one) of serious monographic study of Coke; the
thorough bibliography covers everything that has been written on Coke,
the serious part of which is mostly in articles. (2) Samuel E. Thorne, Sir
Edward Coke, 1552-1952 (London, 1957) -- a brief synoptic treatment by
a distinguished contributor to detailed Coke studies. (3) Holdsworth in
Vol. V -- see below for Holdsworth’s History.
For Hale, again, I have expressed in essay form how he seems to me to
fit the tradition, especially in relation to Coke. (Introduction to Hale’s
History of the Common Law, reprint, Charles M. Gray ed., Chicago,
1971.) See bibliographical note thereto for the Hale sources beyond the
History.
Blackstone’s Commentaries, though well beyond the period of this
study, is important for anyone who wants to see the study in perspective - whether the jurisprudential tradition immediately in question or the substance of jurisdictional law (sparsim for the former, sections of Bk. III
dealing with the non-common law courts for the latter). Blackstone’s text
can be studied in innumerable editions, ignoring the editors and commentators or using them as a valuable supplement. A reader who wants to
avoid the complication of the glossators should use the most easily available edition -- University of Chicago Press reprint of Blackstone’s first
edition, ed. Stanley N. Katz et al., Chicago, 1979. Nothing I know of in
the extensive secondary literature on Blackstone deals with him adequately in the set of relations immediately relevant here. A still unpublished essay of my own, “Blackstone’s History of English Law,” is
intended as a sequel to my pieces on Coke and Hale -- the final chapter of
a further working-out of the lines adumbrated in this Introduction, which
was written before the essays. With respect to jurisdictional law, reading
Blackstone is the best first step -- and at present it would be hard to rec-
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ommend further ones -- toward understanding that the relationship between the common law and the non-common law systems as conceived in
the 1760s was very different from that relationship in practice and implication during the period of this study.)
The vital point about the tradition “affirming” English law is that the
closer one looks at it the more aware one becomes -- as one moves from
Fortescue to Coke to Hale to Blackstone -- that the way the history of the
law is imagined and the meaning of the terms in which it is affirmed
change dramatically. It is a story of successive writers adhering to a common set of basic values, in a sense “saying the same thing,” but in an
equally important sense saying very different things. This Introduction
catches only something of the first transition -- Fortescue to Coke. It explicitly argues that there is a counter-tradition -- more cosmopolitan, more
in touch with natural law thinking, sometimes directly critical of
“Cokeanism.” In the text I call attention to Lord Ellesmere’s opinion in
Calvin as the sharpest example of engagement between the affirmers and
the critics. I refer also to Francis Bacon. There is nothing in the large
secondary literature on Bacon that seems to me to put his legal thought in
all the right perspectives, though the best-known article on the legal aspect of his work is a good start toward an appreciation of it: Paul H. Kocher, “Francis Bacon on the Science of Jurisprudence” (Journal of the
History of Ideas, 1957). I have not myself tried to analyze Bacon’s
thought in detail, as I have that of other figures. The best place to start in
Bacon’s writings is his essay “On Judicature.” His ideas can then be pursued in his into his expressly legal writings (collected in Vol. VII of the
Spedding ed. of Bacon’s Works.) They must be pursued with caution
there, for sometimes, as always with such material, the line between the
lawyer doing his job and the thinker thinking his own thoughts is hard to
draw. My suggestion on p. 38 ff. that major tracts of Bacon’s thought can
be brought under the rubric “jurisdiction” amounts to a suggestion for
reading The Advancement of Learning.
Bacon has never been so well written about as a political thinker -- in
contexts that often make his political thought continuous with his legal -as by S. R. Gardiner. This is an appropriate occasion to say that Gardiner’s great history is the place to go for a sense of how jurisdictional law
fits and has been fitted into the received rendering of general political and
constitutional history. (Samuel R. Gardiner, History of England from the

51

Prohibition: Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War-, 1603- 1642, 10
Vols., London, 1883-4.) Chs. VIII, XII, and XXII are the most immediately relevant. Observations on Bacon come partly in these chapters; they
are otherwise scattered over the first three volumes. Gardiner can be usefully supplemented by J. R. Tanner, English Constitutional Conflicts of
the Seventeenth Century 1603-1689 (Cambridge, 1928), and some of the
most basic documents touching the legal problems dealt with in this study
are available in Tanner’s Constitutional Documents of James I (Cambridge, 1930.) This body of older work is of excellent quality. It is my
starting point. Political history has been advanced in many dimensions by
more recent scholars, but not in the microscopic one that touches the law
of jurisdiction. With respect to that, there is nothing wrong with the rendering of Gardiner et al., save for the missing Prince of Denmark those
authors could not have supplied without ludicrous diversion from their
larger tasks -- the close inspection of jurisdictional law in the courts
which this study attempts to provide.
Between the peaks -- Fortescue, Coke, Hale, Blackstone -- and aside
from the obvious competing eminence, Ellesmere-Bacon, are other books
of the jurisprudential “canon.” These are more obliquely related to the
themes of this Introduction, but they are useful as indirect lights, and
some of them are referred to in the text. Christopher St. German’s Doctor and Student (referred to on p. 15 -- best modern ed.: Selden Society,
T. F. T. Plucknett and J. L. Barton eds., London, 1974) is the most significant work of jurisprudence proper between Fortescue and Coke. Besides its main claim to landmark status -- as the first book to bring the
Chancellor’s court of equity into the open air of literature -- Doctor and
Student is an invaluable source for the intellectual world of the English
lawyer in the early 16th century. In the end, in my opinion, it documents
the “affirmative” nativist tradition along with the tradition’s clearly orthodox bearers, the more so for struggling to accommodate the common law
to the “higher law” conventions of the age and the reality of an equitable
corrective.
Thomas Starkey’s Dialogue between Reginald Pole and Thomas Lupset (ed. Kathleen M. Burton, 1948) is the “canon’s” witness to dissatisfaction with native English law arising out of 16th century humanism and to
a kind of aspiration toward Romanization. Starkey gave the impulse to F.
W. Maitland’s well-known essay English Law and the Renaissance
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(Cambridge, 1901 -- often reprinted), which properly takes note of the humanist “aspiration toward Romanization,” explains why nothing came of
it in the end, and in the process seems rather to exaggerate the real-life
threat, in the Henrician period, of the common law’s being replaced
through the agency of non-common law courts. As a cold sober theory
about practical danger, the “Maitland thesis” was pretty well disposed of
by Holdsworth (History of English Law, Vol. IV, 252 ff). For an up-todate reexamination of the matter, see J. H. Baker, Introduction to The Reports of Sir John Spelman (2 vols., Selden Society, London 1977-78).
In passing: Readers of this book should keep Baker in mind, not for
a great deal of direct help with the legal detail of the later period that concerns me, but for a picture of English law and the legal system at a
slightly earlier time that meets an unprecedented standard of scholarship
and clarity. There is no comparable picture for the late 16th to early 17th
century period where my Prohibition cases fall. I could not provide a
comprehensive one at anything approaching Baker’s level. I inevitably
do speak, with various degrees of explicitness, about the system as a
whole -- in this Introduction and the General Introduction among other
places. I speak from the basic legal history and from impressions which I
like to say jokingly I got, not from books, but from my practice -- not that
of a practitioner of early modern jurisdictional law (who would know infinitely more), but of someone who most of the time, in preparing these
volumes, is playing the role of a “re-stater,” or legal textbook writer, or
law review article-ist, with respect to those dead and gone practitioners.
On the proper occasion, I might be willing to defend that sort of roleplayer or costume-actor among the personae of the historian; when, in the
Introductions and essays, I turn back into something more like a moderndress historian, I am constantly drawing on the quainter character. For
the reader who wants a sense of the system in many aspects -- the same
system, only a little earlier -- at a level above the “basic legal history,”
Baker is the place to go.
For just the “basic legal history,” which is enough for placing the Prohibition cases in context, the best books are: T. F. T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (2nd ed., New York, 1932), J. H. Baker,
An Introduction to English Legal History (London, 1979), and, in a
unique class, W, S. Holdsworth’s monumental History of English Law
(13 vols., 3rd ed., London, 1945). Vol. I of Holdsworth is the basic book
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on the English system of courts in its diversity (cf. General Introduction).
For the parts of medieval history in which Maitland did his specialized
work, Holdsworth was a transmitter; for the later middle ages and the
early modern period, he was a pioneer. In writing an encyclopedic book,
he was necessarily confined for the most part to the printed sources and,
for close work on many of the innumerable sub-topics of legal history, to
monographic studies by others here and there, none of them approaching
the scope and quality of what Maitland had done on the high middle ages.
The close texture of jurisdictional law, my subject, is one example of the
many topics with respect to which Holdsworth could not go beyond what
he could do with any single topic himself in the course of taking on
everything. Nevertheless, the reader of Holdsworth from Vol. III on will
have an enormous knowledge of early modern law and its immediate antecedents -- of the “hardcore” case law and statute law, of the lawyers and
judges, of their literature, and of the surrounding constitutional history.
Holdsworth has by now been improved on and supplemented, but not
succeeded. With respect to lawyers’ literature, in formulating a “canon”
of basic jurisprudential texts here, I am saying by implication that little
else in the corpus of legal writings contributes much to an understanding
of lawyers’ thought beyond the practical level. Others may dispute this
judgment. Holdsworth provides comprehensive guidance to the corpus as
a whole.
A modest “canonical” niche can be assigned to Sir Thomas Smith’s
mid-16th century De Republica Anglorum. Law figures only incidentally,
but Smith provides a valuable contemporary “fix” on the English political
order with the advantage of a partially outside perspective. (He was a
practiced insider of English government, but a professional civilian with
extensive foreign experience, who wrote in part to make English ways intelligible to an educated public that need not be English.)
Richard Hooker’s Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (most conveniently
available in Everyman ed., 2 vols., London, 1907, and subsequent reprints) touches the concerns of this Introduction in interesting ways. It
comes, of course, out of the clerical world, not the legal (including the
Church-legal or civilian). It testifies to at least the following: The
Church of England’s search for a self-conception and ethos distinct from
the other strains of Protestantism; a theory assertive of the particular community’s right to choose its ecclesiastical forms as it chooses its secular
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law, against the Puritan conviction that there was a divinely prescribed,
universal blueprint in the Scriptures (cf. p. 37 in the text); a version of
classical natural law theory, reflecting Thomas Aquinas (from one angle
discomforting to the Cokean will to keep argument from mere natural reason out of legal debate, but so generous toward man-made law and the
self-determination of historic communities that the ultimate formula
could be as easily “natural law on terms acceptable to a Cokean” as an
antagonistic position); a “jurisdictional” mentality parallel to Bacon’s, for
Hooker’s organizing theme is that we are under many laws at once, each
in its sphere, and trouble comes when any of them overreaches its domain
-- a theme to which Coke on his terms would have said “Amen,” and his
terms were more clearly opposed to those of a politician and equity judge,
such as Bacon, than to those of an ecclesiastic such as Hooker. Hooker
was a loyal Church of England cleric, whose sympathy at the practical
level would undoubtedly have been with the ecclesiastical courts and their
protests against over-regulation by the common law; on the high ground
of theory he made peculiarly his, he propounded ideas that do not necessarily serve only the interests he would have cherished. (John Locke’s
celebrated reverence for this Elizabethan High Churchman may remind
us of that.)
The view has long been in circulation that there was some natural affinity between “the lawyers” and Puritan critics of the ecclesiastical establishment, Hooker’s foes. I believe that material in this study will
contribute to sustaining the opinion I hold: the view as stated is jejune.
Lawyers like other people differed over current religious controversies.
To the uncertain degree that they were held together by a professional
ethos -- an ethos given conscious formulation primarily by Coke, and perhaps exaggerated by him beyond the demands of a mere professional
ethos -- I do not think they had much in common with serious Puritan
thought. (Mildly Puritanish sentiments are something else, for these
were widespread in the ruling class and likely to turn up in a caste of conservative laymen apt to be at odds from time to time with high-flying
clerics and their friends in the government.) It is easier to imagine Coke
reading Hooker with fundamental approval -- particularly on the matters
Hooker immediately addressed, though perhaps with moments of theoretical discomfort -- than to see lines of attraction between his mentality
and that of ultra-Calvinist idealism.

55

Prohibition: Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
The last text in my “canon” is Thomas Hobbes’s Dialogue between a
Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England (modern ed.
by Joseph Cropsey, Chicago, 1971), supported by the philosopher’s major
works. Hobbes is the antithesis of the “affirmative” tradition. His relation to lawyers such as Ellesmere and Bacon is like his relation to Anglican divines: he propounded a version of their position so extreme that
they would have been more shocked by it than by a Coke at his most exaggerated. (So his pressing Erastianism to its logical conclusion was
more terrible to Anglican bishops than any spook the bluest of Presbyterians could conjure.) Hobbes analyzed common law ideology as a tissue of
nonsense; “mere reason” or natural law he analyzed as the only possible
source of adjudication besides sovereign mandate. He was father of the
lawyer-Puritan linkage (principally in Behemoth). On his premises, there
is no objecting to it -- per Hobbes, the two groups were victims of different kinds of nonsense, and also malicious propounders of different kinds,
but the will to subvert legitimate authority and substitute one’s own is the
same malignant will behind whatever ideological facade, and if the head’s
muddledness can ever excuse the heart’s disloyalty, then lawyers and Puritans failed alike to grasp the intellectual grounds of political duty.
(There is of course also no objection to linking Puritan religious opinion
and various veins of legal opinion in the texture of straightforward political history, a texture of imperfect alliances. The shifting confluences of
groups alienated from the government and of grounds for criticizing its
policies are classically depicted in Gardiner’s History and its derivatives;
they have been persuasively re-weighed in more recent political history,
with the effect of correcting the impression that over several decades currents of opposition to the Stuarts were constantly accumulating, alliances
always consolidating, towards the fatal moment of civil catastrophe.)
The aspect of Puritanism I speak of expressly in this Introduction -- its
built-in opposition to the “carnal” mode of Christian discipline embodied
in the Church courts -- has not had sufficient discussion. Christopher Hill
in Society and Puritanism in Pre-revolutionary England (American ed.,
New York, 1964) made a valuable contribution by calling attention to it
(Chs. 8-10). A common lawyer or judge could participate in that fundamental objection to ecclesiastical justice as the world had long known it.
I can only say that virtually nothing in hundreds of Prohibition cases suggests any such attitude. Exceptions could probably be found, but it seems
likely that nearly all of the legally minded believed what institutionally
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they must profess -- that the established form of ecclesiastical justice was
a benign and necessary part of the legal order. The belief is compatible
with great disagreement on the exact role assigned to the ecclesiastical
system by the law. My point in the text is that radical disapproval of that
system was at large in the community, to reinforce less radical forms of
dissatisfaction with it.
For awareness of the tradition affirming the native English legal heritage, and of Coke’s centrality in it, historians owe their primary debt to J.
G. A. Pocock’s The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law (Cambridge, 1957). Pocock has been catalytic for my own work on general jurisprudence (not so much for the study of Prohibitions as such, though
even there, to the degree that it started from an interest in pursuing a
fuller picture of Coke, Pocock’s placing of the judge as a figure in wider
intellectual history was an encouragement). I have come to take some
kinds of exception to Pocock’s picture of the “common law mind” (cf. p.
46), but I think the differences are more of perspective than of substance.
The “common law mind” looks more complicated when seen from within
the history of jurisprudence (with hardcore legal history over one’s
shoulder) than when Pocock sets it in the history of historical thought.
Any reader whose interest is caught by what I say in this Introduction
about the prestige of the common law and the perfections ascribed to it by
its initiates should go to Pocock’s representation of those phenomena.
The rest of what I say in this Introduction mostly so merges into a general reading of Tudor-Stuart history that it can hardly be tied to particular
sources. Though its place in the vast literature is certainly modest, I have
given a “general reading” in Renaissance and Reformation England (New
York, 1973). That book was written at about the same time as the present
volume of the study of Prohibitions. I cite it (with the bibliographical
suggestions therein) for the benefit of any reader whose curiosity is engaged by the ways in which my emphases in depicting the background of
cases on Prohibition procedure seem to imply a larger way of seeing the
period in which the cases fall.
There are speculative observations in this Introduction on the reputation of ecclesiastical courts. Throughout the study, I by and large rely for
my sense of what was going on in those courts -- on which any estimation
of their reputation depends -- on the reflection of that activity in common
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law reports. I do not try to coordinate that with the growing body of direct knowledge of ecclesiastical courts based on their own records. This
is a deliberate simplifying measure. There are two pictures: one is of
how the doings of ecclesiastical courts looked to the common law courts
in particular cases; the other is of how they really were -- typically, across
the board, in many normal cases (as opposed to those in which an attempt
was made to arrest ecclesiastical proceedings). I think it is better to let
study of the common law and ecclesiastical sources converge than to
“worry” the former with impressions from the latter. My largely skeptical suggestions in this Introduction seem to me compatible enough with
our improved direct knowledge of the ecclesiastical system in action.
Readers interested in whether they are might usefully start with Ralph A.
Houlbrooke, Church Courts and the People During the English Reformation 1520-1570 (Oxford, 1979), which contains a good bibliography of
other work. Now, however -- just as the present volume goes to press -another book is available, a more comprehensive work and one more directly related to my concerns: R. H. Helmholz, Roman Canon Law in
Reformation England (Cambridge, 1990). Helmholz is extending his distinguished earlier work in medieval ecclesiastical law into the early modern period. Roman Canon Law takes in all that has been done, by
Helmholz himself and by others, and projects a balanced and persuasive
wider picture of the post-Reformation ecclesiastical system -- a picture
that is being and will be rounded out by study of the ecclesiastical court
records in the kind of detail these volumes aspire to on the common law
side. That is a larger task than mine, for the quantity of material is much
greater. It is my hope that the present study will contribute a dimension
to the “rounding out” by working the easier side of the street with some
care.
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II.
STATUTORY RULES GOVERNING PROHIBITION
PROCEDURE
A.
2/3 Edw. 6, c. 13, sect. xiv: “Proof” of Surmise within Six
Months
1. Extent of proof requirement
Summary: Extension of the proof requirement to all or nearly all surmises in tithe suits involving matter of fact--in keeping with the Statute’s
probable policy--came slowly, especially in the King’s Bench. Before ca.
1615, the King’s Bench, though not the Common Pleas, restricted the
scope of the Statute. Whatever the reasons for such restriction, it served
the interest of the plaintiff-in- Prohibition, or tithe-payer. Coke may possibly be associated with the change to a rule more favorable to ecclesiastical interests.
* * *
The Prohibition cases which I have classified as raising essentially procedural issues fall into several sub-groups. The statute law subjected the
courts to two rules directly concerned with Prohibition procedure. I shall
first deal with problems involving those rules.
By the statute of 2/3 Edw. 6, c. 13, sect. xiv, parties bringing Prohibition were required in some situations to “prove” their suggestions within
six months. The meaning of this requirement is as follows: A party
seeking to obtain a Prohibition made a "suggestion" or "surmise" to a court
with power to issue the writ--for all practical purposes, to one or the other
of the two major common-law courts, the King’s (or Queen’s) Bench and
the Common Pleas. The Prohibition was not, in other words, to be had
automatically, like the Chancery writs-of-course by which most suits at
common law were started. To obtain the writ in the first place, plaintiffin-Prohibition had to move the court by showing that he had some kind of
presumptive case. Adversary debate often took place on the first motion
for a Prohibition, though it did not always occur, and Prohibitions were
sometimes issued with little consideration. In situations to which 2/3
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Edw. 6 applied, a further procedural requirement was imposed on plaintiff-in-Prohibition.
2/3 Edw. 6, c. 13, is called “An act for the true payment of tithes.” It is
an important piece of legislation on that subject, various of whose provisions will crop up in this study. Sect. xiv is directed against vexatious use
of the Prohibition in tithe litigation. It is meant to discourage defendants
in ecclesiastical suits for tithes from obtaining Prohibitions on fabricated
or flimsy claims, thereby delaying justice and putting the other party to
the trouble and expense of contesting a frivolous Prohibition. To that
end, parties who had obtained Prohibitions in situations within the act
were required to “prove” their suggestions by at least two witnesses not
later than six months after the granting of the Prohibition. “Prove” in this
context did not mean “establish conclusively.” After the suggestion was
“proved” to satisfy the statute, the defendant-in-Prohibition still had his
chance to dispute the suggestion’s truth and have a jury-trial (as well, of
course, as a chance to challenge the suggestion in law). In short, we have
to do with a preliminary requirement -- “proof’ in the sense of “enough
evidence to justify further proceedings.” This provision was backed up
by two sanctions: (a) If the suggestion was not proved as required, defendant-in-Prohibition “shall upon his...request and suit without delay
have a Consultation granted.” A Consultation was a Prohibition in reverse, as it were -- i.e., a writ authorizing the non-common law court to
proceed in a case previously prohibited. (b) Defendant-in-Prohibition
was also enabled, upon failure of the required proof, to recover double
costs and damages.
Two limits on the extent of the proof-within-six-months requirement
are reasonably evident from the text of the act and common sense. (a)
The requirement only applied to tithe suits. Sect. xiv refers to suits concerning “any matter or cause before rehearsed,” and the previous parts of
the act are almost entirely devoted to tithe law.1 To extend the proof re1

The one qualification on this point is that § X o f the act speaks o f offerings, or “obventions.” I
have found n o cases o n the application o f the proof requirement to suits for offerings. In
Stoneaceran v. Tee (M. 15 Jac. K.B Cited in Stroud v . Hoskins, below, but not separately
reported), it was held that a customary discharge o f anothcr type o f ecclesiastical due -- a
mortuary fee -- does not have to be proved.
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quirement to other kinds of ecclesiastical suits, or to other non-common
law suits on which Prohibitions might be sought, would be dubious. (Admittedly, the reasons for the rule could hold in other cases. The judicial
practice of extending a statute to like cases “by the equity” -- i.e., not by
liberal interpretation of the language, but because of the mere fairness of
having like situations governed by the same rule -- was still acceptable in
the 16th and early-17th centuries. However, it was usually confined to
“positive” or enabling legislation. Extension to administrators of the
power to bring a certain action which a statute gave to executors is a clear
example. A statute imposing a new duty on executors to prove something
by two witnesses would probably not have been extended to administrators. So here.)
(b) The proof requirement could not apply literally to all tithe suits.
For sometimes -- in tithe cases and otherwise -- Prohibitions were sought
and obtained solely on the ground that the ecclesiastical court was entertaining a suit which ought legally never to have been brought there, regardless of the facts. Sect. xiv of 2/3 Edw. 6 contains another provision:
that no Prohibitions in cases within its scope were to be granted unless a
copy of the libel (i.e., the ecclesiastical plaintiff’s statement-of-claim) was
attached to the surmise. This provision was plainly meant to insure that
the common-law judges were correctly informed of the nature of the ecclesiastical suit. Thereby, among other advantages, Prohibitions could
not be vexatiously obtained by misrepresenting what the ecclesiastical
suit was about. The copy of the libel was itself proof that such-and-such
a suit had in fact been brought in the ecclesiastical court. The proofwithin-six-months rule was clearly meant to cover situations where facts
beyond that basic one were asserted in the suggestion. About this there
was never any dispute. 2
Problems did arise, however, as to whether there were any limits on
the proof requirement other than the two I have specified. There was universal agreement that the act applied to the commonest sort of tithe-Prohi2

In many cases, occurences in the ecclesiastical court to which the libel itself would not attest
were surmised as grounds for Prohibitions ( e . g . , that an ecclesiastical judge had improperly
refused t o admit a certain plea.) There are, however, no cases raising the question whether
surmises o f such in-court f a c t s needed to be proved under 2 / 3 Edw. 6 . It may be assumed that
the Act only applicd to out-of-court facts.
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bition case, as follows: A parson or vicar suing to recover tithes had to
proceed in an ecclesiastical court. Tithes were in principle payable in
kind. To take the simplest and most important kind of tithes as an example: An agricultural producer was required to separate 1/10th of his harvested hay or corn from the other 9/10ths and leave it accessible in the
field for the parson to carry away. Suppose, then, that a parson sues a parishioner in the ecclesiastical court for tithe-hay in kind. The commonest
defense to such suits was to claim a modus decimandi. I.e.: The parishioner claims that from time out of mind it has been customary in the parish (or for the occupiers of the particular tenement where the hay in
question grew) to pay the parson 6d. per acre, say, in lieu of tithe-hay.
One of the most certain things that can be said about the law of Prohibitions is that a modus was a good basis for the writ. I.e.: An ecclesiastical
defendant who surmised to a common law court that he should enjoy the
advantage of a prescriptive modus could have a Prohibition for the asking. The truth of the custom -- whether the 6d. had in fact been paid in
lieu of tithe-hay from time immemorial -- was triable by jury at common
law, and the legal sufficiency of modi was determinable by the common
law judges. Everyone agreed, however, that 2/3 Edw. 6 opposed one obstacle to obtaining a Prohibition by alleging a modus: The statute required that the parishioner prove his modus by two witnesses within six
months. 3
Whether other suggestions than modus were within 2/3 Edw. 6 gave
the courts trouble. The statute did not provide altogether clear guidance
in some of the situations that occurred. It was perhaps loosely enough
drawn to justify the rule that all suggestions involving matter of fact
should be proved. If the courts had wanted to lean against parties bringing Prohibitions, the act perhaps gave them room to do so, and such a
course could be defended as fulfilling the statute’s general policy. But if
the courts’ inclination went the other way, the act was confusing enough
to justify taking it narrowly in at least some instances. To understand the
problems that arose, we must look at the cases.

3

A couple of reports merely state the uncontested rule that modi must be proved: Sharpe v Sharpe,
Noy, I 4 8 (undated); Gippe’s Case, H. 11 Jac. C.P., Godbolt, 246.
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My earliest cases come from the Queen’s Bench. In Wiggen v. Arscot
(1588)4 a Prohibition was sought in a tithe suit on the ground that the parson suing in the ecclesiastical court was deprived by virtue of the statute
of 13 Eliz., c. 12. That act provided that parsons who failed to read certain
of the Thirty-Nine Articles publicly in church were ipso facto deprived of
their benefices -- i.e., without ecclesiastical proceedings leading to a sentence of deprivation. The surmise here alleged factually that the ecclesiastical plaintiff had failed to read the articles. Need this surmise be
proved? The report gives only the opinion of Justice Clench. He thought
that the surmise probably stated a good legal cause for Prohibition, “yet
because great inconvenience may arise on the admitting of it, the Court
hath taken order that no prohibition shall be granted on such a surmise,
without great probability of the truth of the surmise.” Nevertheless,
Clench continued, the surmise did not need to be proved under 2/3 Edw.
6, for the persuasive reason that the cause of Prohibition created by 13
Eliz. could not have been within the contemplation of 2/3 Edw. 6. It
would be hard to take 2/3 Edw. 6 to mean “all tithe-Prohibition cases,
whether heretofore known or later created or recognized,” when the act
specifically speaks of “Prohibitions [which] before this time have been
used to be granted.” It does not appear how the factual probability of surmises outside 2/3 Edw. 6 should be ascertained, as Clench thought it
should be where abuse was easy -- perhaps by examination of the party.
In Woodward and Bugg’s Case, from the same term5 a bargain was
surmised, whereby the parson had agreed to discharge a certain parishioner’s tithes for the rest of that parishioner’s life in consideration of L5
paid. The Court held, without reported argument, that his surmise did not
have to be proved. The decision here seems less justified than the opinion
in the preceding case, but the question is not clearcut. 2/3 Edw. 6 mentions (that is as much as can be said) one sort of tithe discharged by
agreement, to which sect. xiv might be taken to refer back: the “composition-real” -- i.e., an agreement for the perpetual discharge of land from
tithes for some consideration, concluded between parson and parishioner
with the consent of the bishop and the patron of the living. The act does

4
5

T. 30 Eliz. Q.B. 2 Leonard, 212.
T. 30 Eliz. Q.B. 2 Leonard, 29.
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not specifically mention other sorts of discharge agreements. Whether to
include them depends on how freely one is willing to take the statute in
order to carry out its purpose. Apart from that, the Court in Bugg v.
Woodward thought the surmise legally insufficient (a debatable point). It
also thought -- even granting that Prohibition lay -- that the writ should
not be issued unless the plaintiff showed the Court a written deed comprising the agreement (on the ground, quite independent of 2/3 Edw. 6,
that where a deed is necessary to make a transaction effective it must be
shown in order to obtain a Prohibition based on that transaction).6 As the
case unfolded, the Court first denied a Consultation based on 2/3 Edw. 6,
then later granted one on the two other grounds, after debating both of
them. One might wonder whether the Court would so readily have excluded surmised bargains from 2/3 Edw. 6 if it had not been inclined
against the plaintiff anyhow.
In Goodiar (or Goodyear) v. Master and Fellows of the College of
Manchester (1601),7 the surmise said that the Master and Fellows had
leased the tithes they were suing for and that the period of the lease was
unexpired. Like bargains other than compositions-real, leases of tithes
are not specifically mentioned in 2/3 Edw. 6. The two judges present
(Gawdy and Fenner) nevertheless thought the language of the statute general enough to include leases. But when they asked the clerks about the
Court’s usage they were told that proof had been required only in modus
cases. The Justices decided to follow that usage.8 The general rule of
confining the act to modi seems doubtful, since it refers to compositions
real and, at least arguably, to several other non- modus situations which

6

7
8

Requiring a deed t o b e proffered would not necessarily remove t h e need t o bring in witnesses if
2/3 Edw. 6 were construed to require it, since the witnesses could b e used t o authenticate the
deed. Practically. there would not be much purpose in such extra proof in m e r e preliminary
proceedings. A deed might well be required for a composition real too, in which case the s a m e
practical point can b e made, despite the mention o f compositions-real in the statute. S a m e point
also for leases -- a s in the case next following. T h e d e m a n d for a deed in Bugg v. W o o d w a r d ,
however, w a s based on t h e fact that the agreement w a s for life. If it had been a valid ground for
Prohibition in itself, a n oral agreement would concededly have been sufficient for a lesser time.
H. 4 3 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.296; Add. 25,202, f.24b.
“Although the words of the statute a r e general, yet since it has never been put in ure in a n y s u c h
cases, it s e e m s good to follow the c o m m o n experience, a n d the intent of the general words in the
statute will b e thus expounded.” (Add. 25,203) Add.25,202 has “...because it has not been used
in other cases, yet the words of the statute purport the contrary.”
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we shall encounter below, but the absence of special mention of leases in
a sense justifies the judges’ exposition.
In Tanner v. Small ( 1608),9 the King’s Bench held that a suggested
bargain for discharge of tithes need not be proved. The “experience” of
the Court was again invoked. That is all the brief report reveals. The rule
excluding bargains was also indirectly upheld in Cobb v. Hunt (below),
and another unreported case was later cited to the same effect. 10
The Common Pleas meanwhile showed signs of taking 2/3 Edw. 6 less
narrowly. (Divergence between the two principle courts was not uncommon.) In a Common Pleas case of 1601,11 a Prohibition was sought on
the ground that the parties in a tithe suit had agreed to go to arbitration.
The arbitrators had allegedly made an award, but the plaintiff in the ecclesiastical suit was nevertheless prosecuting. The Court held that these allegations must be proved in six months, as provided by the statute. Justice
Warburton said explicitly that all matters of tithes, and only matters of
tithes, are within the act. The holding is strong, because the statute says
nothing specific about arbitration. It would seem strange to require proof
of an agreement to arbitrate and the award thereon, while not requiring
proof of a bargain concerning the tithes themselves.
In a second Common Pleas case,12 the ecclesiastical suit was for tithes
of wood. Wood was generally subject to tithes -- i.e., 1/10th of what a
man cut should be set aside for the clergyman. But by virtue of the statute of 45 Edw. 3, c. 3, timber trees over twenty years old (i.e., “quality”
lumber) were exempt from tithes. In our case, the defendant to the tithe
suit sought a Prohibition on the ground that the wood in question was timber of the exempt sort. The Court held that he was required to prove the
factual. truth of this claim and repeated the rule that all tithe cases come
under the statute. The Court’s approach here was sensibly general. Nicer
construction of the statute might have generated a special problem about
wood tithes. As we have seen, sect. xiv speaks of matters “before rehearsed.” Before sect. xiv, nothing specific is said about timber trees,
9
10
11
12

M. 5 Jac. K.B.
Sivall’s Case. 5
P. 43 Eliz. C.P.
P. 44 Eliz. C.P.

Yelverton, 102; Add. 25,205, f.57.
Jac. Cited by counsel in Stroud v. Hoskins, below.
Lansd. 1058, f.10.
Lansd. 1058. f.41.
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though statutory exemptions from tithes are mentioned in general terms.
Later (sect. xv), 45 Edw. 3 is specifically reaffirmed.
A brief later note, labelled King’s Bench13 (the litigative circumstances are not reported), gives the opposite rule on timber trees -- i.e.,
that suggestions invoking 45 Edw. 3 do not have to be proved -- plus a
similarly restrictive rule for another type of case on wood tithes. Wood
cut only for use as fuel in a parishioner’s house was not tithable. The report says that suggestions that the wood sued for was used only for that
purpose need not be proved. Whereas 2/3 Edw. 6 does in a manner mention 45 Edw. 3, it says nothing about wood used for fuel. Whether the divergence between King’s Bench and Common Pleas carried over to
surmised bargains is uncertain for want of significant cases from the
Common Pleas. There is a hint that it may have been in one Elizabethan
report.14 In general, it seems clear that the two courts understood the
statute somewhat differently.
In Reynolls v. Hayes (1615),15 however, the King’s Bench moved away
from its declared habit of requiring proof only in modus cases. A Prohibition was sought on the surmise that the tithe dispute had been put to arbitration. Chief Justice Coke, with Justices Croke and Dodderidge
concurring, held that this suggestion had to be proved within six months,
like a suggested modus. By dictum, Coke also extended the proof requirement to suggestions of exemption from tithes by virtue of the Statute
of Monasteries.16 It may be significant that Coke had previously headed
13
14

M. 17 Jac. K.B. Harg. 30, f.56b.
M. 44/45 C.P. Lansd. 1058, f.50b: A briefly reported per Curiam opinion that a surmise of
discharge by reason of a composition must be proved.
If “composition” means
“composition-real,” the likelihood of conflict with the King’s Bench is less, at any rate, than if
the word is used loosely from some other sort of agreement. A much later note (Johnson’s Case.
H. 4 Car. C.P. Hetley, 146; anonymously reported by Littleton, 297, under T. 5 Car.) says that a
surmise of a “personal agreement” between parson and parishioner does not have to be proved.
Quaere whether “personal agreement” takes in everything short of a composition real or lease.
15 T. 12 Jac. K.B. 1 Rolle, 55.
16 The best evidence supports the treatment of Reynolls v. Hayes in the text, but there is a
complication. In Stroud v. Hoskins (below), a Heydon v. Kenold is cited, from M. 12 Jac.,
wherein the decision was allegedly that a surmise of arbitrament does not have to be proved.
The names and dates are close enough to suggest that the citation goes to the same case. Rolle’s
clear report is more likely to be right than the partisan citation. Further circumstances, reported
by Rolle, may explain the confusion: In addition to the question about the proof requirement,
there was debate on whether Prohibition would lie at all. Initially, the Justices disagreed about
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the Common Pleas, where 2/3 Edw. 6 had been taken in a more reasonable, and more pro-ecclesiastical, sense. We shall see that there are cases
besides this one in which Coke by no means appears as the friend of easy
Prohibitions.
In Congley v. Hall (1619 -- after Coke’s dismissal from the Bench),17
a case on the Statute of Monasteries actually arose, and Coke’s dictum
was judicially affirmed. Monastic land which for any of several reasons
was exempt from tithes at the time the monasteries were dissolved continued exempt in lay hands by virtue of a provision of the Statute of Monasteries. In Congley v. Hall, it was contended that suggestions of discharge
derived through a monastery did not lend themselves to proof by witness
of the sort contemplated by 2/3 Edw. 6. The contention amounted to saying that witnesses could not be expected to know about conditions at the
time of the dissolution and before as they know about the common practice of the community in modus cases. The Court replied that there must
nevertheless be “probable” proof of the suggestion, though it need not be
“precise.” In other words, the witnesses could swear that the land was locally reputed to be exempt, and witnesses must be found to swear at least
that to satisfy 2/3 Edw. 6. Justice Dodderidge said in Congley v. Hall that
there were several King’s Bench precedents to support the decision.
(“Precedents” commonly meant “practice Precedents,” not “decided
cases.” Here, Dodderidge might mean that proof had in fact been taken in
monastic-land cases, not that Consultations had been granted for failure to
take proof. Thus his remark is compatible with the absence -- so far as I
have found, save for the cases just below -- of prior decisions in point.)
There is no particular direct warrant in 2/3 Edw. 6 for including monasticland cases -- only a general mention of statutory exemptions and “privileges,” plus the act’s policy of making Prohibitions a little harder to get.

17

that, whilc agreeing that the proof requirement applied. At a later discussion concerning costs,
dated M. 12 Jac. by Rolle, it was apparently agreed that the Consultation had finally been granted
on the merits. not for failure of proof, so that double costs under 2/3 Edw. 6 should not be
awarded. The lawycr who cited the case in Stroud v. Hoskins may have been misled by the fact
that the Consultation was held not to depend on 2/3 Edw. 6 into believing that the statute was
held inapplicable.
M. 17 Jac. K.B. 2 Rolle, 125; also anonymously by Harg. 30, f.56b.
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With respect to the precision required in proving suggestions that former monastic land was discharged, Congley v. Hall follows an earlier
case, Stransham v. Cullington.18 There, proof of the surmise was offered.
There was no argument as to whether it need have been, but a Consultation was granted on the ground that the proof was inadequate. That
would seem to imply that proof was necessary, though that is inconsistent
with the Court’s reiterated rule that only modi required proof. The proof
was held inadequate because the witnesses only gave their opinion based
on inference. The Court took care to say, however, that hearsay would be
satisfactory. The latter point is confirmed by another per Curiam opinion:19 It is enough for the witnesses to speak “on the report of others,”
“otherwise in twenty years there will be no Prohibitions, for no one can
speak of the time before the statute of 32 [Hen. 8] of his own knowledge.”
In Stroud v. Hoskins, a major Caroline case in the King’s Bench (discussed below for its principal point -- see citations there), one issue concerned the extent of the proof requirement in still another context. Sect. v
of 2/3 Edw. 6 c. 13, provided that wasteland converted to profitable agricultural uses should be exempt from tithes for seven years: I.e.: Land
which had produced no crops and so paid no tithes should continue tithefree for seven years after improvement, then pay regular tithes in kind.
One issue in Stroud v. Hoskins was whether surmises taking advantage of
sect. v needed to be proved under sect. xiv -- i.e., whether proof was required of the factual statement that the land in question had been reclaimed less than seven years ago. On the one hand, 2/3 Edw. 6 does
obviously mention this sort of case, which is perhaps a reason for saying
it is within the contemplation of sect. xiv. On the other hand, sect. xiv
speaks of “Prohibitions [which] before this time [italics mine] have been
used to be granted.’’ So does sect. xiv apply to causes of Prohibition implicitly created by the act itself? In Stroud v. Hoskins, the Court unanimously resolved that surmises that land had been recently reclaimed must
be proved. The decision accords with good construction and the weight
of 17th century opinion in the King’s Bench. According to one report
18
19

P. 33 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 228.
P. 33 Eliz. Q.B. Lansd. 1073, f.129b.
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(Croke), the Court announced its decision in general terms: The suggestion must be proved “because it is a mere matter of fact; and the suggestion ought to be proved by the intention of the statute, as well as a
prescription de modo decimandi, or a discharge of tithes, or any other
such suggestion.” (Italics in the English mine.) Because the arguments
of counsel in Stroud v. Hoskins are fully reported in a MS., one can see
how confused the scope of the proof requirement was as late as 1630.
Though the decision was perhaps predictable in view of the line of previous cases, that history (as was often true when reporting was still informal) was not accurately available, and the old King’s Bench theory that
only modi (with an exception for monastic-land discharges) need be
proved could still be contended for. The decision in Stroud v. Hoskins
was a significant contribution toward clearing up the confusion.

2. Meaning of “six months”
A few cases on 2/3 Edw. 6 turn on the exact meaning of “six months.”
Both principal courts resolved this question liberally -- i.e., in favor of upholding Prohibitions. We may simply note them.
(1) M. 41/42 Eliz. Q.B. Moore, 573: “Six months” for purposes of the
statute means “six months of term-time” -- i.e., vacations not counted.
(Distinctly liberal, especially in view of the practice of offering proof before Justices on circuit, for which see below.)
(2) Pottinger v. Johnson. P. 43 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.324: Proof
before a Justice in the country during vacation is good though it is not recorded in the King’s Bench until the following term, after six months
have expired. Add. 25,202, f.25b has a note with the same date which
may come from the same case: Surmises are usually proved before Justices
in the country -- i.e., presumably, Westminster Hall Justices on circuit,
not Justices of the Peace -- and such proof is good.
(3) Copley v. Collins. M. 14 Jac., probably C.P. Hobart, 179: “Six
months” means “six months by the ordinary calendar,” not “six twentyeight-day months.”
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(4) Skinner’s Case. T. 16 Jac. C.P. Noy, 30; Harl. 5 149, f. 178b: Proof
actually given within six months is good although not entered of record
until later.
(5) H. 2 Car. C.P. Littleton, 19; Harl. 5148, f. 113b: Proof was offered
on the last day of “six months” calculated as twenty-eight-day months.
The judge refused to take the proof because that day was a Sunday, so
that it was not actually taken until the next day.
Held: The proof is still good, because the statute means calendarmonths or a half-year, not twenty-eight-day months. The Court also implied that if the last day of a correctly computed period had been Sunday
proof taken on Monday would do.

3. The standard of proof under 2/3 Edw. 6; discrepancies between
surmise and proof; competence of witnesses
Summary: In general, neither principal court leaned over backwards
to insist that proofs strictly sustain the surmises they purported to prove.
There was no disposition in this area to strike down Prohibitions for the
ostensible sake of technical or logical precision. However, the legal circumstances of the cases did not always permit indulgent treatment of imprecise proof. The courts showed no disposition to override legal
reasoning in such cases, or to be satisfied with extremely nominal fulfillment of the statutory proof requirement.
* * *
Several cases arose on the standard of proof required by 2/3 Edw. 6
and on the effect of discrepancies between what plaintiff-in-Prohibition
surmised and what his witnesses testified to. These cases are of some interest and variety. The degree of precision to require in proofs, as to
which the words of the statute provided no guidance, gave the courts
trouble. I shall take the Common Pleas cases first.
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In Woode v. Savile (1587);20 a modus was surmised: to pay 10/in lieu
of all tithes to the parish clerk, who then pays the money over to the parson. The witnesses testified that the 10/ was customarily paid to the
clerk, but they did not say that he paid it over to the parson. Serjeant
Walmesley argued that the proof was insufficient, and the Court agreed
with him. In this case, as was argued, there was more than a nominal discrepancy between surmise and proof. On several occasions, the courts
were liberal toward nominal discrepancies. Here, the trouble was fundamental. For a surmise to pay 10/ to the parish clerk in lieu of tithes would
not by itself state a valid modus. The reason is that every good modus
must be a considerate exchange between parson and parishioner. It must
appear that the parson has relinquished his tithes in exchange for something he could presumably have considered a material benefit to himself.
To pay money to the clerk simpliciter would not (as was argued) benefit
the parson, since the parson had no legal duty to maintain that official out
of his pocket, and there was no pretense here that he had such a duty by
custom. For all that appeared from the proof, the money was paid to the
clerk simpliciter.
The reports of Baker v. Hulett (1595)21 vary slightly from each other,
so that precise reconstruction of the case presents difficulties. The following statement of the case, based on a combination of the two reports,
seems probable (for present purposes it does not really matter whether it
is exact): A parishioner who was sued for wood tithes by the parson surmised a modus, viz., to pay 2d. per acre of woods to the vicar in lieu of
tithes. (“Impropriate” parishes had both a parson, or rector, and a vicar,
tithes being divided between them according to one arrangement or another.) In other words, the surmise sought a Prohibition on two redun20
21

P. 29 Eliz. C.P. Lansd. 1073, f.53.
M. 37/38 Eliz. C.P. Harg. 7, f. 147; Harl. 1631, f.205 and (second entry) 205b, sub nom. Baker’s
Case. I think there can be no doubt but that the two reports are of the same case, since in
addition to the date and the matter, the names of counsel, given in both reports, are the same.
The conflict is that Harg. 7 only says negatively that the witnesses failed to prove a sum-certain
for the modus, whereas Harl. 1631 says positively that the agreement was proved. In both
reports, counsel argue appropriately to the facts as stated by the reporter. I would conjecture that
the case was argued several times, counsel first concentrating on the mere failure to prove the
modus with certainty and later taking up the further question whether proof of the agreement
should count as indirect proof of the modus, if not as providing sufficient basis for the
Prohibition even though it was not surmised.
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dant grounds: (a) that the tithes did not belong to the parson and (b) that a
commutation was in any event customary. The parishioner’s witnesses
testified that money had always been paid to the vicar instead of wood
tithes in kind, but they did not specify any certain sum of money. They
also testified that the parishioner had an agreement with the vicar to pay
the 2d. specified in the surmise. Counsel for the parson argued that the
proof was insufficient to satisfy 2/3 Edw. 6 for two reasons: (a) If a modus for a certain sum is surmised, it cannot be considered proved when
there is no evidence that that sum was alleged with even approximate correctness. (b) Seeing that the surmise rested on a modus rather than an
agreement, proof of the agreement for the exact sum alleged cannot be
taken as circumstantial evidence of the surmise’s truth. The modus might
in fact be for 6d., whereas the vicar might, for some separate consideration, have agreed to take 2d. The Court, however -- perhaps wisely in
view of the complicated problem -- simply side-stepped the issue of the
proof’s sufficiency, holding that the suggestion that the vicar rather than
the parson was entitled justified the Prohibition by itself. There was further debate (irrelevant as far as 2/3 Edw. 6 is concerned) as to whether the
claim that the vicar was entitled was properly advanced by the surmise.
In another early case,22 the Common Pleas made a liberal exception
from the words of the statute. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition in this case did not
prove his suggestion by witnesses at all, though the statute in terms requires that mode of proof. Instead, he produced two verdicts from previous cases by which the matter of his surmise was shown to be true. The
Court held that the substitute proof was sufficient.
Liberality appears again in a case of 1618.23 It was surmised that the
inhabitants of a village had customarily paid money in satisfaction of
tithes. The witnesses proved the modus only for plaintiff-in-Prohibition
himself. I.e.: The modus was proved to be incorrectly described as running throughout the entire village, but it was proved true that occupiers of
the particular land held by plaintiff-in-Prohibition had always paid money
instead of tithes. The Court ruled that the surmise was adequately proved
despite the discrepancy. It was also held that 2/3 Edw. 6 is satisfied if the
22
23

Not dated. Probably 36 or 37 Eliz. C.P. Add. 25,211, f.69.
P. 16 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5149, f.161.
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witnesses confine themselves to saying that they have heard that the matter in the surmise is true, or that it is “in the common voice.”
Somewhat greater strictness was shown in two other cases. In Hobdale’s Case (1619),24 a modus was surmised to be customary in the parish
of D. in the County of Warwick. The witnesses proved the modus, but it
transpired from their testimony that D. was in the County of Worcester.
Plaintiff-in-Prohibition asked leave to amend his surmise, but he was
turned down and the other party told to proceed in the ecclesiastical court.
This looks like a rather hard ruling, since the plaintiff was punished for
what was probably an attorney’s or clerk’s error. It may be significant,
however, that the brief report does not say that a Consultation was
granted -- only that the defendant was told to proceed in the Church court.
In the absence of a Consultation (which would bar another Prohibition in
the same suit), the plaintiff could probably simply start over with a new,
correct surmise. The judges may have had that in mind. But they in any
event refused to consider the modus sufficiently established in the face of
the difference between the surmise and the proof.
Goddard (Toddard or Stiddar) v. Tiler (or Tilet),25 1628, is more material. A parishioner was sued for tithes of milk and calves. He surmised
a modus, viz. that all inhabitants of the parish paid 4d. per cow and 2d.
per calf in lieu of those tithes. His witnesses affirmed that the tithes had
never been paid in kind, but said that some inhabitants paid 6d., some 7d.,
etc. The Court granted a Consultation on the ground that nothing like a
modus running throughout the parish, as alleged, emerged from this
proof. The judges took care, however, to prevent their decision from being overinterpreted. If a 20/ modus is alleged, they said, and a 40/ modus
proved, that is good enough. The trouble in this case was the “mere uncertainty” of the proof. Later in the term, an attempt was made to reopen
the case by showing that plaintiff- in-Prohibition had later produced some
witnesses who affirmed his surmise in its terms. However, this second
round of proof had not come within the six-month limit. The Court ruled
that one who produces insufficient proof may still prevail by furnishing
new evidence (even, presumably, though it is contradictory) within the
24
25

M.16 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5149, f.141.
T. 4 Car. C.P. Littleton, 151 and 155; Hetley, 100.
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six months, but not after that period has expired. Again the judges offset
their award of a Consultation in this case with permissive language, saying that “slight” proof, “as he thinketh or believeth,” is good enough.
My first Queen’s Bench case in point is from 159326 A modus was
claimed to pay 10/ for wood tithes from a certain park. The witnesses
proved that the party paid that sum for the wood tithes of the park and
two other places as well. The case was adjourned, but the Court is reported to have thought the proof too different from the surmise to be
good, as Coke urged from the Bar. There was another strong point
against plaintiff-in-Prohibition, however.
In Austen v. Pigot (1600),27 Coke was unsuccessful in persuading the
Court to insist on strict proof. Tithes from the demesnes of a manor were
sued for in the ecclesiastical court. The surmise claimed that in lieu of
tithes the parson customarily had a 100-acre close in the manor, consisting of 20 acres of pasture and 80 acres of woods. The witnesses proved
that the parson had customarily had the profits of the pasture, but the surmise was not proved as to the woods. The Court thought this proof sufficient. Chief Justice Popham laid down a generally liberal policy: “...we
ought not to be too precise in accepting proof, but if it is such that it may
reasonably appear that the Court Christian has no cause to hold plea of
tithes, it is sufficient.” Lest liberality be over-interpreted, however, Popham warned that it will not do for witnesses to prove that a parson is
“commonly esteemed” to hold land in lieu of tithes, unless they also
prove that tithes have never been paid. Popham relied strongly on a Cotton’s Case (not independently reported) as exactly in point: Cotton sued
for tithes. The parishioner surmised that the parson had always enjoyed a
26
27

Sherburne’s Case. M.35/36 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 306.
H. 42 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 736; Moore, 911; Add. 25,203, f. 159b. There is one conflict of
possible importance among the reports. Croke says 20 acres of pasture and 20 of woods, and
Moore says 20 of pasture and 10 of woods. I follow the MS, (20 pasture/80 woods) because
Coke in his argument for the defendant from the Bar attaches some importance to the fact that
the surmise was unproved for the greater part, viz. the woods. Croke and Moore give the
opinion as the Court’s, while the MS. represents it as Popham’s without mention of the other
judges. Croke and the MS. agree that the case ended by the parties’ agreeing to go on to formal
pleading and trial. I.e., the defendant waived his objections to the preliminary proof, probably
because he saw that the Court was against him. Quotation in the text and Cotton’s Case are from
the MS.
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certain close in the parish in satisfaction of tithes. The witnesses proved
that “it was commonly taken in the reputation of the country” that the parson had the land in place of tithes and that no tithes had ever been paid.
The proof was held good.
In Nowell’s Case ( 1600),28 plaintiff-in-Prohibition apparently suggested a modus of 60 years’ standing. His witnesses said that 60 years ago
and for 30 years thereafter the suggested modus was in operation, but that
for the last 30 years it had been discontinued, the parishioner instead
compounding with the parson for the tithes. At least Justice Fenner
thought this proof sufficient. In view of the theory of prescription, that is
a reasonable conclusion. Usage of 60 years or any other determinate period did not make a good modus, for immemorialness was required. On
the other hand, a valid modus was not destroyed because it had not been
taken advantage of for 30 years or any other certain period. Here, the
plaintiff need not have said anything about 60 years. If he had simply
said that there was an immemorial modus, the proof would presumably
have been clearly satisfactory. He was, however, indulged, in that he was
not held to prove what he could be taken to have offered to prove.
In Beale v. Webb ( 1601) 29 a modus to pay 4/ was surmised. The witnesses proved a modus to pay 4/6d. The Court held this sufficient proof,
because it showed that tithes in kind were not due. Counsel cited an earlier case contra (Bird v. Collingworth, M. 34/35 Eliz.). That case apparently came from the Common Pleas, for Chief Justice Popham dismissed
it with the remark that the Common Pleas judges were now of a different
opinion.
In Dett v. Webb ( 1602),30 the majority of the King’s Bench continued
to make light of minor discrepancies between surmise and proof, but Popham, who was cautiously liberal in Austen v. Pigot, dissented, emphasizing the limits of liberalism. The ecclesiastical suit in this case was for
28
29
30

M. 42/43 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.276b (the better report, giving only Fenner’s opinion); Add.
25,202, f. 19 (states facts less completely, but appears to give the Court’s decision).
P. 43 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 819; Add. 25,203, f.317b; 2 Dyer, 170B (incorporated in report of
Pelles v. Saunderson and dated M. 42/43).
T. 44 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.549 (excellent report); Add. 25,213, f.35 (unclear report sub nom.
Pett v. Webb).
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tithes of two farms. As to one, the parishioner surmised a modus to pay
4/6d.; as to the other, a modus to pay 2/6d. The witnesses said that the
two farms had always been occupied by the same person, and that the occupier had always paid 7/ (=4/6d.+2/6d.) for the two farms. The witnesses, that is to say, conceived that the money was a lump sum paid in
consideration of both farms. In some ways, the discrepancy between surmise and proof here seems more nominal than in any of the cases above.
So three of the judges thought, for they held “strongly” that the proof was
good and spelled out their thinking: “...the intent of the statute of 2 Edw.
6 was to oust delays which occurred by suing of Prohibitions without
cause ...so that Parliament intended that the plaintiff should make it appear
to the Court that the Court Christian should not have jurisdiction, and
therefore they think that though the proof does not accord as fully with
the suggestion as an evidence on an issue at common law must accord
with it, if it varies only in such manner that the Court can see that the
Court Christian ought not to hold plea thereof, that is sufficient....” The
three judges went on to argue that where, as here, the witnesses are
strangers to the relationship between the parishioner and parson, they can
hardly be expected to know the particulars of why the money was paid,
especially when the two farms were in the same hands.
Chief Justice Popham, on the other hand, expressed his dissent as follows: “...there is a difference between a proof that concurs with the suggestion but is not precise and direct, for then it will be well-allowed on
this statute, and a proof that is variant from the suggestion, for such proof
is no proof, but rather disproves the suggestion, and so will not be allowed. And therefore if the witnesses do not depose directly according to
the surmise, but say that the common voice or opinion of the country has
been such, or if they prove it by any probable circumstances, the Court
should allow it for sufficient proof, for it would be impossible when a
modus decimandi or discharge of tithes is alleged in an abbot before the
dissolution to produce witnesses who could depose of it of their knowledge, and so it is necessary to admit proof by circumstances. But in our
case, the proof varies from the surmise. And if it had been given in evidence on an issue taken on such prescriptions, it would be necessary to
find against him who pleaded them.” One may doubt whether Popham’s
distinction between an “imprecise” proof and a “variant” one is fruitful.
His scruples about slackening the standards of art and relaxing the demands of a statute one may admire.
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The Chief Justice’s reluctance to take the statute too freely was again
displayed in Webb v. Petts.31 A modus of 2/6d. was surmised. The witnesses, speaking from hearsay, said that the sum paid was 3/. The Court
agreed that the witnesses’ reliance on hearsay was no ground for rejecting
the proof. But Popham considered that the difference between 2/6d. and
3/ made the proof insufficient. Justices Fenner and Yelverton held the
contrary, for the usual reason: it was sufficiently clear that tithes in kind
were not due.
In 1605,32 the plaintiff in a Prohibition surmised a modus to pay 2d.
for the combined tithes of his barren cattle (cattle not in milk-production)
and wool. The witnesses said that he had customarily paid 2d. for the cattle, but about the wool they said nothing. The Court upheld the Prohibition quoad the cattle but sent the case back to the ecclesiastical court
quoad the wool. As for the cattle, the decision is permissive in the same
way as several others above: The plaintiff failed to prove his suggestion
literally, since he claimed that the 2d. related to both products as a lump,
but he did prove that no tithes in kind should be paid for the cattle.
In the later Jacobean Boocher v. Rogers,33 plaintiff-in-Prohibition apparently proved the negative part of his surmise (that he and his predecessors as lords of a manor had never paid tithes to the parson, but taken the
tithes themselves). He failed to prove the “consideration” without which
such a privilege in a layman could not be lawful (that he maintained a
chapel in recompense). (Besides the principal church, many parishes
contained subsidiary “chapels of ease.” Tithes customarily contributed to
such chapels could count as consideration for non-payment of regular
parish tithes.) The Court held that the proof was insufficient, for the
strong reason that to prove a modus without consideration is no better
than failing to prove a modus at all.

31
32
33

Noy, 44. Undated, but after February,

1602, when Sir Christopher Yelverton joined the Court. It
is clear from the names that the parties were the same as in the preceding suit, but this one would
appear to be different.
M. 2 Jac. K.B. Lansd. 1111, f.33. Yelverton, 55, same term, seems to be the same case, except
that report says wool and lambs instead of wool and barren cattle and gives the result (same as in
MS.) as the opinion of Justices Fenner, Yelverton, and Williams, the others being absent.
P. 12 Jac. K.B. 1 Rolle, 2.
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In my last case in the present group,34 the King’s Bench was perhaps
more permissive than in any of the earlier ones. Having alleged a modus
for hay, the plaintiff produced his two witnesses. One said that no hay
tithes had been paid from the land in question for 40 years; the other
agreed except that he said 50 years. Both said that they had heard by others’ relation that something was paid in lieu of tithes, but they did not
know how much. Three objections were made to this proof (a) The witnesses’ reliance on hearsay was urged as a defect -- “for many false
things are related.” (b) If witnesses said, even of their own knowledge,
that a sum was paid instead of tithes, but had no idea whether the sum
surmised was the true sum, the surmise could not be said to be proved.
(c) The only thing that was proved was non-payment of tithes in kind
over a fairly long period. Proving that by itself obviously does not prove
that a modus -- i.e., a considerate exchange -- exists. Proofs that vary
from the surmise in, e.g., amounts of money at least go to show that there
is some sort of modus. Here there was nothing to show that.
The Court nevertheless upheld the proof. It was perhaps justified in
doing so, if the hearsay is no objection,35 and proof that an unspecified
sum was customarily paid establishes sufficiently that the parson had no
claim to tithes in kind. The witnesses’ certainty that tithes in kind had not
been paid perhaps supports an inference that they were telling the truth so
far as they knew it and that their hearsay was reliable. The language the
Court used to explain its resolution was rather looser than any that had
been used before. Proof of surmises under the statute, the judges explained, need only be “probable.” Standards of proof applicable to verdicts are irrelevant. It is enough if “the Court can be induced and
persuaded in their conscience that the suggestion is true, and [they] have
good credit of the suit, for the mischief [was] that parsons were kept from
their tithes and put to great vexation, and therefore proof is requisite .... But
when one traverses [i.e., formally denies in pleading] the suggestion, then
there must be strict and exact proof.’’
34

---- v. Paget. T. 22 Jac. K.B. Lansd. 1063, f.9b; 2 Rolle, 434 (dated T. 21 Jac.). Rolle probably
relates to an earlier hearing of the case. It agrees with the MS. but is briefer and gives only the
opinions of Chief Justice Ley and Justice Dodderidge.
35 On this point, an undated note -- Noy, 28 -- confirms the other evidence above that proof by
hearsay was in itself regarded as sufficient.
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“Conscience” is vague. In the interest of fulfilling the statute’s intent
and minimizing litigation, the courts might perhaps have insisted on
somewhat stricter standards of proof than they generally did. But those
very interests point to the need for balancing strictness and leniency. On
the one hand, it might have been advisable to consider fairly closely
whether the preliminary proof held out a reasonable prospect that plaintiff-in-Prohibition had evidence capable of prevailing at a trial -- instead
of discriminating trial standards and preliminary-proof standards as
sharply as the judges in the last case did. Why let the parties go to trial
when in six months the plaintiff has apparently failed to muster evidence
that would sustain his case if a jury accepted it? Of course a friendly and
loosely controlled jury (one expects juries of tithe-payers to be friendly to
tithe-payers) might do better by the plaintiff than his evidence warranted,
but that is hardly a respectable prospect to contemplate. (However, as we
shall see from cases below, verdicts that failed to confirm surmises exactly were sometimes indulged, as well as defective preliminary proof.)
On the other hand, scrutinizing preliminary proof with excessive nicety
would only breed litigation in the long run. There is no point in destroying a Prohibition on a technicality this year when the plaintiff in all probability has a winning case which, by making sure of his witnesses and
avoiding slips, he could successfully prosecute next year. The courts -most expressly Chief Justice Popham -- saw the need for balance,
whether or not they succeeded in stating a satisfactory general rule.
There is no sign that the controversy over Prohibitions and greater official
solicitude for ecclesiastical interests in the 17th century produced any
tightening of proof standards. Popham, at the end of the 16th century,
showed most concern lest lax application of the statute go too far.
The one case on the personal competence of witnesses for the purposes
of 2/3 Edw. 6 may be considered with the cases above, since it too tests
the seriousness with which the proof requirement was enforced. In this
case,36 a Consultation was sought because the witnesses, who had admittedly “proved” the suggestion, were attainted felons. After ascertaining
that the witnesses were in fact felons, the Court granted the Consultation.
Chief Justice Coke pointed out that attainted felons were ineligible for
36

Brown v. Crashaw. M. 11 Jac. K.B. 2 Bulstrode, 154.
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jury service even though they were subsequently pardoned and said that
he himself would not take the testimony of even a convicted recusant (because by statute convicted recusants were supposed to be excommunicated, and therefore should be treated as excommunicated -- hence
ineligible -- whether or not they were in fact).
The Court showed no inclination to relax standards in order to uphold
Prohibitions.37 (Notably, 2/3 Edw. 6 speaks of “honest and sufficient”
witnesses.) It may be worth noting that in the two cases in which Coke
was involved as a judge (this one and Boocher v. Rogers) the decisions
went against plaintiff-in-Prohibition.
4. Double costs and damages

Summary: The very few cases suggest an inclination to avoid awarding penal damages where possible.
* * *
By 2/3 Edw. 6, when plaintiff-in-Prohibition failed to prove his surmise within six months the defendant was entitled to double costs and
damages. (He would have incurred legal expenses in excepting to the
plaintiff‘s proof and whatever damage might ensue from being delayed in
his ecclesiastical suit.) This provision of the statute seems pretty punitive, in view of the many problems as to when proof was required and
when it was adequate. As a sanction against the vexatious Prohibitions
that the makers of the statute were worried about, penal damages made
sense. As the history of applying the statute worked out, that sanction
could be stringent. A man might be reasonably advised that his suggestion required no proof, only to find himself liable for double damages
37

It may be noted in connection with this case that witnesses under 2/3 Edw. 6 were not subject to
criminal punishment for perjury in the same way as most other sorts of witnesses. That is to say,
they were not within the statute of 5 Eliz., c.9, which in effect created the regular criminal law of
perjury for witnesses (as distinct from the ancient procedure of attaint for jurors and Conciliar
power to punish perjury). Add. 25,202, f.36b (P. 44 Eliz. Q.B.), reports precisely such a holding:
that witnesses for purposes of 2/3 Edw. 6 are outside 5 Eliz. (as witnesses in the ecclesiastical
courts were by express provision of 5 Eliz.). An early report (2 Dyer, 242b) raises the question
whether perjurers under 2/3 Edw. 6 could be punished in the Star Chamber. The judges appear
to have thought not. Absence of liability for perjury would seem to be a reason for insisting on
reputable witnesses and perhaps for scrutinizing what they said carefully.
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when a court held the contrary. Or he might proceed in good faith and
make an effort to produce proof, yet find his evidence rejected and himself exposed to the penalty because of some defect in the witnesses’
knowledge or carelessness in their way of speaking. It would not be surprising, therefore, if the courts were to prefer not to award penal damages
in ambiguous circumstances. A few cases suggest such a preference.
One case38 tends the other way, in the sense that an opportunity to
mitigate the rigor of the penal provision indirectly was not taken. In this
case, defendant-in-Prohibition got his Consultation and an award of double costs for failure of proof (as of course he must when there was no ambiguity). He subsequently sued an action of Debt to recover the double
costs. The question was whether he should have the additional costs (i.e.,
single or actual costs) incurred in the action of Debt. It was apparently argued by analogy with the practice surrounding certain other penal statutes
that the additional costs should not be awarded. But the Court held the
contrary, taking the straightforward position that costs are due to one who
has been forced to sue for money he has coming to him by virtue of a
judgment.
In Watlington (or Wakinson) v. Perry (or Pacy)39 a Caroline case, the
plaintiff failed to prove his suggestion. The defendant, however, instead
of seeking a Consultation for failure of proof, took formal issue on the
truth of the suggestion. After the issue was found against him by a jury,
the defendant tried to recover double costs under the statute. He was
turned down, as justice surely required, having “surceast his time.”
In Cobb v. Hunt40 an award of double costs led to a complicated problem. Being sued for tithes, a parishioner surmised a modus for part of the
tithes and a bargain with the clergyman for the rest. The Prohibition was
dismissed for failure to prove the surmise (total failure to produce any
witnesses, it would appear). The defendant was then awarded 50/ costs
38
39
40

Cockram v. Davy (or Davies). H. 2 2 Jac. K.B. Benloe, 143; Lansd. 1063, f.62 (the better
report). T h e parties’ names and the date suggest the major c a s e in the following sub-section
(Note 4), but the reports d o not overlap in content.
Noy, 81; Latch, 140. Neither report dates the case, but since it occurs in Latch it must be early
Caroline. What Noy gives a s a p e r Curiam decision, Latch gives a s the opinion of Justices
Crew, Jones, and Whitelocke.
H. 5 Jac. K.B. Yelverton, 119; Add. 25,205, f.54.
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plus 50/ damages. The judgment to recover these sums was not properly
given, however, owing to failure to enter judgment in the technically correct form. The parson then sued an action of Debt in the Common Pleas
for the money and recovered. Our case is on a writ of error in the King’s
Bench (the normal appellate procedure from a Common Pleas judgment).
Two errors were alleged: (a) The technical fault in the original judgment.
(b) The substance of that judgment. With respect to the second, Yelverton argued for reversal from the Bar, as follows: A surmise of both a modus and a bargain must be proved for the modus but not for the bargain.
(Correct by the King’s Bench rule at the time of this case.) When it was
not proved for either, the Court ought to have dismissed the Prohibition
quoad the modus, but kept it in force quoad the bargain. Erroneously, it
dismissed the Prohibition in toto. On this error was erected the further
one of awarding costs and damages relating to the whole.
The Court accepted Yelverton’s argument on this substantive matter,
as well as on the technicality, and reversed both the recovery in Debt and
the judgment for costs behind it. Under the circumstances of this mishandled case, that seems the right decision. It is possible, however, that
Yelverton’s argument (and the Court’s concurrence with it) went a step
further -- viz. to maintain that even if the original decision on the substance had been correct (dismissal of the Prohibition for part only) no
costs should have been awarded. If that was the argument, it seems rather
easy on the parishioner.
In Reynolls v. Hayes (discussed above), the Consultation could have
been granted either for failure of proof under 2/3 Edw. 6 or for substantive insufficiency. If it was granted for the first cause, defendant-in-Prohibition was entitled to double costs; if for the latter, only to actual costs.
After initial disagreement, the Court was apparently persuaded by Chief
Justice Coke that the substantive reasons for Consultation were good.
Coke then said that those substantive reasons should be considered the
cause of the Consultation, with the result that double costs were not due.
Though the principle of preferring the substantive grounds in the event of
conflict is probably good in itself, Coke may have been moved to insist
on it by the sense that it would be unfair to punish the plaintiff with double costs in this particular case. For the holding that proof was necessary
(for a surmise of arbitrament) was probably not predictable on the basis
of prior King’s Bench practice. I.e.: The plaintiff, though legally in the
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wrong and justly liable for single costs, may have been reasonably advised that no proof was required..

B.
50 Edw. 3, c. 4
1. Cases involving both 50 Edw. 3 and 2/3 Edw. 6
Summary: Two leading King’s Bench cases well-on in the 17th century decided conclusively that Consultations granted solely for failure of
proof under 2/3 Edw. 6 will not bar further Prohibitions in exactly the
same suit -- i.e., that such Consultations are outside 50 Edw. 3. That result was favorable to Prohibitions and against ecclesiastical interests. The
judges may have been embarrassed at their inability to avoid it. Although
cases before Cockeram v. Davies are not decisive, they hardly require the
outcome arrived at.
* * *
A second frequently relevant statutory rule was much older than 2/3
Edw. 6. 50 Edw. 3, c. 4, (1376-77) provided “that when Consultation is
once duly granted upon a Prohibition made to a judge of Holy Church,
that the same judge may proceed in the cause by virtue of the same Consultation, notwithstanding any other Prohibition thereon delivered to him:
Provided always, that the matter in the libel of the said cause is not engrossed, enlarged, or in other manner changed.” Though application of
this ancient rule raised complex problems in 16th and 17th century cases,
the general policy of the statute is evident enough, and plainly desirable:
The act meant to restrict plaintiffs-in-Prohibition to one try in what
amounted substantially to one case. A return bout after one failure was to
be ruled out, and wearing the other party down by repeated litigation was
to be discouraged.
Several cases on 50 Edw. 3 also involved 2/3 Edw. 6, for it sometimes
happened that a Consultation issued because the surmise had not been
proved within six months, after which the plaintiff sought another Prohibition on the same matter. We shall begin with cases of that sort. It was
tempting to argue that 50 Edw. 3 only applied where the substance of the
Prohibition had been determined, certainly not where the Consultation
was granted by virtue of a statutory rule concerned only with preliminar-
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ies and enacted long after 50 Edw. 3. In the long run, that argument was
successful.
The only Elizabethan case I have found on this point is Hobbleton v.
Prince in the Queen’s Bench.41 There, a Consultation was issued for failure
to prove a modus in six months. The parishioner brought a new Prohibition against the same parson, for the same tithes of the same year of the
same land. He claimed the same basic modus (to pay 1d. for tithes of
fruit and garden produce). In one respect, however, he changed his claim.
The first time, he had surmised a custom running through the whole village; the second time, he only surmised that the modus applied to his own
messuage and garden. The Court held that this change made a new case
and let the new Prohibition through. The alteration of the claim, rather
than the mere fact that the Consultation was granted for failure of proof,
was relied on, whence it might be inferred that Consultations based on 2/3
Edw. 6 will, as such, bar further Prohibitions.
In Cop (or Cox) v. Semer (or Semor),42 1607, when a modus was surmised it was objected that the plaintiff had made the identical suggestion
four times before in respect of the same land and on all four occasions
had failed to prove the surmise in six months. The Court, noting that the
tithes now being sued for were of a different year, let the fifth Prohibition
stand. This decision was surely inevitable, at least as interpretation of 50
Edw. 3. It is no doubt vexatious to come back year after year with the
same surmise, but there is no reason to say that 50 Edw. 3 rules it out.
The statute forbids more than one Prohibition on the same libel. A suit
for hay tithes of Greencroft for 1600 and another suit for the same tithes
for 1601 are in a sense about the same thing, but they cannot be said to
have been started by the same libel. So the Court said in this case. It
might be possible to hold the parishioner estopped to surmise the same
modus in another year after having once done so unsuccessfully, but such
a holding would not depend on 50 Edw. 3, and it would be hard to justify
without a determination on the merits. The Court in Cop v. Semer did
not, however, confine itself to the fact that there was a new libel. The
judges also stressed that 50 Edw. 3 speaks of “duly” granted Consult41
42

Harl. 48 17, f.165b. K.B. Not dated, but from its place in the reports, probably from the 1590s.
M. 5 Jac. K. B. Yelverton, 102; Add. 25,205, f.57.
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ations, “which was not the case above, but only for negligence in not
having his proofs ready.” This language leaves the implication that even
if the year had not been different the four unproved surmises would not
stand in the plaintiff’s way.
In Kirby v. Pigge (16 17),43 a surmised modus was not proved. When
the case was returned to the ecclesiastical court, sentence was given
against the parishioner. He appealed the sentence within the ecclesiastical system (which had a several-layered appellate structure and permitted
appeals automatically). Then he sought a new Prohibition. The Prohibition was denied by reason of 50 Edw. 3, the Court holding that a case on
appeal is still the same case within the statute. In the light of other holdings (see below), this decision was correct. That is to say, if the Consultation had been granted on the merits, another Prohibition could not have
been obtained after appeal. The fact that the Consultation here was only
granted because of the proof requirement was not allowed to alter the
general rule. The appeal, not the basis for the Consultation, seems to
have been the point urged in Kirby v. Pigge. The brief reports give no
sign that the intimation in Cop v. Semer -- that failure of proof is simply
not within 50 Edw. 3 -- was revived. The decision rejects it by implication.
In Cockeram v. Davies (1625),44 the case was exactly the same: failure of proof, Consultation accordingly, ecclesiastical sentence against the
parishioner, ecclesiastical appeal, application for a new Prohibition. This
time, the Court went the other way, upholding the second Prohibition. A
good MS. report enables us to follow the thinking of two judges, Dodderidge and Jones. Justice Dodderidge was vehement on the danger of
letting appeals be an excuse for more Prohibitions than one in the same
case. The plaintiff’s counsel relied heavily on the language of 50 Edw. 3
that forbids a second Prohibition to to the same judge. An appellate judge, it
was argued, is not the “same judge” as the recipient of the first Prohibition. In reply to this argument, Justice Dodderidge not only deplored excessive literalism (“Qui haeret in littera haeret in cortice,” he said), but
also gave a reason why a different judge is miraculously the same judge
43
44

P. 14 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,211, f. 157b: Moore, 917, sub. nom Big’s Case.
H. 22 Jac. K. B. Lansd. 1063, f.86.
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in ecclesiastical law. (An appeal in ecclesiastical law, unlike a writ of error at common law, suspended the prior sentence. I.e.: Until the appeal
was decided, the parties remained in the same plight as if no sentence had
yet been given. Therefore, the appeal was in no sense a different suit, but
quasi another hearing of the suit at the original level. Therefore, though
the appellate judge is a different man from the original judge, he is not a
different judge,
Justice Jones does not seem to take to Dodderidge’s scholasticism. He
prefers to make the ordinary distinction between the words of a statute
and its meaning. He admits that the words taken literally do not extend to
an appellate judge, but argues that the intent of the statute is to prevent
vexation. That intent plainly could not be fulfilled if, after trial of the first
Prohibition, the plaintiff could have another one merely by appealing.
But then -- Jones continues -- suppose the first Prohibition fails for a technical fault, such as non-proof of the surmise within six months. Does 50
Edw. 3 intend to deprive him of another chance for such reasons? To this
Jones says, “No.” His argument goes as follows: When a Prohibition is
formally tried, and in consequence of the defendant’s winning a Consultation is awarded, then 50 Edw. 3 comes into force. But if a Prohibition is
granted and then is not proved in six months, it is as if the Prohibition had
never been granted at all. A Consultation awarded in those circumstances
only gives notice of the Prohibition’s nullity ab initio, as opposed to undoing a Prohibition which on its face deserved to be granted. It is therefore not a “duly” granted Consultation within the statute. “This
distinction,” Jones says, “he learned from Lord Popham when he was a
practitioner.”
When he speaks again, Justice Dodderidge has lost none of his sense of
the ill consequences of letting appellors escape the statute. He adds the
consideration that the plaintiff is trying to prohibit his own suit, in the
sense that he has taken the offensive in bringing the appeal and then
turned on himself for his own advantage. (As will appear from cases below, however, self-prohibition was not generally considered objectionable.) On the other matter, Dodderidge is willing to think about Jones’s
distinction (he says he “puit advise” of it).
According to the MS., the Court ended by granting the second Prohibition ”at this time,“ ”since many Prohibitions were granted in similar
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cases.“ This conclusion is not uncommon in Prohibition cases. It means
that the Court was sufficiently persuaded that a Prohibition was appropriate, or just enough in doubt, to grant one, deferring final decision until after formal pleading or at least until there was a chance for further debate
on a new motion for Consultation. But from other evidence it is clear that
the Court finally decided conclusively that the second Prohibition should
be granted.45
Our last case combining 2/3 Edw. 6 with 50 Edw. 3, Stroud v. Hoskins
(1630-31),46 eventuated in unanimous confirmation, after elaborate argument from the bar, of Cockeram v. Davies -- i.e., that Consultations for
failure of proof under 2/3 Edw. 6 are not within 50 Edw. 3. The decision
was announced without argument on the Bench. At most, the Chief Justice, speaking for the Court, gave a cursory indication of the reasons.
This is a surprising feature. Per Curiam opinions were common enough
45

46

In Bowrie v. Wallington (below), in Easter, 1 Car., it was said that a Prohibition was granted in
Cockeram v. Davies “last term,” which would have been Hilary, 23 Jac., a year later than the
MS. report of Cockeram v. Davies. The Prohibition was probably confirmed on advisement at
that time. In Stroud v. Hoskins (just below) Cockeram v. Davies is said to have been so decided
“on great deliberation.” The statement in the MS. that many Prohibitions had been granted in
such cases probably refers to practice-precedents. I.e.: It does not mean that there were decided
cases holding that Prohibitions ought to be granted in such circumstances, only that it had been
done de facto without contest or discussion. The report is therefore compatible with the absence
of reported cases before Cockeram v. Davies straightforwardly holding that failure of proof
under 2/3 Edw. 6 is outside 50 Edw. 3 (for Cop v. Semer contains only a dictum to that effect).
Croke Car., 208; Jones, 231; Harg. 39, ff. 97, 119b, 130, and 137. The MS. gives the arguments
of counsel in extenso, with only a few interlocutory remarks by the judges, whereas the printed
reports give only the result. The MS. says expressly that there was no argument on the Bench.
Jones confirms that by saying that the Chief Justice spoke for the Court. From Croke’s summary
report of the result one would not know whether or not the judges spoke at large. There is one
drastic conflict between the MS. and the printed reports: Viz. The MS. (at f. 137) gives the
opposite result! --judgment for the defendant and a holding in general terms that there may not
be a new Prohibition after Consultation. Since that goes directly against the printed reports, I
think the MS. must be a misreport. The only possible reconciliation is that the Court announced
a decision one way, then flatly changed its mind and delivered a new judgment (again, as Jones
proves, without judicial argument). Such a strange course is all the more possible if the case had
the political overtones I suggest in the text. The chronology may also make such an explanation
possible. Croke and the MS. date the decision H.6 Car., but Jones dates it P.7 Car. If Jones is
right, the Court could have gone for the defendant in Hilary and for the plaintiff the next Easter,
Croke being inaccurate. In the text, I adopt the assumption that the MS. simply does not report
the final result truly. If the alternative explanation were correct, it would add to the narrative
interest. but would not affect the legal analysis. From the MS., it is clear that the case was first
argued at the Bar in H.5 Car. and reargued on two separate occasions in T.6. Leisurely handling
of an important case was common in the 17th century; excessive leisure might indicate judicial
hope that a thorny case would be dropped or compromised.

87

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
in routine cases. In complex ones, where, as here, decision was delayed
over several terms and counsel were permitted to develop lengthy arguments of notable importance, one expects judicial discussion. (The custom was for the puisne Justices to give their reasoned opinions in
ascending order of seniority, followed by the Chief Justice.) Decision
without judicial argument in a major case suggests political embarrassment or, at least, disinclination to commit the Bench too firmly to a decision the judges did not like but could not avoid. Both explanations are
plausible in the case of Stroud v. Hoskins.
The decision went against the ecclesiastical interest at a time when the
church had moved into its aggressive Laudian phase with strong backing
from the government. The losing side was impressively represented by
William Noy, who became Attorney General in 163 1, very shortly after
this case. It is at least possible that Noy and his colleague Calthrop (significantly, those two prominent lawyers argued on the defendant’s side
against two representatives of the plaintiff, Jermin and Brown -- a sign of
a ”full-dress“ case) were retained wholly or in part by the government to
make as powerful a case as possible for their nominal client. In his argument, Noy made one of the very few references to the political controversy over Prohibitions to be found in the reported cases, presumably for
the purpose of adding a little extra pressure to the reasons with which he
had assailed the Court.47 Possibly the judges resented that, but possibly,
too, they were afraid, or disinclined from their own sympathies, to spell
out a decision opposed by the government. A per Curiam opinion is not,
of course, as conclusive for the future as a decision supported by judicial
argument.

47

“In 4 and P.5 Jac., when there was the great debate about Prohibitions, this very matter was
complained of, and the answer given hereto was that the complainants should have shown in
particular where the fault was and then it would be redressed.” By “this very matter,’’ Noy
presumably meant the general question of how strictly 50 Edw. 3 should be enforced. He can
only point to a vague response to what must have been the complaint that it was not being
enforced strictly enough. His intention must be to say that although the judges did not admit
laxity, they were prepared to tighten up enforcement of the statute if specific instances of loose
interpretation could be cited. Noy’s remark only functions as a general admonition and reminder
to the Court.
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Apart from politics, the judges in Stroud v. Hoskins may not have
liked the result that reason and precedent drove them to. Plaintiffs-inProhibition who neglected or lacked proof should presumably not be
overencouraged to seek new Prohibitions. To the end of minimizing litigation and enforcing 2/3 Edw. 6, “one chance in one tithe-year” might
have been a good rule, even though 50 Edw. 3 could not be held to have
enacted it. A lengthy and deliberate statement of the judges’ belief that
no such rule existed would allow tithe-payers and their lawyers to be confident that one did not. We should remember that judicial precedents
were neither so easily discoverable nor so authoritative in principle in the
early 17th century as they later became. Judicial argument could both
publicize a decision in the legal profession and add to its weight. (In the
light of these observations, it is ironic that the judges in Stroud v. Hoskins
may have felt very nearly “bound” by Cockeram v. Davies.)
Over against these possible explanations for the surprising absence of
judicial argument, there is a quite different one: the judges’ desire to settle a troublesome problem in a way they could agree on in the upshot,
without proliferating concurring opinions and hence confusion over the
reasons for the decision. As will appear from the discussion of the issues,
opinions supporting the decision in this case could easily vary in emphasis. The judges could conceivably have been in a state of antagonistic
concurrence.48
48

Lest I seem to make too much of the absence of judicial argument, let me cite one famous case in
which a surprising failure to argue on the Bench clearly points to a combination of political
timidity and a preference not to generalize. It can be proved from a full MS. report (Add.
25,203, ff. 543b, 558, 570, and 678b -- last entry giving the judgment-without-argument) that
that is what happened in Darcy v. Allen (“The Case of Monopolies,” best known from Coke’s
misleading report at 11 Coke, 84b).
The essential question there was Queen Elizabeth’s
prerogative to grant a monopoly to trade in playing cards. The case was elaborately argued over
several terms.
The Court finally decided against the monopolist (the well-known result).
Although one judge said in so many words that a case of such importance should be argued on
the Bench, judgment was in the event entered without public judicial discussion. The judges
were presumably afraid to offend the sovereign (James I by the time the case came to decision)
by talking about the limits of the prerogative. In addition, by keeping quiet they could leave it
uncertain: (a) whether the monopoly was being held unlawful, or the case was being disposed of
on other available grounds; (b) assuming that the monopoly was being held unlawful, whether it
was unlawful only in respect of certain features peculiar to the particular patent in question. It
should be noted that Darcy v. Allen was a genuinely hard case. The precedents almost defied
sorting out into coherent generalizations about the Crown’s power to grant special privileges and
regulate the body politic. Per Curiam judgments are at least a way to avoid saying what you
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In the aspects that concern us here, the case of Stroud v. Hoskins was
as follows: It was surmised in a tithe suit that the land in question was
exempt as recently reclaimed land under the statue of 2/3 Edw. 6. This
surmise was not proved in six months, whereupon a Consultation was
awarded. The plaintiff was now seeking a new Prohibition.
As we saw above, it was unsuccessfully urged that the reclaimed-waste
surmise did not have to be proved. If that argument had prevailed there
would perhaps have been no problem about 50 Edw. 3. I.e.: If the Consultation had been improperly granted (granted on the mistaken impression that the surmise needed to be proved), then a new Prohibition might
seem appropriate. 50 Edw. 3 speaks of Consultations “duly” granted. If
the Consultation had been erroneously granted, would it have been “duly”
granted? Maybe not, but a strong argument contra was made by Noy. He
argued in effect for taking “duly” in the narrowest sense -- as equivalent
to “granted by a competent court in proper form,” not as equivalent to
“correctly granted as a matter of law.”49 As things turned out, Noy would
not have needed to press for so confined a sense of “duly,” for he and his
colleague persuaded the Court that the Consultation had been correctly
granted as a matter of law. How the case would have been decided if the
issue on the proof requirement had been resolved the other way becomes
an academic question. (Though not without interest. Having decided that
a surmise of a given type did have to be proved, should the Court be free
to reconsider the correctness of that decision on a new application for
Prohibition after Consultation? The question would be most troubling if
both principal courts were involved. Suppose the Common Pleas held that
a surmise required proof and granted a Consultation for failure thereof.

49

cannot trust yourself to say without misleadingness. The effect of the tactic in Darcy v. Allen
was probably to discourage monopolists from believing that they could enforce their privileges
through the common law courts, without encouraging would-be competitors to believe that all
monopolies could be easily broken, and without putting too severe a damper on the
government’s enthusiasm for granting them.
Noy took pains to defend his interpretation of “duly” as accepted legal usage. E.g.: A man
erroneously convicted is still spoken of as “duly” convicted.
So with the related word
“lawfully.” AS Noy said, “There is a civil lawfulness and there is a natural lawfulncss.” E.g., a
child may be spoken of as “lawfully begotten” for the purposes of an entail even though he is a
product of adultery. In short, ordinary language can be a very misleading basis for construing
legal meanings. Cf. “due process of law.”
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Then suppose a new Prohibition were sought in the King’s Bench. It is
realistic to imagine the King’s Bench taking a different view of the proof
requirement’s scope. Should it be free, in effect, to review and reverse
the Common Pleas decision? Noy’s interpretation of “duly” would prevent such a problem from arising. Some related problems on the interaction of the two courts are discussed below).
Given the Court’s position that proof of the surmise was required,
Stroud v. Hoskins becomes the same case as Cockeram v. Davies, without the complication introduced by the appeal in the earlier case: Does a
Consultation correctly granted for failure of proof, rather than on the substance, bar further Prohibitions in the same suit by force of 50 Edw. 3?
The Court said, “No.”
Judging by Croke’s report of the briefly-stated reasons for the decision,
it seems that the Court was moved in part by the consideration that 2/3
Edw. 6 came long after 50 Edw. 3. In other words, the makers of 50
Edw. 3 could only have intended to cause such Consultations as they
knew about to bar further Prohibitions. A variety of Consultation created
by statute nearly 200 years later could not be held within their contemplation.
Noy combatted this reasoning with learning and subtlety. (a) He cited
a Commons Petition from 51 Edw. 3 in which it was complained that despite the statute of the previous year Prohibitions were still issued after
Consultation. The petitioners asked that the practice be stopped unless
the nature of the ecclesiastical suit on which the new Prohibition was being sought had really changed. Taking this contemporary evidence to be
relevant for the exposition of 50 Edw. 3, Noy construed it to show that the
intention behind 50 Edw. 3 was comprehensive: All Consultations were to
bar further Prohibitions save for the one case mentioned by the petitioners
in 51 Edw. 3 -- where the ecclesiastical suit was genuinely different. In
the first year of the statute’s life, other exceptions than the one specified
by the petitioners had apparently been read into it; the Commons who had
initiated the statute immediately stepped in to explain their intention that
only the exception expressly allowed for in the words of the act should be
admitted. (b) Noy cited case evidence from before 50 Edw. 3 to show that
prior to the statute new Prohibitions after Consultation had been common.
That went to demonstrate that 50 Edw. 3 was a genuinely innovative stat-
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ute, as opposed to a mere affirmation or clarification of the common law.
(In the absence of contrary evidence, 17th-century lawyers on the whole
liked to believe that old statutes had been in affirmance of the common
law.) If 50 Edw. 3 only declared the common law, it could only refer to
Consultations that previously were bars to further Prohibitions (or ought
to have been if the law was correctly applied). That class could obviously
not include a type of Consultation that owed its existence entirely to a
statute of later vintage. Noy maintained, however, that 50 Edw. 3 had
flatly changed the common law. Instead of referring back to such Consultations as were already bars to new Prohibitions, it looks ahead, making all Consultations hereafter granted bars to further Prohibitions. The
latter class, in Noy’s opinion, was broad enough to include Consultations
granted by virtue of later statutes.
Against Noy, counsel for the other side relied on more common and
straightforward canons of statutory interpretation: 50 Edw. 3 is “penal”
(in the normal sense of “imposing an obstacle or disability,’’ “making
something harder to do”). “Penal” statutes should be interpreted narrowly
in doubtful cases. Later statutory Consultations were certainly a doubtful
case, hence 50 Edw. 3 should not be taken to include them. The upshot of
this argument prevailed with the Court.
Two further lines of argument were also pursued. (a) Cockeram v.
Davies was cited. No attempt was made to distinguish it, for that is impossible to do. In a sense, the appeal in Cockeram v. Davies made it the
stronger case. It was represented, without contradiction, as a general
holding -- that new Prohibitions may be issued after Consultation when
the Consultation is not on the merits. That is broader than upholding new
Prohibitions solely when the Consultation is based on 2/3 Edw. 6. There
is no telling how reluctant the judges may have been, aside from other
considerations, to reverse a recent decision. An earlier case, not independently reported,50 was cited as flatly contradictory to Cockeram v.
Davies, which might have mitigated the pain of reversal. As we have
seen, there were still other earlier cases, not used in Stroud v. Hoskins,

50

Pilton’s Case, H. 11 Jac. K.B., where it was purportedly resolved that a new Prohibition will not
lie after Consultation based on 2/3 Edw. 6.
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which could be employed to argue against the result, though not very decisively.
(b) The winning side maintained that a “duly” granted Consultation, as
contemplated by 50 Edw. 3, meant one granted on the merits. Consultations granted for failure of proof under 2/3 Edw. 6 or any other collateral or non-substantive reason, it was argued, fall outside 50 Edw. 3.
Just below we shall consider whether this claim was supported by cases
on “non-substantive” Consultations other than those grounded on 2/3
Edw. 6. It was in fact not well-supported by such cases. The plaintiff‘s
counsel showed nothing to sustain their distinction. Noy and Calthrop
were almost over-generous in conceding that it was an unsettled question
whether non-substantive Consultations as a class would bar further Prohibitions. They were right to concede that some non-substantive Consultations had been denied such barring effect, but also right to maintain, as
they did, that the recognized exceptions to 50 Edw. 3 were extremely
marginal and distinguishable from the principal case. On the whole, I
think, the losing side in Stroud v. Hoskins had the better case, save for the
fact that Cockeram v. Davies had come earlier and been decided with
care, even if it was not so well- argued as Stroud v. Hoskins.
2. Cases on 50 Edw. 3 alone: Are there any exceptions from the
statutory rule that there may not be further Prohibitions after
Consultation? Conversely, does the rule of 50 Edw. 3 extend to any
situations beyond its words?
Summary: Except as Cockeram v. Davies and Stroud v. Hoskins--going beyond what was required in those cases -- made an exception for all
Consultations granted without determination on the merits, the courts
were disinclined to exempt most “non-substantive” Consultations from
the statute. Appealing within the ecclesiastical system was clearly ruled
out as a basis for new Prohibitions after Consultation, as to most intents
were other attempts to circumvent 50 Edw. 3. A few cases extended the
rule against more than one Prohibition in the same case beyond what the
language of 50 Edw. 3 warrants -- e.g., to the Admiralty.

* * *
The line of cases just considered, in which both 50 Edw. 3 and 2/3
Edw. 6 were involved, must be seen in the light of another line involving
only the former statute. In a few cases, the Consultation issued, not be-
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cause the first Prohibition had been dismissed on its merits, but for some
incidental reason other than failure of proof under 2/3 Edw. 6 -- e.g., failure of the plaintiff to prosecute. In an important sense, the failure-ofproof cases are similar to the other cases of “non-substantive”
Consultations. The major difference between the two classes is that the
requirement of preliminary proof did not exist when 50 Edw. 3 was made,
whereas such defaults on the plaintiff’s part as non-prosecution could
have been within the statute-makers’ contemplation. It would have been
symmetrical to treat the two classes alike, but there was a convincing reason to treat them differently.
Perhaps the obvious discrimination is to say that failure of proof is not
fatal to a second Prohibition, because the proof requirement did not exist
in 50 Edw. 3, whereas non-prosecution or the like is fatal. But the opposite discrimination can be defended. One might argue that failure of
proof touches the substance more closely: Having had a chance to produce evidence of the sort that would be relevant for a final determination,
the plaintiff has failed, whence it may be inferred that he would be unlikely to succeed on formal trial. The reasons for non- prosecution, per
contra, might be various and accidental. For a realistic example: Suppose
a parishioner surmises a modus running through the entire parish. Suppose he finds two witnesses who “prove” his surmise. Then suppose he
discovers on further investigation that he has mistaken his modus because
it applies only to certain land, not the whole parish, whereupon he drops
his case and Consultation issues. Does 50 Edw. 3 really intend to foreclose this parishioner from another Prohibition? This example leads to
another problem: Suppose that the above parishioner goes to trial. Because the evidence shows that the modus only applies to particular tenements, he loses. Then he seeks another Prohibition on a corrected
surmise. Does the change in the surmise, while the ecclesiastical libel remains unchanged, justify a new Prohibition? The answer to the last question should probably be “no,” for the parishioner was surely at fault in
standing on a claim he could not support. But is the nonsuit case so
clear? A mistake in the confusing realm of tithing customs is understandable, and in dropping a misconceived suit the parishioner has done
the sensible, time-saving thing (barring the possibility of amending his
original surmise).
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The earliest case in the present category,51 unlike all those in the preceding one, comes from the Common Pleas. The parishioner in a tithe
suit surmised a modus, which the parson traversed (i.e., denied factually).
A Consultation issued when the plaintiff was nonsuited. He then sought a
new Prohibition, changing his surmise slightly. (Formerly, he alleged a
custom that “singuli proprietarii firmarii seu occupatores” of a certain
grange had paid 13/4d. in lieu of certain tithes. The second time, he alleged that the occupiers of the grange “among them” paid that sum.) Neither the alteration in the surmise nor the fact that the Consultation was the
result of a nonsuit persuaded the Court to grant another Prohibition when
the ecclesiastical libel remained the same. By way of clarification, Justice Glanville pointed out that the holding did not imply that the plaintiff
would be estopped in another year if he was sued for the same tithes on a
52
different libel. Shortly later, the Common Pleas affirmed this dictum.
53
Another dictum from a decade later, agrees: The Court granted a Consultation because the plaintiff-in-Prohibition failed to appear at Assizes
for trial, having been duly notified. The Court said he could not have a
new Prohibition for the same year, but might for another year.
In Foster v. Berkenshare in the King’s Bench (1609),54 the plaintiff-inProhibition was nonsuited, then after losing in the ecclesiastical court appealed and sought a new Prohibition. The Court refused another
Prohibition because the libel was unchanged. Several lawyers at the Bar
were surprised by this holding, saying “that the usage had lately been otherwise, because when the plea is removed by appeal it is not within the
words of the statute, viz., ‘the said judge,’ etc.” Nothing seems to have
been made of the fact that the first Prohibition was lost by nonsuit. If
Consultations based on nonsuits should be treated the same way as Consultations for failure of proof under 2/3 Edw. 6, this case is good authority
against the decision in Cockeram v. Davies. Foster’s Case was relevantly
cited (under the date H. 7 Jac.) in Stroud v. Hoskins, by Calthrop, who
was trying to overturn Cockeram v. Davies. An anonymous report from
51
52
53
54

Watson v. Langdall. T. 41 Eliz. C.P. Harl. 48 17, f174.
Cropley v. Whiteacres. M. 44/45 Eliz. C.P. Plaintiff surmised a modus and was nonsuited. The
briefly reported holding is only that these facts are no bar to a Prohibition to stop a tithe suit for
another year.
Wakeman v.
M. 10 Jac. C.P. Add. 25,210, f.9.
P. 7 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,208, f.43.
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the same term,55 possibly relating to the same case, has the Court laying
down a general rule that new Prohibitions after Consultation can be justified only when the consultation depended on a clerk’s fault or some such
technical error as the mispleading of a statute -- i.e., presumably, where
plaintiff-in-Prohibition is not at fault to the extent that he would be in a
nonsuit or failure-of-proof case.
Biggs v. J. S. Parson de D. (1616)56 combines several themes. A Prohibition was granted on surmise of a modus. The defendant pleaded to issue on the truth of the modus. At the trial stage, the plaintiff was
nonsuited because he could not prove his case. Then, after losing in the
ecclesiastical court, he appealed and sought a new Prohibition by an altered surmise. (He had originally surmised a 2/ modus for all tithes, the
inclusiveness of which was probably what he could not prove, for he
changed his claim to 2/ for corn and hay tithes only.) The plaintiff‘s
counsel relied first on the change in the surmise, but was put down by the
Court because the libel was still the same. Counsel then switched to the
appeal, citing a case57 to prove that an ecclesiastical suit on appeal is not
the same case within 50 Edw. 3. The three judges whose opinion is reported (Coke, Dodderidge, and Houghton) rejected that argument as well.
Coke and Houghton rested on the straightforward point that the intent of
50 Edw. 3. was to “oust multiplication of appeals.” Dodderidge added
the argument he was later to repeat in Cockeram v. Davies: because ecclesiastical appeals suspend the sentence, an appellate judge is strictly the
“same judge” as the original one. On the effect of the appeal, the holding
was in line with other cases we have seen. It also accords with Hele v.
Chaine et al.58 (discussed below for another point) of 1609, though there
may have been one dissent in that case. As far as appears, counsel in
Biggs v. J. S. did not think it worth arguing that there should be a new
Prohibition because the first one was lost by nonsuit. It may be relevant
that the nonsuit came at a late stage. It may have been ordered by the trial
judge for patent failure of evidence, as opposed to being taken voluntarily
by the plaintiff.
55
56
57
58

2 Brownlow and Goldesborough, 247.
P. 14 Jac. K.B. t Rolle, 378; 3 Bulstrode, 182; Harl. 4561, f.221b.
Bacon v. Baker, not independently reported, P. 1 Jac. Also cited, as Sir Nicholas Bacon’s Case,
in Hele v. Chaine et al.
M. 6 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,215, f.47.
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None of the cases just above lend countenance to the theory, advanced
in Cockeram v. Davies and Stroud v. Hoskins, that new Prohibitions are
always permissible unless the Consultation is based on a substantive determination, A little authority can be mustered in support of that theory,
but it is thin and largely distinguishable from the nonsuit and failure-ofproof cases. Arguing against the theory in Stroud v. Hoskins, Noy conceded that a second Prohibition could be granted if the first one failed by
an “act of God,” such as the death of a party. In Stroud v. Hoskins, Justice Whitelocke told of one curious case (without specific citation) which,
though it involved 2/3 Edw. 6, is best considered here: A man by mistake
went to a Common Pleas judge at Assizes to prove his surmise, when he
should have gone to a King’s Bench judge, his Prohibition having been
granted by that court. That is all Whitelocke said. His purpose was presumably to show that there are slips so minor or understandable that always denying a second Prohibition after Consultation would be unfair.
That a layman got mixed up as to the sort of judge he should go before is
understandable, but it seems doubtful whether the nonsuit and standard
failure-of-proof cases were equally deserving of pity.
A bit more materially, there are a few cases in which Consultations issued by the Chancery had been overridden by new Prohibitions from
common law courts. One of these, Syblie v. Crawlie,59 was cited by
Calthrop (Noy’s colleague with the defendant) in Stroud v. Hoskins, by
way of concession. The Chancellor apparently issued a Prohibition, then
realized that he should not have done so for procedural reasons (because
the application for a Prohibition was by English Bill -- i.e., an equity-type
complaint -- which was bad form when one was seeking common law relief through the Chancery). The King’s Bench then granted a new Prohibition on the ground that there was no fault in the party. I take that to
mean that the error in the Chancery was blamed on a clerk (litigants in the
Chancery being highly dependent on the bureaucracy for drawing documents and steering cases through the court). Calthrop’s legitimate point
was that a party who failed to prove his surmise (and the same would
hold for an ordinary nonsuit) was not comparably blameless. The independent report of Syblie v. Crawlie, however, has Chief Justice Popham
59

H. 42 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz.. 736; Add. 25,203, f.171 : Add. 25,202, f.12.
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explaining the decision as follows: “The statute is to be understood when
Consultation is once awarded on examination of the matter and not when
it is awarded for insufficiency in the form of the proceeding.” (Italics
mine.) The other Justices are said to have conceded this distinction. Popham’s statement directly warrants precisely what Calthrop was combatting in Stroud v. Hoskins -- a distinction between substantive and
non-substantive Consultations, as opposed to a distinction between trivial
or faultless Consultations and all others. There is, however, a basis for
doubting Popham’s generalization in Syblie v. Crawlie -- viz. at least one
other case of a Chancery Consultation overridden by a common law court
which points to an exception only for inadvertent or meaningless Consultations not for all Consultations dependent on “the form of the proceeding.”60 The best conclusion is that Calthrop and Noy were right in Stroud
60

At most there were two such cases, and there may have been only one. I have three reports, all
dated P. 34 Eliz. C.P., as follows:
(a) Lyss v. Watts, Croke Eliz., 277: A Prohibition being granted in the Common Pleas, the
defendant showed that the Chancery had already granted a Consultation in the same case. At the
hearing of Lyss v. Watts to which Croke’s report relates, the reason for the Chancery
Consultation seems not to have been brought out. Apparently assuming that the Consultation
was substantive, the Court said that the defendant ought to have another Consultation -- i.e., that
the Chancery’s act should be respected. This was a strong opinion, for, as further reported
discussion shows, the Common Pleas did not approve of the Consultation on the merits. The
ecclesiastical suit was for tithes of slate-stones. The Common Pleas thought, in accord with all
common law opinion on this subject, that no tithes were due for such stones (being, like
minerals, “part of the freehold,” or depletable assets).
(b)
Lansd. 1073, f.I27b, is clearly the same case, because discussion of the tithability of
slate-stones is also reported there. Otherwise, this report says that the Prohibition in Chancery
“abated,” whereupon Consultation was granted, because it was sought by English Bill. The
Common Pleas is reported to have upheld the new Prohibition because the first one failed by the
clerk’s fault rather than the party’s. The MS. is reconcilable with Croke on the assumption that
a second hearing brought out the fact that the Chancery Consultation was extremely
non-substantive.
(c) Lansd. 1073, f.130b looks like a different case from a bare report, though from the date one
suspects that it is another, perhaps confused, version of the same one. According to this report,
the Chancellor reversed one of his own Prohibitions by Consultation because it had been granted
without order of the Court or English Bill. Syblie v. Crawlie and the report just above show that
it was objectionable to grant a Prohibition on an English Bill, whereas this report suggests that
the absence of an English Bill was a fault. Perhaps the meaning is that there was nothing of
record in the Chancery to warrant a Prohibition, not even an English Bill seeking one. In any
event, the Common Pleas allowed a new Prohibition on the ground that the Consultation in this
seemingly mixed-up Chancery case could hardly be considered “duly” granted, and because the
judges thought that a Prohibition was clearly appropriate on the merits (“for although [sic] there
was no English Bill, still the Prohibition was well-granted”).
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v. Hoskins on the basis of prior cases, though as they themselves admitted, the question was confused. One later case61 illustrates the possibility
of “trivial or faultless” Consultations which it would be harsh to include
within 50 Edw. 3. Here the plaintiff-in-Prohibition proved his suggestion
as required by 2/3 Edw. 6 before a Justice at Assizes. But because the
proof was not entered of record, a Consultation was granted for failure of
proof. A new Prohibition was allowed, since the Consultation was a mere
accident. As we have seen, proof provided within six months was good
even though it was not entered until later.
To resume another theme: The well-argued case of Bowrie (or
Dowry) v. Wallington (or Willington) (1625) 62 may be taken as settling
the question whether 50 Edw. 3 could be circumvented by bringing an ecclesiastical appeal. The Court said, “No,” in accord with earlier authority.
In other words, if A. gets a Prohibition, then the Prohibition is undone by
a Consultation, then A. loses in the original ecclesiastical court and appeals to a higher one, A. may not have a new Prohibition. Although there
is some confusion in the reports on this point, it seems clear that the Consultation in Bowrie v. Wallington was substantive -- i.e., granted after
verdict and judgment against plaintiff-in-Prohibition. If the Consultation

61
62

Mayle v. Murlyn. T. 16 Car. C.P. Harg. 23, f.62b.
P. and M. 1 Car. K.B. Popham, 159; Benloe, 148 and 150; Latch, 6 and 76; Harg. 38, f.17b;
Lansd. 1063, f.116b. The reports present some problems of reconstruction. There is conflict on
one point of significance. Benloe, 150 (unlike Benloe, 148) says the Consultation was granted
because the plaintiff-in-Prohibition was nonsuited “upon a mistake of alleging a modus
decimandi for all the vill, where some part pays tithes in kind.” Harg. 38 says the Consultation
was granted either because the plaintiff was nonsuited or because a verdict went against him -the reporter does not know which. All the other reports say that verdict and judgment were given
against the plaintiff. I conclude that there was probably a verdict. If there was a nonsuit, it may
have been ordered by the trial judge upon the plaintiff‘s manifest failure to give evidence of a
modus throughout the village -- which might in itself make the determination “substantive”
enough. Benloe, 150, is dated later than the other reports (M. 1 Car., as opposed to P. 1 Car.),
but all the other reports make it clear that the case was not decided in Easter. Noy’s argument
came in Easter, but on a second hearing, after which (according to Lansd. 1063) decision was
still deferred, probably to be given the following Michaelmas. Popham suggests that on the first
hearing -- before Noy’s argument -- the judges were less than convinced that the appeal could
not justify a new Prohibition.
They said it would not if the appellor and the
plaintiff-in-Prohibition were the same person, and if the Consultation were substantive -- good
enough for this case but still a little qualified. Benloe, 150, is the only decisive report of the
result, from which it appears that Noy’s argument was largely accepted by the Court. In Stroud
v. Hoskins, Noy cited Bowrie v. Wallington as a general holding (perhaps more general than it
was) against new Prohibitions after Consultation.
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had been non-substantive, Cockeram v. Davies might have justified a new
Prohibition, but the appeal would have had nothing to do with justifying it
(as at least Justices Dodderidge and Jones had held in Cockeram v.
Davies the year before, and as the whole Court held by implication in this
case).
The main interest of Bowrie v. Wallington lies in the new arguments
(i.e., beyond those in Cockeram v. Davies) against permitting 50 Edw. 3
to be defeated by an appeal. These arguments were the work of William
Noy (an expert, surely, on 50 Edw. 3, though his expertise was not to prevail in Stroud v. Hoskins). (a) In effect, Noy argued from the theory of
Prohibitions that granting a new Prohibition after Consultation would put
defendant-in-Prohibitions in “double jeopardy.” (That expression, of
course, is not used.) Prohibitions, he emphasized, are public or quasicriminal. I.e.: Defendant-in-Prohibition is accused of contempt of the
King’s jurisdiction for having improperly sued in a “foreign” court. Having once been acquitted of that offense, he ought not to be tried again. 50
Edw. 3 in effect enacted that principle of justice. If there were no other
reasons against letting an appeal defeat the statute, the importance of the
principle behind it would be a reason. (Interestingly, this argument might
be turned to the opposite effect on the separate question of non-substantive Consultations: If defendant-in-Prohibition is not tried and acquitted
for his “offense,” but allowed to persist in it because the plaintiff has
made a procedural mistake, does the public interest and putative policy of
50 Edw. 3 not require that a new Prohibition be granted in order for the
substantive issue to be tried?)
(b) Noy reinforced the argument made by Justice Dodderidge in Cockeram v. Davies that 50 Edw. 3 does not mean “the same judge” literally,
but rather that an appellate judge in the ecclesiastical system must be
taken as “the same judge” as the original one. By ecclesiastical procedure, Noy pointed out, an appellate judge who affirms the sentence below
remands the case to the inferior judge for execution. Thus, if the lower
ecclesiastical judge is told to go ahead by Consultation, and then another
Prohibition is issued to the appellate judge, the effect of the new Prohibition will be to prevent the lower judge (literally “the same judge” who
was permitted to carry on before) from executing his sentence, in the
event that the sentence is affirmed. In addition, Noy cited an analogy to
justify taking persons mentioned in statutes as “persons in interest,” rather
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than natural persons: 27 Eliz., c. 8, gave a writ of error in certain circumstances to “parties plaintiffs or defendants.” The courts had interpreted
that expression to include the executors of such parties. So here, Noy argued: Different ecclesiastical judges in the sense of different men with
different positions in the ecclesiastical hierarchy are the “same judge” in
the sense that they represent the same “interest,” as an executor and his
testator are in that sense the “same person.”
(c) Finally, Noy challenged the printed statute book: The petition in the
Parliament Roll underlying 50 Edw. 3 does not say “the same judge,” but
simply “the judge.” The King’s answer to the petition was that several
Prohibitions should not be issued “in one case.” The judges ordered the
Parliament Rolls to be brought in, from which they verified Noy’s facts.
(It does not, of course, follow that the judges would have gone by the Parliament Rolls instead of the printed statute, or used them to expound it, if
they had been in real doubt about the effect of an appeal. Noy probably
performed the useful office of “over-killing” the theory that appeal ought
to make a difference. Previous cases, common sense, and construction
with reasonable regard for the statute’s intent all worked against that theory. This case buried it.)
63

A report from a few years later confirms Bowrie v. Wallington: Justices Jones and Berkeley restated the rule that an appeal will not justify a
new Prohibition. They or the reporter added that this was “subscribed”
by all the judges of England. (There are various signs of extra-judicial
discussion concerning Prohibitions, like that in James I’s reign, in the
1630s, ending with the judges’ signing an agreement as to how they
would handle certain types of cases. Though the point was well-settled
before, it would seem that new Prohibitions after appeal were included in
that discussion. Cf. the possible political overtones of Stroud v. Hoskins
above.) Jones and Berkeley confused the reporter by saying that although
the statute of 50 Edw. 3 spoke of “the same judge,” there was another
statute of 51 Edw. 3 speaking only of the “same cause.” The reporter was
puzzled because he could find no such second statute. The judges must
have been thinking, perhaps inaccurately, about the historical evidence
offered by Noy on two occasions: the petition, not statute, of 51 Edw. 3
63
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and/or the petition and royal response behind 50 Edw. 3. If the petition,
particularly, should be used to expound the statute, it would be relevant
for the problem raised by appeals, as well as that raised by non-substantive Consultations, for it argues in a general way in favor of enforcing the
statute strictly.
We may now turn to other possible ways around 50 Edw. 3. One problem that might be expected to arise almost never did in fact -- the meaning of “the same libel.” Suppose a Consultation issues for whatever
reason, then the ecclesiastical plaintiff makes some detailed change in his
libel, then the ecclesiastical defendant seeks another Prohibition on the
ground that the libel in no longer the same. Does the proviso in 50 Edw.
3 (“Provided always that the matter in the libel ... is not engrossed, enlarged, or in other manner changed”) mean “not changed in substance” or
“not changed in the slightest”? If the former, what constitutes a change
in substance?
I have found only one case on this point,64 where it arose in a rather interesting form. A parishioner was sued for tithes from former monastic
land. He got a Prohibition on the claim that the land was discharged from
tithes at the time of the dissolution (and consequently discharged now).
The parties went to trial on the truth of this claim. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition
lost because he pleaded one kind of discharge and proved another kind.
I.e.: He had a good basis for discharge, but lost because he surmised the
wrong species. The case was accordingly returned to the ecclesiastical
court by Consultation. The parson (plaintiff there) then added to his libel
an article saying that whether or not the land was discharged at the dissolution tithes had been paid for some sixty years last past. Relying on the
fact that the libel had been added to, the parishioner then sought a new
Prohibition.
One possible course the King’s Bench did not take: None of the judges
argued for granting the Prohibition merely because in a verbal sense the
libel was no longer the same. To do so as a rule would be to evade the
purpose of 50 Edw. 3 by an unnecessarily narrow reading of the proviso,
64

Lady Denton v. Earl (or Countess) of Clanrickard. M. 18 Jac. K.B. 2 Rolle, 207; Harg. 30, f.100.
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though in this case, where tithes were manifestly not due, that path might
have been tempting. Instead, the Court discussed whether the literal addition was a real or significant one.
Dr. Pope, an ecclesiastical lawyer representing the parson, was received to argue that the new words did not amount to a substantial
change. (Civilians were frequently allowed to appear before common
law courts when cases might turn on the truth of some proposition of ecclesiastical or Admiralty law, of which the Justices did not claim expert
knowledge. Civilians often appeared for both sides. Here, there is no
sign of the parishioner’s ecclesiastical lawyer.) The implication of Pope’s
appearance is that assessing the addition to the libel at least might require
civil law expertise. That was a reasonable presumption, for the question
may be framed as: “Is there or is there not the slightest possibility that
the alteration of the libel could affect the ecclesiastical court’s disposition
of the case?” Who but a civil lawyer could be presumed to know? In reality, however, I doubt that the majority of the King’s Bench cared very
much about this nicety, or about what Dr. Pope said.
Pope’s contention seems to have been that the addition was insignificant because, if effect, it was only “pleading evidence”: I.e.: The libel
claimed that tithes were due and had been paid regularly enough over the
whole of time, before and after the dissolution, to exclude any discharge;
the added allegation of recent payment pleaded something which, if true,
might figure in an inference that tithes had always been paid, as claimed;
however, the fact of recent payment would not be decisive, for if the
tithes had not been paid before the dissolution they were not due, and the
ecclesiastical judge would so hold, just as if the addition to the libel had
not been made. Chief Justice Montague (according to Rolle’s report) was
persuaded by this reasoning, holding that there was no addition within 50
Edw. 3. Justices Dodderidge and Houghton, on the other hand, (the MS.
simply says “the Court”) were unpersuaded. They smelt a rat and as
much as said so. Why had Dr. Pope added to his libel? Dodderidge and
Houghton thought they saw why: Notoriously, ecclesiastical rules on prescription were different from common law rules. Whereas at common
law only immemorial usage could establish rights, continuous usage for a
determinate extensive time could establish them by ecclesiastical law. By
putting an express allegation of payment over an extended recent period
into the libel, Pope had created the opportunity (though he himself denied
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it) for the ecclesiastical judge to hold that the tithes were due now by prescription, whether or not they were due at the dissolution. Therefore the
change in the libel could affect what happened in the ecclesiastical court,
whatever the civil law expert said. Therefore a Prohibition should be
granted.
Seeing the majority against him, Dr. Pope agreed to withdraw the addition to the libel, so that no Prohibition was in fact necessary. The Court
(now including the Chief Justice) was still wary enough to warn Pope that
a Prohibition would be granted after ecclesiastical sentence if the ecclesiastical court, even without the addition to the pleading, were to hold the
tithes due by prescription since the dissolution. (Substantively -- apart
from the problem on 50 Edw. 3 -- ecclesiastical courts were never allowed to enforce their standard of prescription against the tithe-payer. If
one was exempt by common law standards, execution of any ecclesiastical sentence to the contrary would be prohibited, and the ecclesiastical
court might be prohibited before sentence if there was any likelihood of
its applying the ecclesiastical standard of prescription in a tithe case.)
Projecting from this single case, one would come to the following general rules on the meaning of “same libel” for purposes of 50 Edw. 3: (a)
Mere verbal alteration does not justify a new Prohibition. (b) Whether an
alteration is really an addition capable of justifying a new Prohibition depends on whether the change could conceivably affect the ecclesiastical
outcome. It is not required by 50 Edw. 3 to lean over backwards to avoid
a new Prohibition, merely because it is not altogether clear that the
change would alter the ecclesiastical outcome, or because the effect on
the ecclesiastical court depends on refinements of ecclesiastical law beyond a common lawyer’s competence. Nor is the common law court
obliged to wait and see whether the alteration does have any apparent or
presumable effect on the ecclesiastical court’s behavior. A further rule of
general interest may be projected from the Court’s final warning to Dr.
Pope: There may be circumstances when a new Prohibition after Consultation would be barred before ecclesiastical sentence, and yet would be
legitimate after sentence. I have no further cases testing and working out
that distinction. It points to a question about the intent of 50 Edw. 3 that
might bear on other situations: Did the statute mean only, as it were, to
forbid and spare the common law courts from going over the same
ground twice -- i.e., from reconsidering and reversing a Consultation once
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granted and from being bothered by litigative warriors-of-attrition, when
there was no information whatsoever- before the court beyond what was
available, or ought to have been, on the first occasion? Or did the statute
mean to be harder than that on plaintiffs-in-Prohibition, more solicitous
for the interests of the ecclesiastical courts as an independent part of the legal system?
A few cases raise the question whether a new Prohibition after Consultation was ruled out by 50 Edw. 3 when the second Prohibition was
sought in a different common law court. I.e.: Does 50 Edw. 3 mean only
that the King’s Bench, say, may not ordinarily grant two Prohibitions in
the same case, or that there may not be two Prohibitions in the same case,
whoever grants them? In these cases, again, the courts were careful to
prevent the sensible policy of 50 Edw. 3 from being defeated.
In Alderman Skinner’s Case (1592),65 a parishioner surmised a modus
applying to a certain park. Upon traverse and trial, the verdict went
against the parishioner because the modus in fact only applied to part of
the park. (An ancient park had been recently extended. The plaintiff was
able to establish his modus for the ancient park, but made the mistake of
claiming it for the whole present park.) After Consultation and sentence
against him, the parishioner appealed to a higher ecclesiastical court and
sought a new Prohibition. This time he of course changed his surmise,
claiming the modus only for the old park. The novelty of this case is that
the new Prohibition was sought in the Common Pleas, whereas the earlier
sequence of events had been in the Queen’s Bench. On the substance, the
Common Pleas thought that no new Prohibition should be granted. This
view is consistent with similar cases above. Common sense suggests that
a party should not be able to evade 50 Edw. 3 by switching from one
common law court to the other. But can it be said that the second Prohibition suit is as good as a repetition of the first, and so clearly within the
statute, when it is brought in a different court? The plaintiff here probably tried to exploit this doubt (the arguments of counsel are not reported). In any event, the Court felt it necessary to find a device for
making it appear that the Common Pleas suit and the Queen's Bench suit
were all one: “To make it appear to be all one suit, the former surmise
65
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made in the King’s Bench reciting the former libel should be sent here by
mittimus and should be pleaded here of record, and then we here send
Consultation.”
In Hele v. Chaine et al. (1608),66 two King’s Bench Justices clearly
opposed disregarding a prior Consultation granted by the Common Pleas.
In this case (a common type), churchwardens sued a parishioner in the ecclesiastical court for a rate assessed by them for repair of the church. The
parishioner got a Prohibition from the Common Pleas, which court subsequently granted a Consultation. The reason for the Common Pleas
Consultation is not reported, but it was probably based on the legal sufficiency of the surmise (turning on the propriety of the method of assessment, about which serious debate in the King’s Bench is reported). The
parishioner then lost in the ecclesiastical court, appealed, and sought a
new Prohibition from the King’s Bench. Chief Justice Fleming, with Justice Williams concurring, took the following positions: (a) On the substance, the rate was properly assessed, so that Prohibition did not lie. (b)
The ecclesiastical appeal would not justify a new Prohibition. (c) By
clear implication, the Common Pleas Consultation was just as much a bar
to a new Prohibition as if the King’s Bench itself had granted the Consultation. The report says that Justice Fenner was absent, and Justice Croke
is expressly reported to have said nothing. Whether the fifth member of
the Court, Justice Yelverton, dissented is ambiguous. The report gives the
arguments of Dodderidge, counsel for the churchwardens, and at three
places the contrary arguments of “Yelverton.” Having given the arguments of counsel on one side, one expects the reporter to give those of
counsel on the other, so that “Yelverton” could refer solely to the practitioner Henry Yelverton. Having accounted for four judges, including the
absent and silent ones, one expects the reporter to account for the fifth
judge, Sir Christopher Yelverton (Henry’s father). I am inclined to conclude that at least one of the speeches labeled “Yelverton” came from the
Justice. (I would not expect a 17th-century judge to disqualify himself
because his son was arguing at the Bar.) In that event, there was a judicial dissent. Assuming that to be true, Justice Yelverton sharply dis66
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agreed with Fleming and Williams on the substance and on the effect of
the appeal. Believing that the appeal would have justified a new Prohibition even if the Consultation had been granted by the King’s Bench,
Yelverton did not need to deal with the circumstances of its having been
granted by the Common Pleas. He did not choose to deal with it on the
assumption that his point about the appeal was unacceptable -- i.e., did
not explicitly say that, appeal or no appeal, the case was as if no Consultation had been granted since none was of record in the King’s Bench. All
one can say is that he was vehement enough in favor of a Prohibition on
the important and controversial substantive question to suggest that he
might have been willing to go that far. The case is inconclusive (it was in
any event referred to counsel for mediation), but interesting just because
of the significant difference of opinion on the substance. Suppose
Fleming and Williams had been of the opposite persuasion on that -- i.e.,
convinced that the Common Pleas Consultation was egregiously in error.
Would they then have resisted the temptation to disregard it?
Virtually all the authority there is, at any rate, suggests that the temptation ought to be resisted. There is a dictum to that effect in one report of
Bowrie v. Wallington.67 Especially significant is the one clear case that
went the other way -- i.e., eventuated in the Common Pleas’ granting a
new Prohibition in the face of a King’s Bench Consultation.68 For the
judges’ language there makes it clear that in the circumstances they
would have overridden their own Consultation -- i.e., that they were in no
way moved by the fact that the Consultation came from the other court.
The suit was properly brought there, for the woman claimed that the other
party had called her “whore.” (“Whore” was not regarded as defamatory
per se at common law. On the other hand, the common law courts consistently permitted the ecclesiastical courts to treat it as defamatory.) A
Prohibition was granted by the King’s Bench because slander qua ecclesiastical offense had been pardoned by the general pardon of 3 James I.
67
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Benloe, 150. The point to be made in Bowrie v. Wallington was that an appellate judge in the
ecclesiastical system is the “same judge” as the original judge. To reinforce this, it was said that
a Common Pleas Consultation bars the King’s Bench from issuing a new Prohibition. That is to
say: In the common law system, one case is one case, regardless of whether the party switches
courts in midstream: so in the ecclesiastical system one suit is one suit, regardless of whether it is
moved from the original level to the appellate.
--- v. Rogers. P. 6 Jac. C.P. Add. 25,215, f.64.
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The particular slander in question had been committed before the pardon
and was therefore covered by it. (Prohibitions were frequently used to
give effect to pardons as interpreted by the common law courts.) For
some reason, however, the King’s Bench subsequently issued a Consultation. The ecclesiastical defendant then turned to the Common Pleas,
where he obtained a new Prohibition.
Chief Justice Coke and Justice Foster (whose remarks alone are reported) defended the decision on the ground that it was manifest on the
face of things that the Consultation was inappropriate. It appeared from
the ecclesiastical libel itself that the slanderous words were spoken before
the pardon. The Court of course had judicial notice of the date of the pardon. The judges had absolutely no doubt that the pardon included such
slanders. It must therefore be presumed, they said, that the Consultation
was granted “inconsulto”or “sub silentio,” not “duly” as 50 Edw. 3 specifies.
Such language raises a disturbing question. Could a presumption of
“inconsiderateness” or “inadvertence” not be made whenever one court
disapproved strongly of another’s Consultation (or even of its own on reconsideration)? Were Coke and Foster not opening the door to interpreting “duly” as “correctly as a matter of law”? The two judges were aware
that these questions would arise and took care to close the door again.
The case would have been decided the other way, they said, if either of
two circumstances had been different: (a) if the objections to the Consultation had depended on anything outside the libel; (b) if the first Prohibition had been formally pleaded to. (I.e.: If the defendant had demurred
to the first Prohibition, a new Prohibition would be denied, however erroneously the King’s Bench had decided the legal issue raised by the demurrer.) With the judges’ qualifications, the power to reverse prior
Consultations implied by this case is extremely limited. “Duly” in the
statute ought, after all, to mean something. The case shows the difficulty
of taking “unduly granted Consultations” to mean “Consultations that
could only have been granted on account of clerical errors or the like”-for here the King’s Bench could have granted the Consultation because it
was egregiously mistaken about the law (i.e., the terms and meaning of
the pardon). But Coke and Foster were careful to show that they reasonably attributed the King’s Bench Consultation to inadvertence (perhaps a
mix-up about dates) and overrode it solely on that assumption.
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The proper effect of one principal court’s Consultation on the other
principal court is further tested in two cases in the group just below, on
expansions of 50 Edw. 3. Before leaving attempts to circumvent 50 Edw.
3, we should note a unique Elizabethan case bearing witness to one further unsuccessful device. All we are told of Copley v. Whittacres69 is
that a Consultation had been previously granted in the matter to which the
report relates. The report says it was erroneously granted, suggesting that
the Court was of that opinion. Assuming that 50 Edw. 3 barred another
Prohibition, the ecclesiastical defendant’s lawyer moved for a Supersedeas to the ecclesiastical court. Justice Kingsmill, whose opinion alone is
reported, saw clearly that a Prohibition by any other name would still prohibit. He turned down the motion for an alternative writ, conserving the
policy of 50 Edw. 3.
Nearly all the evidence shows that the judges approved of the policy of
the statute, as they surely should have, and resisted efforts to whittle it
away. Cockeram v. Davies and Stroud v. Hoskins were exceptions to a
general tendency to favor the values of economic law administration and
respect for the ecclesiastical courts’ place in the sun which the ancient
statute expressed. Approval of the policy of 50 Edw. 3 is further attested
to by the judges’ willingness to extend the act beyond its words, although
there were limits to doing so reasonably, and those limits were drawn in
a couple of cases. In terms, 50 Edw. 3 only applied to relations between
the common law and the ecclesiastical courts. In a few cases, the question arose whether the act barred new Prohibitions to the Admiralty after
Consultation had once been granted. Extension of the statute to the Admiralty was twice upheld.
In the first such case,70 the original Prohibition and Consultation to the
Admiralty were granted by the King’s Bench. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition
made his second try in the Common Pleas. There was apparently no attempt by the plaintiff to exploit the change of courts. This case therefore
confirms those above on that point, though it should be noted that the
Common Pleas discussed the merits and approved of the Consultation le-
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gally. On the principal matter of interest, the Court held unanimously that
although only the ecclesiastical courts are mentioned in 50 Edw. 3, the
rule of the statute applied to Admiralty cases as well. The judges gave as
their reason that the act affirms the common law.
We have encountered one context (Stroud v. Hoskins) where it was advantageous to argue that the statute did not affirm the common law (because if it did it could not extend to failure-of-proof cases unknown at the
time of the act). (Though in no way decisive on this point, the holding in
Stroud v. Hoskins did not lend countenance to that argument.) The logic
of such a decision as the present one is ambiguous. There are several
routes to the conclusion, and the report is too cursory to show which one
the Court took, if indeed it discriminated. One may say: (a) The statute
affirms the common law, therefore it is not “penal” (i.e., does not create
obstacles or disabilities that did not exist at common law before), therefore it may be extended to like cases beyond its words “by the equity.”
(Cf. the argument in Stroud v. Hoskins that 50 Edw. 3 should not be extended to failure-of-proof cases precisely because it is “penal.” Note that
the opposing sides in Stroud v. Hoskins shared the premise that the act
was not made in affirmance of the common law, drawing contrary implications therefrom.) (b) The statute is simply conclusive evidence of the
common law -- as it were, like an especially exalted or authenticated judicial precedent. Then, for purposes of the present case, to refuse a new
Prohibition to the Admiralty is not to apply the statute, which admittedly
does not apply to the Admiralty. It is rather to apply a common law rule
which the statute authenticates in the indistinguishable case of the ecclesiastical courts. (c) The statute, speaking per synecdochen, means to enact
a general rule, though it only mentions the ecclesiastical courts. It is
known to speak per synecdochen because at least the “better opinion” at
common law, if there were no statute, would be that there may never, unless in special circumstances, be new Prohibitions after Consultation.
Then to refuse a new Prohibition to the Admiralty is to apply the statute,
without resort to the doctrine of the equity. For the upshot of the present
case, these distinctions make no difference. There may, however, be contexts in which the precise rationale for taking the act liberally could matter. E.g.: If the statute by its own force enacted a more general rule than
it appears to, it might be harder to justify exceptions to that rule than if
the statute merely evidences a common law rule. There is a sense (quaere
whether it is anachronistic to articulate it for the 17th century) in which at
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least in principle a common law rule, however certain, is intrinsically
vaguer than a legislative mandate. Our case is important as the only express judicial statement that in some sense 50 Edw. 3 does "affirm the
common law." Be it noted that the commonsense reasons for saying so
are overwhelming. Whatever was going on historically before 50 Edw. 3,
allowing second Prohibitions, at any rate in uncomplicated cases, makes
no sense and could hardly have been permitted by the courts over the long
run if the statute had never been made.
The second case on the Admiralty71 comes from the same term as the
one above, but from the King's Bench instead of the Common Pleas.
Here, the plaintiff tried to get a new Prohibition because he had appealed
the Admiralty suit after losing in the first instance and also because he
had now changed his surmise (in what way is not reported). The Court
held unanimously that there could be no new Prohibition so long as the
Admiralty libel remained unchanged. No discussion on the applicability
of the statute to the Admiralty or the relation of the statutory rule to the
common law is reported.
On the two matters discussed just above -- the effect of a Common
Pleas Consultation on the King's Bench and extension of the rule of 50
Edw. 3 to the Admiralty -- the closest approach to a dissent from the early
17th century consensus came from Justice Rolle during the Civil War
(1648)72 In a case from that time, a party sought a Prohibition in the
Common Pleas to stop an Admiralty suit. The Prohibition was pleaded to
issue, and the verdict went against the plaintiff, whereupon a Consultation
was granted. The plaintiff then came to the King's Bench and sought a
new Prohibition on the same surmise as he had made in the Common
Pleas. The Court showed disinclination on the substance to grant the Prohibition, and Justice Rolle said in effect that he could see no sense in applying for a Prohibition in the King's Bench after the matter had been
tried in the Common Pleas. Rolle went on, however, to agree, as counsel
for the plaintiff urged, that the trial in the Common Pleas was "no conclusion to us." It might be a mischief, he said, for new Prohibitions to be
granted after Consultation, but if so Parliament would have to make a law
71
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against it. There was no such law applicable to this case in existence.
Nothing is said about 50 Edw. 3 in the report. The act’s status in 1648
would have been a curious question to discuss, for from the point of view
of the rebel Parliament, from which Rolle held his office, the bishops and
ecclesiastical courts to which the statute refers no longer existed. Some
of their functions were being performed by new agencies created by Parliament, with respect to which, as well as with respect to the Admiralty,
the issue of second Prohibitions could still arise. Rolle’s position may
have been that 50 Edw. 3 was wholly obsolete, leaving the issue at common law. By the common law, contrary to earlier opinion, he seems to
have thought that Consultations need not bar second Prohibitions to the
Admiralty. The report gives no final decision and no judicial views except Rolle’s.
Extension of the rule of 50 Edw. 3 to the Admiralty bespeaks an attitude favorable to the act’s policy, whether or not the statute should be
considered technically in affirmance of the common law. That attitude of
approval could be used to justify extending the statute to circumstances
which in a sense could not possibly have been within the makers’ contemplation, such as failure-of-proof cases, though that option was rejected
in that instance in leading cases. Could a disposition to use the act liberally also justify refusing a Prohibition in what was not literally the same
case as that in which a Consultation had previously been granted, but an
exactly parallel case? One version of that question was raised in Parson
Bugge’s Case (1610).73
There, the clergyman sued for tithes and was prohibited, after which a
Consultation issued. Then the clergyman sued another parishioner for the
same kind of tithes. When the second parishioner sought a Prohibition,
the parson tried to use 50 Edw. 3 to stop him. It was contended (clearly,
though the report does not spell out all the circumstances) that the second
parishioner was relying on exactly the same modus that the first parishioner had relied on unsuccessfully, and therefore that the case was still the
same within the meaning of 50 Edw. 3. Chief Justice Coke, speaking for
the Court, rejected this argument: “...it may be collected by the words of
73
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the statute that it must be on the libel by the same parties for the same
matter.” Surely Coke’s reading of the act is correct. While the act does
not say “by the same parties,” its reference to a single, unaltered libel,
which necessarily starts a suit between two particular parties and none
others, must be taken to imply “the same parties.” Moving on from verbal construction, Coke cites that “most certain rule in the law,” “Res inter
alias acta alteri nocere non debet.” Beyond relying on the words’ clear
meaning, Coke construes the statute with the help of a principle of law
which it is hard to suppose Parliament had any intention of abrogating.
A dictum in an undated case,74 affirms Parson Bugge’s Case while
stretching the policy of 50 Edw. 3 in another direction. According to the
dictum, a parishioner who sues a Prohibition on a modus for tithes of
1610 and fails may not have another Prohibition on the same modus for
the same tithes in 1611. I think such a rule is plainly fairer than the rule
rejected in Parson Bugge’s Case would have been. To foreclose Parishioner B. because Parishioner A. has failed to sustain the modus on which
B. is relying is to deny B. the chance to dig up evidence that A. neglected.
To deny A. a second chance to establish a modus is only to deny him the
opportunity to do a better job than he did before. The dictum does not articulate the relationship of the rule stated to 50 Edw. 3. (An intended or
“equitable” effect of the statute -- though hardly within the words
amounting to “same libel”? A common law estoppel?) One might, I suppose, question extension of the statute as such to a suit for a different
year, then go on to question whether a common law estoppel should take
effect on a mere motion for Prohibition. Granting that the parishioner
should be estopped to claim the same modus in a subsequent year, should
be denied a Prohibition in the first instance? Or should the other party be
required to plead the matter of estoppel formally? Economy would perhaps recommend the former course. Our dictum appears to disagree with
three cases above (Cop v. Semer, Cropley v. Whiteacres, and Watson v.
Langdall). In all those cases, however, the Consultation was non-substantive -- either a result of failure of preliminary proof or of a nonsuit. Here,
the Court may have assumed that the merits of the modus had been determined by verdict or legal ruling.
74
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In the principal case to which the dictum was appended, a new Prohibition was issued simply because the Court decided it had considered the libel too carelessly when it granted Consultation. The ecclesiastical suit
was for tithes of wood and ought to have been prohibited because the
wood in question was non-tithable timber. When the second Prohibition
was granted, there was apparently no reinspection of outside facts, only
reexamination of the libel, from which it was clear that the clergyman by
his own admission was suing for timber of the sort the common law held
exempt. The overridden Consultation was therefore “inadvertent” rather
than “erroneous.” The case is in line with --- v. Rogers above and with
the prevailing disposition to “hold the line” on exceptions from 50 Edw.
3.75
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We may note a few further cases which touch on the subject of this section but add little of
significance:
(1) Dr. Mays v. Hollande. H. 39 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,198, f.203b. In a complicated case on
ecclesiastical livings, it was shown that the Common Pleas had previously granted a Prohibition
and then a Consultation. Coke, at the Bar, tried to stop a new Prohibition in the Queen’s Bench
on the basis of 50 Edw. 3. He was promptly put down by Justice Gawdy, who said that the libel
had been “greatly” changed. The rest of the debate was on the merits. The report gives no
specific information as to the nature of the changes in the libel.
(2) Baldwin v. Girrie. H. 11 Jac. C.P. Godbolt, 245. A case in which it would have been plainly
inappropriate to apply 50 Edw. 3. A tithe suit was prohibited, then a Consultation was granted
because the plaintiff-in-Prohibition was nonsuited. The ecclesiastical court was subsequently
prohibited again, this time from executing an unlawful sentence for treble damages. Taken
literally, 50 Edw. 3 might be said to bar the second Prohibition, for although the circumstances
were changed after the sentence, the libel was not. As far as the report indictates, no attempt was
made to invoke this statute.
(3) Phillips v. Slacke (or Starke). M.3 Jac. C.P. Add. 25205, f.40; Noy, 147. For present
purposes, simply an example of an inadvertent Consultation. After discussing the merits, the
Court decided that Prohibition would lie. but then apparently discovered that a Consultation had
been granted. Nothing in the report (only MS. touches this point) explains how the mix-up
occurred. The Court simply held that the Consultation had issued improvide and sent another
Prohibition.
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Summary (Covering all sub-topics): The issue in the following cases
is whether Prohibitions are barred by waiting too long to seek them or by
other misconduct on the plaintiff's part. The courts were inclined to deny
Prohibitions to the Admiralty after sentence given there. The effect of ecclesiastical sentences gave the courts more trouble. Although there were
some attempts to formulate rules on that subject, the courts came in the
end to a loose discretionary attitude. Prohibitions were sometimes denied
after sentence. Sometimes they were denied because the party entitled to
turn to the common law pursued ecclesiastical appeals before doing so.
Miscellaneous forms of delay or neglect of one’s interests were sometimes held to destroy a man’s right to a Prohibition. In cases of all those
sorts, however, the courts were essentially exercising discretion against
especially negligent or vexatious parties -- not treating undue delay as a
legal bar to Prohibitions. In quite a few cases, circumstances would have
made it hard to apply a firm rule or policy against common law intervention after sentence or even after ecclesiastical appeal. There are indications that in the 1630s the judges were forced to agree that they would not
grant Prohibitions after ecclesiastical sentence, but that commitment was
at best shortlived and ineffectual.

A.
Introductory
The cases on 50 Edw. 3 belong to a larger genus. If we ask “When
will prior litigative events bar a Prohibition which should otherwise be
granted?” the statute (and possibly the common law without the statute)
points to one answer: “When there has already been a Consultation in the
same case, with a few exceptions.” But perhaps the question has more
than one answer. Let us now look at cases which raise that possibility.
The common element in the following cases is that the party seeking a
Prohibition has committed some act or omission which might reasonably
be thought to foreclose his right to the writ.
Within the class, a number of cases turn on the effect of a party’s waiting to bring his Prohibition until sentence has passed against him in the
ecclesiastical or other non-common law court. On one side, it may be ar-
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gued that a party who has waited that long has acquiesced in the ecclesiastical court’s jurisdiction. It is desirable to ease the load on the judicial
system as a whole and to spare the adversary party trouble. Therefore
parties believing they are entitled to Prohibitions ought either to assert
their claims early or forgo them. The sentence is the most obvious
boundary between soon-enough and too-late. (Something might be said
for denying Prohibitions to parties who had acquiesced in ecclesiastical
jurisdiction to the extent of pleading to the ecclesiastical suit. But sentence has the advantage of being an open judicial act, easier to know
about and place in time without investigating the moves of the parties factually. There is also a certain logic, or pseudo-logic, in saying that a Prohibition is meant to stop improper proceedings -- things going on -- and
therefore that the writ should not lie beyond the terminus represented by
sentence, but is appropriate at any time before.) In addition, it is socially
undesirable to encourage the kind of litigative gambling in which a party
tries his luck with one court and, failing there, looks to another. For a less
moral point of view, such tactics are unsporting toward the other party.
These arguments in favor of treating sentence as a bar to Prohibition
might, however, have to be qualified in two ways: (a) Are there circumstances in which a Prohibition would be substantively inappropriate before sentence, but appropriate afterwards? I.e.: Are there cases in which
there is no basis for Prohibition until the ecclesiastical judge’s decision is
known? That in itself is a major question for the law of Prohibitions. If
the answer is “Yes,” as in practice it was, then treating sentence as a bar
can obviously be defended only where the Prohibition ought to be granted
without regard to the ecclesiastical judge’s disposition of the case. The
impossibility of making sentence a bar in all might conceivably be taken
as a reason against treating it as a bar in any case.
(b) Another complication is introduced by the peculiar nature of ecclesiastical appeals. Suppose we accept the theory (encountered in Cockeram v. Davies and Bowrie v. Wallington above) that an ecclesiastical
appeal suspends sentence. Then suppose that A. is sued in an ecclesiastical court. The circumstances are such that he could have a Prohibition at
once. But suppose he waits until sentence is given against him and then
appeals, after which he seeks a Prohibition. Should the Prohibition be denied because A. has waited until after sentence, or should it be granted
because the sentence is in suspense? The policy reasons for insisting that
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Prohibitions be sought early or not at all are all the stronger in this case.
For if it is bad to wait until after sentence, it is worse to wait still longer,
until after an appellate judge has wasted his time and the other party has
been put to further delay and charges. If sentence should be a bar, then a
sentence actually affirmed on appeal should be a stronger bar. But if the
first sentence is not yet affirmed, it is not a sentence, only a sentence in
suspense or in potentia! This complication may of course be ignored,
simply by saying that waiting too long is the fault and that sentence -suspended or not -- is the measure of “too long.” But if that is the sensible course, the courts would have to steel themselves to follow it, or else
not consider sentence a bar at all. For it makes no sense to have a sentence-bar rule if it is always possible to evade it by appealing. The mere
existence of this complication -- the difficulty of steeling oneself against
the logical consequences of the suspension doctrine if that doctrine were
to take hold in other contexts (as it did in 50 Edw. 3 cases) -- might count
as a reason for paying no attention to the state of the ecclesiastical suit,
but simply granting Prohibitions whenever it was appropriate on the merits.
Against the policy considerations in favor of treating sentence as a bar,
it may be argued that Prohibitions are designed to protect the “royal dignity,” or at least the lines of jurisdiction that the law lays down and attaches importance to. There is a public interest in Prohibitions’ being
issued whenever on the substance they ought to be. The negligence, miscalculations, or bad gambling of private litigants should not prevent that
public interest from being asserted. Moreover, even from the point of
view of efficient private law administration, there is some advantage in
allowing the party to defer his Prohibition until after sentence. It may be
that the party entitled to a Prohibition will win in the ecclesiastical court,
either on the same grounds that would support a Prohibition or other sufficient grounds. There is no hint that anyone ever suggested that Prohibitions should as a rule be denied until after sentence. But by allowing the
party to wait and see if he wants so, some unnecessary litigation over Prohibitions would be kept out of the common-law courts. If parties knew
that they were not prejudicing their right to a Prohibition by defending the
ecclesiastical suit, they would tend to defend it, and sometimes they
would do so successfully. The adversary party -- defendant to the Prohibition -- was normally plaintiff in the ecclesiastical suit. He could hardly
complain if the law so framed the rules that his chance to fight on the
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ground of his ostensible choosing was improved (of course in practice
one rarely had a choice).

B.
Admiralty Sentences
Cases on the foreclosing effect of non-common law sentences are best
considered in several sub-groups. Few cases raise the question in a completely simple form. Nor can the question be entirely abstracted from the
substantive character of the cases in which it arose. Let us look first at a
sub-group which illustrates the last point.
The courts showed an inclination, with only slight qualification, to refuse Prohibitions to the Admiralty after sentence there. Ecclesiastical
sentences were less likely to bar Prohibitions. This difference may reflect
practical realities and social attitudes which could not be officially admitted. The Admiralty was most frequently prohibited from entertaining contract suits beyond its jurisdiction. It was supposed to confine itself to
contracts made on the high seas. Contracts made in England (and, more
controversially, those made in foreign countries) were supposed to be
sued on at common law. The Admiralty enjoyed considerable popularity
in the mercantile community, however. It was probably common for
merchants to sue there when, strictly speaking, they ought not to, and for
the defendants to such suits to acquiesce in the court’s jurisdiction. When
the loser in an Admiralty suit came seeking a Prohibition, the unstated assumption may have been that he was a merchant who had been genuinely
willing for his quarrel to be settled in the Admiralty, until the smart of defeat drove him to investigate his common law rights and look for a way
out. In addition, though the Admiral might be out of his territory in adjudicating a contract made in Limehouse, there is every reason to presume
that he would be perfectly fair between merchant and merchant, perfectly
competent to discover the facts on which the majority of commercial disputes depend, and even an expert on technical aspects of the sorts of cases
likely to come before him. For many reasons, such presumptions could
not be made in the case of the ecclesiastical courts. There were far more
kinds of Prohibitions to ecclesiastical courts. More kinds of
people -- including poor, ignorant, and provincial ones -- passed through
the ecclesiastical courts. A man’s seeming-acquiescence in their jurisdiction might be much less conscious and intentional than that of an experi-
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enced merchant in Admiralty jurisdiction. Finally, the ecclesiastical
courts often sat as judges between laymen and the corporate interests of
the Church, for those corporate interests were involved with such private
ones as an individual clergyman’s claim to tithes. Though the etiquette of
a mixed judicial system required presuming that ecclesiastical judges
would handle cases within their jurisdiction fairly, a certain tacit suspicion of their objectivity -- an unstated assumption that the common law
was charged with protecting the layman qua layman, even in the face of
his own acquiescence -- may well have been present. Let us look first at
the Admiralty cases.
In Susans v. Turner (1597),1 which involved several questions about
the Admiral’s jurisdiction, the Common Pleas judges said it was their rule
not to grant Prohibitions to the Admiralty after sentence in the simplest
standard case: i.e., where a contract suit was brought in the Admiralty on
the pretense that the contract was made at sea and a Prohibition was
claimed on the surmise that the contract was actually made on land in
England. Jennings v. Audley (1611)2 presented a somewhat more complex situation. The plaintiff in the Admiralty sued on a contract which he
said was made in the Straits of “Mallico,” “within the jurisdiction of the
Admiral.” His libel did not say in so many words that the Straits were on
the high seas, but in effect expressed the conclusion that they were within
Admiralty jurisdiction. (As the law was, it did not follow automatically
from the fact that something was done on a ship riding on the water that it
was done on the high seas, because rivers, harbors, and “territorial waters” were regarded as land, English or foreign. By the controversial but
prevailing common law theory, things done on land in a foreign country
were not within Admiralty jurisdiction and were amenable to common
law trial.) In response to this case, the Court laid down a rule, but the application of the rule to the case is not made clear in the report. The rule
was as follows: (a) By merely pleading to the substance in the Admiralty
-- much less waiting on sentence -- an Admiralty-defendant admits the
court’s jurisdiction and debars himself from a Prohibition, provided the
Admiral’s lack of jurisdiction does not appear on the face of the libel.
1
2

M. 39/40 Eliz. C.P. Harl. 1631, f.272; Noy 68 (undated). Another MS., Add 25,199, f.7b, dated
40 Eliz. C.P., probably relates to the same case. At any rate, the same rule is stated as a dictum.
M. 9 Jac. C.P. 2 Brownlow and Goldesborough, 30.
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Thus, in our case, if the libel had said “At London in Middlesex within
the jurisdiction of the Admiral,” the lack of jurisdiction would appear on
the face of the libel, because nothing done at London could possibly be
within the Admiral’s jurisdiction -- or on the high seas. Quaere as to the
spectrum, which includes the principal case, where an element of judicial
notice of the facts of geography would be required: e.g. -- “At Madrid in
Spain within the jurisdiction of the Admiral -- (or ”on the high seas“)”;
“On the river Seine on the high seas (or within the jurisdiction of the Admiral)’’; “At Bordeaux (a notorious seaport) on the high seas.” My guess
would be that in none of these cases would the lack of jurisdiction be considered evident on the face -- i.e., that if the Admiralty defendant behaved
in such a way as to seem to admit that Madrid was some place in the middle of the ocean, the courts would take no account of their knowledge to
the contrary.
(b) If the lack of jurisdiction does appear on the face of the libel, a
Prohibition should be granted even though the Admiralty defendant has
waited until sentence has gone against him. I.e.: Ceteris paribus, waiting
for sentence is no more a sign of acquiescence, thus sentence is no more a
bar, than pleading to the substance. (There is no sign that a sentence was
involved in Jennings v. Audley, so that the second rule should be taken as
a dictum.)
There is another judicial statement from the same term as Jennings v.
Audley, in general language and without reported context;3 The Common Pleas held that as a matter of law it would grant Prohibitions to Admiralty suits based on contracts made in foreign countries (i.e., on land or
quasi on land), but if the Admiralty-defendant admits the jurisdiction and
suffers sentence to go against him (nothing said to suggest that merely
pleading constitutes acquiescence) Prohibitions will be refused, unless the
Admiral’s lack of jurisdiction appears on the face of the libel.

3

M. 9 Jac. C.P.

2 Brownlow and Goldesborough, 30. This report is stuck into the long account of
a completely unrelated case (Baxter v. Hopes). It could be a somewhat distorted version of
Jennings v. Audley and it could be another case.
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In Tourson v. Tourson (1614)4 Coke’s King’s Bench adopted the basic rule enunciated by the Common Pleas in the reports above and applied
it to the case at hand. Here, a contract suit was brought in the Admiralty
with the allegation that the contract was made “on the river of Lisbone”
(plus, presumably, explicit jurisdiction-giving language, such as “on the
high seas”). A Prohibition was sought on the ground that the “river of
Lisbone” was not legally on the high seas. Coke said that with the consent of his brethren he would apply the following rule and deny the Prohibition in the instant case: If the Admiralty suit is based on the pretense
that a contract was made on the high seas, and the Admiralty defendant
replies to the substance and a sentence is given (n.b. the “and”), a Prohibition will not be granted on the bare surmise that the place in question
was not on the high seas, unless that appears by the libel or (qualifying
the above opinions slightly) by writing or other “apparent matter.”
Coke’s unwillingness to grant the Prohibition in the instant case shows
that he would not make use of his knowledge that “the river of Lisbone”
was geographically related to Portugal in such a way as to be legally
“land.” To take advantage of that point -- i.e., to show how the river and
Portugal are in fact related and persuade the Court that in law the contract
was as good as made on Portuguese soil -- the Admiralty defendant
would have had to move before sentence. The only “brother” to speak in
Rolle’s report is Justice Houghton, who agreed with Coke. An undated
opinion in Coke’s reports,5 represented as per Curiam, might relate to
Tourson v. Tourson. It in any event gives essentially the same rule,
slightly softened. (Instead of saying a Prohibition will not be granted after sentence unless lack of jurisdiction appears by the libel or other solid
evidence, Coke’s report says the Court “will be advised” -- i.e., take it as
a matter of discretion whether to grant a Prohibition, be disinclined to
grant one unless a strong case can be made. Coke’s report is careful, also,
to prevent over-interpretation: An Admiralty-defendant, the report explains, cannot give jurisdiction -- i.e., common law courts are always legally free, within their discretion, to grant Prohibitions. The habit of
refusing them after sentence is a policy to prevent “vexation,” an habitual
way of using discretion, not an application of a rule of law.
4
5

M. 12 Jac. K.B. 1 Rolle, 80.
12 Coke, 77.
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A later Admiralty case6 raised a slightly different problem from that in
the foreign contract cases. Here, a group of sailors joined in an Admiralty
suit against the master of a ship for wages. After sentence, the master
sought a Prohibition on the ground that the wage contract was made on
land in England. It does not appear from the report whether the libel contained jurisdiction-giving language, such as “on the high seas,” or
whether, if such language was included, there was anything on the face of
the libel to show that it was patently fictitious. In denying a Prohibition,
the Common Pleas, in any event, gave no sign of concerning itself with
those features. Its motive was the nature of the suit. Eventually, the
courts were to except mariners’ suits for wages from the general rules
limiting Admiralty jurisdiction. I.e.: The Admiralty was allowed to entertain them even though the contract was manifestly made on land, because sailors were poor men, whose efforts to collect their wages should
not be delayed by legal wrangling, and whom Admiralty rules permitted
to join in a common suit, as they could not do at common law. In our
case, the Court relied expressly on the sentence and characterized refusing the Prohibition as an act of discretion. It justified the exercise of discretion, however, by the undesirability of depriving poor mariners of their
wages and the economy of a joint suit, not by discussing the degree to
which acquiescence in a fictitious or legally doubtful local allegation
ought, in general, to bar a Prohibition. A few further scraps of evidence
confirm the courts’ inclination to refuse Prohibitions when such acquiescence in the Admiral’s jurisdiction could be made out.7
6
7

P. 19 Jac. C.P. Winch, 8.
(a)
Hollmast’s Case.
Noy, 70.
Undated.
A barely reported per Curiam statement that
Prohibitions to the Admiralty or ecclesiastical courts (quaere as to the latter) will not be granted
after sentence.
(b) Don Diego Serviento v. Jolliff et al. Undated. Jac. C.P. Hobart, 78. The Court took pains to
point out that they were especially glad to grant a Prohibition -- which they strongly thought was
deserved on the merits -- because it was sought before any proceedings in the Admiralty and the
claim to a Prohibition depended solely on the libel.
The same report notes another case decided on the same day:
Watts et al. v. Villiers.
Prohibition denied because the claim that certain events happened on land was not advanced
until after sentence and nothing appeared on the face of the libel to show that it was on land.
(c) Somerset v. Markham. M. 39/40 Eliz. C.P. Croke Eliz., 595. This report contains a broad
affirmation of the barring effect of sentence with reference to ecclcsiastical courts. The cursorily
reported principal case seems to have involved an Admiralty suit where Prohibition was sought
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In closing this group of Admiralty cases, we may take brief note of a
parallel situation. Prohibitions were sometimes used to stop suits in courts
of equity -- either because a party had improperly resorted to such a court
when he could have sued at common law, or because someone was seeking an equitable remedy which the common law court regarded as intrinsically unjustifiable. Although the cases involving courts of equity are
not consistent, the doctrine appears among them that at least in some circumstances Prohibitions should not be granted after decree, albeit that
they would have been grantable before. Because relations between the
common law and equity -- as opposed to common law relations with the
more distinctly “foreign,” civilian-manned Admiralty and ecclesiastical
courts -- raise special problems, I shall defer such cases until taking up
Prohibitions to equity as a substantive topic. The point to note here is that
the common law courts were relatively inclined to treat equity decrees,
like Admiralty sentences, as bars to Prohibition -- relative, that is, to ecclesiastical sentences. Some, at least, of the reasons why Admiralty sentences were more effectual bars than ecclesiastical sentences may apply
to equity decrees. That question we shall take up later.

after sentence, but to have been complicated by an appeal.
below.

Cases so complicated are discussed

(d) Scarborough v. Justus Lyrus. Early Car. K.B. Latch, 252. Contains a general dictum by
Justice Jones, that Prohibition will not be granted after sentence on a surmise that the matter was
not done on the high seas. Sergeant Hitcham contradicted Jones, not flatly, but as if to say, “But
acquiescence in jurisdiction does not give jurisdiction.” That reminder accords with earlier
opinion. The principal case involved application for a Prohibition after sentence, but did not
really turn on the effect of sentence.
Rather, a Prohibition was refused because
plaintiff-in-Prohibition was seeking to introduce a substantive defense (not a claim going to the
Admiral’s local jurisdiction) which he could perfectly well have pleaded in the Admiralty.
Neglecting to assert a defense in a non-common law court and later trying to assert it through
Prohibition proceedings is related to acquiescence in an inappropriate jurisdiction, but as a
significantly different problem is dealt with elsewhere.
The relationship between the two
problems may explain the exchange between Jones and Hitcham: Hitcham (arguing for a
Prohibition) trying to establish a generally permissive rule which would justify a Prohibition
despite the party’s neglect of his opportunity in the Admiralty; Jones disputing such
permissiveness by reference to the courts’ readiness to refuse Prohibitions when there was any
sign of acquiescence in the jurisdiction.
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C.
Bare Sentence in an Ecclesiastical Court
Turning now to the ecclesiastical courts: There is little simple direct
authority on whether or not sentence should bar a Prohibition -- if not as a
strict matter of law, at least as an habitual exercise of discretion in the absence of strong contrary considerations. Several cases which in a sense
raised that question were complicated by an appeal (which could in theory either strengthen or weaken the claim to a Prohibition) or by a De excommunicato capiendo. (As to the latter: With a possible exception for
the High Commission, excommunication was the ultimate ecclesiastical
sanction. The ecclesiastical courts could order a man to do various
things, including payment of money, but if he disobeyed they could only
excommunicate him. They could not authorize taking his body or goods
in execution. Excommunication could, however, be translated into temporal sanctions. After a brief waiting period, upon due certification that
A. was excommunicated and unrepentant, the King’s writ De excommunicato capiendo would issue, pursuant to which A. could be imprisoned until the ecclesiastical judgment was satisfied.) The case against a
Prohibition might be decisively strengthened by translation of an ecclesiastical sentence into a common law record by De excommunicato capiendo.
The evidence from reports not complicated in either of those two ways
suggests that the courts never committed themselves firmly to lean
against Prohibitions after ecclesiastical sentence (unless they did so extrajudicially in Charles I’s reign). They were committed to lean that way in
Admiralty cases, while insisting that they were not bound to; in ecclesiastical cases, they probably would have insisted on their discretion to weigh
plaintiff-in-Prohibition’s delaying until after sentence against him, but
without any commitment as to what weight they would normally give it.
One cursory report, without context,8 shows a division over the effect of
sentence in the early- 17th-century Common Pleas. Justice Walmesley
said flatly that Prohibition will not lie after judgment in the ecclesiastical
court. He was sharply contradicted on that proposition by Chief Justice
8

P. 8 Jac. C.P. Harg. 52, f.43.
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Coke and Justice Daniel, who said they had a great deal of recent authority on their side. Another report from the same term9 has Coke laying
down a rule, with the concurrence of the rest of the Court: “...that after
sentence given in the Spiritual Court, he would not grant a prohibition, if
there were not matter apparent within the proceedings; for I shall not allow, that the party shall (to have a prohibition) shew any thing not
grounded on the sentence to have a prohibition, because he hath admitted
of the jurisdiction; and there is no reason for him to try if the Spiritual
Court will help him, and afterwards at the common law to sue forth a prohibition.” The context of this statement is not reported. (Coke’s remark is
appended to the full report of a case in which the Court did grant a Prohibition after sentence. In the principal case, however, a Prohibition would
not have been appropriate until after sentence. The reporter introduces
Coke’s speech with a “but” -- as if he were surprised at the result in the
principal case: “But Cook said, the same day in another case ....”)
Coke’s rule leaves a certain ambiguity. He clearly meant to exclude the
surmising of matter of fact outside the record by parties seeking Prohibitions after sentence. However, he expressly includes the sentence in the
record. That is obviously necessary for one type of situation (such as that
of the case to which the rule is appended): where there is no basis for a
Prohibition except an erroneous sentence. The ambiguity arises in another situation: Suppose a Prohibition could be obtained without going
outside the record before sentence, but the party waits until after sentence
to seek his Prohibition. Should he be barred for “admitting the jurisdiction,” or allowed his Prohibition on the total record (i.e., because it appears on the face of the libel that the ecclesiastical court lacked
jurisdiction -- which could have been shown earlier -- and because the
sentence shows that the ecclesiastical court did not refuse jurisdiction -whether or not asked to by the party)? Possibly Justice Walmesley’s concurrence with Coke on this rule argues for taking it in the stronger sense:
i.e., as erecting a bar to Prohibition whenever the party has failed to act as
soon as he might. In any event, Coke’s rule is stronger than a mere claim
of discretion to deny Prohibitions when there has been undue delay.
There are other cases which seem to go no further than such a claim of
discretion.

9

P. 8 Jac. C.P. Godbolt, 163 (Within the report of Candict v. Plomer)
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In one later case, 10 (the remark has no apparent context and the report
is somewhat garbled) Sergeant Harris at the Bar asserted what I take to be
the following rule: Ecclesiastical sentence should certainly not bar Prohibition if the sentence is given “suddenly” -- i.e., (presumably) without
giving the ecclesiastical defendant a fair chance to investigate his rights
and pursue a Prohibition. Otherwise, whether to give any weight to the
sentence is discretionary. Fotherlye’s Case (1627)11 provides a clear exposition of the Common Pleas’ attitude. It was said at the Bar in that case
that the Court’s “custom” was to deny Prohibitions after sentence. The
judges did not deny that that might be true in some sense, but Chief Justice Richardson was explicit on the limits of the “custom.” It is true, he
said, that Prohibitions should be sought in due time, “but that is in cases
which concern interest and rights which adonque [“then,” “after all” or
“long since”] are settled.” In other words (I take it), it is in the Court’s
discretion to refuse Prohibitions on account of a sentence, but that discretion should be used only to prevent a negligent party from reviving a dispute of some consequence which the other party was entitled to consider
long-settled. Fotherlye’s Case itself was a poor occasion to invoke the
“custom,” since, as in other cases to be noted below, a Prohibition would
hardly have been appropriate before sentence. Even the lawyer, Finch,
who invoked it leaned on the shaky additional argument that the sums involved in this dispute (concerning an intestate’s estate) were small -- as if
to say “Prohibitions should be denied after sentence so long as no one
will suffer very serious pecuniary damage thereby.” Richardson replied,
“ ...a greater or lesser sum will not change the law.”
Two reports from late in Charles I’s reign give a little more countenance to the view that ecclesiastical sentence should usually preclude a
Prohibition. As we shall see below, there are indications that the judges
committed themselves to such a policy extra-judicially in that reign. In
the first of these cases,12 a Prohibition was sought on a surmised modus
after sentence in the underlying tithe suit. It was denied because it was
sought “too late” (there is nothing to suggest that “too late” means any10
11
12

Baron v. Goose. P. 17 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5149, f.291b.
H. 2 Car. C.P. Littleton, 21.
M. 15 Car. K.B. March. 73.
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thing more than “after sentence.”) Rolle, arguing for the Prohibition at
the Bar, tried unsuccessfully to make a distinction on the basis of the
Court’s past practice. He conceded that a Prohibition should be denied if
a parishioner, being sued for tithes, fails to plead his modus in the ecclesiastical court and waits until sentence goes against him before seeking the
Prohibition; contra if he pleads his modus and then waits for sentence, as
in this case. In other words, double negligence should count against
plaintiff-in-Prohibition, but not the sentence by itself. (Subject to a little
dispute, a Prohibition could be obtained on a modus -- at least before sentence -- without pleading it in the ecclesiastical court and surmising that
the plea had been rejected.) The second report13 is just a note: Prohibitions should not be granted after sentence without “special cause” (no explanation of “special cause”).
In a third Caroline case, Dudley v. Crompton,14 the Common Pleas denied a Prohibition sought four years after sentence in a defamation suit.
The three puisne justices thought that Prohibition would lie if it had been
sought in time, Chief Justice Bankes disagreeing on the substance. The
exact meaning of “too late” is not expounded, but it is clear from the
puisne Justices’ words and tone that the four years moved them, rather
than the sentence as such. They were little short of scandalized to learn
that the ecclesiastical court had regarded the vague abuse in question as
legally defamatory; two of the three Justices thought in addition that the
sentence was cast in dangerously loose terms, so that a Prohibition specifically requiring retraction or non-execution of the sentence would be
justified. Waiting four years to protest being punished for one particular
scurrilous speech (probably by an order to apologize for the words or to
do some sort of penance, plus costs to the prosecuting party) is unconscionable. Refusal of the Prohibition was surely justified if the Court is
assumed to have any discretion at all. If the judges promised categorically to deny Prohibitions after sentence at the high moment of Laudian
power, this case shows that in 1642 they no longer felt obliged.

13
14

H. 16 Car. C.P. March, 92.
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D.
Appeals
Parallel and related to the last line of cases are those in which a Prohibition was sought after sentence and ecclesiastical appeal from that sentence. As argued above, an appeal could in theory alter the situation in
contrary ways: (a) On the assumption that appeal suspends sentence, a
suit pending on appeal may be regarded as prohibitable notwithstanding
any rule or policy against Prohibition after sentence. (b) The position of
plaintiff-in-Prohibition seems weakened by taking an appeal. One who
seeks a Prohibition pending his own appeal seem to have entrusted himself to the ecclesiastical system even more than one who has merely
waited until sentence and then turned to the common law. One who seeks
a Prohibition after the appeal is decided seems (aside from theories about
suspension) to have two sentences against him instead of one.
The earliest report involving an appeal15 is very brief -- a bare statement that it was adjudged that after sentence and appeal no Prohibition
will be awarded. Ayliffe v. Brown (1614)16 casts doubt on that generality. Here, a Prohibition was in fact denied on the ground that the plaintiff
had not only waited until after sentence and appeal, but until after the appeal was decided against him. The Court seems to stress the double sentence, as opposed to the first sentence and the mere taking of the appeal.
In addition, the Court went out of its way to show that it did not think
plaintiff-in-Prohibition had altogether clean hands, even though he would
probably have been entitled to a Prohibition at an earlier stage. (The
plaintiff was an executor seeking to stop a legacy suit on the ground that
there were possible debts outstanding against the estate. An executor was
not obliged to pay legacies until he was free from accountability for common law debts. The Court was cool toward the executor in this case because he had refused to give security for payment of the legacy if the
estate was sufficient, as the ecclesiastical court had apparently given him
the option of doing. The judges seem to have thought that that was a reasonable demand, possibly that it would have been reasonable at any stage.
The Court’s position may have been “We might not have granted a Prohi15
16

Sir George Carie’s Case. 40 Eliz. C.P. Add. 25,199, f.16b.
H. 11 Jac. C.P. Godbolt, 243.
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bition before the decision on appeal or even earlier, but after this much
delay we will not stop to consider the merits.”) It may also be relevant
that the decided appeal here was by the Delegates, the top of the ecclesiastical ladder. (The appeal must have gone directly there, because the
original court, as in many testamentary cases, was the Prerogative Court
of Canterbury.) The “faith and credit” given to a decision by the court of
last resort in the ecclesiastical system was conceivably greater than what
would have been given even to an appellate court below the summit. On
the whole, Ayliffe v. Brown counts for an open-discretion theory, rather
than a strict policy on the effect of sentence or appeal.
Brabin v. Trediman ( 16 18)17 goes much farther that way, for a Prohibition was granted after the first sentence had been twice appealed and
twice affirmed, the second time by the Delegates. Without going into the
somewhat involved facts of the case at this point: It seems clear that the
judges thought that the ecclesiastical handling of the case was especially
outrageous. The appeals were specifically relied on by the defendant, but
to no avail. A case from the last term (Dame Layton v. Hussey, not independently reported) was cited in support of the Court’s holding, as an example of a Prohibition granted despite appeal. Brabin v. Trediman could
be taken as authority for never paying attention to an appeal, but that is
probably unnecessarily strong. It certainly is authority against any duty to
give significant weight to appeals in the face of solid conviction that the
ecclesiastical courts were wrong. It would have been hard in this case to
argue that the Prohibition should have been sought before the first sentence. The case would therefore be compatible with the following rule:
To wait unnecessarily until sentence and then appeal seriously weakens
one’s claim to a Prohibition; but merely to appeal from a sentence one
was justified in waiting on does not weaken one’s claim, even after the
appeal is decided.
A further King’s Bench case,18 rather garbled in the report, leaves that
court well-short of making ecclesiastical appeals fatal to Prohibitions.
The Prohibition in this case was apparently undone by Consultation on
the ground that the party entitled to a Prohibition had “surceased his time”
17
18

T. 16 Jac. K.B. 2 Rolle, 24.
Churchwardens de ---. H . 20 Jac. K.B.

2 Rolle, 270.
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by bringing two ecclesiastical appeals. But as in Ayliffe v. Brown, this
reason was reinforced by other considerations: The suit was by churchwardens for a rate. By dragging the churchwardens through the ecclesiastical courts before trying to stop them by Prohibition, the rate-payer had
put the parish out sixty pounds, whereas the suit was only for six pounds.
The parish -- a public body responsible for various aspects of the community’s spiritual and temporal welfare -- was perhaps entitled to greater
consideration than a private litigant would have been. In addition, the
rate-payer seems to have taken an untenable legal position in the ecclesiastical court, so that his defeat there was more his own fault than the ecclesiastical judges’.
In Fartham v. Rudd,19 the late-Jacobean Common Pleas embraced the
same open-discretion attitude as the King’s Bench took in the preceding
cases. The Court was disinclined to grant a Prohibition after affirmation
of sentence on appeal in a defamation suit, but the judges limited their position carefully. They said they would have granted a Prohibition in the
instant case before sentence, or even after one sentence, as they had done
in a similar defamation case (Calthorp’s Case, not cited by date), but if
application for a Prohibition is delayed until after appellate sentence,
“then we are more wary, for it is a matter that rests in the discretion of the
Court, and so the Court will advise.” Note “will advise”: The judges
were only ready to think about denying the Prohibition. I imagine they
would consider just how intolerable the ecclesiastical decision seemed to
them. (It was one of those trivial-in-consequence but foolish holdings
that vague abuse was defamatory, a species of ecclesiastical decision
which the common law judges found hard to take.)
In the Caroline Dickes et uxor v. Brown,20 waiting for sentence and
taking an appeal was held against plaintiff-in-Prohibition, at least by Justice Dodderidge. Dodderidge’s remark to that effect is only incidentally
noteworthy, however, because the whole Court clearly agreed that the
claim to a Prohibition was bad on the merits. In Ward v. Cory,21 the de19
20
21

T. 22 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5148, f.44.
M. 1 Car. K.B. 3 Bulstrode, 314; Benloe, 139 (dated H. 1 Car.) and 170 (dated P. 2): Noy 77
(undated, sub. nom. Dixye v. Brown). Bulstrode is the good report.
P. 6 Car. K.B. Harg. 39, f.106.
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fendant in an ecclesiastical suit for defamation suffered sentence to go
against him, appealed, and then sought a Prohibition. The Court was in
doubt about the merits and adjourned the case. But the judges expressly
agreed that the sentence and appeal would not bar the Prohibition. In
Reynolds v. Dr. Lockett22 on the other hand, the Common Pleas rested
denial of a Prohibition solely on the fact that the plaintiff had appealed
twice -- i.e., had a first-instance sentence plus one appellate sentence
against him and an appeal to the Delegates pending. The surmise was
that the parson suing for tithes was not truly incumbent, being automatically deprived for failure to read the articles as required by 13 Eliz., c.
12, and that the ecclesiastical court had refused to admit a plea to that effect. The Court clearly and unanimously held that Prohibition lay on the
merits, but nevertheless denied the writ. In Pew et uxor v. Jeffryes, 23
from the same year as the last case, the King’s Bench also showed respect
for ecclesiastical sentence and appeal, though only with supporting effect.
The case was tangled in ways we need not go into here. Once the tangles
were straightened out, the Court was more than inclined to deny a Prohibition on the merits. It actually did so with the observation that a Prohibition was especially inadvisable here, where the ecclesiastical sentence
had been affirmed once on appeal and appealed again. The plaintiff-inProhibition’s delay was only used to overcome a shadow of doubt (as to
whether allegedly defamatory slang could be understood in such a way as
to put the language clearly within ecclesiastical jurisdiction -- a problem
both tricky and trivial).
A couple of cases from Charles I’s reign raise the question of the effect
of sentence and appeal in special ways. In Smith v. Executors of Poyndreill 24 the Common Pleas refused a Prohibition sought too late, but in a
manner that strongly confirms the cases pointing to a “rule of discretion.”
Despite the result, this case is in a sense especially favorable to Prohibitions, for the only reason to prohibit at all was a statutory rule regulating
traffic within the ecclesiastical system. 23 Hen. 8, c.9, protected people
against being sued in ecclesiastical courts other than those of the diocese
they lived in. The act was frequently enforced by Prohibitions. The ec22
23
24

H. 12 Car. C.P. Harg. 23, f.4.
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clesiastical defendant could have a Prohibition on the surmise that he was
being sued in the wrong diocese. It is arguable that Prohibitions sought
solely on that ground should have been refused after sentence, not to
mention appeal; for the rule was purely local and intra-ecclesiastical. A
presumption of acquiescence in the “wrong court’s” jurisdiction is most
likely to be harmless when there is nothing to choose between the law and
procedure of the wrong court and the right one. One bare note in a MS.
report gives it as a Common Pleas rule that Prohibitions on 23 Hen. 8 will
not be granted after ecclesiastical sentence.25 In Smith v. Executors, the Court
declined to enforce the statute. It did so, however, in the full light of exacerbating circumstances. The ecclesiastical suit was fairly trivial -- for a ten
pound legacy. Instead of suing in the executors’ home diocese as he should
have, the legatee sued in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury. After losing
there, the executors appealed to the Delegates, who affirmed the sentence
and assessed costs. The executors were subsequently excommunicated for
failing to carry out the sentence. After that much delay, the Court
thought, the executors had lost their right to a Prohibition. Even so, an additional ground was relied on: The executors had themselves proved the
will in the Prerogative Court. They were probably quite entitled to do so,
since the Prerogative Court had probate jurisdiction when the estate was
of a certain size and its property scattered over more than one diocese.
The Court’s point was that the legatee had a certain excuse for suing in
the wrong court to start with -- a certain right to assume that the executors
would not object to having all litigation about the will in the probate
court. The executors’ behavior had strongly confirmed that assumption.
One undated report,26 relating to a special problem confirms what
most of the cases above show: that appeal, even decided appeal, only influenced the courts’ discretion, and that in a fairly marginal way. The report states a rule, as follows: When a party entitled to a Prohibition loses
in the ecclesiastical court and appeals from the sentence, he may still have
his Prohibition, not only quoad the suit, but also quoad costs assessed by
25
26

H. I5 Jac. C.P.
mistake for 23.
Noy, 137.

Harl. 5 149, f.93b.

The report reads “32” Hen.8, but I think that must be a
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the ecclesiastical judge of first instance. In one way this rule makes
sense: If the ecclesiastical court has no jurisdiction, and if waiting until
after sentence is neither strictly nor as a strong discretionary habit a bar to
Prohibition, why should the party “in the right” pay costs? But two arguments can be made contra: (a) Liability for costs would be a fair penalty
for failing to seek a Prohibition before sentence, assuming the Prohibition
remains grantable. A fortiori when the delay extends beyond the moment
of sentence, until after costs have been assessed and until one has brought
an appeal. (b) The statute of 32 Hen. 8, c.7, required the ecclesiastical
judge of first instance to assess costs notwithstanding any appeal from his
sentence. By the statute, the winner at the original level was not to wait
until the appeal was settled in his favor to have a judgment for costs.
(The reason for that provision was clearly to prevent a just winner from
being kept from his costs while successive appeals were brought frivolously, only to prevent the winner from collecting until a remote time
when the costs might no longer be recoverable. If the original sentence
was reversed on appeal, the winner below would presumably be liable for
the costs of the appeal plus the costs recovered earlier.) To reverse the
judgment for costs, as well as the sentence, by Prohibition would be to
undo what the ecclesiastical judge had done by way of fulfilling his statutory duty, as well as what he ought not to have done, and it was the
party’s delay in seeking a Prohibition that caused him to do his statutory
duty. Noy’s report suggests that this second argument troubled the
judges, for they announced their rule “notwithstanding” 32 Hen.8. The
rule strongly favors Prohibitions “notwithstanding” the party’s delay and
seeming-acquiescence in ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

E.
De Excommunicato Capiendo
A group of four reports, all from the same term, introduces the further
complication of a De excommunicato capiendo. The abstract question is
whether issuance of that “temporal” writ against the loser in an ecclesiastical court will invariably bar him from a Prohibition, whether or not any
“spiritual” event (sentence, appeal, decided appeal, excommunication itself) would have that effect. The reports, however, present problems of
reconstruction and reconciliation. Although three of them may relate to
the same case, I shall consider them one by one. (a) One report, labeled
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Cope’s Case27 does not recite the facts, but gives the opinions of three
judges, as follows: Chief Justice Coke with the concurrence of Justice
Warbarton, said that a Prohibition should never be awarded, whatever the
merits, after an ecclesiastical loser is “taken” by De excommunicato capiendo. Coke thought it illogical that a Prohibition -- whose nature is to
stop the ecclesiastical courts from proceeding -- should be issued after the
ecclesiastical courts had “proceeded as far forth as they can” and the
party had been handed over by matter of record to the temporal courts.
Justice Foster disagreed. He admitted that there was authority (from the
Register of Writs) against Prohibition after De excommunicato capiendo.
He apparently thought, however, that the rule was not invariable and that
the example in the Register was somehow different from the present case.
(Without more information, I cannot reconstruct his point in substance.)
(b) The second report28 gives every sign of relating to the same judicial discussion. This one gives the case: A man was sued in the wrong
diocese and therefore could have had a Prohibition by force of 23 Hen.8.
But he neglected to seek one until after sentence had gone against him
and a De excommunicato capiendo had been issued. Coke and Warbarton
said that they could simply find no authority in favor of Prohibitions after
De excommunicato capiendo. At the same time, they emphasized that ecclesiastical sentence as such is no bar, despite some ancient authority to
the contrary. Coke went on to qualify the latter point by a distinction
seemingly different from the one he made elsewhere: viz. that Prohibitions should not be granted after sentence when the ecclesiastical court’s
lack of jurisdiction appears on the face of the libel, contra when it does
not. (The distinction makes sense and is not really inconsistent with
Coke’s view above -- that Prohibitions should not be granted after sentence on matter of fact outside the record. There were three basic types of
claim to a Prohibition. (i) Where all the plaintiff need do is show the libel. (ii) Where the libel shows that the suit originally belonged in the ecclesiastical court, but subsequent pleading or the ecclesiastical judge’s
interlocutory handling of the case raises the right to a Prohibition. (iii)
Where out-of-court facts are surmised. Coke may well have thought that
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134

Self-foreclosure
sentence should be a bar in cases (i) and (iii), but not in case (ii). If a man
should know his right to a Prohibition the moment he is informed of the
libel against him, he is relatively without excuse in delaying. If he should
know his right only at a later stage, he is relatively justified in waiting until sentence, even though ideally he ought to move more quickly. The
time between the accrual of the right and sentence might be brief, and it
would be very awkward for the common-law court to inquire in each case
whether the party moved quickly enough.) Finally, Coke gives an indication of regarding Prohibitions on 23 Hen. 8 as a special case -- as if to
say, “Although sentence as such is not always a bar to Prohibition, and
even if De Excommunicato capiendo were not a bar, Prohibitions sought
solely on the ground that the suit is in the wrong ecclesiastical court
should not be granted after a sentence.” His words are: “...in this case it
may be that at the time of the judgment pronounced he was dwelling in
the diocese in which he was sued, for it is a transitory thing.” I.e., (I take
it): For the reasons I state above, Prohibitions based on a “merely local
and intra-ecclesiastical rule” are a special case -- the more so (Coke adds)
because local facts change. A man might be sued in the wrong diocese
originally, neglect his Prohibition for a time, then, before sentence, move
to the diocese in which he was sued. Would it not be absurd in those circumstances to undo a perfectly valid sentence by Prohibition and force
the ecclesiastical winner to start all over again in exactly the same court?
Justice Foster disagreed with Coke and Warburton “vehementer.” Just
how many of their several points he disputed is unclear, but he plainly
controverted the other judges on De excommunicato capiendo. To
Coke’s point that Prohibition after that writ was without warrant in the
books, Foster said, “First command the Bishop to absolve him, inasmuch
as it appears that he was unjustly vexed.” I would construe this as saying:
“It is perfectly possible to proceed against the spiritual authorities and
force retraction of the excommunication, despite the De excommunicato
capiendo. Of course issuance of that writ in a sense takes the matter out
of ecclesiastical hands, and of course a Prohibition cannot undo the De
excommunicato capiendo. If the party is in jail by virtue of it, he will
have to look for some way of getting out. The thing we can do to help is
see that the wrongful excommunication is reversed, and the existence of
the De excommunicato capiendo is irrelevant as far as our inherent power
to do that is concerned.”
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From this report and the last one, it may be safely concluded that the
majority of the divided Common Pleas opposed Prohibition after De excommunicato capiendo. Justice Walmesley would surely have agreed
with Coke and Warburton, for he was more inclined than any other member of the Court to consider sentence by itself a bar.
(c) The third report29 is distinctly different. Without stating the case,
it gives the following rule as a per totam Curiam holding: If a man is
sentenced in the ecclesiastical court, then De excommunicato capiendo
issues, then he appeals, he may have a Prohibition because the appeal
suspends the sentence. In none of the cases involving appeals above is
there any sign of the “suspension” doctrine. This report alone lends it
countenance in the context of the barring effect of sentence. The rule
here is especially strong, because of the De excommunicato capiendo.
For it might be argued that, although the appeal suspends the sentence,
the De excommunicato capiendo still bars Prohibition by “taking the matter out of ecclesiastical hands,” or erecting a common law record to which
a Prohibition would be repugnant. In addition, the party seems relatively
at fault when, besides waiting on sentence, he delays his appeal (i.e., assuming the “suspension” doctrine, fails to take prompt advantage of the
means to have a Prohibition despite the sentence) until the further inconvenience of a De excommunicato capiendo has descended on him.
(d) The final report30 is labelled “King’s Bench,” so despite the coincidence of date it must relate to a different case from those above. It is
very brief -- a mere noted rule in general terms that Prohibition may not
be granted after De excommunicato capiendo.
Allowing for the difficulty of putting the reports on De excommunicato capiendo together coherently, and taking the cases on ecclesiastical
sentences as a group, perhaps the main point to observe is that Coke was
relatively ready to close doors to Prohibitions by seeing self-foreclosure
or acquiescence in at least some circumstances. He was relatively inclined to consider self-foreclosure as a formal category -- to elaborate dis29
30
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tinctions as to when it should and should not take effect and to frame such
distinctions as rules of law. The more typical judicial attitude was to regard Prohibitions as grantable whenever they were deserved on the merits, and then on occasion to deny them, when in the court’s discretion the
plaintiff had behaved very irresponsibly.

F.
Miscellaneous Forms of Self-foreclosure
Alongside cases on the foreclosing effect of sentence, appeal, and De
excommunicato capiendo, we may consider a few more in which other
acts and omissions by the party substantively entitled to a Prohibition
were discussed as possible grounds for denying the writ. These cases are
all different from each other. As a group, they confirm the courts’ disposition to grant Prohibitions even though the plaintiff had neglected his interests.
In a case of 1605,31 the plaintiff was entitled to a Prohibition because
the land with respect to which tithes were sued for was exempt as recently
reclaimed waste. An unsuccessful attempt was made to block him on the
ground that he had confessed the libel before seeking the Prohibition.
The brief report does not explain exactly what “confessing the libel” involved. The man had probably not paid his tithes, then, sued for them,
had in ignorance admitted they were due as alleged. Subsequently, he
probably discovered the statutory exemption for reclaimed land. To deny
the Prohibition in such circumstances would be a pretty harsh application
of the presumption that every man knows the law. One who contested an
ecclesiastical suit might do so because de facto he did not know his right
to a Prohibition, but the very fact that he made a legal fight suggests that
he was advised by at least an ecclesiastical lawyer -- that he felt the claim
against him was invalid and bestirred himself to oppose it, in which case
it was his responsibility to discover all his rights, to look into the common
law as well as the ecclesiastical law. A poor man, guilty as sin of neglecting the parson, might well come and “confess the libel” without the
slightest idea that he had a defense. Insofar as pleading to the ecclesiasti-
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cal suit (and even waiting on sentence) were not generally fatal to Prohibitions, “confessing the libel” certainly should not have been.
In a later,32 much more inexcusable negligence was held against a
plaintiff-in-Prohibition. Here, a man got his Prohibition in plenty of time.
He failed, however, to serve it on the ecclesiastical court and the adverse
party. It would seem that his omission was deliberate, for after losing in
the ecclesiastical court he himself appealed. Then, after a lapse of two
terms, he served the Prohibition. The King’s Bench held that he had “surceased his time” and therefore could not take advantage of his Prohibition
(i.e., instigate the proceedings which followed when a Prohibition was
disobeyed, whereby defendant-in-Prohibition was attached and required
to contest the Prohibition formally, ostensibly to justify his disobedience).
The decision was surely right, for the plaintiff was, at best, grossly negligent. More realistically, he was gambling on the ecclesiastical courts in
preference to litigating over the Prohibition at common law. (His conduct
is most intelligible on the assumption that his Prohibition was shaky.)
One who gets his Prohibition in time obviously knows his common
law rights -- ignorance thereof could not explain his failure to serve the
Prohibition, whatever inadvertence or craftiness does explain it. On the
other hand, one who merely fails to seek a Prohibition at a reasonably
early stage might be ignorant of his rights, though of course he might alternatively be either speculating on the ecclesiastical outcome or simply
negligent. Because of this difference, the failure-to-serve case seems
stronger than the standard sentence or sentence-cum- appeal cases. So by
implication the Court held. It qualified its rule in one way, however:
Suppose a man gets a Prohibition, fails to serve it, and also fails to appear
and plead in the ecclesiastical court. Suppose that the ecclesiastical court
consequently excommunicates him for failure to appear -- i.e., does not
give sentence on the matter, but uses excommunication as a sanction to
enforce attendance. In that event, the judges said, the man may take advantage of his Prohibition. The difference makes sense: In this case, as
well as the principal one, failure to serve the Prohibition is negligent. But
failing to serve and going on to contest the ecclesiastical suit, as in the
32
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principal case, bespeaks acquiescence -- i.e., waiting to see which way the
ecclesiastical cat will jump. Non-appearance bespeaks the opposite, improper though it is to take it upon oneself to stay away simply because
one has a Prohibition in one’s pocket. The judges thought that that impropriety would be too severely punished by, in effect, quashing the Prohibition. A more generous attitude toward ecclesiastical courts and
ecclesiastical plaintiffs than the common law judges typically showed
might have led to the opposite conclusion.
Coffe and Wollston v. Town of Shrewsbury33 provides an example of
the “open discretion’’ theory of the judicial power to refuse Prohibitions.
On the complicated merits of that case, the Court clearly thought that a
Prohibition should be granted. Chief Justice Hobart, however, favored
withholding the Prohibition “in discretion” because he was convinced that
the plaintiff’s behavior had been dilatory and his motives vexatious. The
exact grounds for his suspicion are not clear from the report. Hobart said
that the plaintiff had “been in the Chancery and Arches and in the Court
of Requests; and the Prohibition is solely for vexation.” Presumably that
means that the plaintiff had tried unsuccessfully to get a Prohibition elsewhere and also tried to make his point in an ecclesiastical court (the
Arches), instead of going directly to a major common law court as soon
as he thought he was entitled to a Prohibition. Also, the plaintiff’s claim
was based in part on what seemed off-hand a technically correct but unusual and rarefied contention, whereas his object was only to escape a
church-rate. Hobart probably wanted to avoid a thorny legal debate in a
suit of slight material consequence and was therefore ready to look for a
discretionary basis for denying the Prohibition. The rest of the Court
would not go along with Hobart, however, so that the Prohibition was finally granted. Justice Hutton, who directly answered Hobart’s plea for a
discretionary approach, was moved by the consideration that part of the
plaintiff‘s claim was not rarefied, but a standard ground for Prohibition.
The report as a whole does not count against the “open discretion” theory
as such, but against straining it to deny Prohibitions when the plaintiff has
behaved questionably.

33
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Standard cases on sentence, etc., ask whether a plaintiff entitled to a
Prohibition may foreclose himself. In Gilby v. william,34 the King’s
Bench did not think the plaintiff was entitled to a Prohibition on the merits. His delay in seeking one was used against him in another way, however. The plaintiff had waited on ecclesiastical sentence, appealed, and
lost again at the appellate level. Then he sought a Prohibition on grounds
the judges thought insufficient. They might, however, have granted the
Prohibition in order to permit adversary debate on the merits, for the other
party was not represented at the hearing on the surmise. That was probably urged as the proper course, and it probably would have been in normal circumstances. In this case, the Court thought the plaintiff‘s delay
destroyed any right he might otherwise have to a provisional Prohibition,
pending formal pleading or motion for Consultation by the other party.
The Prohibition was simply denied after the plaintiff had had his chance
to argue for it ex parte.
Standard cases ask whether the ecclesiastical loser may have a Prohibition when he has unnecessarily waited to lose before seeking one. In
Barkham v. Woode,35 the shoe was on the other foot. A parson sued a
parishioner for tithes. The parishioner pleaded in the ecclesiastical court
that the land was recently reclaimed waste and therefore exempt by the
statute. The ecclesiastical court gave judgment for the parishioner -- i.e.,
that the land was exempt for the reason alleged. The parson appealed.
Then, to halt the appeal, the parishioner sought the Prohibition he could
have had as soon as the ecclesiastical suit was started. The Prohibition
was denied, “since he has sentence for him and the other appeals only to
reverse it, which is just. For the appeal is on the old libel and therefore if
erroneous sentence is given it is fit to be reformed.” To put it another
way: If I have acquiesced in the ecclesiastical court’s jurisdiction to the
extent of contesting the suit, when I win my mouth is surely stopped to
dispute the jurisdiction for the purpose of cutting off the other party’s appeal -- an appeal that may perfectly well be justified. (Here, it is perfectly
possible that the first ecclesiastical court misdetermined the factual question whether or not the land was recently reclaimed -- the same question
34
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that would probably be litigated over at common law if the Prohibition
were granted. Realistically, to grant the Prohibition would amount to
transferring the litigation to the common law -- thus adding to the expenses of the parson, who did no wrong in suing in the ecclesiastical
court to start with and was in no way discouraged by the parishioner from
the steps he took there, including the appeal. Suppose, however, that the
appellate courts were to reverse the sentence. Should the parishioner then
have his Prohibition? In other words: Compare A., who wins in the ecclesiastical court of first instance, then loses when his adversary appeals,
then seeks a Prohibition, with B., who seeks a Prohibition either after losing in the original court or after losing both there and on his own appeal.
Is A.’s claim weakened, relative to B.’s, by his having won once? Another problem arises if we imagine a case turning purely on a question of
law, as the principal case is unlikely to have done: X. sues Y. in an ecclesiastical court, and Y. wins because the ecclesiastical court resolves in his
favor a question on law solely within common law competence. Should
Y. have a Prohibition to cut off X.’s appeal, with the effect of bringing
the legal issue into proper hands? The main reason for raising these
speculative questions is to emphasize that Barkham v. Woode, which is
unique of its type, does not resolve them.)
Our last case comes from the Civil War period. 36 Here, a Prohibition
was sought to a borough court (the Corporation of Lincoln), rather than a
“foreign court”, such as the ecclesiastical courts or Admiralty. (Prohibitions from superior courts of common law to inferior ones -- such as the
borough court with franchisal jurisdiction here-were perfectly appropriate, though few cases of that sort or problems of consequence arising
from them are reported.) The surmise was local -- that the cause of action
“if any were” arose outside the circumscribed jurisdiction of Lincoln. It
was urged against the Prohibition that the party seeking it had admitted
Lincoln’s jurisdiction by pleading there (only pleading, not waiting for
judgment). In a case of this sort, where there was no problem of “crossing legal systems,” inferring acquiescence in the jurisdiction from the
minimum basis -- pleading to the merits -- seems justified. However, the
judges were hesitant to do so, and their remarks by the way are of some
interest. On one hearing of the case, only Justice Rolle spoke. Off-hand,
36
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he thought that Lincoln should be prohibited if it was outside its jurisdiction, pleading or no pleading. On the other hearing, Justice Bacon spoke
and Rolle spoke again. Bacon made a surprising distinction between
“foreign” courts and the inferior common law court here. Without explaining his thoughts, he favored the Prohibition in this case despite the
party’s pleading but said that “had it been the Spiritual Court or the Admiralty, it had been otherwise.” Rolle replied that there was no difference
between such non-common law courts and the borough court here. In
either case, he thought, courts exceeding their jurisdiction should be prohibited. At the same time, he thought it “mischievous to grant a prohibition in this case, for thereby many judgments will be stopped.” The
Justices accordingly adjourned the case for advisement. Nothing more is
heard of it. It is noteworthy that one Parliamentary judge, Bacon, was
readier to infer acquiescence in “foreign” jurisdiction than most earlier
judges would have been. The secularization of what remained of ecclesiastical jurisdiction may be reflected in that instinct. On the other hand, in
somewhat different ways the two judges adhered to the tradition of seeing
a public interest in jurisdictional lines -- an interest the neglectfulness or
acquiescence of private parties could not compromise.

G.
Prohibition Inappropriate until after Sentence.
The cases discussed so far in this section have been simple in form. In
most of them, a man properly informed of his rights could clearly have
obtained a Prohibition at point x. In a loose or “moral” sense, he should
have (if he proposed to seek a Prohibition at all). But he waited until a
later point, y, to seek a Prohibition. The question was whether the gap between x and y, or the particular character of the party’s acts and omissions
within that gap, should destroy his right to a Prohibition at point y. A
number of cases bearing on the effect of an ecclesiastical sentence on
Prohibition proceedings cannot be reduced to that formula. To those
cases we now turn. They go to illustrate the complexity of meshing the
common law and ecclesiastical systems, and hence to show the impossibility of any such inclusive rule as “Prohibitions must always be sought
before the ecclesiastical court gives sentence in a prohibitable suit.” The
courts’ refusal to admit such a rule categorically for simple cases may reflect the impossibility of universalizing it.
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In Lady Lodge's case,37 an executor waited a long time before trying
to stop a legacy suit, for he made his move only after the sentence against
him had been affirmed by the Delegates on appeal. His delay was not
held against him, if indeed that was urged. From the reporter's careful
specification of the facts, I am inclined to think that relevance was attached to the delay, though in counsel's arguments as cursorily reported it
is not relied on. The substantive complexities of this case are too great to
work through fully at this point. Basically: A. made a will with B. as executor and died. B. made C. his executor and died. C. was sued by A.'s
legatee, not straightforwardly, but by way of executing a sentence for the
legacy already given against B. C.'s real point was that he never had any
property from A.'s estate (because B. had conveyed it away), hence that
he could not be held to pay A.'s legacies. The mere lack of funds from
the appropriate estate was perfectly assertable in the ecclesiastical court -i.e., no basis for a Prohibition. C.'s right to a Prohibition depended entirely on his claim that the ecclesiastical court had passed on the validity
of B.'s conveyance, a question that the common law was solely competent to decide. In short, the case comes down to a common type: A suit
unquestionably within the ecclesiastical court's jurisdiction is brought
there, but it turns out that the suit cannot be settled except by determining
an "incidental" question solely within common law jurisdiction. As we
shall see in Vol. II, that situation presented a substantive problem, since it
was arguable that jurisdiction over the "principal" engendered jurisdiction
over the "incident." However, that argument was unsuccessful as a generality, for Prohibitions were often used to make sure that the common
law courts settled common law issues incidental to ecclesiastical suits.
With respect to delays through sentence, or through sentence and appeal,
such cases raise a special problem. In the present case as I have schematized it, there was presumably a point short of sentence at which C. knew
that the inappropriate question of B.'s conveyance was before the ecclesiastical court. That is to say, he could have sought his Prohibition earlier.
But should he have? Could he be reasonably expected to? Would it have
been the most useful thing to do? Speaking generally: In "principal-incident" cases it was likely to be unclear before sentence whether the ecclesiastical court would consider the inappropriate "incidental" question
37
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relevant for its decision. An ecclesiastical court hardly seems to exceed
its jurisdiction if, being confronted with an issue beyond its competence,
it concludes that it can decide the case without resolving that question one
way or the other. Even if it does treat the common law issue as relevant,
and therefore pass judgment beyond its competence, it may of course decide it in such a way that neither party thinks the common law would do
anything different -- in which case further proceedings could be avoided.
For these reasons, it is perhaps better to tolerate or encourage waiting on
sentence and even trying an appeal. The rule would be: At least when
the party so times his moves as to make it possible, keep the common law
courts out of the case until it is quite clear that the ecclesiastical courts
have in fact decided a question beyond their competence against plaintiffin-Prohibition -- then whether they decided correctly or not may be debated pursuant to the Prohibition. In Lady Lodge's Case, itself, it may
have been unusually baffling whether determination of the common law
issue (the validity of the conveyance) was going to be an essential ingredient in the ecclesiastical court's decision, because behind the sentence
against the plaintiff-in-Prohibition (C. in the schema) was the earlier sentence against B., into which the validity of the conveyance may or may
not have entered. In the event, the Court thought that the ecclesiastical
court had -- or was likely to have -- determined a question beyond its jurisdiction, so that the Prohibition was granted.
But the Court immediately issued a partial Consultation in order to
protect the legatee against loss of any rights he might have independent of
the disputed conveyance. The flexible solution arrived at did justice to
both parties. A rigid requirement that Prohibitions be sought at the earliest possible moment would have resulted in injustice to the executor, for
he would have been stuck with liability for the legacy when he probably
had nothing from the estate out of which it was bequeathed. Whether he
ought to have had property from that estate, or was in a position to recover such property, depended on a "common law issue" which he could
not fairly have been expected to raise before it was clear that the ecclesiastical court was going to hold him liable.
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In Bagnall v. Stokes,38 waiting until after sentence was positively encouraged. Here, an executor was sued for a legacy. His substantive defense was that the legatee had made him a release. However, he had only
one witness to prove the release. Ecclesiastical rules generally required
that matters of fact be proved by at least two witnesses. Prohibitions
were frequently issued to prevent that evidentiary rule from being applied. In this case, the executor surmised the release and the fact that he
had only one witness, but he did not surmise that he had pleaded the release and unsuccessfully offered to prove it by one witness in the ecclesiastical court. As we shall see, it was problematic in cases of this sort
whether one needed to allege such an unsuccessful attempt in order to obtain a Prohibition. The Court in this case thought that an unsuccessful
proffer needed to be surmised, and therefore that Prohibition did not at
present lie. The Court said, however, that this decision was no mischief to
the plaintiff because he could have a Prohibition after sentence if necessary. The plaintiff was not told to go plead his release and proffer his
proof, then seek a Prohibition at once if the proof was ruled insufficient
(Prohibitions were commonly sought at that point in such cases). Rather,
he was told to wait on sentence.
The advice makes sense in two ways: (a) A rule requiring application
for a Prohibition at an interlocutory stage would be hard to enforce because of the unpredictable speed at which sentence might follow an adverse ruling on a plea or evidence. I.e.: Suppose a man seeks a
Prohibition after sentence on the ground that the two-witness rule was the
cause of his losing. Assume a rule that waiting avoidably until after sentence will always bar Prohibition. Then the common law court would
have to investigate the actual chronology of events in the ecclesiastical
court to ascertain whether the gap between rejection of the evidence and
sentence was large enough to allow reasonable time for instituting Prohibition proceedings -- a cumbrous and unnecessary task.
(b) The final effect of ecclesiastical insistence on the two-witness rule
might be unpredictable. Suppose proof by one witness is offered and rejected. How certain is it that the party offering such proof will lose? That
38
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depends on his other defenses, and even on the stringency with which the
two-witness rule is ultimately enforced. (I am not sure about this, but inclined to think that ecclesiastical courts may sometimes have overruled
pleas unsupported by a proffer of two witnesses, then later relented if
documentary or circumstantial evidence was brought in to back up a single witness.) The advantage of waiting for sentence is that then one
knows who has lost and can relieve him if he has possibly lost as a result
of an inappropriate ruling by the ecclesiastical court. The disadvantage is
that then the dependence of the sentence on the inappropriate ruling either
has to be gone into or assumed, possibly contrary to fact. The advantage
of encouraging (if not requiring) parties to seek Prohibitions at an interlocutory stage is that the factual common law issue, if disputed -- in Bagnall v. Stokes, whether or not the release was made -- could be settled at
common law before the ecclesiastical court has been permitted to go on.
By going on, it would at least waste its time, at worst create a complicated
problem about the "cause" of the sentence. (It is incidentally noteworthy
that in Bagnall v. Stokes a Consultation was issued. I.e.: The executor
got a Prohibition without consideration, so that when the Court got
around to deciding that the Prohibition was inappropriate a Consultation
had to be granted. No one suggested that 50 Edw. 3 would stand in the
way of a new Prohibition after sentence. Cf. Lady Denton v. Earl of
Clanrickard above.)
In a late-Jacobean legacy case, 39 the K.B. positively insisted on having
a sentence before granting a Prohibition. An executor sought a Prohibition on two grounds: (a) Because the ecclesiastical court refused to let
him rely on a sealed acquittance for the legacy. (The refusal was allegedly because the witnesses to the acquittance were dead -- an especially
indefensible evidentiary ruling, as the King's Bench judges clearly
thought.) (b) Because, apart from the acquittance, the ecclesiastical court
made what the executor claimed was an egregious legal error in holding
him liable at all. (We may defer the substance of this complex problem
until Vol. II.) The executor surmised that the ecclesiastical court had
given sentence against him, the sentence being founded on those two errors. The King's Bench, however, declined to grant a Prohibition until
39
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the sentence was shown -- i.e., until its exact content was certified to the
Court. Without having scrutinized the sentence for themselves, two of
the three judges who speak in the report (Dodderidge and Chamberlain)
were disposed to favor a Prohibition, while the third (Houghton) was disposed to deny it. Their difference was over the fundamental question,
raised in a complicated form by the double surmise, whether Prohibitions
could legitimately be used to control the behavior of ecclesiastical judges
when the suit as such was proper to their jurisdiction. The Justices
agreed, however, that no Prohibition should be granted until the sentence
was known to them in its exact terms. If they were going to prohibit -possibly dividing the Court on a major issue -- they wanted to be as sure
as they could that the sentence did in fact depend on intolerable error.
This case is at the opposite extreme from those in which sentence was
discussed as a possible bar to Prohibition. It presents the kind of situation
in which insistence on seeking a Prohibition before sentence would have
been least feasibIe. The executor here could have turned to the common
law as soon as his acquittance was unreasonably excluded -- but then he
had another wholly independent defense fully assertable in the ecclesiastical court (i.e., without inviting the ecclesiastical court to pass on an issue
solely within common law competence). He could have sought a Prohibition on his second ground the moment he was sued, for that claim
amounted to total non-liability to one in the position of the party suing
him -- but then if that party had acquitted him voluntarily and the ecclesiastical court allowed him to use his acquittance, the difficult legal point
raised by the second ground need never come up. If he had sought a Prohibition the moment he was sued, relying solely on the second ground -i.e., simply suppressing the acquittance -- he probably should have been
turned down, for there would at that point have been every reason to predict that he would win in the ecclesiastical court. In other words, although the ecclesiastical court may in the event have committed so
egregious an error on a question within its competence that it deserved to
be prohibited, one does not assume in advance that a court will take leave
of its senses.
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Partlet v. Butler40 illustrates a way in which the shape of a case in the
ecclesiastical court could make it hard to require seeking a Prohibition before sentence. Parson Butler libelled against Partlet for two offenses consisting in the same act: (a) for defaming him; (b) for disturbing divine
service by the act of speaking the defamatory words. As to the slander,
Partlet was (as the King's Bench thought in the event) entitled to a Prohibition because Butler could have maintained an action for the words at
common law. (The most indisputable ground for prohibiting ecclesiastical defamation suits was that the words were defamatory at common law,
so that resorting to the ecclesiastical court was a simple infringement of
lay jurisdiction.)
As to the disturbance of divine service, the ecclesiastical court had undoubted jurisdiction and was entitled to find Partlet guilty whether or not
the words were true or defamatory. The ecclesiastical court resolved the
case by sentencing Partlet to recant the words, without distinguishing the
two elements in the libel, to either or both of which the sentence could
have been appropriate. ("I'm sorry I called the preacher a criminal in
church last Sunday and take it back" was probably more or less what he
was sentenced to say.) After sentence, Partlet sought and obtained a Prohibition with the effect of forcing reversal of the sentence (costs were no
doubt the material point). Chief Justice Popham favored an off-setting
Consultation (Cf. Lady Lodge's Case) quoad the disturbance, but the
other judges disagreed and prevailed. The report gives no sign that anything was made of Partlet's waiting until after sentence. Could he have
reasonably been expected to move earlier? It would in a sense have been
salutary if he had done so, for then the ecclesiastical court could have
been prohibited from taking any action quoad the defamation, in which
case the sentence could have been framed unambiguously to cover
only the disturbance and Butler could have recovered the costs of appropriately prosecuting for that offense. (As things turned out, he would lose
the costs, in a sense unjustly. But to adopt Popham's solution would have
been to leave the ecclesiastical court free to award Butler his full costs
anyhow, when he had no business suing there for defamation -- in a way,
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to reward wrong-doing). But would it really be fair to expect Partlet to
make that salutary move? He probably believed, in men's ordinary selfjustifying way, that he had spoken the truth and would be vindicated on
the important point, whether or not he was technically guilty of disturbing
divine service. The greater fault lay on Butler and the ecclesiastical court
for failing to distinguish the two offenses clearly in the libel and the sentence. (In fact, as the report shows, Partlet claimed that Butler had forged
a release. He spoke his defamatory words in the context of accusing him
of that. Whoever was in the right, the parties clearly had a substantial
quarrel. Partlet does not look like an idle mischief-maker, slandering the
parson from mere ill-will.)
Candict (or Conduit) v. Plomer (or Plumer)41 shows how seeking a
Prohibition before sentence could be all but impossible, as opposed to
"not reasonably expectable" or "not desirable." Here, a man was elected
parish clerk by the inhabitants of the parish, in accord with immemorial
custom. The parson appointed another man clerk by virtue of the ecclesiastical canons of 1604, which purported to give clergymen such power of
appointment. The parishioners' electee was then sued in the ecclesiastical
court to the end of depriving him. Before sentence, he obtained a Prohibition. (Prohibitions were several times successfully used to block implementation of the 1604 canons in the face of the lay community's
prescriptive rights. Even apart from that, the judges in this case held that
the ecclesiastical powers had no authority to deprive a parish clerk -- as
opposed to disciplining him -- because the office was intrinsically lay.)
Then the parishioners' electee was sued again in the ecclesiastical court
for various misdemeanors in church. This second suit did not manifestly
violate the Prohibition, though in fact it amounted in part to accusing the
man of doing things appropriate to a parish clerk, as if he had no title to
do them (such as setting bread on the communion table). The ecclesiastical court proceeded to resolve the second suit by a sentence of deprivation! The Common Pleas had no hesitation about granting another
41
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Prohibition (requiring reversal of the worthless sentence and presumably
preventing the ecclesiastical plaintiff from recovering costs). To expect
the clerk to seek his Prohibition before sentence would have been absurd,
since the second suit did not and legally could not aim expressly at his
deprivation. The only procedural question worth asking would seem to
be whether he could have had a Prohibition before the unanticipated sentence, on the ground that he was being sued at least in part for acts that
would only be wrongful if he were not parish clerk. I would hardly bring
up the case in the present context had not the clerk's lawyer, Serjeant
Houghton, expressed some doubt as to whether the Prohibition was grantable after sentence. ("But what shall we do? for we are deprived by sentence given there.") It may be significant that he was addressing Coke's
Common Pleas, for Coke was warier than other judges of Prohibitions after sentence. Also, Coke's earlier remarks in the discussion of this case
may have suggested that he considered the second suit prohibitable before
sentence because it was visibly predicated on the assumption that the parishioners' electee was improperly exercising the office of clerk. But
Coke was prompt to assure Houghton that the sentence was no obstacle
(and to express his outrage at the ecclesiastics' conduct).
Brabin v. Trediman 42 (discussed above for its bearing on the effect of
appeal) presents another situation in which common law intervention before the first sentence would have been nearly impossible. The essence of
the case was as follows: Brabin was required by an ecclesiastical court's
decree to refrain from disturbing Trediman's enjoyment of a particular
pew. (Ecclesiastical litigation over pews was common, as were Prohibitions in such cases.) By his Prohibition, Brabin wanted to challenge the
ecclesiastical court's decree on two grounds: (a) His right was based on
a custom permitting the churchwardens to assign pews at discretion. The
ecclesiastical court had disregarded or overruled this allegedly reasonable
custom in holding for Trediman. (b) The ecclesiastical decree was erroneous on its face. (It said that Trediman and his heirs were to have the
use of the pew, without adding "so long as he lived in the parish." Brabin
maintained that it was a flaw in the decree not to spell out that qualification. Taken as meaning to omit it, the decree could not be good, for
42
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strangers to the parish could not have a right to seats in the parish Church.
By Brabin's theory, that rule should be enforced by the common law. It
was not the ecclesiastical court's right to give a stranger an interest in a
pew, if it meant to do anything so absurd, nor was it the ecclesiastical
court's right to frame its decree carelessly if it liked.) The second point
could obviously not have been raised by Prohibition before the decree
was made. The very fact that a man might in the end have several independent grounds for Prohibition -- some perhaps easier than others to
handle -- is a reason for not insisting that he seek common law help as
soon as one ground accrues. As for Brabin's first point by itself: Ecclesiastical courts were commonly prohibited in pew suits on the surmise that
plaintiff-in-Prohibition had a private prescriptive right to the seat. Such
prohibitions exemplify the rule that trial of "time out of mind" claims
should take place at common law. They presume that quasi-proprietary
interests in pews were acquirable (i.e., that they were "real rights," not
held by the mere grace of the ecclesiastical authorities). Brabin v. Trediman is unusual, because Brabin was not defending his private right on a
prescriptive basis, but the churchwarden's prescriptive right to assign him
a pew.
Still, the principle seems the same: Brabin took his stand on custom.
Having done so, he could have obtained a Prohibition without waiting to
see how the ecclesiastical court would jump. Should he have? The question is academic because of the alternative basis for Prohibition, but the
report is suggestive on this point. Brabin's surmise stressed the reasonableness of the custom, over and above its mere existence. Possibly,
then, Trediman had not quarrelled with the fact of the custom, but had instead convinced the ecclesiastical court that it was not reasonable. Then
imagine the following case: A. sues B. in an ecclesiastical court. B. relies on a custom. A. admits the custom de facto but takes issue on its reasonableness. After the ecclesiastical court decides it is unreasonable and
gives sentence for A., B. seeks a Prohibition on the ground that the ecclesiastical court made an erroneous legal judgment as to the custom's reasonableness. Should B. have come sooner, with a bare surmise of the
custom, forcing A. to demur at common law to contest its reasonableness? There can be no doubt that the reasonableness of a custom was a
"common law issue," just as the fact of a custom was for trial by jury at
common law. (It was a standard rule, applied in many contexts, that customs were valid only if they were reasonable in the judges' eyes, as well
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as immemorial in the jury's.) As with other common law legal issues
"incidental" to ecclesiastical suits, an argument can be made for waiting
until it appears that the ecclesiastical court has actually done something
wrong. With respect to reasonableness questions in particular: There is a
sense in which they were both easy and hard -- easy in that often no very
special skill (such as real-property law), as opposed to common sense and
fairness, was required to settle them; hard in that generalized standards
for judging customs were difficult to evolve. There might be advantages
in letting the ecclesiastical court look a custom over first, then reviewing
the ecclesiastical decision if one of the parties thought his chances of persuading the common law court to take a different view were really serious. Ecclesiastical opinion on the reasonableness of a custom affecting
church matters might be persuasive as to its reasonableness at common
law.
In Chase v. White,43 there was no discussion as to whether the Prohibition, being sought after sentence, was sought too late. But the case is
worth noting as another test of the feasibility of requiring that Prohibitions be sought as early as possible. The ecclesiastical suit was for tithes
of draught animals (computed as the equivalent of 1/10th of the herbage
they consumed). Draught animals used for farm labor were not tithable
(on the theory that they were "means of production" for crops that paid
tithes). Animals used for the commercial carrying trade, on the other
hand, were tithable. The two judges who speak in this report (Dodderidge and Chief Justice Ley) thought that beasts used partly for farm labor and partly for carrying came within the exemption -- i.e., owed no
tithes at all, not even pro rata for as much of the year as they are used for
carrying. In this case, plaintiff-in-Prohibition could undoubtedly have sought
the writ the moment he was sued, simply by surmising that he was being sued
for tithes of a non-tithable thing. The common law court would have
granted one if it agreed that the thing was non-tithable. Any relevant
question of fact (here, what use was made of the animals) would have
been tried by jury pursuant to the Prohibition. Instead, the parishioner
43
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took his chances in the ecclesiastical court. The ecclesiastical court gave
sentence that he should pay tithes for such part of the year as the beasts
were used for carrying, and nothing for the rest of the year. Dodderidge
and Ley thought the sentence erroneous in its terms, by standards which
in principle the common law was entitled to enforce. (The ecclesiastical
courts were never permitted to entertain suits for tithes of products which
the common law regarded as intrinsically exempt.) Dodderidge did, however, express hesitation about granting a Prohibition in this case. He
wanted to be sure that issue had not been taken "in the negative" in the ecclesiastical court: I.e.: If the parties had taken issue as to whether the
beasts were ever used for farm work, and the ecclesiastical court had
found as a matter of fact that they were never so used, then the sentence
would be justified and Prohibition would not lie. That the sentence in its
terms expressed an erroneous rule of law would make no difference. In
other words, a factual determination by the ecclesiastical court would not
be called in question, even though the sentence showed that the ecclesiastical court was proceeding on a mistaken view of the law.
Now, if plaintiff-in-Prohibition had moved before sentence, the Court
would have been spared investigating whether the sentence was really
"caused" by an error in law. The ecclesiastical court would have been
spared proceeding under an erroneous impression, because the Prohibition would have held up if the parishioner proved on common law trial
that the beasts were employed to any appreciable extent for farm labor.
But nothing was said to suggest that the plaintiff ought to have moved
earlier. Should he have'? For this kind of case, would there have been
any disadvantage in a general rule against Prohibitions after sentence?
Although I do not think the answer to these questions is clear, the human
grounds for going easy on the parishioner in such a case can be seen: A man
is sued for tithes of his oxen. Knowing the law in a rough way -- that
laboring beasts do not ordinarily pay tithes -- he assumes the suit is founded
on a mistake of fact, compounded perhaps by some wishful clerical thinking
about the law. "The Parson knows I do some carrying. Maybe he doesn't
realize that I use the animals interchangeably on the farm. Maybe he has gotten
greedy and thinks he can squeeze some additional tithes out of me. Surely
all I need to do is show the ecclesiastical judge the truth -- that the animals
are 'really' working cattle, that this is an unheard-of tithe claim." It turns out
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to be more complicated. A legitimately ambiguous legal issue is involved
(whereas generally the rules about tithability were simple and notorious,
the sort of rules the ecclesiastical courts would respect whether they liked
them or not, as in this case they respected the exemption for draught animals insofar as they were actually used for farm work). How to plead his
case becomes problematic. But having committed himself to the ecclesiastical court on the understandable assumption that his case is open-andshut, a layman will perhaps not have sufficient motive to seek a
Prohibition when the complications close in. He might as well wait and
see what the ecclesiastical judge will do. The chance of the controverted
questions’ being resolved in his favor look fair enough. Why go to the
perhaps unnecessary trouble of a Prohibition?
In Fotherlye’s Case44 (discussed above for general points on the timing of Prohibitions), Chief Justice Richardson said in so many words that
the Prohibition could not have been sought before sentence. I wonder
whether that was true in a strictly literal sense, but Richardson’s point
was practically sound. In this case, an intestate’s sister sued in the ecclesiastical court to force the administratrix (intestate’s widow) to distribute
part of the estate to her. The ecclesiastical court awarded the sister 10%
of the £200 estate, after which the administratrix sought, and in the event
obtained, a Prohibition. I can see no reason why the administratrix could
not have moved as soon as she was sued, for her legal contention was that
the sister had no claim to any share of the estate and the ecclesiastical
court no discretion to assign her a share.
It is understandable, however, that the administratrix waited on the ecclesiastical court’s decision. Had the Common Pleas been asked to intervene before sentence, it might understandably have preferred to delay.
My reason for saying this boils down to the predictability of the ecclesiastical outcome. The ecclesiastical court erred in this case, in the judges’
opinion (an opinion well-confirmed by other intestacy cases), because
statutory law limited the freedom which the ecclesiastical authorities
originally had to impose an equitable settlement of intestates’ estates.
The common law courts were keepers of the subject’s statutory rights and
44
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exclusive authoritative interpreters of statutes. At least they were that in
their own conceit and in practice. The ecclesiastics disagreed. In their
opinion, ecclesiastical courts were competent to construe and apply statutes when claims purportedly based on them were advanced in cases
within ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Lay and ecclesiastical lawyers might argue about this question of principle outside court, but the common law
courts had the weapon of Prohibitions, so that they could and did enforce
their interpretation of statutes. But what should a common law court do
when faced with a statute-based claim to a Prohibition? Wait and see
whether the ecclesiastical court would apply the statute correctly, or prohibit at once in order to insure that construction and enforcement of statutes stayed strictly within the common law's province?
A good case can be made at least for preferring the former option -i.e., for encouraging rather than punishing plaintiffs-in-Prohibition who
waited until they could claim that an ecclesiastical court had decisively
ignored or misconstrued a statute. In the first place, it is a reasonable presumption that the ecclesiastical judge will correctly understand and obey
statutes affecting him. There might be notorious exceptions -- cases of
known and constant disagreement between ecclesiastical and common
lawyers on a statute's meaning. But the statutes on intestacy involved in
Fotherlye's Case were probably not an example of that. Even if they
were to a degree, it would be uncertain before sentence whether the ecclesiastical judge would in the event use his discretion so as to produce a result contrary to the statute. (Here, the statutes in effect gave everything to
the wife. By assigning a small share to the sister, the ecclesiastical judge
assumed more discretion than he had. His mistake, however, was to claim too much
discretion. It would have been unpredictable before sentence whether he would
in fact see any equitable basis for giving the sister a share.) Secondly, the very
fact that authority to interpret statutes was a bone of contention is a reason for
presuming in favor of the ecclesiastical judge until he actually commits an
error. It is more insulting, as it were, to assume that an ecclesiastical
judge will misconceive or ignore his statutory duty than to assume that he
will not be able to handle a "common law issue" in the sense of "an issue
calling for expert knowledge of the common law."
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Eaton v. Ayliffe45 presents an unusual situation, in which a Prohibition
was granted in the face of objection that it was sought too late, but where
it is hard to see how the delay could have been considered blameworthy.
The report is too poor for much sense to be made of the judges' opinions,
but the following reconstruction probably catches the essential point: Ecclesiastical litigation over the right to pews was most frequently prohibited because a prescriptive title to the pew, triable at common law, came
in question. Ordinarily, it was the ecclesiastical defendant who got a Prohibition on the surmise that his adversary was suing to establish his right,
whereas the defendant's right rested on prescription. In our case, however, Eaton sued in the ecclesiastical court to establish his title to a pew
and himself set up a prescriptive claim at the outset. The ecclesiastical
court held against him and awarded costs to Ayliffe, the defendant there.
Eaton then appealed. When he saw that the appellate court was going to
affirm the sentence below, he sought a Prohibition.
Whatever Eaton's hopes may have been, the Court plainly thought that
the only possible application of the Prohibition -- if it should be granted at
all -- was to frustrate the award of costs. To have required reversal of the
body of the sentence (presumably a sentence in the nature of a declaratory
judgment that Ayliffe was entitled to the pew and/or an order to Eaton to
stay out of it) would have been absurd. Although, as we shall see, prohibiting one's own suit was by no means ruled out, it was usually permitted
only when a common law issue arose in the course of the ecclesiastical
suit and could not have been certainly anticipated by the ecclesiastical
plaintiff. Here, Eaton took his prescriptive claim before the ecclesiastical
court voluntarily. Having done so, one might suppose that he had assumed the risk of costs if he failed. The judges seem not to have taken
that position, however, for if the report is right they granted the Prohibition going to the costs. Insofar as I can grasp their reasons from the obscure report, they seem to have taken the power to award costs as a
function of "really" or "legally" having jurisdiction over the matter. If (as
in this case of a prescriptive claim) the ecclesiastical court ought never to
have entertained it (i.e., should, at least in theory, have said to Eaton, "Go
away, we cannot judge a prescriptive title."), then the ecclesiastical court
45

Early Car. C.P. Hetley, 94.
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has no power to award costs, even though both parties have consented to
have the suit determined there, and even though there was no way to prevent the ecclesiastical court from making a decision and, presumably, enforcing it by spiritual sanctions. (Quaere, however, if Eaton were
excommunicated for disturbing Ayliffe's enjoyment of the pew contrary
to the sentence. Could he then have a Prohibition? Could he call the excommunication in question pursuant to an attempt to imprison him by De
excommunicato capiendo?) Assuming the rule that costs were not lawfully awardable, the question remains whether Eaton moved too late, as
Ayliffe's counsel urged.
The appeal was the problem, for he obviously could not have moved
before sentence. By taking an appeal and as good as waiting until it was
decided against him, did he commit himself to ecclesiastical justice in
such further degree that his right to avoid costs (morally a shaky right to
start with) was destroyed? It is not clear from the report how the judges
responded to this, except that in granting the Prohibition they rejected the
argument from Eaton's delay. It seems to be arguable, in support of the
court's decision, that the delay should not have harmed him, even assuming a stronger policy against permitting Prohibitions after appeal than existed. For under the circumstances appealing seems the honorable course,
compared to seeking a Prohibition to escape the costs immediately after
sentence: A man entrusts himself, in a sense inappropriately, to the ecclesiastical system, the other party making no objection. He loses and is erroneously charged for costs. He could get a Prohibition at once. Instead,
he tries by appeal to show that he should have won and therefore owe no
costs (for all we know, he had no expectation of costs for himself if the
sentence was reversed). Has he not acted as to fulfill a kind of "contract"
with the other party to abide the ecclesiastical courts' award insofar as the
ecclesiastical courts could make one (as they could not for costs)? If he
could avoid the costs -- as he was entitled by law to do -- without breaking the "contract," should he be penalized for trying to?
Our last case in the present line, from 1633,46 shows the judges in perplexity over prohibiting after ecclesiastical sentence, At an earlier date,
this case would probably not have been difficult. By and large, as we
46
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have seen, sentence was not a formidable bar to Prohibition even when
the party had no good excuse for delay. In the more complex cases just
considered, the courts were ready to take it for granted that waiting on
sentence was justified, sometimes to insist on waiting. In the case of
1633, the Prohibition was sought before sentence. A majority of the
Court would have preferred to wait until after sentence. The difficulty of
doing so was expressed by Chief Justice Richardson: "If you permit them
to go to sentence in the spiritual court and then award Prohibition, they
will complain that it is against our promise not to grant Prohibition after
sentence." We have seen other signs that the judges were forced into an
extra-judicial commitment on the handling of Prohibition cases in Charles
I's reign. Plainly, the ecclesiastics insisted on the theory that sentence
should be a firm bar to Prohibition. Plainly, the judges signed on the dotted line. In our case, they were stuck with the consequences.
The case was of the sort in which delay until sentence would have had
advantages. Tithes were sued for by the holder of a deanery. (By usage,
tithes could be due to ecclesiastical persons and corporations other than
parish ministers.) The holder of the deanery claimed it through the King,
thus by royal letters patent. It came in question in the ecclesiastical court
whether the tithes attached to the deanery were included in the royal
grant. A Prohibition was sought because the meaning and validity of letters-patent was exclusively within common law competence. To Justices
Jones and Berkeley, waiting to see what the ecclesiastical court would do
seemed the best course. They relied on a general principle: When the ecclesiastical court is entitled to entertain a case at its start, it should not be
prohibited unless and until it decides an "incidental" common law issue
erroneously.
The practical considerations I have dwelt on in the present context
might recommend waiting even if that general principle were not embraced: Construction of a routine patent is not a very difficult job. The
chance of the ecclesiastical judge's reading it erroneously could be very
slight. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition might have an utterly flimsy argument for
his interpretation of the patent, so that the Prohibition proceedings would
come to a vexatious delay, or he might have so strong a case that it would
be mischievous to put the other party to the needless charge of defending
a Prohibition if his side was to be heard at all. Conceivably, the suit
could be resolvable without construction of the patent: e.g., by the eccle-
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siastical judge’s finding that no tithes were ever attached to the deanery.
Why not wait until it was clear that a real problem within common law
competence existed, until one party or the other thought seriously enough
that the ecclesiastical court had misconstrued the patent to venture a new
round of proceedings?
Chief Justice Richardson may or may not have agreed with Jones and
Berkeley in the abstract. If he did, he was worried enough about violating
the extra-judicial promise to favor prohibiting now -- clearly the preferable alternative to not prohibiting at all, since no one disputed that construction of a patent was ultimately the common law’s business. Justice
Croke favored a Prohibition now on general principles -- ecclesiastical
judges should be prohibited as soon as it is surmised that a common law
issue is before them -- without apparent concern for any out-of-court
commitment. Jones gives no sign of such concern either: He speaks only
once (before Richardson delivered his admonition) clearly and strongly in
favor of waiting on sentence.
Justice Berkeley looked for a way out. While agreeing with Jones that
no Prohibition ought to be granted at present on the ground surmised, he
suggested that a Prohibition now could perhaps be justified another way:
Were the bounds of the deanery not implicitly in question before the ecclesiastical court? If so, an immediate Prohibition could be granted on a
commonplace ground. (When ecclesiastical courts, normally in tithe
suits, were confronted with the question whether Blackacre was inside or
outside Parish X., they were invariably prohibited, Bounds of parishes
were regarded as factual questions exclusively triable by jury at common
law. It was almost never suggested that the common law should wait to
see how the ecclesiastical court resolved a bounds issue. It would probably have made no sense to do so, for the whole point -- as in the case of
prescriptive titles -- was that one and only one method of trying the facts
was appropriate in such cases.)
Although Richardson needed a way out himself, he was not impressed
by Berkeley’s idea. (Partly because he was unsure whether the bounds of
a deanery came under the same rule as the bounds of parishes, partly because the terms of the patent as alleged made it doubtful -- though
Berkeley would not admit that -- whether there was an implicit issue
about the deanery’s bounds.) Richardson preferred to play out the conse-
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quences of the extra-judicial promise, whether or not the Prohibition
would have been delayable before any such promise was made. Divided
and perplexed, the Court adjourned the case. There is no report of further
action.
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IV.
Self-prohibition
(The conclusions of this section are summarized in the text immediately below.)
We now turn to cases on whether a man may prohibit his own suit.
That problem could easily arise: e.g., A. sues B. in an ecclesiastical
court. B. introduces a defense which in principle the common law should
determine -- either a defense triable by jury as to fact or a legal defense
within exclusive common law competence. A. seeks a Prohibition,
whereas B. to all appearances is content for his defense to be verified or
evaluated by the ecclesiastical court. Ought A. to have a Prohibition to
stop the suit he initiated himself?
The answer to that question can be stated categorically: Basically, the
courts did not consider self-prohibition objectionable. In the standard
schematized case above, A. would get his Prohibition. If he waited until
after sentence against him, or until after appeals, his chance of getting the
Prohibition would still be excellent -- at least as good as B.’s chance if B.
had sought the Prohibition after comparable delay. In a couple of cases,
the courts refused to let ecclesiastical plaintiffs prohibit their own suits.
The exceptions, however, are quite easily distinguishable. Deeply problematic cases on self-prohibition could have arisen. It was not always
permitted. Cases therefore could have occurred in which the rationale of
the mainline cases and of the exceptions had to be searched and generalized. In fact, however, there are no cases on this subject showing the
courts in doubt or divided. Basically, self-prohibition was permitted;
when it was not, it would have been outrageous to permit it. We shall accordingly need to do little more than note the relevant line of cases.
Before doing so, however, we should reflect on the implications of the
courts’ attitude. In permitting self- prohibition, the courts obviously favored Prohibitions -- Prohibitions, not ecclesiastical defendants over ecclesiastical plaintiffs, (typically) parishioners over parsons. If a parson
wanted a common law issue that arose in his tithe suit tried by jury, he
could get it so tried; if the parishioner in that case thought his chance of
convincing an ecclesiastical judge by witnesses was better than his
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chances with a jury of his peers, he was out of luck. The central idea behind permitting self-prohibition was the “public stake” in Prohibitions:
“Foreign” courts should not determine common law issues to the derogation of the ‘‘royal dignity.” It makes no difference how the common law
court finds out that lay jurisdiction is in danger of being infringed -- from
the ecclesiastical defendant, the ecclesiastical plaintiff, or a little bird.
Private law considerations concerning the informer’s standing or moral title to common law assistance are irrelevant -- or almost irrelevant.
On the whole, the cases on self-foreclosure above also support the
“public stake” approach. The courts were not really ready to say that a
dilatory party destroys his right to a Prohibition. For -- the “public stake”
theory says -- it is not primarily his right. As a private litigant, he may be
in a weak position, but he still informs the common law courts of an offense against themselves and the King. He ought to have informed them
earlier, but soon or late “foreign” courts who meddle where they have no
business should be stopped. On the other hand, in self-foreclosure cases
the exigencies of economy and fairness to private litigants caused the
courts to compromise the “public stake” theory -- on occasion; without
complete confidence; without an articulated view of the rival claims of
“public” and “private” considerations. Permissiveness toward self-prohibition might, because of its implications, be urged as a reason for nonrecognition of a party’s power to foreclose a Prohibition. Conversely, the
intrusion of “private” considerations in self-foreclosure cases could be a
reason for treating them as relevant in self-prohibition cases. For example: An ecclesiastical defendant who not only waited for sentence against
him but took two appeals and lost them before seeking a Prohibition
would at least be in danger of losing the Prohibition. Could it not be argued that an ecclesiastical plaintiff in comparable circumstances is at least
the a fortiori case? (I.e., A. sues B. in the ecclesiastical court. A common law issue arises. Neither party seeks a Prohibition. A. loses, takes
two appeals and loses twice again. Then A. seeks a Prohibition. Is A., as
the original plaintiff, not in a slightly weaker position than B. would be if
they were interchanged?) However, the courts show no signs of having
considered that argument, or of being urged to in the terms in which I
have stated it. On the other hand, self-prohibition was sometimes not permitted. Private justice was only almost irrelevant. In self-foreclosure
cases, the courts explicitly reserved discretion to deny Prohibitions in the
interest of private justice. Perhaps one should conclude that in self-prohi-
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bition cases, too, they reserved what can only be called discretion to take
that interest into account. But problematic tests of such discretion were
rare in the latter context.
If self-prohibition cases are seen through the categories of private justice, a distinct set of considerations comes into play. It is unintelligent to
say that it is ipso facto “repugnant” to prohibit one’s own suit. Many
sorts of claims -- e.g., a parson’s claim to tithes -- could only be asserted
in an ecclesiastical court. A parson might know that his title to certain
tithes depended on whether or not a certain modus was valid; he might
sue with the sole intention of subjecting the modus to a legal test; he
might prefer as an individual and intend as a “good subject’’ to have the
test made at common law. Nevertheless, his only option was to start an
ecclesiastical suit. If the parishioner would take no step to transfer the
contention to the common law, surely the parson should be able to. Going a little deeper than ‘‘ipso facto repugnance,” however, an argument
against self-prohibition can be made: Should every plaintiff not be presumed to have faith in his claim? I.e.: In the very act of bringing a lawsuit, is one not saying, “I believe that the truth of my claim will stand up
to any fair factual investigation, and that its legal validity will be evident
to any reasonable and impartial judge.”? Even when ground rules of the
legal system require a man to sue where he might not choose to, is he still
not saying that? Ought he not to have that kind of faith, or else refrain
from suing? Litigation is after all an extreme way to settle conflicts. Is a
kind of bias in the defendant’s favor not built into the very idea of law?
The defendant has not started trouble, has not made demands on the time
and energy of the courts, has not sought to secure his interests by the coercive power of the state. Is there not reason to allow defendants the procedural advantages they are on paper entitled to, while looking very hard
at a plaintiff who, by maneuvering procedurally, casts doubt on his faith
in the “natural justice’’ of his claim?
This line of argument obviously raises huge problems. It may be rejected as a general argument in its premises. It may be regarded as specious in particulars. For instance: While it makes sense of a sort to
presume that a plaintiff has sufficient faith in the factual truth of his claim
to entrust it to any putatively fair fact-finder, it makes less sense to suppose that faith in a claim’s legal validity ought to imply willingness to
have it adjudicated by any fair-minded judge. Competence in the sense of
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“expert ability” may accompany, and account for the distribution of, competence in the sense of “legal authority.” E.g.: A parson suing, perforce
in the ecclesiastical court, to test the validity of a lease on which his tithes
depend can hardly be supposed to entrust an inexpert ecclesiastical judge
with the technical exposition of a conveyance. If, however, the argument
above is conceded some force, it would justify looking hard -- if not too
hard -- at ecclesiastical plaintiffs seeking Prohibitions. “Looking hard”
would mean asking questions that need not be asked if the ecclesiastical
plaintiff‘s right to a Prohibition is just as good as the defendant’s. E.g.:
Is the “common law issue” in question legal rather than factual? If legal,
is it one that genuinely requires special expertise? If not, is it one on
which ecclesiastical rules are notoriously different from common law
rules, so that the ecclesiastical court is likely to err? Has the ecclesiastical
plaintiff sought a Prohibition as soon as possible, thus acting so as to rebut any presumption of willingness to have his claim adjudicated by the
ecclesiastical court? (Sed contra: Waiting until after sentence or until appeals are exhausted can be taken as acting consistently with the faith in
his claim that a plaintiff ought to have. Perhaps common law intervention
in an ecclesiastical plaintiff’s favor should always be delayed until an error in law can be attributed to the ecclesiastical court.) “Looking hard” at
an ecclesiastical plaintiff’s application could also mean considering the
structure of interests realistically: De facto, as posited above, a parson
might prefer to have a modus tried at common law. But is a clergyman
(of course a parson could be a lay impropriator) really entitled to object
to having his right to tithes judged by the Church if the parishioner is content? In an important sense, the ecclesiastical courts existed because the
Church was a “franchise.” I.e.: It was privileged, subject to limits and
controls, to look after its own people, the “spiritual estate,” and, in enforcing those people’s rights, also to enforce its corporate interests. If a lay
defendant voluntarily trusts his interests to the law and procedure of the
Church, can a member of the clerical order complain? This argument
would probably cease to hold if the ecclesiastical plaintiff were not a clergyman (or even, like a lay impropriator, representative of an intrinsically
“spiritual” right). Ecclesiastical plaintiffs could be ordinary laymen
driven to the Church courts by what could be considered historically accidental delegations of functions -- e.g., an executor seeking to prove a will;
a legatee seeking to recover his legacy.
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The very complexity of the problems I have outlined is a reason for doing what the courts substantially did -- allowing ecclesiastical plaintiffs to
get Prohibitions as easily as ecclesiastical defendants. Exceptions were
made only when it was intuitively obvious that to grant the Prohibition
would be grossly unfair -- “in discretion,’’ one would have to say.
We may now review the cases. In Holcroffte’s Case,1 a lessee of an
impropriate parsonage sued for tithes. His title to the parsonage and
tithes turned out to depend on the meaning and validity of several leaseassignments. He did not seek a Prohibition merely because that “common law issue” had arisen. Rather, he proffered proof of his assignments
by a single witness, and sought a Prohibition only when and because the
ecclesiastical court, owing to its usual two-witness rule, rejected his evidence. The Queen’s Bench granted the Prohibition. The only note of
hesitation was sounded in the interest of the lessee (plaintiff-in-prohibition): Chief Justice Popham wondered how he would get back into the
ecclesiastical court to claim his tithes once the validity of his assignments
was determined at common law. Coke, the lessee’s counsel, had an answer: “Well enough, for we will prove the assignments here and then we
will have a Consultation, and on the Consultation they will proceed.”
(I.e.: In Coke’s opinion, a man could prohibit his own suit to get an issue
determined at common law, then undo his own Prohibition by a Consultation -- no doubt a qualified Consultation, authorizing the ecclesiastical
court to proceed ita quod it treat the question of the assignments as conclusively decided.)
In Pyper v. Barnably2 the defendant in a tithe suit pleaded that the
relevant land was not in the plaintiff‘s parish. The original ecclesiastical
court decided in the defendant’s favor -- I.e., that the land was in a different parish. The parson then appealed and lost again. Then he sought a
Prohibition on the standard ground that issues concerning the bounds of
parishes were triable at common law. Serjeant Heale, representing the
parishioner, tried to make the general case against self-prohibition: The
parson “chose them to be his judges,” the more so because he had taken

1
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an appeal. But Chief Justice Popham, speaking for the whole Court, invoked the “public stake” theory of Prohibitions to reject Heale’s argument: “...If the Court Christian will hold plea in derogation of the
common law, the Court ex officio ought to restrain their proceedings.”
3
In Saunders v. Lashford, the general case against self-prohibition was
again urged at the Bar. Again there was the added factor of an appeal.
(A parson sued for tithes, lost, appealed, lost again, then sought a Prohibition on the ground that the validity of a lease had come in question.) The
only Justices present, Yelverton and Fenner, thought the Prohibition
should clearly be granted.
In Worts v. Clyfton4 the ecclesiastical plaintiff sought a Prohibition in
a tithe suit dependent on two leases and a composition-real -- both “common law issues.” It does not appear from the report that the ecclesiastical
court had given sentence or that there had been any appellate proceedings. The Court upheld self-prohibition is strong terms: “...et non refert,
although the plaintiff in the Spiritual Court brings this prohibition to stay
his own suit; for if this court hath knowledge by any means that the Spiritual Court meddles with temporal trials, they ought to grant a prohibition.”
In Napper’s Case,5 the defendants to a tithe suit pleaded a modus and
made no move to get a Prohibition. The ecclesiastical judge was proceeding to examine witnesses as to the truth of the modus when the parson applied for a Prohibition. The Court issued a temporary stay to halt the
examination of witnesses and assigned a day to show cause against the
Prohibition. Although that step is less decisive than actually granting a
Prohibition, it probably does not imply reluctance to allow self-prohibition. Prohibitions nisi and temporary stays were common, the point being
to permit adversary debate before definitive issuance of the writ. It
would, I think, be a little hard to let a man prohibit his own suit on a naked ex parte motion. However well-established the right to do so was,
any such attempt raised a serious question. The other party should have
3
4
5

P. 44 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.471.
M. 12 Jac. K.B. Croke Jac. 350.
Undated, probably Jac. C.P. Hobart, 286.
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his chance to argue against the Prohibition when there was any reasonable
question about its legal propriety. That is all the Court gave him here.
6
Berd v ---. is obscurely reported, but it contains another express statement -- probably by counsel -- that self-prohibition is perfectly permissible. The Court granted the Prohibition, endorsing the point. The
ecclesiastical plaintiff was suing to secure his right to a pew. Apparently
his libel claimed on its face that the pew was appurtenant to his freehold.
I assume that this fact as such was challenged, thus raising a real-property
question within common law competence.

Farmer’s Case 7 had a complication. In this case, a tithe suit was prohibited on the ecclesiastical defendant’s motion, upon the standard surmise that the land was discharged in the hands of its former monastic
owners. Pursuant to the Prohibition, the parties took issue on the fact of
the discharge. At the trial, after the parties had presented all their evidence, plaintiff-in-Prohibition (ecclesiastical defendant) was nonsuited.
(Probably his evidence manifestly failed to establish the discharge.) A
Consultation returned the suit to the ecclesiastical court. The ecclesiastical defendant then pleaded the identical discharge and the spiritual judge
was proceeding to try it. Thereupon, the ecclesiastical plaintiff sought
and obtained a qualified Prohibition -- prohibiting the ecclesiastical judge
from accepting the plea of discharge. (That was probably tantamount to
ordering the ecclesiastical judge to give sentence for the parson-plaintiff,
though there is no theoretical reason why the parishioner-defendant could
not have some alternative defense.) The decision was surely sound. It
amounted to requiring the ecclesiastical court to respect a res judicata -and judicata in the competent court. Even if the discharge had not been as
good as adjudged (by virtue of the probably-involuntary nonsuit at trial),
the ecclesiastical defendant would have been in a weak position to object
to the Prohibition: He took due exception to the ecclesiastical suit and
had his chance to establish his discharge in the proper forum. If he had
simply changed his mind -- i.e., simply dropped his Prohibition at an
early stage and gone back to the ecclesiastical court, hoping to establish
his discharge there -- it would be reasonable to prevent him by a second
6
7

H. 6 Car. K.B. Harg. 39, f. 138b.
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qualified Prohibition. The report gives no arguments against the course
taken by the Court. I can imagine two: (a) 50 Edw. 3 forbids more than
one Prohibition in the same suit. It does not say that there may be two if
they are sought by different parties, or if one is a general Prohibition and
the other qualified. The Court’s decision implies an exception to 50 Edw.
3 -- an undoubtedly sensible “exception without a rule,” like those occasionally made for second Prohibitions after ecclesiastical sentence when
the first Prohibition had been inconveniently obtained before sentence.
(b) A man may not prohibit his own suit, even in the special circumstances of this case. I.e.: If one adopted. the arguments against self-prohibition in radical form (“self-prohibition is ipso facto repugnant”; or “a
plaintiff always undertakes to make his claim good, wherever its adjudication falls”), then one could argue that the ecclesiastical plaintiff in our
case was helpless -- even to take advantage of a res judicata, even though
the other party was in a very weak moral position. The Court’s decision
implies rejection of those arguments in radical form and hence encourages their rejection in more normal circumstances.
Over against the group of cases above, there are a few in which selfprohibition was not permitted. In a way the strongest such case is Kinsley v. Piggins (1630),8 in which the ecclesiastical suit was for
defamation -- for saying that Kinsley “did keep a man in his house to
bugger.” The suit was probably prohibitable because those words were
actionable at common law, hence, by the usual rule, not actionable in the
ecclesiastical court. They were actionable at common law because buggery was a statutory crime by 25 Hen. 8, c. 6. (Falsely accusing someone
of a secular crime was the clearest case of common law defamation.) I
say “probably” prohibitable, instead of “certainly,” because statutes creating secular crimes raised a special problem with respect to coordinating
common law and ecclesiastical jurisdiction: If buggery was once an ecclesiastical offense but not a lay offense, and then it was made a lay offense by statute, it might be argued that it remained concurrently an
ecclesiastical offense (depending on the constructed intent of the statutemakers). If it did remain an ecclesiastical offense, it could then be argued
that the ecclesiastical court also retained concurrent jurisdiction over
8

M. 6 Car. K.B. Harg. 39, f.133.
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defamation consisting in the false imputation of that offense. In Kinsley
v. Piggins, however, the Court did not need to go into those complexities,
if indeed it would have been inclined to in other circumstances (instead of
simply holding categorically that no ecclesiastical action lies when a common law action would lie for the same words). The Court refused the
Prohibition in this case because Kinsley, the ecclesiastical plaintiff, was
also plaintiff-in-Prohibition. So far as the report shows, that was the sole
reason for the decision.
The existence of a possible alternative basis for denying the Prohibition makes it harder to project from the case. Let us assume, however,
that the Prohibition would certainly have been granted if it had been
sought by the ecclesiastical defendant. Then what does the decision imply? The report is spare. Why Kinsley wanted to prohibit his own defamation suit is in no way indicated. The obvious motive would be to cut
the other party off before he could vindicate himself. In a quarrel, Piggins accuses Kinsley of buggery. In his anger, Kinsley slaps a defamation suit on Piggins -- probably in the wrong court, but he doesn’t know
any better, and what’s done is done. When he cools off, Kinsley thinks
twice about having his sex-life reviewed in court -- the more so if there’s
a chance of Piggins’ proving that he is a bugger, to his possible incrimination as well as embarrassment. But Piggins still wants to fight, hoping
to win. He has no need for a Prohibition. For Kinsley, it’s the only way
out.
The disparity between this sort of story and any account one might
give of the motives and strategies of the parties to, say, tithe litigation is
obvious. The greater part of litigation over defamation, whether at common law or in the ecclesiastical courts, was patent “quarrelling in the
courts.” Though the judges tried to discourage it in various ways, it could
not be prevented. To have granted the Prohibition in Kinsley v. Piggins
would have been to cut off one litigative feud (without, on paper, preventing it from starting up again at common law). The price for that would
have been unfairness to one disputant, Piggins, in a quarrel already
joined. As defendant to an essentially criminal suit (for all ecclesiastical
defamation suits, aiming not at damages but at some “penitential” act,
were essentially criminal), he deserved the chance to clear himself of unbrotherly slander if he chose to. To deny the Prohibition was probably
only to let the ecclesiastical judge determine factual questions (Were the
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words spoken? Were they true?) -- a far cry from letting ecclesiastical
judges decide such “common law issues’’ as the validity of a lease or the
truth of a modus. They were indeed factual questions of a sort he was
used to determining. (A defamation suit for “bugger” is not much different from one for “whore.” The latter was unquestionably within ecclesiastical jurisdiction. It is not as facetious as it sounds, on the other hand,
to suggest that the legal definition of buggery might present rather more
problems than simple whoredom. After sentence, Kinsley might have
had a chance for Prohibition on surmise that the ecclesiastical court had
erred in its understanding of “buggery.” The problem was whether penetration was necessary to constitute the crime.) One might conclude from
Kinsley v. Piggins that an ecclesiastical plaintiff is estopped to prohibit
his own suit when starting it was in the simplest sense his mistake -- i.e.,
when he could have sued at common law, or when he had no cause of action assertable anywhere. I wonder, however, whether such a rule would
stand up against the “public stake” theory of Prohibitions in a serious
matter -- e.g, if a man sued in an ecclesiastical court to recover a piece of
ordinary secular property, to the blatant infringement of the common law,
and the defendant made no objection. On the whole, Kinsley v. Piggins is
best dismissed as an exception for the exceptional category of defamation
suits.
Self-prohibition was also not permitted, again for the best of reasons,
in Hutton v. Grimball.9 But the total effect of that case and another related one10 is to reinforce strongly the general rule that self-prohibition
was entirely permissible. In both these cases, the ecclesiastical plaintiff
sought a Prohibition based on 23 Hen. 8. That is to say, a man sued in the
wrong diocese (not the defendant’s home diocese, where the statute required ecclesiastical suits to be brought), then tried to prohibit his own
suit for that reason. One might suppose that self-prohibition would never
be permitted in such cases: The fault the ecclesiastical plaintiff is trying
to take advantage of is his own. The defendant, so far as appears, would
just as soon be sued in the wrong ecclesiastical court as in the right one.
Denying the Prohibition would not hand over an issue beyond ecclesiasti-

9
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M. 9 Jac. C.P. Harg. 15, f.255.
Langdale’s Case. M. 8 Jac. C. P. Harg. 15, f.236b.
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cal competence to the ecclesiastical court. Nevertheless, in Langdale’s
Case, the Court granted the Prohibition. The report gives only the holding. What the suit was about is not reported, so there is no basis even for
asking whether there might have been any ulterior reason for granting the
Prohibition. As it stands, the holding is stronger for self- prohibition than
any other: A prohibitable suit should be prohibited, whoever moves for
Prohibition and whatever the grounds.
A year later in Hutton v. Grimball the same Court went the other way.
But the circumstances were special: (a) The suit that was brought in the
wrong diocese was for defamation. (Perhaps, as I argue in Kinsley v.
Piggins, there were reasons against self-prohibition specific to defamation
suits as a class.) (b) The Prohibition was sought after sentence against
the ecclesiastical plaintiff, the ecclesiastical judge having found factually
that the defamatory words were never spoken. (Thus, the effect of prohibiting would be to override the defendant’s vindication of himself, when
he had been accused of a “crime” he had not committed, and to deprive
him of his costs, when he had been unjustly vexed both by a groundless
accusation and by being sued outside his home diocese.) It would have
been dogmatic indeed to prohibit in this case. The equities were so clear
that the decision can hardly be taken to overrule Langdale’s Case. The
Court’s explanatory language, on the other hand, was general enough to
count as reversing the earlier case. The judges said that only ecclesiastical defendants -- the victims of being improperly drawn out of their home
dioceses -- could take advantage of 23 Hen. 8. They also said (in effect
proposing an alternative ratio decidendi) that waiting on sentence constituted an admission of local jurisdiction within the ecclesiastical system,
though not of ecclesiastical jurisdiction as against the common law. (This
point could be made against an ecclesiastical defendant who waited too
long to invoke 23 Hen. 8, as well as an ecclesiastical plaintiff. Cf. the
partially contrary Executors of Smith v. Poyndreill above.) Finally, the
Court expressly affirmed the practice it seemed on the surface to be violating in Hutton v. Grimball: “...it was admitted here that Prohibition may
be granted at the suit of him who first sued in ecclesiastical court, and
though it be at the suit of the party or ex officio it is not material.”
We may note, finally, two anomalous cases in which the right to prohibit one’s own suit was in a sense questioned. In neither is a final decision reported. In neither would a decision have signified much for the
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straightforward problem of self-prohibition. In one case11 an executor
was not permitted to prove the will in the ecclesiastical court because he
could offer only one witness. He then sought a Prohibition analogous to
the many aimed at preventing enforcement of the ecclesiastical two-witness rule. Two of the Justices took note of the fact that the executor was
seeking to prohibit his own suit, though not in such a way as to suggest
disapproval of self-prohibition in general. Self-prohibition was not the
real problem in this case. The problem was whether there was anything
to prohibit. (Ordinarily, a Prohibition stopped a suit in progress. Was
there anything for the executor to stop here? He had not started a suit, but
rather been prevented from taking the first ex parte step in an ecclesiastical proceeding. So, at least, the situation could be interpreted. On that interpretation, the question was in effect whether the executor could have a
Prohibition to do the service of a Mandamus -- i.e., to prevent the ecclesiastical court from standing in the way of the executor’s administration of
the estate, even if it could not be forced to accept the will directly. There
may also have been a substantive question as to whether the ecclesiastical
courts were entitled to apply their two-witness rule to probate, even
though they were not allowed to apply it in other contexts. The judges
adjourned the case without decision. If they had denied the Prohibition,
they would only have furnished one very special example of “self-prohibition prohibited.”
The other anomalous case12 presented a complicated problem. Counsel threw in an objection to self-prohibition as reinforcement to arguments that were really substantive, as if to say, “It would be most unjust
to grant the Prohibition in this case, especially since the ecclesiastical
plaintiff is trying to prohibit her own suit.” In brief, Mrs. Harris sued
White for defamation and won. White appealed and lost again. He appealed again and this time was successful -- the sentence below was reversed and costs awarded against Mrs. Harris. Between the first appeal
and the second came a general pardon, which extended to White’s ecclesiastical offense of slander. Mrs. Harris sought a Prohibition to take advantage of the pardon and escape the costs. I.e.: She claimed that as of
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H. 2 C a r . C . P . Harl. 5148, f.114.
Harris v. White. P. 1 Car. K.B. Lansd. 1063, f.120b.
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the time the second appellate court decided against her the offense was
wiped out by the pardon, and consequently that no “incident” of the suit
grounded on that offense (the costs) could be given effect. Common sense
might suggest offhand that Mrs. Harris’s cause was shaky, but in fact the
application to cost awards of pardons covering the “principal” was a recurrently difficult problem, and Mrs. Harris’s case was formidably argued. The Court ended by issuing a temporary stay of ecclesiastical
proceedings, reserving judgment on the Prohibition until later. If this
conclusion suggests an inclination to grant the Prohibition, then we have
another example of “self-prohibition permitted” -- and permitted in a
“hard” case, where an excuse for preventing Mrs. Harris from escaping
the costs might be welcome. If the conclusion suggests disinclination to
prohibit, objection to self-prohibition can hardly be taken for the reason.
The only reported judicial remark, by Justice Dodderidge, is a ruminative
and doubting one as to how pardons should be handled -- i.e., going to the
substance.
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V.
"Judging by the Truth"
A.
Introductory
From the cases on self-foreclosure and self- prohibition above, a predominant theory of the Prohibition emerges: Prohibitions are granted in
the public interest upon information to the Court. It does not matter
whom the information comes from, whether the informer's hands are
clean qua private party, whether his motion is timely. On the other hand,
it was difficult entirely to exclude considerations of private justice in Prohibition cases. "If Prohibition should lie in principle to protect the public
interest it should lie here" was too stringent a rule to apply with complete
consistency. We turn now to several classes of cases which further test
the "public stake'' theory of Prohibitions against the claims of private justice. Cases of these several kinds in one way or another raise a common
question: "To what extent should parties in Prohibition cases be allowed
to take advantage of technicalities or points of strict legal logic?
That question of course arises in every branch of law administration.
In innumerable contexts, courts have a choice between strictness and leniency, between doing substantial justice and insisting on procedural standards. The law erects procedures, "right ways of doing things." There is a
social interest in insuring that litigants observe those standards -- because they are perceptibly or presumptively reasonable, or, failing that,
because regular forms of some sort are necessary and those that exist, exist. In addition, forms of procedure inevitably beget expectations in private litigants -- reasonable and unreasonable expectations, just ones and
cunning ones. Parties will inevitably say, and within bounds of reason
must be allowed to, "Whatever the substantive rights, I should win because the other party has violated the procedural rules of the game. He
could have done things the right way, and if he had perhaps he would
have a case against me. But he has done them the wrong way. It is unfair to me (as well as publicly undesirable) to help him out -- to dismiss
his errors as if procedure were unimportant, or to let him go back and correct his mistakes, and to decide the substantive matter on the basis of facts
that have accidentally emerged despite my adversary's failure to make his
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case in due form." Litigation is warfare. Given the adversary system, that
is a salutary fact. At the same time -- if the agonistic character of life is
tragic, the bellicose or sporting character of litigation is at least a nuisance. To allow parties the advantage of procedural points when that is
avoidable is both socially desirable within limits and a necessary concession to expectations naturally and properly formed in an adversarial
world. But it is also, in one degree or another, to indulge sharpness and to
waste time in the long run, to punish the laity for bad counsel and reward
the rich and the smart. It is to cheat that rather amorphous genius loci,
Substantial Justice, of his worthy and .hungry demands. With these tensions, courts struggle in countless situations. It would be mistaken to assume that unreformed, traditionalistic common law courts did not often
struggle with them -- that they were mere sticklers for form, connoisseurs
of litigative jousting, aficionados of logic abstracted from life.
I recite those truisms in order to put the Prohibitions cases below in focus. If we find the courts lenient toward procedural errors and disinclined
to allow parties the advantage of them, we may legitimately see the "public stake" theory of Prohibitions in operation. We may take the judges as
saying, "It is of no concern whether the plaintiff has 'done the right thing'
procedurally." If it appears that Prohibition ought to lie, it will be
granted -- never mind how it became apparent, never mind whether this
careless plaintiff ought to lose in an ordinary contest between party and
parry, never mind that it is unsporting or even more seriously unfair to
deprive the defendant of his well-taken procedural point." Procedural indulgence of defendants. it should be noted, could similarly imply the
"public stake" theory, for the defendant, too, can be conceived as the
court's informer -- its source of facts and reasons for seeing no infringement of the "roya1 dignity," or for upholding the putatively desirable jurisdiction of "foreign" courts in their sphere. A difference in procedural
tenderness toward plaintiffs and toward defendants would signify something else -- a "when in doubt prohibit" policy, or bias in favor of typical
interests of plaintiffs (or vice versa).
However, a caveat must be put in the way of inferring the "public
stake" theory from procedural leniency: It cannot be glibly assumed that
the courts would behave differently on the "public stake" theory from the
way they would behave if they saw Prohibition cases primarily through
the categories of private justice. I.e.: It is not necessarily true that 16th
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and 17th century courts would tend to prefer procedural nicety over substantial justice in mere contests between party and party. I would expect
them -- as I would expect most courts at most times -- to do so in somewhat greater degree than when they recognized an important public interest in the substantive outcome. But one should be careful of naked
inference, looking for positive signs of the courts' attitude before concluding too much. The self-foreclosure and self-prohibition cases above
furnish a clearer test than the cases below.

B.
Variant Verdicts
Summary: If a verdict, or conceded evidence, literally falsifies a claim
but substantially supports it, should the claim be upheld? Did the "public
stake" in Prohibitions lead the courts to follow the truth as established by
verdict even though the claim to which the verdict responded was misstated? Some of the evidence supports an affirmative answer to those
questions, but it must be considerably qualified.
* * *
One sub-group of cases involves discrepancies between special verdicts or conceded evidence and plaintiff-in-Prohibition's claim. It may be
advantageous to look at simple example before taking up the cases: Suppose A claims a modus to pay 6d for tithes and the jury finds a modus to
pay 10d (I.e.: The jury so finds by special verdict. Juries were in many
situations permitted or encouraged to return the facts as they knew them,
as opposed to finding generally that the claim to be established -- e.g., a
modus for 6d -- was true or false. When a special verdict was returned, its
application -- whether or not the facts as found sustained the claim to be
established -- was a question of law for the Court.) Should the jury's
negative finding -- that tithes in kind have never been paid -- be used to
sustain the Prohibition? Or should A's failure to prove his claim as alleged be taken against him and Consultation granted? (Cf. the similar
problem in connection with preliminary proof of surmises under 2/3
Edw. 6.)
From a public point of view, the Prohibition should clearly be upheld.
If private considerations are relevant, how strong is the case against A?
The following points seem to me to be the main ones bearing on that
question:(a) Though A obviously ought to have alleged his modus correctly, confusion about tithing customs is understandable. (Imagine a
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newcomer to community, or a purchaser of land misinformed by the previous owner.) (b) On the other hand, indulgence toward careless pleading
of modi might encourage a species of fraud: A jury of friendly and selfinterested neighbors knows the custom is really 10d, but is tempted simply to find the plaintiff's allegation of 6d true, for then he will certainly
not have to pay tithes in kind, as he ought not, and a verdict for 6d will
not make it any easier for the parson to collect 10d in the future. A dishonest verdict might be hard to get away with if strong evidence of the
truth were presented at the trial, in the judge’s hearing. But the plaintiff
would only have a motive to present evidence of a 6d modus, and the defendant should not have to bear the burden of proving something he does
not believe (for his ecclesiastical suit is predicated on the claim that there
is no modus at all.) Moreover, under the still-prevailing ancient theory,
jurors were supposed to draw on their own knowledge, though judges
could, to a limited degree, control verdicts flagrantly against the evidence
as presented. The defendant in our case would be entitled to assume, especially when communal custom was in question, that the jurors knew the
truth and would declare it. Even apart from the absurdity of expecting a
man to present evidence against his interest and belief, one should not
have to hustle up evidence to make sure that jurors could not commit
fraud. Insisting on strict conformity between claim and verdict when jurors were honest would of course not prevent dishonesty, but it would
tend to condition litigants and their lawyers to be careful, and it would
catch deliberately fraudulent plaintiffs whose hopes backfired. (I.e.: one
intentionally alleges a too-low modus, gambling on the jury’s collaboration, but the jurors tell the truth. Making that man pay tithes in kind for
one year is modest punishment.)
(c) The preliminary-proof requirement affects the equities: If A. alleges 6d by an honest mistake, the necessity of finding two witnesses to
back him up gives him an occasion to discover the truth. So in principle
the proof requirement should reduce the excusability of coming to the
jury with an inaccurate claim. But complexities arise: A man says 6d, then
in looking for preliminary proof discovers that the truth is 10d. Will he be
allowed to amend his surmise? Hopefully. But suppose he cannot or does
not. His preliminary proof for 10d will probably be accepted even
though the surmise says 6d (see above). Now what is he supposed to do
when he sees a 10d verdict looming? Drop his surmise and start over
correctly? If a Consultation for non-prosecution is obtained by the other
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party, will a new Prohibition be barred by 50 Edw. 3? Perhaps when he
pleads formally he should change from 6d to 10d. But will a discrepancy
between the surmise and the declaration be held against him (see below)?
In sum: The problems of escaping from an initially inaccurate surmise
are perhaps a reason for "judging by the truth" instead of holding parties
to prove exactly what they allege.
(d) The defendant is perhaps entitled to assume, (seriously as opposed
to sportingly), that the verdict must support the plaintiff's claim exactly.
That is to say, his so assuming might affect his conduct: Suppose a parson says to himself, "I think I can make my claim to the tithes in kind
stick, at least against A. For he says he only owes me 6d That can't be
true. It's just possible that the jurors will find a 10d modus, properly
enough. I doubt it, but they might, for I know that 10d has occasionally
been taken for tithes in this parish. Maybe the jurors will infer a custom
from that. Maybe they ought to. But 6d -- that's unheard-of. A. is seriously misinformed, if not just ornery. I know that he will fail with the
jury. So I can safely count on tithes in kind from him this year." (The superior economic value of tithes in kind of course explains why there was
so much litigation over modi.) These thoughts are not unrespectable.
Both the parson's economic planning and his litigative conduct (not making an all-out effort to show that there is no modus, on the assumption
that the worst the jurors can find is a 10d modus) could be influenced by
what is probably the layman's natural guess about the law -- viz. "My adversary will surely be made to prove exactly what he is foolish enough to
believe or wicked enough to assert." Whether the law should try to conform to "the layman's natural guess about the law" is a large and persistent question. Moreover, opinions can differ over the respectability and
typicality of the thoughts I have put in a parson's head. Imagine a malevolent parson: Knowing full well that a 10d modus is the custom, he
picks out a parishioner whom he knows to be misinformed about the
amount of the modus. This parson's motive from the start is to catch a parishioner in a legal squeeze-play and extract unowned tithes. Perhaps the
second parson is more typical than the first, and the thoughts of the first
may need very little modification to pick up the flavor of sharp practice.
(e) Against the plaintiff in our case, it may be urged that he would be
in a better position if his mistake were not favorable to himself. Thus, if
one pleads a 10d modus and proves a 6d one, he should perhaps win on
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public grounds. Insisting that the mistake be unfavorable to the party before
invoking the "public stake" theory might be a compromise between fairness to the defendant as a private party and the public reasons for "judging by the truth." In sum: There is no manifestly right solution to our
exemplary case within the perspectives of private law.
Turning now to the real cases: In the early Pelles v. Saunderson,1 the
ecclesiastical suit was for grain tithes from 60 acres. A Prohibition was
obtained on the surmise that the 60 acres were recently reclaimed waste -i.e., that the land produced no crops and paid no tithes before reclamation
and was therefore exempt for seven years after reclamation by 2/3 Edw. 6.
The jury found that 30 of the 60 acres were completely barren before reclamation, but that the other 30 acres had paid tithes of lambs and wool (not
of grain.) The theoretical alternatives were: (a) Consultation for the whole
60 acres. (The plaintiff did not prove what he said was true -- that the 60
acres by reason of barrenness had never paid any tithes.) (b) Consultation
quoad only the 30 acres that paid lamb and wool tithes. This course would
involve: (i) Interpreting the statute to mean that land that had paid any
sort of tithes before reclamation was not exempt. (ii) Going by the truth
as established by verdict, rather than punishing the plaintiff for an inaccurate claim. (c) No Consultation. This would involve: (i) Interpreting the
statute to mean that land which by reason of uncultivation had never paid
grain tithes (nor, I feel sure, hay tithes) was exempt from "great tithes' -grain and hay -- for seven years after being reduced to cultivation, even
though it had previously paid some "small tithes" in virtue of grazing use.
(ii) Going by the truth, but in a different sense. I.e.: The plaintiff did not
prove what he said -- no tithes from 60 acres -- but he proved all he need
have claimed -- no great tithes from 60 acres.
The judges of both principal courts, plus the Chief Baron of the Exchequer, conferred about this case. There is no sign that the first course -Consultation for all -- was considered. It may be material that the defendant had not traversed the plaintiff's claim, but pleaded affirmatively that
the 60 acres were fruitful. (The reporter tells us, with perhaps a note of
surprise, that such pleading was said to be tolerated by Queen's Bench
1

M. 1/2 Eliz. Q.B. 2 Dyer, 1706.
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practice. It would be unacceptable by the normal canon: one should not
make an affirmative statement which amounts to an implied denial of adversary's statement without at least accompanying it by an express denial.) Thus the verdict failed to conform with the defendant's statement
as well as the plaintiff's, which is perhaps a reason for not being too hard
on the plaintiff. As between the other two courses, the judges were first
inclined to (b), but later decided on (c). So far as the spare report indicates, the change was only a matter of information: When they were disposed to (b), the judges were under the impression that the ecclesiastical
suit covered the lamb and wool tithes as well as the grain. When they got
the facts straight and saw that the parson could recover his lamb and wool
tithes by starting a new suit -- i.e., without a Consultation in this one -they had no apparent hesitation about taking course (c). In sum, Pelles v.
Saunderson comes to authority for "judging by the truth," but owing to its
complications it is not clear authority for simple cases such as our example above. It points to one kind of reason for "judging by the truth," a reason that would not hold in simple cases -- viz. legal ambiguity: The
plaintiff in Pelles v. Saunderson may have drawn his claim as he did because he thought his only chance of asserting the exemption from grain
tithes for all 60 acres was to show that none of the land had ever paid
tithes of any sort. That would have been a legal miscalculation, not a
matter of factual misinformation. To the degree, at least, that it was a legitimate miscalculation, perhaps it should not be held against him. (The
report is too brief to show whether the judges were in serious doubt about
the statute's meaning, As far as it goes, they hardly seem to have been.)
In a case of 1609,2 Chief Justice Coke cited a Queen's Bench judgment from 19 Eliz. ( 1576) in favor of "judging by the truth" in simple modus cases: Plaintiff-in-Prohibition said that the commutation he claimed
was customarily paid at Michaelmas. The jury found that there was a modus; but that the custom was to pay at Pentecost. The Prohibition was upheld in spite of the discrepancy. Coke used "public stake" language in
explaining that decision (whether he was interpreting or stating from a re2

M. 7 Jac. C.P. Add. 25,211, f. 189; Harg. 52, f.29. The same citation from 19 Eliz. appears as a
noto in 13 Coke, 58, where Chief Baron Tanfield is said to have a MS. report of the case, and the
case is said to have been "well-debated." The 1576 case is also cited in Chambers v. Hanburye
below.
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port the reasons actually given in 1576): "...because it goes to the jurisdiction of the court; though the prescription is not found in the manner common in law, yet it suffices." In other words: In a purely private matter, if
issue were taken on prescriptive title it would have to be more strictly
sustained by the verdict, but here there is a public interest. Quaere
whether a mistake as to the day of payment is more trivial and hence excusable than other mistakes, e.g., as to the amount of a modus. Probably
there is no difference: the important thing is that the verdict showed no
tithes in kind due.
In Folcot v. Ridge,3 the parties were at issue on a modus for hay tithes
from certain specified land. The jury found that there was a modus, but
also that part of the land had never been mowed (in which case, there
could not possibly be a modus for hay.) The verdict did not, however,
specify which of the acres in question had never been mowed. The Court
upheld the Prohibition, on the ground that the defendant had not contested
whether all the land had been mowed. In one sense, the Court went by the
substance, as opposed to punishing the plaintiff for an inaccurate claim:
The plaintiff said such and such specified land was subject to a certain
modus. The jury said in effect, "Money is indeed given in respect of such
hay as is grown within the area specified, but is not true that there is a hay
modus applying to exactly the land to which the plaintiff says it applies,
for some of that land has never produced hay." In another sense, the
Court cared more about pleading-logic than the truth: If the defendant's
traverse of the modus implied an admission of the plaintiff's implied
claim that all the land mentioned was hay land, then the reality could be
ignored. Quaere whether it would have made a difference if the jury had
said what specific land had never been mowed. (The reporter takes special note of its indefiniteness.)
In Chambers v. Hanburye,4 plaintiff-in-Prohibition claimed a modus to
pay a certain sum for all tithes "at every time when he shall be required."
His evidence was offered to the Court for evaluation before any verdict.
(A common practice. A party could "demur to the evidence" -- i.e., concede the factual truth of the evidence, but contest its legal sufficiency to
3
4

T. 36 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 333.
M. 40/41 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.14.
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maintain the claim of the party offering it. The Court must then determine the validity of that legal assertion. As this case shows, however, decision on the legal effect of the evidence did not necessarily conclude the
matter between parties.) The evidence showed that the money was customarily paid at Lammas, not as the plaintiff said, on demand. Tanfield,
at the Bar, argued that only the existence of the modus, not the day of
payment or whether there was a fixed day, was relevant, citing the case of
19 Elizabeth above. The judges said they would be of Tanfield's opinion
if the jury returned a special verdict. (The plaintiff's evidence was held
good for his purpose, despite the discrepancy, but the evidence was not
treated as equivalent to a verdict. A special verdict finding the modus to
pay at Lammas would be considered a verdict for the plaintiff, but the
jury was left free to bring in some other verdict.)
One late Elizabethan report5 underscores the limits of "judging by the
truth" in modus cases. An opinion is reported, without specified context,
to the following effect: Plaintiff-in-Prohibition alleges a 20/ modus. The
truth is that he has always paid money instead of tithes in kind, but sometimes he had paid less or more than 20/. Held: The plaintiff's prescription
here fails, even though there is only one established instance of a different
sum paid. The point here is really substantive, not procedural: A modus
by nature is a custom of paying so much for tithes. If one alleged a modus
to pay various sums, or an uncertain sum, the prescription would be bad
on its face. Therefore, to prove a practice, even from time immemorial,
of paying one sum this year and another sum that year is manifestly not to
prove any modus at all -- which is not the same as proving a different
modus from the one alleged. I cite the case here because the existence of
the report suggests that an argument from permissive application of verdicts may have been made: Jury A says "Tithes in kind have never been
paid, but the commutation that ought to be paid is 10d, not 6d as the
plaintiff alleges." Jury B says "Tithes in kind have never been paid, but
we cannot say that 20/ should be paid as a commutation, as the plaintiff
alleges -- for all we know positively is that various sum of money have
been paid." The negative statement common to the two verdicts makes
for a superficial similarity. It perhaps encourages arguing that if the negation in the first is more important than the affirmation, so should it be
5

Lansd. 1172, f.53. Dated T. 40/41 Eliz., which cannot be correct. M. 40/41? T.40? T.41?

183

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
in the second. But as the report implies, the point is badly taken. (And
note: We as yet have no cases directly holding that a 10d verdict will sustain a 6d claim.)
Nowell v. Hicks6 presents the converse of the last case: a bad substantive point against plaintiff-in-Prohibition which may have got its
color from procedural problems. Here, the jury found that the communal
modus alleged by the plaintiff had obtained up to 20 years ago, but added
that within the last 20 years some parishioners had paid in kind. Justices
Clench and Fenner, alone in Court, thought this was a plain finding for
the plaintiff. Surely it was, for as a matter of substance a modus was not
destroyed by an interruption -- i.e., by the mere fact that the de jure thing
was done instead of the customary thing in specific instances. (Though of
course instances of payment in kind could count as evidence against a
modus -- perhaps as a evidence to conclude a jury in the absence of any
positive evidence of the alleged custom.) No arguments contra are reported, only that the plantiff's counsel moved for judgement and argued
that he should have it because the verdict was in his favor. From the fact
that he had to argue, I would infer that the other party was making
trouble, or at least that the Court was expected to have some hesitation. I
can see a possible basis for momentary hesitation in a superficial resemblance to discrepant-verdict cases: If a man who pleads a 6d modus and
proves a 10d one should lose (quaere whether he should), then what
about a man whose plea says that tithes in kind have never been paid in
the parish, and whom a special verdict likewise in one sense supports and
in one sense contradicts? But surely a plaintiff-in-Prohibition who alleges a perfectly true and legally valid modus in the parish is not by implication saying that the custom has always been observed de facto by every
parishioner. Surely he is not bound to anticipate and explain away in his
plea such facts as might count against him in evidence.
Hall v. Spencer7 contains the same point as Nowell v. Hicks, plus others which make it a much more material discrepant-verdict case. Here, a
modus (16d for hay tithes) was laid in a manor. I.e.: The tithing custom
was alleged to be the custom of the manor, applicable to its customary
6
7

M. 43/44 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.384b.
P. 1 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,203, f.684.
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tenants (copyholders). Manors were local units -- comparable to parishes,
towns, etc. -- capable of having their own tithing customs. as well as other
customs of their own at odds with general law. The jury found a special
verdict, as follows: (a) The land whereof tithes in kind were demanded
is customary land of the manor, as alleged. (b) The customary tenants of
the manor have used to pay the 16d commutation up to 23 years ago.
(c) For the last 23 years, they have paid sometimes more than 16d, sometimes less.
The three puisne justices of the King's Bench (Chief Justice Popham
being absent in the Star Chamber) made the following determinations:
(a) Cessation of observation of the modus for 23 years does not destroy it.
The verdict is not against the plaintiff because it shows such a cessation.
(b) The verdict is, however, against the plaintiff for another reason: The
jury did not find a custom of the manor, as alleged -- i.e., a modus within
and throughout that local unit, applying to its customary tenants. Rather,
it found the customary practice of a group of people, holders of a particular group of tenements, the customary tenements of that manor. It is as if
A. alleged a parochial modus and the jury found a modus applying only to
a particular piece of land. A -- and so the plaintiff in this case -- has a
perfectly good claim to the commutation, but he must allege it correctly.
There are two kinds of modi -- those pervading a local unit capable of its
own custom (parish, town, manor, etc.) and those peculiar to particular
pieces of land, singular or plural ("the close called Greencroft," or "all the
customary tenements in the Manor of Dale"). A man must correctly allege which kind of modus he has, as between those two kinds. A jury
must answer the question "Is such-and-such the local modus?" if that is
the question it is asked. It may not say "No -- but the plaintiff has always
paid a certain commutation in respect of his particular tenement," or "We
do not know -- but the plaintiff has always paid a certain commutation in
respect of his particular temenent." (c) Since, however, it appears from
the verdict that the parson has no right to tithes in kind, a Consultation
should not be granted.
Rather, a new Venire facias (i.e., another jury to retry the issue) should
be awarded. I.e.: Instead of punishing the plaintiff for what was not his
fault, the Court "punished" the jury (and tacitly, perhaps, the trial judge)
for rendering an unnecessary special verdict. If the jurors believed that
the customary tenants of the manor had always paid the commutation,
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save for the recent cessation, they were in a position to find that the custom of the manor was as the plaintiff said it was. The possibility that the
jurors could in good conscience find only a modus applying to particular
tenements was merely theoretical. In reality, no doubt, the jurors and trial
judge were confused by the 23-year cessation. Being unsure that they
could affirm the plaintiff’s claim as stated when the custom had not been
observed in recent years, they chose and were permitted (for trial judges
undoubtedly exercised a good deal of control over whether juries returned
general or special verdicts) simply to return the facts as they knew them.
In doing so, they inadvertently stated the facts in such a way, that strictly
construed, they failed to support the plaintiff‘s claim. A new jury could
be expected more or less automatically to return a proper general verdict
for the plaintiff, the law having been clarified. The solution arrived at
was liberal and fair. The more liberal and more economical alternative
would have been to refuse a Consultation simpliciter, without a new Venire facias to establish a logically elegant record. In rejecting that alternative, the Court implied a rule for the simpler parallel case: A man
alleges a parochial custom and the jury finds a modus applying only to the
plaintiff and his predecessors in estate with respect to a particular tenement. There, Consultation should be granted, for the plaintiff has without
excuse misstated his modus, even though it is evident that he does not
owe tithes in kind. Simply denying Consultation in the principal case,
where the plaintiff was not at fault, would tend to encourage similar permissiveness in the parallel case where he is at fault. (That is to say,
where he can be considered to be too much at fault to win. It is of course
not inevitable that he be so regarded.)
In Berrie’s Case (1617),8 a parochial modus for hay tithes was
claimed. The jury returned a special verdict: There was such a modus ap8

T. 15 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5149, f.98; Hobart, 192. I follow the MS. except at the point noted, for
Hobart’s report is plainly of his own opinion only, giving no suggestion of the division in the
Court. Hobart’s thoughts (perhaps rather that than what he actually said in Court) as reported by
himself took account of the “public stake” theory of Prohibitions: “...we shall never give them a
Consultation to proceed in all, no nor in part, where the suit appears to us originally ill-founded,
and a Prohibition leaves more power in this Court, than the other actions, in as much as it locks
up that Court [the ecclesiastical] which cannot require it to be opened but with a key of right and
justice...” This is strong language, hard to reconcile with Hobart’s agreement (in the MS.) with
Warburton’s case of a 6/ modus alleged and a 12/ modus established.
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plying to most of the parish, but one particular tract of meadowland customarily paid tithes in kind. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition had five acres in that
tract. Upon this verdict, the Court was presented with two choices: (a) A
general Consultation, for the issue was manifestly not found for the plaintiff according to his claim. (b) A Consultation quoad only the five acres
which clearly owed tithes in kind. The judges were divided as to which
course to take. Chief Justice Hobart and Justice Winch favored the partial
consultation. They embraced the general policy of "judging according to
the truth," relied on Pelles v. Saunderson as supporting that policy, and
maintained that it was consistent with practice in ordinary private suits.
(As to the last point: Hobart put the case of an action of Debt on a tenant's obligation not to commit waste. Suppose the lessor alleges that the
lessee did waste by cutting 20 trees and the jury returns that he cut ten
trees. Although, Hobart said, this verdict is strictly speaking against the lessor, it will be taken in his favor -- i.e., the lessee will be held to have committed waste and hence to have forfeited his obligation. So in the
principal case, though the verdict is strictly speaking against the plaintiff - and the jury might, if it had chosen, have given a general verdict against
him -- the special verdict will be taken in his favor so far as possible -i.e., with respect to all but the five acres. To emphasize the private law
parallel is to de-emphasize the "public stake" in Prohibitions. In the MS.
version, nothing is said of the special character of Prohibitions, but Hobart's report of his own opinion shows that he had it in mind. See note 8.)
Justice Hutton took the opposite view: The verdict was simply against
the plaintiff, so that a general Consultation should be granted. Hutton for
his part claimed good common law to support him (citing a prescription
where one claimed to have been seised of a vill from the time of Henry
VIII and the jury found that he was seised from Henry VII -- held, the
prescription fails in toto even though the truth was more on the party's
side than he imagined.) Though he speaks less directly, Justice Warburton
plainly agreed with Hutton. He says simply that the verdict is "void,"
then lays down an important parallel rule: If one claims a 6/ modus and
the jury finds a 12/ modus, the issue is found against the plaintiff (implying that Consultation should be granted even though tithes in kind are
manifestly not due.) This rule the rest of the Court conceded, notwithstanding the judges' disagreement in the principal case. The first and
only judicial statement -- a dictum -- on the problem in our "exemplary
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case" above goes plainly against "judging by the truth." The ultimate disposition of Berrie's Case is not reported. We are left with a picture of the
Court evenly divided on the important question at issue.
The only case8a in the present line later than Berrie's, is a relatively weak
instance of liberalism: A modus of 40/ for all tithes was claimed as applying
to the scite and demesnes of a manor owed by Crane, Plaintiff-in-Prohibition.
The evidence showed that part of manor had been severed before Crane purchased it. (Assume A. owned the unit prescriptively identified as the Manor
of Dale. A. conveys some of the demesnes to B. and the rest to Crane, in
the name of the Manor of Dale. Crane has the manor -- i.e., is lord with
the jurisdictional rights of a lord that comes to him -- while B.'s land is
severed from it -- i.e., no longer part of that manor or any other.) The effect of the severance was that the 40/ modus applied to more land than the
scite and demesnes of the manor, to which Crane's plea applied it. The
Court held upon this evidence (not upon a verdict incorporating it) that
Crane's prescription was good despite the discrepancy between the exact
truth and his claim. Having applied the modus to the unit to which it applied prescriptively (the manor), Crane was not obliged to spell out the
further circumstance that he was not the owner of all the ancient manor,
or that what the modus now applied to was the manor-plus. (Note that
Crane's "mistake" of a sort was against himself He did not, so far as the
present record showed, dispute his duty to pay 40/, even thought he did
not possess all the land covered by that modus.)
From the cases above, we must conclude that the courts never reached
a firm policy of "judging by the truth" when verdicts failed to fit plaintiffs' claims. Sometimes they so judged. They tended to be liberal towards plaintiffs who were not at fault, or scarcely at fault, in stating
claims that turned out not to be provable exactly as stated. But they cannot be said to have embraced the "public stake" theory so boldly as to
overlook the party's fault and the imperatives of procedural correctness.
They did not say "The conclusive truth of the verdict is the decisive information to the Court. If on the basis of that information Prohibition should
lie, it will lie, however things stand between plaintiff and defendant."
The divided Court in the late-Jacobean Berrie's Case -- and the dictum in
that case -- do not recommend "judging by the truth" very strongly. The
doubts in that case do not really go against the weight of earlier holdings.
8a Crane v. ---. M. 13 Car. C.P. Harg. 23, f.15.
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Coke came closer than any other judge to endorsing "judging by the
truth" on public grounds as a general policy.

C.
Misconceived Surmises
Summary: A plaintiff who claimed a Prohibition on the basis of a
misconceived legal theory, but was plainly entitled to one on a different
theory, had a good chance of being helped out by the Court, according to
the "legal truth," provided the claim he originally relied on had not been
falsified by verdict. This conclusion, however, depends on slight and ambiguous evidence.

* * *
The cases in the last group ask whether the truth as established by verdict or conceded evidence should be decisive, notwithstanding discrepancies between that truth and the party's claim. Whether or not to "judge by
the truth" (or give primacy to the public interest in Prohibitions, or do
substantial justice in spite of the party's error) could arise in other ways
as well. Suppose a plaintiff-in-Prohibition misconceives the law and
draws his surmise in accord with his misconception, so that the defendant
would have grounds for demurring. But suppose it is clear on the face of
things that the plaintiff would be entitled to a Prohibition on a different
legal theory than the one he has adopted. Should the Court help him out,
or should it leave him to consequences of his folly -- and leave an improper suit in the hands of a "foreign" court? A few cases raised that
question.
In Brewer et al. v. Dawson (1597),9 a parson sued for tithes computed
as one-tenth of the rent the parishioners paid for their houses. At common law, as the judges clearly agreed, the parson had no claim to such
tithes -- i.e., men had no duty to pay what amounted to a real-estate tax to
the Church. Actually, the parson's claim was not all that absurd, for he
based it on prescription. Generally speaking, non-tithable products, such
as minerals or ocean fish, could be subject to tithes by special custom. In
this case, however, the judges also clearly agreed that the parson's prescriptive title was bad (because he claimed the "real-estate tax" as the cus9

M. 39/40 Eliz. C.P. Harl. 1631, f.272b.
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tomary commutation for other things which in their turn were legally nontithable.) Therefore, the parishioners had an open-and-shut claim to Prohibition on the ground that they were being sued for tithes which were
simply not due by the law. However, they did not make that claim. Instead, they surmised that they paid certain other tithes in lieu of any
charge on their houses. As a defense to a tithe suit, that was bad by wellestablished principles, as the judges again clearly agreed: A man sued for
hay tithes could not escape them by alleging a modus to pay corn tithes
instead. Payment of one species of tithes was never good consideration
for exemption from another species.
Because the surmise in Brewer et al. v. Dawson was founded on a manifestly untenable legal theory, the defendant moved for Consultation. After discussing the case on two occasions, the Court decided unanimously
to deny the Consultation. For it was clear from the parson's libel ( attached to the surmise as required by statute ) that he had no claim and
should have been prohibited on a correctly drawn surmise. It should be
noted that the case arose on motion for Consultation, before formal pleading. If the plaintiffs had declared on their misconceived surmise and the
defendant had demurred, could judgment for the defendant have been
avoided? (The propriety of Consultation on motion is discussed as a distinct topic below. There was no mention of that problem in this case.)
In Baxter v. Hope (1611),10 a parishioner did essentially what the
plaintiffs in Brewer et al. v. Dawson did -- alleged a modus when the
proper claim would have been de jure exemption from the tithes sued for.
The tithe suit was in part for "after-crop and stubble." (After corn was
harvested, another crop of some sort was grown in the cornfield during
the same year and/ or the stubble was grazed. The parson was suing for
tithes of such by-products.) The parishioner said in his surmise and his
declaration thereon that the custom was for householders to pay corn
tithes and in consideration thereof to be discharged of tithes of aftercrops. That is to say, the plaintiff pleaded what looked like a modus. But
taken as a modus, the claim here was presumably bad: paying corn tithes
could not be good consideration for exemption from tithes of after-crops,
10

M. 9 Jac. C.P. Harg. 15, f.260.
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assuming the latter owed tithes de jure. When the defendant demurred to
the declaration in this case, the Court faced two question: (a) Should the
plaintiff's claim be construed as a modus? (b) Assuming that the claim,
despite its appearance, is not to be taken a modus, are after-crops tithable
de jure? A majority of the Court said "no" to the first question, Justice
Foster dissenting. The Court then proceeded to decide that no tithes were
due from after-crops by the law. (A conclusion which accords with most
opinion on that often-discussed question).
Baxter v. Hope is an instance of "judging by the truth" or "helping the
party out of his legal mistakes," but in a more complex sense than Brewer
v. Dawson. Strictly speaking, the majority of the Court understood the
plaintiff as claiming a de jure exemption. The judges (save for Foster)
did not say. "The plaintiff has made the mistake of claiming an invalid
modus, but we will find for him anyhow since he never ought to have
been sued for such tithes." They said instead, "The appearance of the
claim is deceptive -- it really amounts to claiming a de jure exemption, or
at least admits of such interpretation." Color of a sort can be given to that
reading of the plaintiff's claim. There is a sense in which the theory behind legal exemptions from tithes of after- crops "sounded in exchange,"
or involved the notion of "consideration": A given field produces its
main annual crop, on which tithes are paid. Therefore (in consideration
thereof, considering that fact) subsidiary crops are tithe-free -- for postharvest use of a field, while it may be incidentally profitable to the user,
contributes to the upkeep of the field, or at least to the general maintenance of the farmer's husbandry, and hence to the ultimate value of the
parson's tithes on the main crop.
Therefore, a plea which cites payment of tithes for the principal crop as
"consideration" for exemption quoad after-crops can be taken as merely
invoking the theory on which the de jure exception of the latter is based -i.e., as innocuous "surplusage." However, as Justice Foster presumably
thought, such construction strains against the apparent tendency of the
claim's language and ignores the probable motive behind it. As to the latter: A man hopes to claim de jure exemption, but he is not sure that the
Court will hold that after-crops are intrinsically tithe-free. So he draws
his claim to keep all options open. "Maybe the Court will think the aftercrops are intrinsically exempt and will find a way of deciding in my favor
whatever I say. But if the judges think the after-crops are legally subject
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to tithes, maybe I can make out a modus, notwithstanding the general
rule that one tithe cannot be consideration for another. For perhaps it can
be plausibly argued that non-payment on after-crops from time immemorial was presumptively in consideration of the increased value of the main
crop by virtue of post-harvest use -- in other words, that this is not a true
case of claiming to pay one tithe in consideration of another." I strongly
suspect that such calculations -- the strategy of a lawyer, not the simplicity of a layman -- were behind the plaintiff's position in Baxter v. Hope,
for the case falls in an intricate and problematic area of tithe law. The
question then arises whether such strategy should be indulged. The usual
motive for a professionally drawn ambiguous claim -- i.e. for avoiding a
clear stand on one legal theory or another -- is hoping for the best of both
worlds. Does the value of substantial justice, in general or in Prohibition
cases particularly, outweigh the value of discouraging what might be
called "cheating on the common law" (i.e., inventing ways of fishing for
substantial justice in defiance of the common law's pervasive "take your
choice" philosophy -- the philosophy that said "Traverse or demur,"
"Make your declaration accord with the writ you have brought or find another writ that suits you better")?
Thus, when the majority in Baxter v. Hope understood the plaintiff as
claiming a de jure exemption it committed a colorable, but strained and
lenient, act of construction. Strictly speaking, the Court did not endorse
"judging by the truth" regardless of the plaintiff's handling of his claim.
If a man came forward with what could only be regarded as a bad modus
(a prescription to pay hay tithes in consideration of after-crops from cornfields would be an example), the decision in Baxter v. Hope would perhaps leave room for holding against him despite the Court's conviction
that after- crops were exempt de jure. Strictly speaking, the decision endorses "judging by the truth" only in the form of the rule: "When possible,
construe claims in such a way that the legally correct result can be produced." The Court's language (probably per Chief Justice Coke) was
certainly broad enough to embrace such a rule, if not a still more general
policy in favor of substantial justice and the public interest in Prohibitions
(for the Court did not make the pretense of merely construing, of giving
mildly ambiguous language a sense it could easily be made to bear):
"...Foster... said that it is not good law that the payment of tithes in one
kind should be satisfaction for tithes in another kind or in the same kind
for part in the same kind, but the other judges said, as to that, that it is
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only surplusage here to show a prescription, but we as judges will adjudge according to the law, which is that he will be discharged..." (My
italics).
In the King's Bench case of Jouce v. Parker,11 plaintiff-in-Prohibition
tried unsuccessfully to take advantage of the same legal "truth" -- de jure
tithe-exemption -- that prevailed over bad pleading in the preceding cases.
The form of the case was different, however. Here, a parishioner pleaded
exemption by way of modus from tithes on two classes of "dry cattle."
("Dry" means "not in milk-production. The two classes were draughtoxen and heifers. Their tithes, if they owed any, would be equal to onetenth of the herbage they consumed.) The parson traversed the alleged
modus, rather than taking exception to it on legal grounds. The jury
found for the parson -- i.e., that tithes in kind had always been paid for
the dry cattle. The parishioner then moved in arrest of judgment on the
ground that dry cattle were exempt from tithes from tithes de jure. The
Court turned down the motion.
How much does this holding imply? Hardly that a party who unwisely
stands on prescription will always be struck with his folly. Here the parishioner said that tithes in kind had never been paid, whereas the truth established by verdict was that they had regularly been paid and no
commutation paid in their stead. It does not follow from that verdict-truth
that they ought to have been paid, or that the parson was entitled to maintain a suit for them qua tithes in kind. The verdict does, however, suggest
that the parson might be entitled to the tithes by way of prescription (assuming, realistically, that dry cattle were exempt de jure -- though the
Court did not need to decide that question in this case.) If he were so entitled, he of course ought to sue by way of prescription. Nevertheless, it
would be hard to deprive the parson of his tithes when both the factual
truth and the parishioner's fault in misconceiving his claim weighed on
the parson's side. In the preceding two cases, the parson moved for Consultation and demurred, respectively. There is perhaps a sense in which a
party who takes his stand on the law expresses faith in the general legal
justice of his claim, not simply his belief that he can "take apart" the
other party's claim as stated. (Cf. my argument above on every plaintiff's
11

T. 18 Jac. K.B. Croke Jac., 575.
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implied faith in his suit's "natural justice.") In this case, on the other
hand, the parson made no statement construable as such an "expression of
faith." He simply said, "The plaintiff is not telling the truth," and the jury
backed him up. It seems more unfair to turn back and help out a party
who has demonstrably "not told the truth" -- who has thus vexed someone
else with a "false" suit -- than to come to the assistance of someone who
has only mistaken the law. (This point would apply to our "6d. modus,
10d verdict" case above, except insofar as some untruths -- untruths in details, as to dates of payment, amounts, etc. -- may be regarded as more excusable than others.)
In sum, there are reasons for distinguishing misconceived claims challenged by legal exception from those falsified in their terms by jury trial.
To judge by the brief report, the Court in Jouce v. Parker probably did
not worry about that distinction as such -- as opposed to seeing intuitively
that the legally foolhardy and factually falsified parishioner was in a weak
position. In addition to that general perception, the Court relied on another point against the parishioner: To one intent, his motion in arrest of
judgement was based on a legal error. In stating his ill-fated modus, the
parishioner applied it to other people's draught-oxen grazed for hire on
his land, as well as his own draught-oxen. The Court thought that the
other people's oxen were clearly tithable (in accord with the better option.) I.e.: De jure, a man who took money for use of his grazing-land
("agistment") owed tithes on the herbage consumed by the guest-cattle.
Therefore the "agisted" beasts could only be exempt by way of modus, and
the verdict showed they were not.
This consideration would not necessarily stand in the way of arresting
judgment quoad the parishioner's own oxen and heifers and granting
Consultation quoad the guest-oxen only. But perhaps it adds to the equities against the parishioner (and proportionately reduces the general
meaning of the decision): After starting off on the wrong track and failing to establish facts favorable to himself, the parishioner was trying to
escape by arresting judgment -- and even then he was being legally careless and/or greedy. For instead of trying to escape only insofar as he had
a fairly good case in substance (with respect to his own oxen and heifers),
he also, on the face of his motion, hoped to escape quoad the agisted cattle, where the Court thought he plainly had no case.
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Norton v. Fermer12 raised the same point as Jouce v. Parker and came
out the same way, but the shape of the case and reasons for the decision
were slightly different. Here, the ecclesiastical suit was for tithes of
wood. Unlike (in all probability) most dry cattle, wood was perfectly
tithable de jure. There was, however, a vein of opinion (probably the
stronger vein) that wood used for fuel in a man's house was exempt by
law. In this case, the parishioner got a Prohibition on surmise that the
wood in question was used as fuel and that by custom wood so used was
tithe-free. (The report does not tell what consideration was alleged. As
with after-crops, it was easy to say that exemptions of firewood were in
consideration of something -- and similarly easy to defend common law
exemption as based on a universal or presumptive "consideration." A
man must be able to heat his house in order to maintain an agricultural establishment. Therefore, the parson can be said to exchange tithes of fuel-wood
for the greater value of other tithes that will come from a decently maintained
"family," or agricultural establishment. So to speak, keeping the family
from freezing to death was deductible as a legitimate business expense,
by common law or customary law as the case might be.) The parson in
Norton v. Fermer traversed the custom, and the jury found in his favor.
The parishioner then moved in arrest of judgment: that even though there
was no such custom, fuel-wood was exempt de jure. The Court denied
the motion. In explaining the decision, it gave two reasons: (a) The judges
12

T. 4 Car. C.P. Croke Car., 113; Littleton, 152. I follow Croke in the text because it purports to
give the final per curiam judgment. Littleton gives an earlier discussion (same term) ending with
an adjournment. Littleton reveals disagreement among the judges, which I take to have been
composed later. Justice Hutton argued for the view finally adopted, at least as the better opinion
-- that fuel-wood is only exemptible by custom -- while Justice Croke argued that it is exempt de
jure.
Croke also expressly endorsed "judging by the truth" in the case of a misconceived
surmise, because in his opinion that was what should be done in case of a variant verdict. (He
puts the case of an alleged 4d. modus and a verdict for 3d. and says no Consultation should be
granted.)
Hutton cited two cases, not independently reported, in his favor: (a) A Dr. Graunt's Case, which
sounds exactly like Brewer et al. v. Dawson, except that the plaintiff who misconceived his
claim tried to escape only after verdict, by motion in arrest of judgement. According to Hutton,
consultation was granted. (b) Another case, cited in Dr. Graunt's, where one entitled to the
statutory exemption for timber-trees mistakenly relied on a custom. There too a motion in arrest
of judgment was denied and Consultation granted in keeping with a verdict against the custom.

195

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
did not think -- or did not think it clear- -- that fuel-wood was exempt de
jure. ("Or did not think it clear": I question whether it is correct to say
that fuel-wood was not exempt de jure. "Correct" or not, this Court said so
in terms and may well have thought so. However, the report suggests to
me that the judges' stance was less-than-dogmatic. They said -- correctly
-- that it was "usual" for customs to be alleged in fuel- wood cases, and
that "hearth-penny" -- a small monetary payment--was often alleged as
consideration for discharge from fuel-tithes. The judges may have meant
to say, "Whether or not fuel is exempt de jure -- however we would decide that question if it were raised straightforwardly -- the frequency of
custom- based claims to this exemption is prima facie reason for doubting
that the motion in arrest of judgment is well-founded in the abstract.") (b)
In any event, the parishioner took his stand on the custom and lost -- he
cannot escape by the back door now.
If the Court in Norton v. Fermer believed flatly (subject only to possible correction after full-scale adversary debate on a demurrer) that there
was no de jure exemption, the decision has little meaning for our present
purposes. If the Court was only inclined so to believed, the decision need
only mean, "Parties should not be helped out unless it is quite clear offhand that they could have won if they had not misconceived their claims. The
Court should not spend its time giving all due consideration to a weak
contention, or debating a dubious or difficult one, in order to come to the
aid of someone who could have helped himself." In this case, in addition
to the doubtfulness of the parishioners' legal contention, a material fact
was in a sense outstanding: Was the wood in question actually used for
fuel? Legally, the parson's traverse of the custom no doubt implied admission that it was , but the real truth had never been tried. Would it be
fair to trap the parson in his legal admission while relieving the delinquent parishioner?
For a final hypothesis as to the Court's view of the substantive question: The large number of "precedents" of custom-based claims to fueltithe exemption relied on by the judges suggests the possibility of treating
law-based and custom- based claims to the exemption as true options. It
is logically puzzling to say "This product is tithe-free de jure, but a man
may prescribe to pay a commutation for tithes of this product." Logically, either custom-based claims should be good if factually true and
law-based claims should be bad, or vice versa. The Court in this case was

196

Judging by the Truth
inclined to be logical: i.e., to conclude that law-based claims were bad
from the presumption that the many custom-based claims that had been
made were not all ill-conceived (a perfectly acceptable presumption in
17th-century jurisprudence, where practice-precedents or "repeated de
facto happenings" were allowed considerable force.) But perhaps this
logic is not entirely compelling. Non-tithable products were tithable by
prescription. In order to "save" the precedents, one might conceivably interpret custom-based claims in the case of a particular product, such as
fuel-wood, as founded on an admission, not of the parson's de jure title,
but of his prescriptive title, against which a counter-prescription could be
invoked.
Counter-prescriptions raise logical problems of their own, but those
problems perhaps admit solution. On this theory, one could say that as a
matter of law fuel-wood was exempt de jure, but also hold a party, such
as the parishioner in this case, absolutely to his custom-based claim once
he made it -- for there would be no sense in which it was ill-conceived.
Despite the rather elaborate hypotheticalness of this line of argument, I
doubt that it can be overlooked as a possible construction of the Court's
thinking in Norton v. Fermer. The point is that the Court could have held
several positions on the legal issue -- whether fuel-wood was exempt de
jure or not -- and still reach the same conclusion. I think it is quite likely
that the Court did hold several positions, in the sense that it saw vaguely,
and saw that it did not need to sharpen its vision, that the plaintiff had no
case, "whichever way you slice it."
In summary: On the basis of the four cases above, one would be entitled to conclude that the courts would help out plaintiffs-in-Prohibition
who founded their claims on a misconceived legal theory when and if the
plaintiff's claim was challenged legally. On the other hand, the courts
frowned on attempts to escape ill-conceived claims by motion in arrest of
judgment after verdict. I am not sure, however, that I would invariably
advise my client against making such a motion in arrest of judgment, for
sharper cases can be imagined than either of the two on that point above.
For example, suppose A. is sued for tithes of a flagrantly non-tithable
product, such as coal. Suppose A. claims a flagrantly unlawful prescriptive exemption -- alleges no consideration whatever. Instead of demurring, the parson traverses. The jury finds for the parson (that there is no
such custom of non-payment.) Will a motion in arrest of judgment fail in
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this case? (This case differs from Jouce v. Parker (a). in that no consideration is alleged for the exemption, making it "flagrantly unlawful," (b)
in the implications of the verdict, owing to the character of the product.
In Jouce v. Parker, the verdict implied that the parson had received tithes
for dry cattle from time immemorial -- not necessarily rightfully, but de
facto. Minerals, on the other hand tended by nature -- and I am far from
certain that judges would close their eyes to such reality -- to be "oneshot," limited, or recently exploited products. When the jury says there is
no custom of non-payment, it hardly can be assumed to mean that the parson has been collecting tithes on this parishioner's coal from time immemorial. If that were true, there would not be any coal left to litigate about.
The jury must only mean that a few instances of tithe payment, or the
very fact that coal has only been mined within recent memory, force it to
conclude that here is no such custom as alleged. Admittedly the imaginary case would be unlikely to occur, but it is perhaps worth considering
by way of emphasizing that the strongest case on motions in arrest of
judgment, Jouce v. Parker, has it limitations.

D.
"Legal Truth," Miscellaneous
Alongside the cases above on discrepant verdicts and misconceived
claims, we may consider two cases where, in different circumstances, the
courts were asked to "judge by the truth," or bail out a legally entitled
party who had mishandled his cause. In Pringe v. Child (1603),13 a vicar
sued the parson of the same parish for small tithes. (Such a suit is in no
way surprising. The vicar claimed to be endowed with the small tithes -i.e., tithes other than corn and hay. The commonest arrangement between
vicar and parson was for the small tithes to go to the former, the great to
the latter. The parson here had carried off the parishioners' small tithes,
refused to pay them in respect of his own land, or both.) The parson got a
Prohibition on surmise of a prescriptive right to the small tithes as against
the vicar. In pleading to the Prohibition, the vicar relied on his endowment of 1310. The parson demurred to that plea, whereupon the Court
gave judgment for the vicar and granted Consultation. (A plainly correct
13

P. 3 Jac. K.B. Lansd. 1111, f.60; Add. 25,209, f.36; Noy, 3 (dated T. 2 Jac.). Lansd. 1111 is the
good report. The others are too brief to bring out the point with which we are concerned here.
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decision: even if the parson had been collecting and not paying small
tithes continually since 1310, the usage would not be immemorial, and
the parson could not be admitted to prescribe against his own endowment
-- "his own" in the sense of "the parson's qua corporate person.") The
suit having been returned to the ecclesiastical court, sentence was given
for the vicar. The parson appealed. When the appellate court was on the
point of reversing the sentence below, the vicar got a Prohibition on surmise of his endowment, hut without mentioning the former judgment in
his favor. The parson demurred.
It is at this point that our problem arises. In the Court's opinion, the
vicar's claim to a Prohibition on the basis of his endowment was bad.
(Clearly correct: Contentions between vicar and parson as to who was
entitled to which tithes, and hence over the terms of endowments, were
often affirmed to belong to ecclesiastical jurisdiction.) On the other hand,
in the Court's opinion, the vicar could have validly claimed a Prohibition
by reciting the earlier judgment. (The Court may have meant, "The invalidation of the parson's title to the tithes, insofar as it depended on the
prescription as against the endowment, in the prior common law suit concluded the ecclesiastical courts. The case was sent back by Consultation
in order to allow the ecclesiastical courts to do what the lower ecclesiastical court did -- give sentence for the vicar -- not to abjudicate the matter
by its own standards, as the appellate court proposed to do." This proposition can be questioned. When the common law decides, for whatever
reason, that Prohibition does not lie and sends a suit back by general Consultation, can it not be argued that the ecclesiastical courts ought to be
free to handle the case by their own lights?
But even if this point is conceded -- and even if the Court in our case
did not necessarily deny it -- the vicar ought still to have pleaded the
prior judgment. Thereby he would at least state a prima facie cause for
Prohibition, or at the very least a possible cause. He would open the
question, if it can be regarded as an open question, whether the prior common law judgment restricted what the ecclesiastical courts could do. As
it was, the vicar had foolishly failed to state any cause for Prohibition
whatever.) In these circumstances, should the Court help the vicar out?
Should it visit him with his folly by granting Consultation, or take notice
of the matter of record he could have used? The Court faced this question
directly and resolved it leniently: No Consultation was granted for the
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time being. The vicar was told to start over with a new Prohibition and
amend his surmise. (By this solution -- as opposed to refusing Consultation definitively -- commitment was properly avoided as to the vicar's
ultimate title to a Prohibition. Properly, because even if the ecclesiastical
courts were concluded by the prior judgment the parson should have an
opportunity to show anything he could in his favor -- e.g., that the ecclesiastical suit could be decided for him on another point, without contravening the common law judgment.)
Chief Justice Popham proceeded to take both parties to task: "This
matter was badly handled on both parts. For at first if the parson had not
brought Prohibition those of the ecclesiastical law would have adjudged
for him on his prescription, being almost for 300 years, against the vicar's
endowment, and the vicar could not have a remedy at common law, for he
could not have a Prohibition to prohibit himself. And now the vicar has
negligently omitted the judgment in his Prohibition, and so there is folly
on both parts." Popham's first point is clear: The parson ought never to
have brought a Prohibition, for he has the kind of prescriptive claim
against the vicar that would probably have succeeded at ecclesiastical
law, where immemorialness was not insisted on, but which was bound to
fail at common law in the face of the endowment. His second point may
seen surprising in the light of the court's general tolerance for self-prohibition. However, Popham was clearly right in result: If the vicar had sought a
Prohibition when the parson set up his prescription in the ecclesiastical
court, he would surely have been turned down -- not because he was trying to prohibit his own suit but because he had no grounds for a Prohibition. For the parson's prescription should surely be interpreted, however
he stated it, as an ecclesiastical prescription -- i.e., a claim that as a matter
of ecclesiastical law the 300 years' usage should prevail against the endowment. Men were generally allowed to prohibit their own suits when
issues within common law competence arose, but there would have been
no common law issue in this case. Prescriptions were usually common
law issues, but not as between vicar and parson. (In the actual case, the
ecclesiastical defendant -- parson -- of course got his Prohibition by alleging
a prescription. On the face, he could not have been turned down: one
sued for tithes comes and says he has a prescriptive exemption in the
common law sense -- Prohibition lies. Quaere whether there would have
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been any way for the vicar to defeat the parson on the law, without pleading his endowment -- merely by bringing out that the contest was between
vicar and parson and so within ecclesiastical jurisdiction, whatever the
nature of the claims and counterclaims.) Popham's apparent language
against self-prohibition may be taken as shorthand. As for Popham's
dwelling on the mistakes on both sides: Perhaps the pervasiveness of folly
in Pringe v. Child was an added reason for disregarding legal nicety on
the side of the tarnished parson and trying to straighten the matter out as
justice required.
The reporter adds one further note: "But the opinion of Coke at Lincoln was with the ecclesiastics, because it seems there was a later composition." Whatever the context of Coke's involvement, the hint is
significant: It looks as if there was a further issue in the ecclesiastical suit,
beyond the prescription, the endowment. and the bearing of the common
law judgment -- viz., a claim that the vicar and parson had an agreement
of relatively recent vintage governing the distribution of tithes. If so, the
vicar probably had no ultimate right to a Prohibition -- as Coke presumably thought. The ecclesiastical court of appeal may have been perfectly
entitled to find for the parson on the basis of the agreement, regardless of
the other events -- and right or wrong (for although compositions between
parishioner and clergyman were within common law jurisdiction, all matters concerning the apportionment of tithes between vicar and parson belonged to the Church.) In that event, all the Court did for the negligent
vicar in Pringe v. Child was give him a chance to make the best case he
could for himself. The decision basically reinforces Brewer v. Dawson
and Baxter v. Hopes above, except that in Pringe v. Child the Court resorted to its knowledge of the record to aid a delinquent party, rather than
simply to its knowledge of the law.
Hill v. Thorton (1629)14 presents another kind of tension between the
party's delinquency and the legal rights. In this case a landowner's son
and heir got a Prohibition to stop the executor from probating his father's
will. The surmise (a) claimed that the father did not make the will which
the executor was seeking to probate; (b) recited that the purported will
comprised both land and goods. (Prohibitions were often sought and
14

M. 5 Car. K.B. Croke Car., 165; Harg. 39, f.67b.
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often obtained to stop probate of wills including both real estate and personalty. The theory behind such Prohibitions was that authentication of
the will as a whole by an ecclesiastical judge would tend to prejudice anyone who wanted to challenge the will at common law quoad the reality.
The basic fact behind that theory was that the probate authority of ecclesiastical courts extended only to personal estate. If land was claimed in
common law litigation by virtue of a devise made pursuant to the Statutes
of Wills, it made no legal difference whether or not the will comprising
that devise had been admitted to probate. It was argued, however, that if
a mixed will had been proved in ecclesiastical court a common law jury
would be prejudiced in favor of its authenticity. Though sometimes successful, that argument did not always prevail. Mixed wills gave the
courts trouble and led to mixed results. In the instant case, however, the
heir-plaintiff almost certainly had good grounds for Prohibition, for he
challenged the authenticity of the will eo instante. I.e.: He did not propose to stop probate of the mixed will because its authenticity might be
contested in common law litigation; he contested it here and now.) The
executor took issue on whether the father in fact made the will in question. After presentation of evidence at the trial, the heir-plaintiff was nonsuited -- probably involuntarily or semi-voluntarily, because the evidence
manifestly supported the will.
Our case arises at this point. For the heir-plaintiff then tried to persuade the Court to withhold Consultation notwithstanding the nonsuit
(and what I would assume to be virtual, though not literal, establishment
of the will's authenticity.) In other words, he tried to invoke a flat rule
that probate of mixed wills should be prohibited. His initial claim involved the theory that would lie behind such a rule, but did not rest flatly
on that rule and did not require it as a flat rule, to be good claim. Now he
was asking the Court to treat him as if from the start he had relied solely
and simply on the theory that no mixed will should be probated. His
counsel proposed parallel cases in support of "going by the truth" despite the nonsuit: e.g., suppose a clergyman sues for tithes of timber trees
and pursuant to a Prohibition to the parties take issue on a collateral point
(i.e., a point other than whether the trees were really timber). If the plaintiff is nonsuited, Consultation will still not be granted, because it is legally manifest that the ecclesiastical court has no jurisdiction to entertain
a suit for timber.
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The judges conceded the parallel cases. I find it difficult to visualize
them concretely, but they come to saying that a nonsuited party will not
necessarily lose, if according to the "legal truth" he ought to have won.
There is a sense in which being nonsuited, even in some degree involuntarily, can be considered worse than losing the case one has stated on demurrer or by verdict. A non-prosecutor is negligent of his interest, as
opposed to ill-advised or misinformed; or he has lost faith in his suit before any test of it is made; or he has convicted himself of frivolity by failure to produce any evidence in his favor, as opposed to showing
something and being overruled by the jury. To the degree that he is
worse, perhaps he has less right to be helped out of his legal mistakes by
the court. Nevertheless, the Court agreed, he will not always lose. In the
principal case, however, the judges would not listen to the heir-plaintiff's
contention. Instead, they took one of the most standard and most sensible
courses in mixed-will cases: Consultation quoad the goods only. The effect of that was to let the ecclesiastical court go ahead and probate the
will as a document, so that the executor could assume his functions, legacies be collected, etc., while making as sure as possible that the ecclesiastical court's proof of the will would not be used against a common law
challenger quoad the land. The judges said expressly in this case, as in
others, that the fact of probate could not be given in evidence in a common law suit about the land. By formally limiting the Consultation to the
goods, probate was rendered strictly irrelevant in any future land suit: an
attempt to introduce it as evidence, however inconclusive, of the will's
authenticity could be countered by saying (warrantably if a bit fictitiously) "No document mentioning land was ever proved in the ecclesiastical court -- fur the ecclesiastical court was expressly forbidden to touch
this document insofar as it has to do with land."
Going by his nominal pretensions, this solution should have satisfied
the heir (obviously his ulterior purpose was to block the will altogether
because of interest in the personal estate.) The Court's decision amounts
to simple rejection of the rule on which the heir was relying. In other
words, the judges did not think that probate of mixed wills should be prohibited generally, only quoad land. Therefore the decision (as distinct
from the dictum on parallel cases) says nothing as to whether a nonsuited
party should be helped out by the Court. If the Court's view of the law
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had been otherwise, or had been in doubt, it seems to me that the equities
were still strongly against the heir-plaintiff, since he had -- and had failed
to take advantage of -- an opportunity to disauthenticate the whole will at
common law, thus avoiding the prejudice that he pretended to be concerned about.
With respect to the underlying rule, Justices Jones and Whitelocke (in
the slightly fuller MS. report of the judges' words) conceded that in the
leading Marquis of Winchester's Case probate of a mixed will had been
prohibited in toto, but they thought that case distinguishable. It surely
was, for in Winchester's Case the surmise said that the testator who made
the mixed will was a lunatic, and the decision was against a Consultation
quoad the goods where the effect of such a Consultation would have been
to open the possibility of contradictory rulings on the testator's sanity (if
indeed anyone had the interest or standing to challenge his sanity in the
ecclesiastical court, whereas his disinherited heirs obviously had an interest in challenging it at common law.)
If Winchester's Case had parallelled Hill v. Thorton in form -- i.e., if
issue had been taken on the testator's sanity and plaintiff-in-Prohibition
had been nonsuited -- there might still have been good reason for withholding Consultation quoad the goods. For notwithstanding the plaintiff's
negligence or inability to produce evidence, and even assuming that mere
prejudice in the event of further common law litigation could be guarded
against, it is hardly fitting to have a man's legacies paid on the assumption that he was sane when there is a strong probability that a jury will
soon be asked to pass on his mental condition and may well find him
mad. In Hill v. Thorton, per contra, the heir-plaintiff's whole case depended on the claim that probate might prejudice him, and he was in a
weak position to urge that claim when he had created an opportunity to
avoid prejudice, then neglected or tried-and-failed to exploit it. Such,
perhaps would be the spelled-out meaning of Jones's and Whitelocke's
discrimination between Winchester's Case and this case. (Their words:
"...the Prohibition [in Winchester] was granted, scil. for the goods and for
the land, since the cause on which the Prohibition was grounded, scil. the
testator's lunacy, was entire and one and the same thing. But contra
where the suggestion consists on several grounds, as here.")
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E.
Variance between Surmise and Libel
Summary: Surmises were generally expected to conform with the libel by which the ecclesiastical suit was commenced--i.e., not to misrepresent, even in small ways, the suit one was seeking to prohibit. The libel
(which in many cases was required by statute to be affixed to the surmise)
showed the truth conclusively, but the courts would not on that account
overlook inaccuracies in the surmise and prohibit any suit which on public grounds ought to be prohibited. They were disinclined, however, to
grant Consultations (as opposed to merely declaring the Prohibition void)
once a Prohibition was granted on an inaccurate surmise, and in one important case a principled exception was made to the requirement of conformity. There was therefore a reasonable chance that a mistaken surmise
would not do the plaintiff-in-Prohibition much harm.
* * *
A further kind of discrepancy between "truth" and the party's statement of this case occurred when a plaintiff-in-Prohibition was inaccurate
in reciting the nature of the ecclesiastical suit against him. As a rule, the
truth was right in front of the Court, for in all Prohibition cases within 2/3
Edw.6,c. 13, Sect. xiv, a copy of the ecclesiastical libel had to be attached
to the plaintiff's surmise. In any event, producing the libel would show
conclusively and exactly what the ecclesiastical suit was about. Imagine;
then, some difference between what the surmise says about the ecclesiastical suit and what the libel shows. Is there any point in penalizing the
plaintiff for his inaccuracy? One would hardly think so, for it is difficult
to imagine inaccuracy of this sort as amounting to more than clerical error. The plaintiff presumably has the libel right in front of him. What can
go wrong except misreading, or a slip in writing, or some carelessness in
communication when a plaintiff orally informs the attorney or clerk who
draws the surmise -- hardly worthy grounds for letting justice fail?
Yet there is something puzzling about prohibiting an ecclesiastical
court from entertaining a suit described as x, because someone has come
and so described it, when it is manifestly entertaining no such suit. Cf.:
John says to Father "Tell William to stop teasing the dog." Father sees
with his own eyes that William is in fact teasing the cat. He would gladly
intervene to stop that activity, but he obviously cannot do so by literally
carrying our John's request -- by using the words "Stop teasing the dog."
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It may seem unnecessary to reduce Prohibitions to "literally fulfilling the
plaintiff 's request" (i.e., to "Stop entertaining the suit commenced by this
libel"). But will justice and orderly law-administration sometimes require
such reduction"?
Our example may be altered to expose the problem: (a) Imagine extreme disjunction between what John complains of and what William is
doing -- either there is no resemblance between the activity described and
the activity observed, or there is resemblance in form but great difference
in moral seriousness. Father may feel a certain unfairness about using his
authority to prohibit William's activity -- even though abstractly he considers the interference justified -- when he would never have observed it
had he not been deceived, or credulous, or unnecessarily shocked, by the
request made to him. "I searched out William in an anxious and angry
mood, intending to do as John urged me. But William is doing something
quite different, and it's only mildly naughty. Though I could and maybe
should tell him to stop, it seems a little unfair in the circumstances. If I
spoke at all, would I speak too loudly because of the state I was in, or too
softly because of the relief I now feel?"

Of course this story has no literal application to Prohibition cases. But
it helps make this point: "Extreme disjunction" between surmise and
libel is imaginable. E.g., A man sued for hay tithes claims a modus
covering all tithes but recites that he is being sued for corn tithes. The feel
of unfairness, or sense of emotional disproportion, that is crucial in the
story is hardly going to enter directly into such reluctance to prohibit as
one may have. But the residue of that feeling, or the unconscious force of
such an analogy, may have something to do with it. There is no very good
"cold" reason not to prohibit. Hay or corn, the ecclesiastical court is obviously entertaining a suit which it ought not to if the alleged modus is true.
If one is reluctant to prohibit -- if it seems odd -- the reluctance is "irrational." But in what sense? Because one is all too legal or all too human?
Because one has fallen for a "formalistic" or "essentialist" notion -- that a
Prohibition "by its nature" refers to the case recited in the surmise, or that
the surmise is "grounded" on the libel and must therefore pursue it? No
doubt. But such notions may sometimes be projections from such reallife paradigms as the story represents, and perhaps there is value in legal
"irrationality "which serves to maintain a kind of contact with those paradigms. "Extreme disjunction" can of course be taken as a limiting case,
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short of which variance between libel and surmise could be overlooked,
but once a limiting case is admitted the way is open to argue that degrees
of variance are too hard to judge, and therefore that the best policy is to
insist on strict conformity.
(b) Suppose that Father has a strong policy against acting on the boys'
complaints unless he sees for himself that they refer to activity that is really going on. When John says "Tell William to stop teasing the dog,"
Father will not shout a command to that effect, intending William to hear
it wherever in the house he may be. Instead, he will say "Take me to William," and will act only after that order has been fulfilled and he has observed William. Now go back to the original case: Father does de facto
observe William teasing the cat. Recollecting his policy against acting
blindly, he says to himself, "Though abstractly I ought to order William
to stop teasing the cat, would doing so undercut my policy of insisting
that the boys show me the offenses they complain of? I would not have
acted on John's complaint if he had been unable or unwilling to lead me
to William. I would in a sense not have believed him -- i.e., a certain presumptive incredulity, or suspicion of irresponsible or malicious complaints, underlies my policy. Is it quite consistent to act pursuant to, or
because of, John's complaint here -- where it is vitiated on its face, demonstrated not have been literally credible (as opposed to presumptively
suspect)? Is it consistent to demand that the boys be prepared to back up
their complaints ostensively, but not to insist that they be accurate in their
words? John does not appear to have been actually irresponsible or malicious here -- rather, he was mistaken, accountably or unaccountably, or
merely let the wrong word escape by some trick of the psychopathology
of everyday life -- and he has in a general way acted virtuously in calling
attention to improper activity that manifestly is going on. Nevertheless,
the inconsistency troubles me."
This version of the story has a direct application to Prohibitions. By
virtue of 2/3 Edw. 6, many Prohibition were not lawfully grantable unless
a copy of the libel was affixed to the surmise. "Presumptive incredulity,
or suspicion of irresponsible or malicious complaints" was the clear policy of the statute. It would be legitimate to translate those attitudes, being
sanctioned by statute, into a policy of the law, relevant even where the
statutory requirement qua form of procedure did not apply. In the event
that a Prohibition within the statute was somehow granted without a copy
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of the libel having been affixed, Consultation probably would lie (as distinct from treating the Prohibition as null ab initio and therefore not amenable to being undone by Consultation, or not requiring it.)15 Because of
the statutory requirement and its implications, precisely the reflections attributed to Father in the story come to mind. Is there an inconsistency in
demanding that plaintiffs-in-Prohibition demonstrate their good faith
and the reality of the ecclesiastical suit, but not insisting that what they
say conform to what they point to?
The arguments against following the libel and overlooking or mentally
amending inaccurate surmises of course fall under the "private" approach
to Prohibition cases. A full-blooded "public" approach would go the
other way: If, as the libel conclusively shows, an improper ecclesiastical
suit is going on, it should be stopped. It should be stopped (to allow for
the outside possibility) even though the suit described by the surmise
looks like a completely different suit from the one the libel attest to, even
though perhaps no party to the unquestionably real suit wants to prohibit
it, even though it has perhaps been decided long since. But maybe that is
too "full-blooded." In any event, the cases show that variances between
libel and surmise could give the courts trouble.
The earliest cases in point involved small misnomers. In Gibbs v.
Rowlie (1583),16 the surmise named the ecclesiastical plaintiff as "Rector
of Nether Beddington." In the libel he was referred to as "Rector of Beddington," and there was nothing in the libel to suggest that Beddington
and Nether Beddington were the same place. (In substance, the ecclesiastical suit was for tithes, against which a modus was claimed.) A Prohibition having been granted, Solicitor General Egerton moved for
Consultation. His argument had two prongs: (a) If the Prohibition had
been granted without any libel affixed, Consultation would lie. This is in
effect the same case -- i.e. failing to show (by attaching the libel) that
there is any suit by the Rector of Nether Beddington going on is no
worse, or no different, from showing that a suit by the Rector of Bed15

One undated note in the reports (Harl. 4817,f.162) says flatly that Consultation will be granted in
that case. See below for doubts on this point.
16 M. 25/26 Eliz. Q.B. 1 Leonard, 272; Harg. 11, f.30 (Reports fully accordant, but M.S. gives the
argument for Consultation more adequately.)
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dington, very possibly a different man, is in progress. (b) As a practical
matter, denying Consultation is as good as letting the inaccurate or logically inappropriate surmise do the service of a correct surmise. For without a Consultation the ecclesiastical court will not proceed. In other
words, there are only two choices -- to penalize plaintiff-in-Prohibition or
not to penalize him. The alternative to Consultation -- treating the Prohibition as void ab initio, pretending that since no suit by the Rector of
Beddington was ever prohibited the ecclesiastical court is free to proceed-is to leave plaintiff-in-Prohibition in as good plight as if he had surmised
correctly. For in fact the ecclesiastical court will not dare to proceed, in
the face of the Prohibition, on the basis of a technicality.
The Court in Gibbs v. Rowlie rejected Egerton's argument. The Consultation was denied. The Court said, however, that since the Rector of
Beddington had never been prohibited, "let the parson proceed in the
Spiritual Court at his peril." Several observations must be made on this
decision: (1) It obviously says that Consultation will not be granted when
there is a variance between libel and surmise, at least when the variance is
minor and unlikely to be more than a slip. (2) From the reports, the reasoning behind the decision remains ambiguous: (a) The Court might have
rejected Egerton's premise -- that Consultation lies if a Prohibition is mistakenly granted when a copy of the libel is not attached. (See the note
above for authority contra. However, the alternative of regarding the Prohibition as merely void and the ecclesiastical court as entitled to proceed
is available. The text of 2/3 Edw. 6 is not, in my opinion, decisive. The
requirement of affixing the libel is intermixed, in Sect. xiv, with the
requirement that preliminary proof of surmises be given within six
months. Consultation is plainly required if the preliminary proof is not
supplied. Whether it is also required if the other procedural hurdle--affixing the libel -- is sidestepped could be argued both ways on the basis of
the text. We have encountered the doctrine, in connection with 50 Edw. 3,
that a Prohibition granted for failure of proof within six months is "really"
void ab initio, the statutory Consultation being mere notice of that fact.)
(b) The Court might have accepted Egerton's premise while distinguishing variance cases. There are three possible bases for distinguishing: (i) Failing to attach the libel is a serious failure to observe a
categorical and reasonable statutory requirement. If by any chance a Prohibition slips through despite violation of that requirement, the plaintiff
should be penalized, and perhaps the statute itself demands a Consultation.
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Variances between surmise and libel, at least ones of the sort this case
presents, are likely to result from mere carelessness or understandable
mistake. Therefore the plaintiff's offense is less serious and the reason for penalizing him less -- and anyhow there is no statute to worry about. (Contra: If a prohibition slips through without a libel attached to the surmise,
it is a judge's mistake. Presumably the judges ought also to check
whether the surmise and libel correspond, when a libel is attached, but
perhaps the fault is somewhat more the party's though a lesser fault -- i.e.
if the libel is there, the judge has a right to suppose the party has looked at
it carefully in drawing his surmise. Further, might a party not fail to attach a libel in the belief that his case was outside 2/3 Edw.6--whereas only
carelessness could explain failure to follow the libel? I know of no cases
on the scope of 2/3 Edw. 6 quoad affixing the libel, but the many cases on its
scope quoad proof within six months prove that it was often questionable what
Prohibitions the statute applied to. Its scope was clearly the same with respect to both of the procedural hurdles.) (ii) The logic making failure to
point to any ecclesiastical suit equivalent to mispointing is specious. (iii)
Consultation is less necessary in variance cases. If the ecclesiastical
judge is prohibited in a correctly described suit, he will obviously not proceed without Consultation. It may be the case that the Prohibition ought
not to have been issued because no copy of the libel was attached, but the
ecclesiastical judge has no way of knowing that. If it were pointed out to
him, he would not be competent to decide whether or not the Prohibition
was valid. The ecclesiastical judge who would presume to interpret a
statutory requirement and overrule a common law act would be hardy-tofoolhardy. But if an ecclesiastical judge is prohibited, say, from entertaining Smith v. Brown, why should he not proceed in Jones v. Robinson?
Even if he has reason to be pretty sure that "Smith v. Brown" is a mistake
for Jones v. Robinson, he has a "plea," a good-enough basis for believing
he may proceed with impunity.
(3) "Jones v. Robinson" notwithstanding, the Court probably assumed
that the ecclesiastical judge would not proceed without a Consultation.
The Court probably intended, by denying the Consultation, to avoid inflicting any penalty on plaintiff- in-Prohibition and to insure that the case
would turn out as if the trivial variance did not exist. While the parson
could go try to persuade the ecclesiastical judge to proceed -- and if, per-
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haps against the odds, he was successful, he would be out of peril of the
attachment procedures that followed on violation of a Prohibition -- he
would no doubt be better advised to contest the modus at common law if
that was the real question. After all, in this case the choice was Consultation or no-Consultation. No-Consultation was the way to go easy on
plaintiff-in-Prohibition, short of some special measure to protect him absolutely against the consequences of his mistake, and the court was not
invited to think about that. (E.g., staying ecclesiastical proceedings in the
"real" suit until the plaintiff amended his surmise to conform to the libel,
then issuing a new Prohibition.) If it is at all relevant that the Court did
not propose something like that on its own -- then the decision was in a
sense a compromise: the parson was dared to go back to the ecclesiastical
court, the parishioner perhaps a little frightened by the chance that he
might.
(4) The Court said the ecclesiastical judge was free to proceed because
there was no Prohibition referring to the Rector of Beddington. I.e.: The
Prohibition in this case followed the surmise and said Nether Beddington.
The chances are that the discrepancy was not noticed when the Prohibition was issued. A seemingly pettifogging, but perhaps not wholly insignificant, question may be raised on this point, however. Presumably if a
judge notices a variance he ought to grant no Prohibition at all -- just as if
no copy of the libel were affixed. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition, being apprised
of the reason he could not have a writ, would be perfectly free to start
over or, if permitted, to amend his present surmise, Sed quaere. Two
other courses would be theoretically open to a judge who noticed a variance: (a) to grant the Prohibition, following the surmise -- thus leaving
the ecclesiastical plaintiff and ecclesiastical judge free "at their peril" to
proceed in the real suit; (b) to grant a Prohibition in the terms of the libel, without requiring plaintiff-in-Prohibition to recommence or amend.
In contradistinction to the case of failure to affix the libel, no statute forbade either of these courses (unless, along Egerton's line, variance cases
should be regarded as the same in effect as failure-to-affix case -- within
the policy or even the equity of the statue.) Course (a) would seem an unintelligent thing to do, for it would create an entirely unnecessary problem
for the ecclesiastical court and defendant-in-Prohibition. Course (b)
would be both sensible and oriented toward the public purpose of halting
unwarranted ecclesiastical suits economically and without regard for
carefulness of the "informer's" behavior qua private party. It is, however,
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(apart from any bearing of 2/3 Edw.6) subject to the kind of philosophic
disquiet I have indicated above. Gibbs v. Rowlie does not answer these
questions , but it might be considered relevant in its implications if they
were to arise.
In Lovegrove v. Inocke (1588),17 George Lovegrove was sued in an
ecclesiastical court. He got a Prohibition, naturally enough, in that name.
It appeared from the libel, however, that the ecclesiastical suit was
brought against "Gregory" Lovegrove. The reporter makes it clear that
"Gregory" was simply a mistake. All the brief report says is that the Prohibition "was abated." I.e.: It was held merely void on account of the variance. The ecclesiastical court was left free to proceed against a
non-existent person! If there was a motion for Consultation (of which the
report gives no sign) it was denied. George could perhaps find a way out
by rewriting his surmise so as to show the misnomer in the libel and request in terms that the Prohibition refer to the suit against "Gregory." If
he wanted any further protection, he would have to make such an attempt.
As things stood, the Court would not act on its own to make sure that the
ecclesiastical judge refrained from any further moves against him. The
danger, I should think, would be that the ecclesiastical judge would permit rectification of the libel and then proceed against a person in esse.
George could no doubt have another Prohibition in that case, showing the
amended libel, but the responsibility would be his. A stay of proceedings
or new Prohibition now, referring to the suit against "Gregory," would
have something to recommend it, I think. But what if (contrary to the
clear truth here) there really was a Gregory? Should George be able to initiate prohibition of the suit against Gregory? From a public point of
view, we may say "Why not?," but the public point of view could not be
pushed that far.
In Hutton v. Barnes (1605),18 the surmise said that the tithe suit in
question was for 40 fleeces of wool. The libel showed that the suit was in
fact for 400 fleeces. On account of this variance, the ecclesiastical plaintiff moved for Consultation. The Consultation was granted at Assizes
(the only instance of such a step at Assizes I know of.) The propriety of
17
18

T. 30 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 105.
M. 3 Jac. K.B. Yelverton, 79
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the Consultation was brought in question in the King's Bench by writ of
error. The Court reversed the judgment below.
In justifying the decision, the Court relied on the substantive grounds
for Prohibition and said that the Consultation would have been appropriate if
those grounds had been different. In other words, sometimes Prohibitions granted
despite variance between surmise and libel should be undone by Consultation and
sometimes not, depending on the nature of the common law's title to prohibit. In
Hutton v. Barnes, plaintiff-in-Prohibition claimed a total exemption from tithes
by virtue of the Statute of Monasteries and an exemption allegedly enjoyed by the monastic house at the time of the dissolution. The Court
said that the variance was not material in this case because the claim to
Prohibition came to asserting the ecclesiastical court's total lack of jurisdiction in the suit--meaning by its "total lack of jurisdiction" its alleged
want of power to hold the land in question charged by any tithes at all ("...
the suggestion discharges the Spiritual Court from all manner of power
for any tithes at all; and therefore the variance is not material." Earlier in
the report, plaintiff-in-Prohibition's prescription is said to "oust the Spiritual Court of all jurisdiction.") The Court then proceeds to distinguish modus cases: There, the tithe suit does "originally" belong to the
ecclesiastical court, therefore agreement between libel and surmise is
material. ("...the suggestion is grounded upon the libel, and the plaintiff is
to stay the proceedings there but for one cause certain.")
This decision is not easy to make sense of. It must, I think, be analyzed from two angles (a) "at common law"; (b) in the light of 2/3
Edw.6. (a) As to the first: is there any point in considering variances
more material in one case than another, and particularly in distinguishing
monastic-discharge from modus cases? The colorability of the distinction
can be seen by comparing polar-opposite cases: Imagine an ecclesiastical
suit utterly and scandalously beyond ecclesiastical jurisdiction -- e.g., a
suit for five-pounds damages for breach of contract to sell a horse. Suppose to surmise for a Prohibition says four-pounds, or a cow instead of a
horse, and that the truth is immediately evident from the libel. It is unimaginable that a Consultation would be granted in this case. On the
other hand, imagine a suit for hay tithes and a modus alleged applying to
corn tithes. (The Court in Hutton v. Barnes put this latter case.) A Consultation must obviously be granted here, if despite the variance a Prohibition slips through. For a modus applying to corn is simply irrelevant

213

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
vis-a-vis parson's claim to hay. Yet writing "corn" instead of "hay" is just
as likely to be a mere slip as writing "40" for "400.") Thus, comparing
extremely divergent cases shows (1) that variance between surmise and
libel must sometimes have a material bearing, and sometimes not, on
whether to prohibit and whether to grant Consultation; (2) that the distinction does indeed have to do with the ecclesiastical court's "origina1" jurisdiction or lack of it. The Court in Hutton v. Barnes took two
steps -- perhaps not necessary steps--within this framework. (1) Asserting a monastic discharge was assimilated toward (in our example) asserting the ecclesiastical court's utter incapacity to entertain a suit for breach
of contract. The difference is obvious: No one ought to bring a contract
suit in an ecclesiastical court, and the ecclesiastical judge ought not to
touch one. The statutes of Praemunire were made against just that. But
a parson who seeks tithes from Blackacre does no wrong to sue in a ecclesiastical court, and the Court no wrong to listen to him, though the parishioner may have reason to stop the suit until the matter can be tried at
common law. What difference if that matter is a monastic-discharge or a
modus?
On the other hand, the contract case and the monastic-discharge case
can be stated to look alike. In the contract case, the surmise for a Prohibition says "No suit of this type has any business in the ecclesiastical court"
(implying -- we have agreed -- "whether or not I have described the particular suit against me accurately, for all that is material is the type of
suit".) In the monastic-discharge case, the surmise says "No suit of any
sort for tithes from Blackacre should be brought, for the land is totally exempt." Why not the same implication, "whether or not I have described
the particular suit against me accurately, for all that is material is that it is
a tithe suit, and no suit of that sort is good quoad Blackacre"? In a modus
case, the mere type of suit -- that the ecclesiastical suit is for tithes -- cannot possibly be solely material, for then Prohibition would have to be
granted, or Consultation denied, in the impossible case (where the libel
says "hay" and the statement of the modus in the surmise says "corn.")
Putting it more practically, when the libel says "hay" and the surmise
"corn," the common law judge would be warranted to say, as it were,
"Wait a minute. What about this discrepancy? Hasn't there been a clerical mistake here?" But he ought not -- the reasoning goes -- be free to say
that. When on the face an utterly irrelevant modus is alleged, the judge's
only choice should be to deny Prohibition. (2) From the proposition that
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some variances in modus cases must be material, the Court in Hutton v.
Barnes advanced expressly to the generalization that accuracy is material
in modus cases, and to the application thereof to the modus case directly
parallel to the principal case: In a modus case, the judges said, a variance
as to the amount of tithes sued for (e.g., 40 fleeces as against 400) would
be just as material as a mix-up between hay and corn. Again, this step is
not necessary, though the difficulty of distinguishing degrees of accuracy
and materiality perhaps justifies it.
(b) As to 2/3 Edw.6: The statute probably entered into the decision, at
least to help the distinction above come out. It could account for the decision altogether. With respect to another issue, the statute was directly involved in Hutton v. Barnes: The Assize Justices, in addition to granting
Consultation, awarded defendant-in-Prohibition double costs under 2/3
Edw.6. This award was also objected to by the writ of error, and it too
was reversed by the King's Bench. The Assize Justices clearly reasoned as
follows: The statute gives double costs to defendant-in-Prohibition when
the surmise is not proved within six months. Since the proof requirement
and the requirement that a copy of the libel be attached are linked together in the statute, double costs must also be given when plaintiff-inProhibition fails to affix the libel. Since there is no difference between
affixing no libel and misrepresenting the one affixed, double costs should
be given in the principal case. In reversing the award of costs, the King's
Bench held expressly that the double-costs provision of the statute applied only to failure of proof within six months.
Now, as to the merits of the Consultation: The Assize Justices, in reasoning as they did about the costs, must have reasoned similarly about the
substance. Viz.: "2/3 Edw. 6. requires attachment of the libel with the
same force and seriousness as it requires proof within six months, for it
penalizes violation of both procedural requirements in the same way. Insisting with that force and seriousness on attachment of the libel points to
a policy of making demands on plaintiff-in-Prohibition, of making sure
that his surmise is in reaction to an ecclesiastical suit that is actually going
on. Leniency toward inaccurate surmises, or indifference as to whether
the Prohibition is really 'grounded' on the libel so long as a libel is there,
would violate the policy, if not the direct force, of the statute." In reversing the conclusion to which this reasoning was probably the path, the
King's Bench might have said, "2/3 Edw. 6 does not involve such rigor
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against plaintiffs-in-Prohibition. It limits double costs to one of the requirements it sets up. The other one -- affixing the libel -- is shown to be
less serious because violation is not punished by double costs. It perhaps
is to be enforced by the other and lesser sanction -- obligatory Consultation if a Prohibition slips through. But must it always be so enforced?
There has been doubt as to whether even the more serious proof requirement applies beyond modus cases. Its application to monastic-discharge
cases has certainly been questioned. Perhaps the history of interpreting
the proof requirement points to a distinction between cases 'originally'
belonging to the ecclesiastical court and others. If so, the same discrimination favoring plaintiff-in-Prohibition must apply to the lesser demand
on him -- affixing the libel. The more so because there would be reason
for making such a distinction even if there were no statute (the reasons
under (a) above.)
Therefore we conclude, at least probably, that no libel was required by
the statute to be affixed in this monastic-discharge case, or at any rate that
no Consultation should have been granted if no libel had been attached. If
that is true -- even probably -- the still lesser offense of inaccurately reciting the ecclesiastical suit, or not 'grounding' the surmise on the libel
precisely, which is not directly within the statute, should have the benefit
of the distinction." The Court in Hutton v. Barnes did not, so far as the
report shows, talk in these terms -- rather, it discussed the case "at common law." I suspect, however, in view of the statute's involvement in the
case and in view of the difficulty of treating the matter of the costs and
the matter of the Consultation as entirely separate, that such thoughts as I
have spelled out entered into the Court's perspective on the case. It
would have been possible and rational, though the report does not indicate that this happened, to hold simply that the requirement of showing
the libel does not apply to monastic-discharge cases, and hence that variances do not matter in such cases by any pretended force of the statute. It
would remain a question at common law whether defendant-in-Prohibition could come forward and show the libel, claiming Consultation on the
ground that plaintiff-in-Prohibition had misrepresented the ecclesiastical
suit.
One further point should be observed on Hutton v. Barnes. The Court
held that Consultation should not be granted in the instant case. Where
does that leave the parson? Free "at his peril" to carry on in the ecclesias-
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tical court? Not subject to procedures incident to violation of a Prohibition because only a non-existent suit concerning 40 fleeces had been prohibited? Though the judges said nothing as to that, it is unlikely that that
is the implication they wished to leave. Denial of Consultation was
based on conceiving plaintiff-in-Prohibition's claim as an objection to
any possible tithe suit with respect to the land in question, whether the
one described in the surmise or not. The Prohibition should be interpreted correspondingly, as "carrying out the plaintiff's request" -- viz. as
saying "You are forbidden to entertain any tithe suit with respect to this
land, whether the one for 40 fleeces described by the plaintiff or any
other, pending common law adjudication of the matter of discharge." On
the other hand, by way of strong dictum, the Court held that Consultation
should be granted in modus cases when the surmise varied from the libel.
No exceptions appear to be admitted. Both ways, therefore, Hutton v.
Barnes goes counter to the two misnomer cases above.
Beyond the three cases just considered, I have found none directly on
the effect of variance between surmise and libel. A few others involve
the rule that surmise and libel ought to correspond, but in less direct
ways. Dean and Chapter of Wells v. Goodwin19 illustrates how, in a
complicated case, it could be problematic whether the surmise and the libel really disagreed. The ecclesiastical suit purported to be for a pension
settled on a vicar by the former monastic owner of a rectory, in which
case the claim was plainly within ecclesiastical jurisdiction. (There was a
class of annuity-like payment known as a "spiritual pension" running between parson and vicar or other ecclesiastical persons. The common law
took no notice of such dues but left the ecclesiastical courts free to enforce them, as intra-Church business.) The rector wanted to show that
what the vicar was, or should be, suing for was not a "spiritual pension,"
but what amounted to a rent or annuity charged upon the rectory -- i.e., an
ordinary temporal due, concerning which the common law should ultimately judge -- and then to show that nothing was now owing under the
temporal transaction which in reality gave the vicar's claim such color as
it had. He attempted to plead the matter which would tend to show this in
the ecclesiastical court, then got a Prohibition on surmise that his plea had
been disallowed. The vicar argued in the King's Bench that the surmise
19

P. 4 - T. 5 Jac. K.B. Harl. 1631, f.302b.

217

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
had misrepresented the ecclesiastical suit -- in effect, that whereas the libel set up a claim to a "spiritual pension," the surmise talked as if the ecclesiastical suit were to recover the temporal due which the rector thought
was the only colorable claim. The rector denied this, arguing that he had
represented the purported object of the ecclesiastical suit accurately, and
then gone on to show his reasons for believing that its real object was,
and only could be, something else. The Court finally held for the vicar,
granting Consultation. I find it difficult to access this decision and to discern in what degree it depended on perceiving a conflict between the surmise and the libel. In other words, could the surmise have been rewritten
to conform better to the libel? Or was the rector trying to do the impossible (move his properly ecclesiastical claim -- that there is no "spiritual
pension" as alleged -- over to the common law by surmising what
amounted to his evidence -- that the vicar had once been granted a rent
and in virtue of that grant had collected something which he now claimed
to have collected in virtue of his "spiritual pension")? I think the latter is
likely -- i.e., that conflict between libel and surmise here was not a procedural mistake, but an inevitable symptom of a misbegotten attempt.
In Wrothmeal v. Gill,20 as I understand the case, a Prohibition was denied in part because interpreting the surmise so as to make it state a sufficient cause for Prohibition would throw it into conflict with the libel. The
parishioner in a tithe suit wanted to say, in effect, "I am being sued by a
mere hired curate, not the holder of the living or his vicar -- hence by one
without title to the tithes." He could not surmise this as a fact, because as
a fact it could (as the Court held) be pleaded in the ecclesiastical court. If
the ecclesiastical court ruled out the defense -- i.e., took the erroneous position that a "stripendiary" curate was entitled to recover tithes -- Prohibition would lie straightforwardly, but not before. If the parishioner was to
get a Prohibition now -- before pleading in the ecclesiastical court -- he
needed to make it appear from the face of the libel that the ecclesiastical
suit was brought by a legally unqualified person. The case turns on his
attempt to do so. The surmise found fault with the libel for reciting that
the ecclesiastical plaintiff was curate without saying that he was "admitted, instituted, or inducted" (the three distinct "legal ceremonies" whereby
20

M. 1 Car. K.B. 3 Bulstrode, 310.
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a man was installed in a living.) In other words, the parishioner claimed
that the libel failed on its face to show that the ecclesiastical plaintiff held
a living with tithes appertaining. The Court refused to accept this argument. By construction of the word "curatus" itself, plus other language in
the libel, the judges held that the ecclesiastical plaintiff had sufficiently
set out his pretense to be holder of the living, whether or not it was true.
At this point, if I understand the report correctly, the parishioner's lawyer
tried to save the day by arguing that his surmise sufficiently pleaded the
"truth" (that the parish was impropriate, having neither parson nor vicar
with cure of souls), and that Prohibition should lie on that showing
(though not on a showing simply that the person suing in the ecclesiastical court did not hold the living).
Whatever the merits of this (either as to construction of the surmise or
as to the law), Justice Dodderidge said that a surmise to such effect would
be contrary to the libel. The rest of the Court clearly agreed, for the Prohibition was denied and the party told to plead his matter in the ecclesiastical court. I take the point to be: According to the libel as construed, the
ecclesiastical suit was brought by the holder of the parish living, a "curatus." A surmise which said in effect, "There is no such thing as a 'curatus' -holder-of-the-living in this parish" would contradict the patent reality
that the ecclesiastical suit was brought by "such a thing," though of
course his claim to be that might be false. (Cf. the last case: "I claim so
much as a 'spiritual pension'" cannot be met by "But you cannot possibly
be claiming a 'spiritual pension' -- though you might have color to claim
a rent." So here: "I am suing you as the beneficed clergyman of X" cannot be met by "But you cannot possibly be suing me in that capacity -- for
X has no beneficed clergyman." The legal pretense of the libel, however refutable,
must be accepted, as must its factual statements -- e.g., that tithes for so many
acres, so many fleeces, such and such a product, are claimed -- though those
statements may of course be untrue, in the sense that a man sued for hay from
100 acres might in fact have only ten acres of hay. In both of the last two
cases, however, it seems to me that speaking of conflict between libel and
surmise is only a manner of speaking. Plaintiffs-in-Prohibition were not
held to accuracy as a matter of procedure, but rather told as a matter of
substance that Prohibition will not lie on surmise of facts tending to show
the ecclesiastical suit's lack of color, or "impossibility," anymore than on
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the surmise that what a libel says is simply untrue. In either case, the
matter should be pleaded in the ecclesiastical court and resort to the common law had only when and if the ecclesiastical court commits an error
within the common law's power to control.)
In Townshed v. Baker,21 a modus was surmised to stop a suit for tithes
of furze (a shrub used for fuel, sometimes cultivated.) Defendant-in-Prohibition demurred to the suggestion. He advanced a number of objections to the surmise, inter alia a conflict between its language and that of
the libel: Whereas the libel said that the suit was for tithes of "furze
lands," the surmise said it was for tithes of "furzes." In relation to the matter of the contention, the discrepancy was not trivial, since the parson's
suit was directed at land sown with furze, and therefore possibly withdrawn from production of other tithable crops, as distinct from furze harvested in the state of nature. In substance, a modus applicable simply to
"furzes" might be interpreted to apply only to the wild variety. On behalf
of plaintiff-in-Prohibition, however, it was argued that the demurrer
amounted to a waiver of objection to the surmise-libel variance. That is,
the admission of facts involved in every demurrer was, inter alia, an admission that the ecclesiastical suit was what the surmise said it was. The
Court apparently accepted this point, for the Prohibition was upheld. The
decision, of course, was based on the Court's opinion that the modus was
legally sufficient. Holding the demurrer to admit that the surmise recited
the ecclesiastical suit correctly, notwithstanding the libel, would in no
way have prejudiced the parson's claim that the modus did not extend to
cultivated "furze lands," or any other of his legal contentions. For our present purpose, the decision only says "Demurrer waives objection to variances." Therefore a defendant-in-Prohibition who wanted to take
advantage of a variance should be advised to move for Consultation instead of demurring.
Lastly, there is one case from the Admiralty in which the principle that
libel and surmise must conform was in a sense tested. Prohibition to the
Admiralty were not within 2/3 Edw.6 -- i.e., the statutory requirement
that a copy of the libel must be attached to the surmise. Therefore, inso21

P. 13 Car. C.P. Harg. 23, f.11b.
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far as failure to represent the libel accurately was conceived as equivalent
to failure to attach the libel, conformity perhaps need not be insisted on in
Admiralty cases. Moreover, conformity in one strict sense could not
possibly be demanded in the most common Admiralty case: A sues in the
Admiralty on a contract allegedly made on the high seas. B seeks a Prohibition on surmise that the contract was made on land. Obviously B's
whole point is to contradict something the libel says. Granted that Prohibition lies, B cannot be asked to accept A's pretense in the way one being
sued for what was labeled a "spiritual pension" was required to accept
the ecclesiastical plaintiff's pretense. (Though claiming a "spiritual pension" contrary to the reality could be a jurisdiction-giving maneuver like
alleging a contract to have been made at sea.)22
In Don Alonso v. Cornero,23 however, there was a reasonable question
as to whether the surmise followed the libel properly. In this case, the
Spanish ambassador sued a Spanish subject in the Admiralty, alleging
that Cornero's goods had been confiscated for crimes against the King of
Spain, and that Cornero had come to England carrying 3,000 lbs. of tobacco worth £800. The ambassador prayed attachment of the confiscate
tobacco in the hands of
. I.e.: He left a deliberate blank in the libel,
by way of saying "I request attachment of the goods in whosever hands
they now are, Cornero's or anyone else's." The tobacco was actually attached in the hands of Watts, who then sought a Prohibition. The theory
behind his application was that the present ownership in England of the
goods (which he claimed to have bought for value) should be determined
by the common law, even though the goods were confiscated before they
were brought into England. The court accepted this substantive theory
22

23

The point that a surmise may say that a contract was made on land, contrary to the Admiralty libel,
was relied on in Hughe's Case (M. 11 Jac. C.P. Godbolt, 214, to support a parallel and equally
obvious ruling: That a surmise founded on 23 Hen.8, c.9, may aver that the ecclesiastical
defendant is being sued out of his home diocese, though that does not appear from the libel. That
this was held, inter alia, in Hughe's Case suggests that the point was challenged. I can only
imagine a serious challenge as a way of saying that Prohibition should not lie at all to enforce 23
Hen. 8. I.e., "Surmises should conform to libels. If a libel says or implies that the defendant lives
in the diocese where the suit is brought, he may not surmise the contrary. Therefore, exception
to ecclesiastical suits based on 23 Hen. 8 must be left to the ecclesiastical courts." The parallel
with the Admiralty then comes to saying that Prohibitions to enforce 23 Hen. 8 are just as
acceptable in principle as Prohibitions to stop contract suits falsely or fictitiously laid on the high
seas.
M. 9 Jac. C.P. Hobart, 212.
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and granted the Prohibition. It was argued by the way, however, that
Watts had no standing to bring a Prohibition founded on the libel against
Cornero because he was not named therein. The Court expressly rejected
this argument, saying that as "a party grieved by that undue suit" he was
entitled to his Prohibition. (N.b., as a "party grieved," a party in interest -not because the interest of an "informer" is irrelevant as long as the suit is
undue.) The decision on this point seems entirely sensible, especially
considering the blank in the libel. Strictly speaking, however, allowing a
party whose involvement does not appear from the libel to stop a "foreign" suit may be seen as inconsistent with the usual policy of insisting
that the libel attest to the reality of the suit to be prohibited. (If Watts had
been turned down on a nicety, he would perhaps have been able to stop
the attachment proceeding as such, as opposed to the suit against Cornero.
Quaere.)
By and large, one must conclude that conformity between surmise and
libel was demanded. The serious exception was the one made in Hutton
v. Barnes for Prohibitions conceived as going to the original or total jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court. However, the logical peculiarities of
this subject and the direct or indirect intrusion of a statutory rule tend to
disqualify it as a test of the "favor" of Prohibitions or the relative weight
of "public" and "private" values.
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A.
Introduction
Let us now turn to cases on errors or alleged errors in pleading. In the
classes of cases just above, there was a "truth" to compare with the
party's misstatement or mistake. A verdict said one thing and the plaintiff
another; or there was a legally correct way to frame a complaint over
against the plaintiff's misconceived surmise; or the libel established what
the ecclesiastical suit was about, whereas plaintiff-in-Prohibition misrepresented it. By definition, pleading problems proper arise when there is no
"truth" in front of the Court. A man says something in order to move the
Court to act for his benefit. The question may then arise whether he has
"spoken properly," or whether he has spoken so improperly that the step
he requests should not be taken. Has he contradicted himself? Spoken
ambiguously? Been too vague? Said too little? The Court cannot respond
by saying, "It makes no difference, for we know the truth and can act on
that." It must respond in ways like the following: "There is a contradiction
of sorts -- but either way, or at least one way, he has given us a sufficient
reason to act in his favor"; or, "Though he might have been more precise
or fuller, indeed should have been, what he has left out is not essential to
his purpose"; or "Though he has not said enough to give us reason to act,
we will presume that what is left out is favorable to him unless the other
side says the contrary." Those, of course, are lenient responses. The
judges may equally well insist on "immaculate speech" even when there
is a reasonable basis for mitigating such insistence. What counts as "immaculate" in pleading is of course conditioned by the traditions of legal
practice -- as meaningful, clear, or polite speech in ordinary discourse is
defined by the conventions that have developed in many social contexts.
Yet, for all the importance of convention, there are natural limits to the
unintelligibility, vagueness, or incompleteness than even the most permissive court can tolerate.
So in ordinary life a request or order can be so garbled that it is impossible to carry out; or not fulfillable except by guessing -- without much
confidence in one's guess -- as to what the speaker is driving at; or, short
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of that, so unnecessarily muddy that it is unfair to expect the hearer to
take the trouble to guess; or perhaps the speech is suspiciously unclear, as
if the speaker were trying to get his way by creating confusion, knowing
that a clear statement of his purpose would be laughed down. The common law, of course, had a proud tradition of "good pleading." Litigants
were presumed to be advised by professionals who knew their business.
The courts we are dealing with as a rule held the party responsible for
"speaking properly" well-short of the "natural limits." We need to ask
whether such standards were relaxed in the special circumstances of Prohibition law, but we should expect relaxation to be, at best, relative to a
strict tradition.
In one aspect, then, the issue about pleading in any juridical context is
how hard the litigant's utterance should be scrutinized as against the
"natural limits" of clear and responsible speech. I.e.: Ought one to see
mere unintelligibility where it can be seen through rather "cold" and rigorous logico-grammatical spectacles? Or ought one to avoid seeing it in
legal discourse when it would not be visible in ordinary discourse, where
we usually judge with the eye of common sense, having regard to the
speaker's probable intent and probable justifiability in the real-life context?
In other aspects, pleading problems are more markedly the product of
convention. So are everyday problems about "proper speaking" and
whether to act on a request or order: "Pass the meat and potatoes" is not
an unintelligible request, but it may be regarded as inappropriate and unworthy of being carried out, (a) because it is incomplete owing to the
omission of "please" and (b) because it may be regarded as impolite to
ask for two dishes at once. At the limits, an utterance strongly condemned by etiquette may seem quasi -illogical, or one may express the
condemnation by picking holes in the logic. "The rule in this household
is that requests for dishes must give evidence on their face of being made
in a courteous spirit. By omitting 'please,' you have given no such evidence and therefore failed to state a cause why I should pass you anything
-- just as if you had left out the word 'pass.'" Or: "Your request is contradictory or ambiguous because, for all that appears, it demands the simultaneous performance of two acts which cannot in all aspects be done at
the same time. If that is not literally true, still I cannot imagine that your
real intention is not to help yourself first to the meat and then to the pota-
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toes, or vice versa. Surely it would have been clearer, as well as more polite, to make two separate requests in accord with the intended sequence."
One type of pleading problem strongly tied to positive legal tradition
derives from the common law's "take your choice" policy -- demur, or
traverse, or confess-and-avoid. In "nature," it is perfectly common and intelligible to say, e.g., "I did not hit you, but even if I had I would have
been justified." The common law's insistence on either denying the facts
alleged against one or admitting them and disputing their legal effect engendered problems in the construction and evaluation of pleading language: E.g., being forced either to deny or admit, I assert facts radically
inconsistent with the facts alleged against me. but omit to deny the latter
in the expressly negative language implied in the idea of "denial." If I
have really done that, I have "spoken badly" in terms of convention. As
in the meat-and-potatoes case, the failure of manners can be taken as a
failure of logic, for there is a sense in which no affirmation, however
pregnant with negation, is ever fully delivered of its burden. That would
be true even if a choice between traversing and pleading were not insisted
on, but the convention sharpens the eye to the contradiction. The etiquette is not necessary, and how deserving it is of strict enforcement is a
typical problem, but it does have a basis in natural sense, for there can be
genuine uncertainty, e.g., as to whether an affirmation is meant in effect
to deny, or as to whether verbally it is tolerably close to at least an implied negation. (So, in some circumstances, a request to "pass me everything on the table" might be genuinely baffling to execute, as well as
grossly rude and "constructively" illogical.) Within the set of standards
dictated (as strict standards) by a positive legal tradition and considered
deserving of strict enforcement, problems will arise as to whether the
rules have really been broken -- e.g., a statement may mix affirmative and
negative elements in such a way that it is problematic whether it is an affirmation improperly trying to do the work of a negation, or a goodenough negation with affirmations superfluously thrown in.
Legal convention is also strongly determinative of "burden of pleading" problems -- problems as to how much a party must say to move the
Court tentatively in his favor (i.e., to move it in his favor unless and until
the other party makes a countervailing statement.) What counts as "stating a prima facie cause of action" and what counts as "anticipating a defense" is a matter of convention, though the conventions are influenced
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by real-life probabilities. E.g. To commence an action for battery, Smith
might be expected to say "Jones struck me intentionally," but not to add
"and not in defending himself." Convention could permit Smith to omit
the "intentionally," leaving it to Jones to plead accident. It could also require Smith to anticipate common defenses such as self-defense. Yet
there is reason for the convention: people are often struck accidentally, so
a striking should not be presumed intentional until the contrary is asserted; more often than not, intentional strikers appearing in the role of
defendants were not defending themselves, so an intentional striker will
be presumed at fault unless he speaks up to deny it.
The "burden of pleading" was usually clear at common law because of
the writ system: The writs ex hypothesi stated valid causes of action; a
plaintiff "declaring upon the writ" -- spelling out his complaint along the
lines of the writ -- must obviously say as much as the writ says and
equally obviously need not anticipate defenses which the writ does not
anticipate. Prohibitions, however, were a species of "procedure without
writ." Questions could therefore arise as to whether surmises said as
much as need be said to state a good cause of Prohibition.
The interest of "substantial justice" is usually served by presuming in
favor of the pleader when everyday probabilities and the everyday use of
language provide a reasonable basis for doing so. I have reviewed the
character of pleading problems in highly general terms, however, as a reminder that they occur in different contexts and that in those different settings the way to "substantial justice" and the feasibility of lenient solutions
may vary considerably. In the context of Prohibitions, the "public stake"
approach might justify a very lenient attitude toward plaintiffs: "If there is
the least apparent ground to prohibit, prohibit. It is almost enough that
someone has come here and claimed a Prohibition -- as it were, that
someone has pointed, however vaguely, in the direction of an ecclesiastical court that might be out of bounds. Prohibit, then investigate. Let the
truth come out, however badly the parties botch the job of assisting a
clear and manageable truth to emerge -- the job for which they are responsible in private litigation." Such permissiveness would go against the
habit of insisting on "good pleading," as well as the interests of private
justice, and its feasibility may vary from situation to situation even within
Prohibition law.
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B.
Conformity between Surmise and Declaration
Summary: Must plaintiff-in-Prohibition's formal statement-of-claim (declaration)
correspond exactly with the surmise by which he initially moves the Court to grant
a Prohibition? The one case on this subject favors strict conformity.

* * *
Cases involving pleading problems fall into several sub-groups. Gomersal v. Bishop (1587
or 1588),1 is the only case on one question: Is conflict between the plaintiff's surmise and
his declaration fatal? As to the procedural setting: After a Prohibition was granted -- and assuming
it was not quashed or undone by Consultation on motion -- the defendant had the nominal choice
of obeying or disobeying the Prohibition. If he wanted to contest it formally, on the facts or the
law, he nominally "disobeyed" -- i.e., consented to being attached as if he had actually disobeyed
The procedures pursuant to an Attachment-on-Prohibition then came into play. The plaintiff-in
-Prohibition set out his case by a declaration, analogous to the declaration on the writ (the
plaintiff's first pleading move) in writ-initiated common law actions. The defendant was then free
to demur, traverse, or confess-and-avoid. If he took either of the first two courses, issue was
arrived at; if he took the third, pleading continued to issue in the standard common law way.
In Gomersal v. Bishop, plaintiff-in-Prohibition surmised in a tithe suit that the parson
had agreed with him to take 7/ a year for the tithes for the rest of the parishioner's life.
Upon attachment, the plaintiff declared that the parson had leased him the tithes for life
at 7/ per annum. The defendant (with Coke as counsel ) demurred. The Court held
unanimously that the declaration was bad owing to the variance. A declaration in
Attachment-on-Prohibition, the judges said, should conform to the surmise as a
declaration on a writ should conform to the writ.
There is no doubt but that the variance between surmise and declaration here was real
I.e.: A contract to take money for tithes was not the same thing as a lease, which conveyed
the property in the tithes. The practical purpose of discharging a parishioner by agreement
and leasing him his own tithes was much the same, but the transactions were manifestly
different -- the words "contract" and "lease" were by no construction synonymous.
The Court's decision may sound entirely in good form -- i.e., mean simply that a declaration
must use the same words as the surmise or synonymous ones.
But the decision may not have been quite that simple. "Contract" and "lease" were in
no sense synonyms. In form, the surmise and declaration plainly conflicted. What could the
plaintiff (who also had a good lawyer, Godfrey) say for himself? The reports suggest an answer.
Though they do not give the arguments at large, they have Godfrey saying that a con1 Leonard, 128 (dated T. 30 Eliz. Q.B.); Croke Eliz., 136; Add. 25,196, f.198; Harl. 1633, f.55b.
(Croke and the MS. date the case T.31. The MSS. alone show that Coke was the plaintiff's counsel).
Note: The page margins have been expanded to accomodate new text in the second paragraph.
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tract discharging tithes is a good cause of Prohibition, and Coke saying
that a contract in discharge of tithes will support a common law action
for breach of contract. From those remarks, I would reconstruct the
plaintiff's contention as follows: Godfrey did not maintain that form
never mattered in Prohibition cases -- i.e., that if the declaration is good in
itself it makes no difference in any case whether it conforms to the surmise exactly, or even approximately. Rather, he maintained that the surmise and declaration here both stated good causes, and equally good
causes, of Prohibition, and, in that case -- considering that there was no
further conflict -- the pleading should be construed favorably. I.e.: The
surmise should be dismissed as a mistake, innocent in the sense that the
mistake caused nothing to happen that would not have happened otherwise -- for the parson was just as properly prohibited on surmise of a contract as if the parishioner had correctly surmised a lease.
What then was Coke's counter-position? He could perfectly well have
argued that Prohibition simply does not lie on surmise of a contract,
whereas it plainly lies on a lease: One who contracts to pay money in lieu
of tithes may recover his loss by action for breach of contract if an ecclesiastical court forces him to pay tithes in kind in the face, of the agreement. Therefore it is not necessary to prohibit the ecclesiastical suit, and
doing so would amount to enforcing a contract specifically, contrary to
the common law practice of "enforcing" contracts only by compensatory
damages. This was entirely a legitimate opinion, probably the better opinion in the long run, and Godfrey cited recent authority contra. On this
premise, Coke could proceed as follows: The Prohibition in this case
should never have been granted. When a bad Prohibition slips through -as could easily happen in the absence of adversary debate, especially in
such a cases as this one, where opinions on the merits could legitimately
differ -- it is only fair to stick the plaintiff with his original theory. It is
unfair to let him improve his case on further consideration. Therefore in
this case the declaration must be overruled -- whether or not verbal conformity between surmise and declaration matters, and whatever should be
done when the surmise and declaration both state good cause for Prohibition.
An alternative argument can be constructed without claiming that the
Prohibition in this case should never have been granted: Let it be admitted only that it is less clear that Prohibition should be granted on a con-
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tract than on a lease. I.e.: In a full-dress debate as to whether Prohibition
will lie on surmise of a contract, serious arguments could be made both
ways -- irrespective of Coke's opinion, Godfrey's opinion, the better
opinion, or decided cases on either side. A serious debate as to whether
Prohibition would lie on a lease, per contra, is unimaginable. Or, short of
that, admit only that the theory of Prohibition on contracts and that of
Prohibitions on leases are not the same though the writ lies equally well
on either surmise. Thus: Ecclesiastical judges should clearly not pass on
conveyances or real property, the clearest case of "common law issue."
Therefore tithe suits should be prohibited as soon as the parishioner
comes and claims that he is exempt from tithes by virtue of a lease. In the
case of a contract, ecclesiastical courts should allow parishioners the specific benefit of discharge-agreements -- i.e., not award tithes in kind in
the face of a contract. If ecclesiastical courts fail to respect contracts in
that' way, the Prohibition should be used to control them. But that is different from using the Prohibition to prevent ecclesiastical courts from entertaining issue beyond their competence. They are not incompetent to so
much as listen to a claim of an agreement, though they are not free to dispose of such a claim by their own lights. Therefore, to surmise a contract
and then switch to a lease at the declaration stage is in effect to obtain one
variety of Prohibition and justify another variety. In other words, the disjunction between the surmise and the declaration in our case is extreme.
No one would say that "contract" and "lease" are synonyms in the ordinary sense. Godfrey, however, tried to make them out as "virtual" synonyms in a special sense: "two related, easily confusable, grounds for
Prohibition -- equally good grounds and the same sort of grounds." Coke
might have replied: "For that argument to have color, two conditions
should hold, neither of which does. (a) 'Equally good' should mean
'equally clear or uncontroversial,' not 'equally good in abstract truth.' (b)
'The same sort of grounds' should refer to the underlying theory of the
Prohibition, not to the superficial resemblance in practical effect between
protecting a tithe discharge based on contact and protecting one based on
lease."
Though construction is required to state the arguments, I think it is
clear from the reports that something like the exchange I have supposed
took place -- i.e., that Godfrey tried to argue that the variance was superficial or inconsequential and Coke replied in one or both of the ways
specified. (The exchange in reality may have been brief, informal and
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implicit, not in form the kind of debate I have spelled out.) How is the interpretation of the decision affected? Godfrey's attempt to explain away
the variance was rejected. That could be done, however, without accepting the replies I suggest Coke made. It could be done simply by insisting
on literal correspondence between surmise and declaration, as a matter of
good pleading, citing the analogy of declarations on writs. The reports
suggest that that is what the Court did. In other words, the Court chose to
regard the issue as one of form in the simple sense and to lay down a
pleading rule conformable to common law habits, when other approaches
were available. The judges chose not to consider whether the surmise
was good in substance, and hence not to get into the question whether a
bad Prohibition may be saved by a good declaration. They chose also not
to consider whether an apparent or literal variance may under some conditions be tolerated, and hence to go into what those conditions are.
As it stands, the decision is strong for good form, though perhaps the
availability of other approaches could be used to mitigate it in a
"hard" case. Suppose a declaration departed from the surmise in a more
plainly trivial way -- e.g., by changing the amount of a modus. As it
stands, Gomersal v. Bishop should doom the declaration, at least to the
extent that a comparable discrepancy would doom a declaration on a writ.
But it is easily arguable that the discrepancy in Gomersal v. Bishop was
much more fundamental than, e.g., a conflict between a 6d and a 10d modus. Should Gomersal v. Bishop be followed because the Court refused
to go into the character and degree of the discrepancy? Or should it be
not-followed because the Court neglected to go into that question although invited? Unfortunately there are no cases to resolve this nicety
upon stare decisis. Fortunately, perhaps, there was no stare decisis, properly so-called, in the earlier 17th century. My guess is that a trivial difference between surmise and declaration would probably have been
overlooked. As Gomersal v. Bishop stands, it is stricter than the run of
holdings in parallel areas (variant verdicts and misconceived surmises),
very possibly because it was perceived as a mere pleading case and a
stock-response was furnished by common law practice. (The plaintiff in
Gomersal v. Bishop might have done better to lie low until verdict. In all
probability, the plaintiff originally mistook the transaction behind his discharge, then discovered on investigation and better advice that what he
had and could hope to prove was a lease. Honorably, in a sense -- but
also fearfully, lest he be nonsuited or verdict be given against him -- he
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came forward and rectified his claim in the declaration. If he had said
"contract" in the declaration and gone to trial, he might hope for a special
verdict finding the lease, then denial of the parson's motion for Consultation on "judge by the truth" grounds. To say that the plaintiff's chances
might have been better that way is of course to criticize Gomersal v.
Bishop.)

C.
Pleading on the Plaintiff's Part: Surmise and Declarations
Summary: Although the courts hardly took every opportunity to be
permissive, their holdings on statements-of-claim were largely liberal.
There is only slight basis for saying that the pleading standard for declarations (which were pleadings properly so-called) was higher than for surmises (mere "informations"). The courts did not encourage demurring to
declarations on points of form or subtly conceived points of law when a
contest on the facts was possible. A few cases on the "burden of pleading" (plaintiff's duty to anticipate defenses) tend slightly against going
easy on the plaintiff, but they are neither unambiguous nor readily discussable apart from the particular situations to which they relate.
* * *
Several cases turn on assorted errors and inelegancies of pleading, and
a few on the "burden of pleading." (By the "burden of pleading" I mean:
Must the plaintiff say X, or will X be presumed in his favor until the defendant says not-X? Some cases ask that. Those which we take up first
ask whether a party had misspoken, as opposed to leaving too much to the
other side.) Classifying cases as involving pleading errors, as opposed to
substantive law, is inevitably problematic because an allegedly mispleaded claim is inherently an allegedly bad claim. E.g.: To set up a modus and lay no consideration is simply bad. But suppose a modus is set up
and the surmise contains what looks like an attempt to make out some
consideration. It may in some cases be ambiguous whether objection to
the surmise is substantive ("The consideration alleged is not really consideration within the legal meaning of the term") or procedural ("If you
want to claim that this is consideration for your modus you must state
how that is so more clearly".) In classifying cases as essentially procedural, I have gone by common probability: If the chances are that the
party had a perfectly good prima facie claim, capable of being stated in a
more unexceptionable fashion -- so that presuming in his favor would
have a reasonable basis -- the case is classified as procedural. There is
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sometimes similar ambiguity in distinguishing "burden of pleading" cases from
mispleading cases: "The plaintiff ought to have said X in addition to what he
has said" could mean "He has not stated an adequate claim" tout court, or "He
has left too much to the defendant." Again, I have gone by probability: If
"Defendant struck me" is objected to, there is a "burden" problem, because there obviously are real defenses to such a claim, some of which, it
is argued, the plaintiff ought to have anticipated. If "Defendant trespassed on my pasture" is objected to on the ground that the plaintiff
should set out his title, the problem is mispleading, because the defendant
probably has no defense based on the quality or quantity of the plaintiff's
estate, but is merely saying that the unexplained "my" is too vague (too
vague, of course, for a reason -- because people speaking as landholders
ought to give earnest of their right to hold others liable in that capacity -but not because the defense of "no interest" or "no right to speak as holder
of this land" is so likely that it should be anticipated.)
Two cases bearing on good pleading raise a special problem. In Man's
Case (1590 or 1591)2 a Prohibition was undone by Consultation essentially because it had been granted on a too- general and inelegant surmise.
Man was sued in the High Commission for incestuous marriage (his late
wife's sister's daughter.) While the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction
over the validity of marriages and the crime of incest, their authority was
limited and directed by the statue of 32 Hen. 8, c.38, which confined forbidden marriages in England to those within the Levitical degrees of relationship. Prohibitions were sometimes granted to prevent ecclesiastical
courts from enforcing marriage law inconsistent with the statute. Man's
Prohibition was deserved on that ground in substance, for his marriage
was outside the Levitical degrees. It was dissolved by Consultation, however, because it had been obtained by relying generally on the statute, not
by reciting specifically that the marriage in question was not within the
Levitical degrees.

2

4 Leonard, 16 Dated M. 33 Eliz. Q.B. (M.32/33 or 33/34)
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That is all the report says about the ground for decision. Man presumably said in effect, "The suit against me should be prohibited because it
contravenes 32 Hen. 8." He ought to have said "...because I am charged
with incest in respect of a marriage not within the Levitical degrees, contrary to 32 Hen. 8." Is there any reason for holding the difference important? The answer, I suspect, trenches on substantive law. Why should the
ecclesiastical court be prohibited? Two replies are possible in this type of
case: (a) Because the ecclesiastical court is invited to deprive the plaintiff
of a statutory right, and the interpretation of statutes belongs to the common law. (Analogous to "Because a claim in the ecclesiastical court depends on a lease, and the construction of conveyances is within exclusive
common law competence.") (b) Because the ecclesiastical court is invited
to dissolve and punish a marriage which may not legally be dissolved or
punished, vide 32 Hen. 8. The theoretical difference between these two
statements is considerable. Whether construction of statutes belonged exclusively to the common law was a difficult and sensitive question. To
assert such proprietorship was to say that the King's ecclesiastical judges
could not be trusted to understand and faithfully apply the statutes -- the
highest law of the land, binding on every man because putatively every
man's act -- as they could not be allowed to decide question beyond their
professional training. Formulation (b) has the advantage of avoiding that
implication. Of course, the common law courts protected the subject's
statutory rights as they understood them by means of Prohibitions. But
that -- says formulation (b) -- is only an instance of protecting the subject's rights generally. There is no special variety of Prohibition for protecting statutory rights or insuring that statutes are construed by common
law courts. Therefore it states no cause of Prohibition merely to evoke a
statutory right and show that it has been, or may be, violated. Plaintiff-inProhibition must rather state a specific way in which, on the facts as they
are claimed to be, he has been, or may be, treated illegally. Therefore, because this distinction is important, the plaintiff must not seem merely to
evoke a statutory right. He must not leave it ambiguous whether he wants
common law help because a statute in involved, or because he has suffered, or may suffer, a specified illegality. If he does leave it ambiguous,
his surmise will be construed against him, even though it is perfectly clear
that he could prevail merely by rewriting his surmise. So I take the meaning of the decision in Man's Case. The circumstances being special, and
the distinction involved a sensitive one, the case says little about the construction of pleading generally.
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In Man's Case, the Prohibition was granted after sentence against Man.
There was no suggestion that it should have been sought earlier. The
structure of the case, indeed, was such that the opposite suggestion might
have been made if the circumstances had created the opportunity. I.e.: If
Prohibition had been sought before sentence, it might have been urged
that no cause of Prohibition had accrued. The distinction developed
above perhaps points that way: If ecclesiastical courts are perfectly competent to entertain claims and defenses based on statutes, how can they
be prohibited until they have committed an error? There is not just one
answer to that question, for there is an argument from economy for prohibiting suits that cannot be good on their face as soon as they are
brought. But a later opinion both confirms Man's Case and adds the rule
that actual error in the application of a statute -- either interlocutory or final -- must be assigned to make out a claim to Prohibition.
In the later case, Samstead v. Dr. Huchenson (1612),3 a parishioner,
being sued for tithes, pleaded in the ecclesiastical court that the parson
was presented by "corrupt agreement" -- i.e., that the owner of the advowson was bribed to present Dr. Huchenson to the living. The point of the
plea was to claim that Huchenson was never installed in the living, by virtue of the statute of 31 Eliz., c. 3, which made admission to benefices
pursuant to bribes ipso facto void. Therefore he had no title to the tithes.
Huchenson replied that the King had pardoned him his simony. Samstead
then sought a Prohibition on two grounds: (a) because the case depended
on a statute; (b) because it depended on a royal pardon. I.e.: The theory
of the surmise was that construing statutes and pardons was common law
business as such. The report gives only the opinion of Chief Justice Coke,
which is against granting Prohibition. Coke's preliminary words suggest
that he did not have much faith that the ecclesiastical court would handle
the case correctly and avoid Prohibition in the long run. (The bribe in this
case was alleged to have been given by Huchenson's friends. In Coke's
opinion, the statue extended to a bribe for a clergyman's benefit even
though he himself had no knowledge of it. His words suggest that he did
not think the ecclesiastical court would understand the statute that strin-

3

M. 10 Jac. C.P. Harl. 48l7, f.224b.
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gently. He also thought the pardon would not extend to validate Huchenson's installation -- i.e., a clergyman installed as a result of a bribe was
simply never installed, and pardoning him could not change that, though
it would relieve him of other sanctions attached to the offense. There too,
perhaps, Coke was not confident that the ecclesiastical judge would make
the right discrimination.) Nevertheless, Coke held that Prohibition would
not lie until an error could be laid to the ecclesiastical court: "...no Prohibition shall be granted dicendo in his surmise that the statute is to be expounded by the common law. For since the statute says that the admission
will be void, that is plain and sufficient direction to... the ecclesiastical
court to give sentence against the parson ... But if the judges of the ecclesiastical court will not allow the plea...And in the same manner if they misconstrue the statute Prohibition lies on surmise thereof."
The point of this opinion is that before assignable error no right to Prohibition has accrued. That point is substantive, not a matter of pleading.
As stated, however, I think Coke's opinion goes to affirm Man's Case,
and that it could be applied to a pleading problem: It is never good, according to Coke, to say (dicendo) simply that a statute is involved and
therefore the suit should be prohibited until the statute's meaning is resolved at common law. I infer that in a true pleading situation -- where
the right to Prohibition has clearly accrued -- the party must be careful to
rest his surmise on a specified error, not on a general complaint that his
statutory rights have been violated by an incompetent court. E.g.: Suppose Samstead had been in a position to surmise that his statute-based objection to Hucheson's seisin of the living had been disallowed. I would
infer that he must be careful to say that and only that -- "I tried to plead
that Hucheson was never lawfully installed in the living and entitled to
the tithes, by virtue of such and such a corrupt bargain (spelled out) and
the statute of 31 Eliz., and I was erroneously not allowed to make that
plea." He must be careful not to short-circuit such a statement or expand
it in such a way as to make it ambiguous whether the erroneous disallowance of a plea (analogous to many others involving no statute) or the
suit's dependence on a statute was the theory of his claim.
Coke's opinion in Samstead v. Dr. Huchenson (as opposed to his preliminary comments on the legal merits) goes only to the statute, not the
pardon. Possibly the same point should be made about a pardon -- i.e., actual error in the handling of a pardon must be surmised; a surmise assert-
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ing or implying that claims based on royal pardons are beyond ecclesiastical competence is bad. But Coke made no such point about the pardon.
Suppose for the sake of argument, however, that an ecclesiastical suit
should be prohibited merely because a royal pardon comes in question,
regardless of how the ecclesiastical court handles it. Then our case would
be as follows: In the ecclesiastical court Samstead pleads the corrupt bargain and statute. His plea is not disallowed. Therefore, as Coke's opinion
says, Samstead has no present cause of Prohibition -- only the possibility
of cause if the ecclesiastical court ultimately misconstrues the statute.
Hucheson answers the plea of the bargain and statute by pleading the pardon. We have stipulated that Samstead now has cause of Prohibition in
principle. Is there any reason to deny it to him? There might be a pleading reason: Samstead rested his surmise on two grounds -- one good and
one bad. When a plaintiff does that, the surmise should perhaps be taken
against him. A less formalistic argument might say, "On his own showing, Samstead had no complaint against the ecclesiastical court. He accepted the ecclesiastical court's jurisdiction to the extent of making his
plea, which the ecclesiastical court was perfectly willing to hear. If he
had sought a Prohibition before pleading he would have been turned
down, but that does not detract from his acquiescence. For his claim to a
Prohibition on the basis of his own plea is no better now than it would
have been earlier. Given such acquiescence, does Samstead have standing to claim a Prohibition because a 'common law issue' has been introduced by the other party? Is his position not like that of a man seeking to
prohibit his own suit when he himself is at fault, or when he has created
the situation in which the 'common law issue' is introduced in a meaningful sense (as opposed merely to suing in the only possible place)?" I
doubt that that argument is very good (because Samstead had no choice
except to plead the bargain and statute in the ecclesiastical court), but it is
conceivable that weight could be given (a) to Samstead's failure to move
as soon as he thought, though incorrectly, that he had cause of Prohibition
(instead of waiting for something reinforcing to turn up) and (b) to the ecclesiastical court's apparent willingness to accept his correct interpretation of the statute (whether or not one expected them to accept it in the
long run). Finally, there would be a practical argument for withholding
Prohibition until sentence simply because the plaintiff's claim was complicated. We have seen cases above which can be taken as sanctioning the
Court's discretion to "throw up its hands" when faced by complex claims
to Prohibition -- i.e., to wait and see whether the ecclesiastical court will
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do anything wrong, even though, strictly speaking, sufficient basis for
Prohibition now has been stated. Such discretion may be conceived as
the converse of discretion to deny a Prohibition because it is sought too
late.
This analysis quoad the pardon is of course entirely speculative. The
report gives only Coke's opinion quoad the statute. His omission of comment on the separate matter of the pardon could imply the opinion, on one
ground or another, that Prohibition based solely on the pardon could not
be justified. But it might equally well mean only that he reserved judgment on that point on the occasion to which the report relates. A final
word of warning is in order with respect to Man's Case and Samstead v.
Dr. Huchenson: These cases should not be taken as the last word on
whether construction of statutes belonged as such to the common law.
We shall meet with contrary suggestions on that question. The two cases
do, however, recommend care in setting up claims to statutory rights visa-vis the "foreign" courts.
Markworth v. Colfes (1598)4 raises a characteristic pleading problem:
whether affirmative language will do when a point of negative import
must be made to state a strictly valid claim. In this case, a parson sued
for tithes of barley. The parishioner surmised a modus to pay 6/ to the
vicar in lieu of barley tithes. It was objected that the surmise ought to use
negative language -- that it is customary not to pay the tithes in kind to the
parson, but instead to pay the commutation to the vicar. As it stood, the
surmise left this negative to be inferred from the affirmative. The Court
overruled this objection and laid down two generalizations about pleading
in Prohibition cases: (a) The Court expressly invoked the "public" approach to Prohibitions as grounds for construing surmises favorably: A
surmise is only an information to the Court, on which it may act according to the common sense meaning--here, the obvious implication that
nothing was due to the parson by the custom. Strict canons of pleading
are not applicable; (b) A surmise, in any event, is not a pleading properly
so-called -- i.e., a statement to which the defendant makes a formal answer. There is a difference between the standard of pleading applicable
to a declaration on a Prohibition and that applicable to a mere surmise. (I
4

M. 40/41 Eliz. C.P. Harl. 4817, f.172.
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do not take the latter point as saying that a declaration in this case would
be bad for omission of any explicitly negative prescription, only that it
might be. In other words, on demurrer to a declaration, it would be relevant to argue that negative language was required, whether or not that is
actually true. In the context of whether to grant Prohibition on a given
surmise, the argument is irrelevant, however valid in the abstract.)
In another late-Elizabethan case,5 it was objected that the surmise,
claiming a modus, was defective for failure to set out plaintiff-in-Prohibition’s estate in the land that produced the crop. The objection was overruled: “...for it is all one if he has an estate at will, for years, or a fee, for
the tithes are demanded against him.” That is plainly correct. I can understand the objection only as a speculative formalistic quibble. It is
likely (the brief report does not say) that the modus here was private -i.e., applicable to particular land (not to the whole parish or some other
local unit.) In that event, the prescription would be laid as accruing to the
present holder and those whose estate he has (i.e., his predecessors in estate.) The defendant’s objection was probably a matter of arguing that it
is incomplete to prescribe in que estate and not to say expressly that one
has any particular estate in the land, or repugnant so to prescribe and
leave the possible inference that one has no estate. But the Court’s point
was surely well-taken: The actual occupier or crop-producer was liable
for tithes, and he was entitled to the benefit of a modus whether local or
applicable only to particular land. Whatever would have been gained in
formal elegance by setting out the estate, doing so would have had no
relevance for the matter at stake. (It might be asked whether one without
any legitimate estate -- a naked disseisor or abator -- may take advantage
of a private modus. I know of no authority on this point, but the answer
is probably that even then the occupier’s interest in the land is irrelevant.)
A couple of cases turn on the special problems of pleading prescriptive
claims. In the Rector of Tunstall’s Case,6 plaintiff-in-Prohibition said
“that before. the time of memory two acres of meadow were allotted to the
parson’s predecessor in lieu of tithes ...and that the rector for the time being received and had the aforesaid two acres in recompense of the
5
6

P. 41 Eliz. C.P. Add. 25,203, f.5b.
P. 5 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,215, f.35.
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tithes...from time whereof memory of man does not exist." This was not
an elegantly pleaded modus because it alleged an event (allocation of the
two acres) before the time of memory. The second part of the quoted sentence speaks properly and says enough -- that the two acres have been enjoyed in consideration of the tithes from time beyond memory. By the
theory of prescription, to say that a specific event took place before memory involved an implicit contradiction -- as if one were to say, I know
event X took place at a time that nobody knows anything about." There is
no contradiction, on the other hand, in what amounts to "Practice X has
been going on and no one knows when it started. "The defendant in this
case stated his objection to the plaintiff's claim by saying that he could
not take issue on the allocation. I.e.: An asserted event should be capable
of being denied. But an event asserted to have taken place at a time nobody knows about cannot be denied. This objection came to saying that
since the first part of the prescription was bad the whole should be taken
against the plaintiff. The Court, however, ruled that since the second part
of the claim was good the first part could be overlooked. In the terms of
the defendant's objection: the judges told him he could take issue on the
immemorial usage. In other words, the claim as a whole did not prevent
the defendant from taking issue on the relevant fact.
The report of the Rector of Tunstall's Case concludes by saying that
the parties joined issue by consent and waived demurrer. Thus it is clear
that the discussion above was not on demurrer (but on motion for Consultation or to quash, for a Prohibition had been granted.) The Court's
opinion was of course dissuasive to demurring. It is possible, however,
that a higher standard of pleading would have had to be considered if the
Court had faced a demurrer to a declaration which repeated the inelegance of the surmise (and quaere how far a declaration may correct the
surmise.) For that reason, and in the interest of substantial justice, it is
possible that the Court used some persuasion to see that the defendant
took issue on the facts.
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Prose v. Dr. Leyfield7 arose on demurrer. In this case, a parishioner
sought to stop a tithe suit by showing one type of monastic discharge -- a
prescriptive exemption at the time of the dissolution. In pleading the monastery's exemption, he made the mistake of saying that the abbey was discharged from its foundation to the dissolution. I.e.: Instead of saying that
it was discharged from beyond the time of memory until the dissolution
(an indefinitely long period of time), he referred the usage to a specified
period (the distance between two events -- the foundation and the dissolution.) The parson demurred on account of this violation of the theory of
prescription, and the Court upheld the demurrer. The parishioner's counsel argued unsuccessfully that it would have been enough simply to allege
that the land was discharged in monastic hands at the dissolution -- i.e.,
that it was unnecessary to say why it was discharged. Therefore the admittedly bad pleading was surplusage and should not be held against the
plaintiff. But the Court rejected this argument. Having rejected it, there
was no way to hold for the plaintiff, it seems to me. For if the plaintiff
had to show the manner of discharge and chose prescription, then he
must plead an adequate prescriptive title, which he utterly failed to do.
Justice Dodderidge, with Chief Justice Coke concurring, said that the
plaintiff's plea would have been good if he had expressly laid the foundation of the monastery before memory (albeit, cf. last case, a "specific
event.") As it was, there was mere failure to claim immemorial usage.
The Court would not presume, until the contrary was shown, that nonpayment throughout the monastery's history was non-payment from time
immemorial. Nor would the Court permit monastic discharges to be alleged in general terms, without showing the manner of discharge.
As noted, Prose v. Dr. Leyfield arose on demurrer. Quaere whether
Prohibition should have been granted in the first place, and whether a motion for Consultation should have been granted if one had been made. As
the Court finally saw the case, the surmise was bad on its face. Could
anything be said in favor of indulging it until a formal challenge came on
demurrer? Possibly, for the plaintiff here probably had a perfectly good
basis for a proper prescriptive claim. Most monasteries were established

7

T. 12 Jac. K.B. 1 Rolle, 54.
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quite a while before the dissolution. The intelligent move would probably
have been to claim a straight prescriptive exemption for the monastery
and leave it to the defendant to prove if he could that the monastery was
established at a known time (which is to say, within memory.) Possibly a
bad surmise should be let through until either: (a) the plaintiff improved
his declaration, say by adding that the abbey was founded before memory
(in which event the question whether the surmise and declaration sufficiently conformed could be taken up); or (b) the defendant took issue on
the fact (i.e., whether the abbey was paying tithes at the dissolution and
before), in which event the truth could prevail despite bungled pleading.
Sed quaere.
The last two cases above indirectly suggest the question whether standards of precise pleading should be the same on demurrer as on preliminary challenge to a Prohibition. The case of Price v. Mescal8 is a
pleading case in only a marginal sense, but it contains an important indication of the judicial attitude toward demurrers in typical Prohibition
cases. For that point, the report should be noted here. In substance, Price
v. Mescal was a complicated modus case. A parishioner was sued in one
action for several sorts of tithes. He surmised five distinct modi covering
those several tithes. The plaintiff declared upon his Prohibition, and the
defendant demurred. Upon the demurrer, the defendant's counsel urged
objections to all five modi. The issues debated essentially concern what
constitutes a legally valid modus. Though that question is often hard to
distinguish form whether a modus is well-stated, and some of the points
in dispute could possibly be reduced to pleading, I shall defer the matter
of this case.
The point to note here is the strong exception to the demurrer taken by
Chief Justice Coke: "...to demurre upon such matters, is a very desperate
kind of practise, and I would never have done so, but to joine issue upon
the customes, and first to try whether there was such a custome or not?
and if it be found so, then afterwards to demurre upon the validity of this
in law." In other words, Coke did not approve of demurring to prescriptions. He liked to see the truth established by verdict first. Legal debate,
if any should be necessary, ought to come upon motion in arrest of judg8

T. 12 Jac. K.B. 2 Bulstrode, 238
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ment or, where appropriate, upon a special verdict. His words perhaps
suggest that the "desperate practise" of demurring was in his opinion both
foolish from the defendant's own point of view and a mischievous thing
for counsel as "officers of the Court" to do -- risky for the defendant to
stake everything on the refined construction of a pleaded "text" when a
jury might find straightforwardly that the tithes has been paid in kind;
mischievous to burden the Court with difficult problems of law when the
alleged customs might be unprovable in fact.
Coke could not, of course, get around the demurrer by disapproving of
it. He necessarily went on to discuss the points of law that had been
raised. In the event, Consultation was granted quoad two of the five
modi. In taking this step, Coke and the Court said that even where a demurrer is "bad," the Court should look at the declaration on its own and
grant Consultation if it is defective. I am not sure I understand the force
of this remark in relation to the case. I do not think the demurrer was
considered legally "bad" just because Coke thought it a foolish and mischievous step. The Court's reason for granting the partial Consultation
seems to have been essentially a matter of pleading -- the plaintiff's incompleteness in stating his claim. (He claimed a discharge for certain
classes of cattle without showing that the cattle in question belonged
thereto. He claimed the right to pay a fixed number of cheeses in consideration of certain tithes without showing that he produced any cheese.
These flaws would seem offhand to be in the airtightness with which he
stated his claims, rather than in the probable merit of the claims.) Perhaps the effect of the total demurrer to the declaration's sufficiency in law
was a waiver of these formal objections (the defendant's counsel argued
against the prescription on other grounds than the Court thought decisive.) In any event, the ill-advised defendant was treated generously and
the plaintiff held to high standards of pleading.
Coke's objection to the demurrer as "practise" has a bearing on our
procedural concerns. If it was bad practice to raise possibly unnecessary
debate on the legal merits of modi -- a species of debate that involves the
muddy line between the modus "as is" and "as stated" -- is it not also bad
practice to raise possibly unnecessary debate on purer pleading questions?
Quaere. But if so, there is an argument for not looking too hard at surmises: Let formally doubtful surmises through, hoping -- and using the
Court's influence to urge -- that issue will be taken on the facts, so that
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the contention can be settled on the truth. The public interest in prohibiting when Prohibition is due would be served thereby. On the other hand,
Price v. Mescal itself insists on high pleading standards for declarations.
Surely the best way to insure demurrer-proof declarations (and to avoid
problems of conflict between declaration and surmise) would be to withhold Prohibition on formally inadequate surmises. Once, however, a Prohibition slips through, it should probably be allowed to stand if at all
possible (i.e., not undone by Consultation on motion), in hope of factual
issue.
The final feature of Price v. Mescal goes to vindicate Coke's objection
to the demurrer, The reporter tells us that the remaining three prescription (those with respect to which the declaration was held good) were
tried by jury "at the Bar" (i.e., in Westminster Hall). Since the fact of
those modi finally came to trial, I can only suppose that the defendant was
persuaded and allowed to abandon his demurrer, for the effect of demurring ought to be admission of the customs as "facts." The jury found for
the plaintiff, upholding the modi "against the directions of the Court, and
contrary to all their evidence, insomuch that the Court said unto them,
that they never heard of so ill a verdict, they having no proof at all for the
prescription... but for the tithe to be paid in kind, and therefore the Court
said that it should be tryed again by another jury..." In addition to its
value as evidence of a new trial awarded for a verdict against the evidence, the results show how foolhardy and unnecessary it was to demur.
If courts could be depended on to control biased juries as this one did,
parsons had no reason to figure demurring as the lesser risk, compared
with pro-parishioner jurors.
The ill-advised demurrer in Price v. Mescal must have been abandoned. In Foster v. Hade (or Hide),9 a demurrer based on a point of
pleading was given up with the consent of Coke's King's Bench. Here, a
Prohibition was granted on the standard ground that the bounds of parishes had come in question in the ecclesiastical court. When plaintiff-inProhibition declared, he undertook to show how the parsonage came to
his opponent. (The relevance of such a showing does not appear.) He
said that it came to the King by the dissolution of the monasteries, was
9.

H. 13 Jac. K.B. 1 Rolle. 332; Harg. 47, f.110b.
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granted to a corporation by the King's letters patent, and then granted over
by the corporation. In some way, however, he allegedly failed to plead
these transactions adequately, wherefore the defendant demurred. (Just
what was wrong does not appear from the brief reports. There were special rules about the pleading of letters patent and deeds. It was not
enough to say, e.g., "Jones got Blackacre from the King by letters patent."
The date, effect, etc., of such documents had to be specified if one wanted
to rely on them.) Coke, speaking for the Court, agreed that the declaration
was defective for the reason alleged. Nevertheless, he refused to grant a
Consultation with the effect of permitting the ecclesiastical court to determine the bounds of parishes. With the Court's assent, the parties then
took factual issue. In effect, the Court's response to the demurrer was
"forget about it." The defendant was not given the advantage of his apparently well-taken pleading-point. On the other hand, he was not stuck
with his demurrer when the Court decided that a common law issue
could not be turned over to ecclesiastical trial just because the plaintiff
had mispleaded. By permitting the defendant to withdraw the demurrer
and take issue, the court denied the plaintiff the advantage of the admission of fact in his favor which the demurrer ought to imply.
Demurring on pleading points was discouraged. In one sense, that is to
say that pleading was not given consummate importance in Prohibition
cases. But it does not follow that pleading points could not be insisted on
by means other than demurrer. There were four other contexts in which to
complain of bad pleading on the plaintiff's part, all of which appear in
cases below: (a) In adversary debate before any Prohibition was granted;
(b) On motion to quash a Prohibition; (c) On motion for Consultation;
(d) On motion in arrest of judgment after verdict on a factual issue.
In Allen's Case,10 a parishioner surmised a modus to pay 1d per acre
''or thereabouts." The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Coke, had
no hesitation in denying Prohibition. To state the point substantively: A
modus must be definite to be good. To state it as a matter of pleading: It
is not enough to say, in effect, that a modus exists, without making any
definite statement as to what the modus is. The Court will not presume -10

M. 7 Jac. C.P. Add. 25,211, f.189; Harg. 47, f.29.
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even with the help of an approximate averment -- that there is a basis far
prohibiting the ecclesiastical suit. It will not let the Prohibition through in
order to see whether the jury will come up with a definite sum.
Thus a party who genuinely does not know the amount of the modus
affecting his land must still take a stab at a definite sum. As we have
seen, he would probably be safe enough if the jury found a different sum.
But for just that reason the decision in Allen's Case may perhaps be
questioned. Ignorance of the details of a modus could be excusable. Is it
better to insist on definiteness in the surmise and then go easy on a variant verdict, or to tolerate an honest expression of uncertainty in the surmise and simply ask the jury for the truth? Making the plaintiff plead
definitely when he may not know the truth makes him run the risk of a
general verdict against him. Short of that, it invites the problem of what to
do with a variant special verdict -- a source of legal contention, one must
admit, even if one is strong advocate of "judging by the truth." But the
other course -- the one ruled out by Allen's Case -- raises problems too: If
"1d or thereabouts" is tolerated in a surmise, should it be tolerated in a
declaration? Merely to leave that question open is to risk demurrers. To
permit a vague surmise but insist on a definite declaration raises the problem of conformity between surmise and declaration. Assuming an
equally vague declaration would be acceptable, what does a traverse
mean, and what can the jury find? "There is a modus for 1d. or thereabouts" can be read as "There is a modus of some sort" (="There is a modus"). Denying that seems to say "There is no modus at all." If that is
what the traverse means, may the defendant introduce evidence of, say, a
6d modus without cutting his own throat? Could the jury ever find its
way to a special verdict -- even out of its own knowledge -- if the question before it must be logically reduced to "Is there any sort of modus?
Perhaps that reduction is not inevitable, but at least the question arises.
For the reason last given, the decision in Allen's Case seems right.
The problems one way are worse than the problems the other way. At
least as far as the brief report indicates, the Court saw the case as cut-anddried. Coke cited an analogy -- a Cox's Case, where a copyholder prescribed to pay a fine of "not above 2/" and the prescription was adjudged
bad for vagueness. I would suggest that the analogy may have been seductive. In the end, it probably points the right way, but an argument
contra can be made for the special circumstances of Prohibition cases.
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"All prescription must be definite -- look at copyhold cases" might at least
arguably contain a fallacy. (Cf. Gomersal v. Bishop, the possible fallacy
in "Surmise and declaration must conform -- look at the relation declaration must bear to writs.")
Price v. Osborne11 shows a pleading point successfully made on motion, but with the effect only of quashing the Prohibition, not of obtaining
a Consultation (as the defendant presumably desired.) The report of this
case is skimpy, but I reconstruct it as follows: A Prohibition was granted
to stop a suit for hay tithes on surmise of a modus that the parson enjoyed
five acres of meadow in consideration of all the hay tithes of a vill. The
parson then moved that the surmise was defective for failure to aver that
the land which produced the hay in question in this suit had lately been
converted from arable to meadow.
Assuming the conversion to be a fact, why should the plaintiff aver it
(as, in the event, the Court thought he should have)? I think that question
can only be answered by appreciating the lurking substantive matter.
Changes in land use understandably raised problems in tithe law. Modi
such as the one in this case (i.e., where the commutation was not computed at so much per acre or other unit, but as a lump sum or the equivalent for all tithes of a given sort) could not as a rule be allowed to stand in
the face of major changes in land use. Leaving inflation aside, 5/ for all
hay might represent fair value according to the traditional employment,
let us say, of 100 acres -- where roughly 1/4 of the land was usually in
hay, the rest in other crops, either tithable in kind or subject to their own
commutations. If the farmer suddenly converted all 100 acres to hay, the
parson's income from this land would be drastically and unfairly diminished. The modus in that case would probably be interpreted as applying
only to hay produced on land that had always or sometimes produced hay.
A modus unmistakably alleged to apply to all hay produced within a
given area, regardless of how much it was devoted to hay, would probably be held an unreasonable custom.

11

M. 15 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5149, f.25.
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To return to the pleading point in Price v. Osborne: The parson must
have alleged the conversion from arable to meadow in his libel, attached
to the surmise. Otherwise, it could not be taken for a fact which the parishioner was obliged to aver. To say he should aver it means, I assume,
that he should either affirm it or deny it. I.e.: He should plead his modus
and say the land was not recently converted to hay, in which event the
parson could admit the modus and take issue on the conversion (reserving points of law until after verdict.) Or else the parishioner should plead
his modus and admit the conversion, in which event the parson could demur to a concordant declaration or move for Consultation, so raising the
legal issue -- whether the modus should be interpreted or allowed to apply to any converted land (apparently only one acre was allegedly converted in this case.) The fault was saying nothing at all about the alleged
conversion.
This objection to the surmise seems well-taken, as the court agreed. At
the very least, it was unnecessarily loose pleading, leaving the parson to
plead at common law what he had already made part of the record. I.e.
suppose as things stood the parson could admit the modus and plead the
conversion, leaving it up to the parishioner to demur to that plea or traverse it. But the extra step was avoidable by forcing the parishioner to
plead in such way that the parson could get to the point at once. The
Court accordingly "disallowed" the Prohibition and "ordered" that the ecclesiastical court proceed. But it refused Consultation (So I take the
words of the report "mes navera procedendo"). So in the upshot the
plaintiff's mispleading hardly hurt him, for there would be nothing to prevent his making a correct surmise and having a new Prohibition. The case
was handled like some of those on conflicts between libel and surmise -the Prohibition was void, the parson and ecclesiastical court could carry
on at their peril and if they had time to move before a new Prohibition issued. If I reconstruct the case correctly, it can indeed be seen as a libelsurmise conflict of a somewhat problematic sort. (The standard
libel-surmise case was a misrecitation of the ecclesiastical suit. Here, it
might make a question whether sliding over one element in the ecclesiastical claim -- the conversion -- is equivalent to, say, misrepresenting a suit
for 400 fleeces as a suit for 40. That the suit here was for tithes in kind
from such-and-such land was not misrepresented, though the legal theory
behind the parson's claim -- that no modus, if there was one, applied to
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the converted land -- was ignored).
In the Caroline case of Wood and Carverner v. Symons,12 the Common Pleas was divided on one sort of objection to a surmise and united in
insistence on tight pleading in another respect. In this case, a man being
sued for hay tithes surmised: (a) In consideration of extra work in making up hay in the meadows, the parishioners were customarily exempt
quoad hay grown on "headlands." (I.e.: They did more than their legal
duty in preparing the parson's share of the main hay crop, probably by
shocking and binding it in more convenient form than they had to -- and
in return paid no tithes on hay harvested from the uncultivated ends of arable open fields where the plough-teams turned around.) (b) No tithes are
due for headland hay de jure. The plaintiff omitted, however, to say expressly that the hay in question in this case came from headland! On account of that omission, the judges agreed that the suggestion was
"naught" and denied Prohibition. In addition, the surmise was objected to
as duplicitous -- for claiming a discharge via a modus and via the common law. The two Justices whose remarks are reported responded differently to this objection. Yelverton thought the double allegation
immaterial. One might suggest twenty grounds for Prohibition, he said.
Richardson disagreed with Yelverton's principle, though without holding
the duplicity fatal to the surmise in this case. So, at least, I take his meaning, for he said that the claim of common law exemption was surplusage
(mere unnecessary added words, to be ignored.) The real difference between these two positions is not obvious. Yelverton's principle would argue for granting Prohibition unless all the alleged grounds were
inadequate, Richardson might argue for picking the weakest ground alleged and denying the Prohibition if that is not strong enough (i.e., construing duplicitous surmises against the plaintiff to that extent.) In the
instant case, it is more likely that he took the first ground mentioned in
the surmise as the plaintiff's claim and the other ground as surplusage.
But what does that imply? Consider these possibilities; (a) The modus
comes first and is held bad on its face. Will the Prohibition be denied
even though the Court thinks the product being sued for non-tithable de
12

M. 5 Car. C.P. Hetley, 147.
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jure? Such a result would be inconsistent with the cases on misconceived
surmises above. (b) The de jure exemption comes first and is held bad.
Will the ecclesiastical court be turned loose to determine a modus? I
should doubt it. In short, I wonder whether Richardson's adverse reaction
to Yelverton's general point would turn out on reflection to mean anything in the context of deciding whether or not to grant Prohibition in the
first place.
Later on, it might mean something. Richardson's point might come to
saying: "Having put the modus first, the plaintiff must declare upon the
modus. I.e.: He must offer the defendant a factual issue. After an unfavorable verdict, perhaps the plaintiff may move in arrest of judgment that
the product is exempt de jure. Perhaps the Court ought to intervene on its
own motion to prevent collection of tithes not due de jure -- using its discretion as to when to intervene. Those bridges we will cross when we
come to them. The immediate point is that declarations cannot be duplicitous. The best way to prevent their being is to construe the surmise as asserting a single claim and insist that the declaration conform. The best
way to that end is to take the first good ground alleged in the surmise as the
plaintiff's sole pleaded claim." Would Yelverton have disputed this? In
the actual context of Wood and Carverner v. Symons -- the first motion
for Prohibition -- Yelverton's opinion sounds righter than Richardson's -i.e., more accordant with the "merely informational" nature of the surmise. Looking ahead, however, I find it difficult to suppose that Yelverton would be equally tolerant of duplicity in the declaration. How is the
defendant to answer twenty separate claims, or even two? (If the declaration were permitted to assert two claims, at the least a problem of interpreting a demurrer or traverse would be introduced. If the defendant
demurs to challenge the claim of de jure exemption, does he confess the
modus? If he takes factual issue on the modus, does he waive the right to
argue that the product is tithable de jure?) Granting that the plaintiff must
take a single stand at the declaration stage, it would make perfectly good
sense to say he may take his choice, and perhaps that is what Yelverton
would let him do. The disadvantages thereof are: (a) Introduction of a
possible conformity problem. (Does a single-claim declaration follow a
multiple-claim surmise as a valid declaration on a writ follows the writ?
Richardson's approach, by giving the surmise a definite single-claim interpretation, establishes a clear criterion of what the declaration must conform to if it is not to fail.) (b) Attaching no penalty at all to a duplicitous
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surmise, provided the duplicity is eliminated in the declaration. (Perhaps
there is no need to attach a penalty. Richardson's approach would attach
only the mild one of eliminating the plaintiff's free choice at the next
stage. That mild penalty is perhaps comparable to the "penalty" of
merely denying the Prohibition when the surmise is loosely pleaded -- as
the Court actually did in Wood and Carverner v. Symons -- for denial was
no bar to starting over with a more "artistic" surmise. We have considered the wisdom of being tough on ill-stated surmises -- to that mild extent -- precisely in order to avoid trouble later on.)
In Henchman v. Parsons,13 defendant-in-Prohibition tried to take advantage of a mispleading late in the game and failed because he had
waited too long. A man was sued for a parish rate to repair the church.
He got a Prohibition on surmise that there was an ancient "chapel of ease"
in the parish, to the upkeep of which he had always contributed, and that
he had customarily been discharged from repair-rates for the main
church. This was a common type of response to rate suits, analogous to
the modus in tithe suits, I.e.: It was common and lawful to claim a customary duty to maintain a chapel, and in consideration thereof a customary exemption from helping maintain the church. In this case, however,
the plaintiff failed to say expressly that he was discharged from repairing
the church in consideration of repairing the chapel. He laid down a
negative prescription (non-repair of the church) alongside an affirmative
prescription (repair of the chapel), but he omitted to say expressly that the
two usages had any relation to each other. I.e.: He left it to be inferred
that the one was consideration for the other -- a safe enough inference by
common sense, but stricte juris, the mere coincidence of the two usages
in no way legitimated the negative one. Simply never paying rates for the
church would not establish a right not to pay them, any more than immemorial non-payment of tithes would establish a lawful exemption; always
repairing the chapel by itself would only go to establish a customary duty
of so doing, over and above the parishioner's legal duty to the church.
In the abstract, the Court thought the surmise in Henchman v. Parsons
defective. However, the judges refused to grant Consultation because the
13

T. I6 Car. C.P. Harg. 23, f.65b (Incorporated into the report of a Sir Thomas Houlte's Case.)
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defendant did not move for it until after a verdict was given against him.
Originally, he took issue on the negative prescription -- whether the plaintiff had in fact customarily contributed to the church. After the jury found
that issue for the plaintiff, the defendant brought up the point of pleading
(or, if you prefer, the point of law -- that customary non-contribution to
the church, which the verdict established, plus the admitted contribution
to the chapel, did not legitimate the exemption.) In refusing Consultation
at this stage -- and apparently only because this stage had been reached -the Court was in effect willing to infer that the one usage was claimed as
consideration for the other. That amounts to taking the problem as one of
pleading. (Quaere whether similar permissiveness would have been
shown at any stage in a tithe case. In the rate case, the Court may have
been moved at heart by the established fact that the plaintiff "did his bit"
for the church-edifices in the parish. Letting a man out of economically
valuable tithes in kind -- to the parson's real loss -- was more serious.) 14
Alongside the mispleading cases above, we may consider a few on the
"burden of pleading." A late-Elizabethan opinion15 goes as follows:
"Rakings" are exempt from tithes by the common law, but the plaintiff-inProhibition must surmise that tithes of the main crop were set out without
covin. "Rakings" means hay or corn raked up or gleaned after harvesting
the bulk of the crop. There are many cases concerned with tithes of rakings. As with second crops in a single year and other post-harvest land
uses, it was a question whether rakings were exempt de jure or only exemptible by considerate modus. The present holding (in accord with
most other opinion on that subject) says as a matter of law that rakings
are exempt de jure, provided that the rakings represent what was left behind by inevitable or honest accident. Obviously enough, a man could
not be allowed to leave a substantial part of the crop lying on the ground
14

15

In one earlier case (Shelton v. Mountaine. H. 13 Jac. Court uncertain), a defendant tried to raise a
pleading point by motion in arrest of judgement after verdict against him. This is the only thing
about the case that is really worth noting. The motion was turned down, but because it was
without merit of any sort. The plaintiff had claimed to be discharged for tithes of a park. The
defendant argued that the claim was not well-stated because he did not say it was an ancient
park. The Court did not hold that this was no inelegance, or a forgivable inelegance, in pleading,
but rather that the antiquity of the park was utterly irrelevant, since the suit had nothing to do
with park products, such as game. In effect, "park" was just a geographic description of the area
to which the modus applied.
H. 38 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,198, f.112b. (Litigative context not reported.)
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until a second raking-over in order to evade a substantial part of his tithes.
As a matter of pleading, the opinion says, plaintiff-in-Prohibition must allege in his surmise that the rakings in question were not left behind
fraudulently. He must not leave it to the defendant to plead fraud.
Only three years later, in the well-reported Greene v. Hunne,16 the
same court appears to go the other way on the same issue. But it is not finally necessary to see a conflict. In Greene v. Hunne, a man sued for barley-rakings surmised a modus to do extra work in making up the main
crop into cocks, and in consideration thereof to be discharged for rakings
"not willfully dispersed." I.e.: The parishioner relied on prescription
rather than de jure exemption, and in describing the modus he said that it
only applied insofar as there was no deliberate or fraudulent failure to
catch as much as possible the first time over. A Prohibition having been
granted, Francis Bacon moved for Consultation on behalf of the defendant. Bacon contended that the surmise was bad for failure to allege that
the rakings in question in this case had in fact not been "willfully dispersed." I.e.: The plaintiff claimed benefit of a custom covering only honest rakings but did not say the rakings he was sued for fell in that class.
The Court was unanimously against Bacon on this point. But we must
be careful in constructing its exact meaning. Chief Justice Popham spoke
first, making the following points: (a) There was no need to allege a prescription at all, for rakings are exempt de jure. (Implication: Though the
plaintiff here rested squarely and solely on prescription, he should be
treated -- at any rate in the context of a motion for Consultation -- as if he
had relied solely on the common law. Cf. "misconceived surmises.") (b)
Of course the de jure exemption only applies to honest rakings, but the
parson suing for rakings has the responsibility to say that they were "willfully dispersed." I take this to mean that he must say so in his ecclesiastical libel. In other words, if it appears from the libel (attached to the
surmise) that the parson is claiming dishonest rakings in terms, the ecclesiastical suit should not be prohibited, except on surmise that the rakings
were not, in fact, dishonest (assuming that the fact of fraud should be
tried at common law -- probably a safe assumption). If no such thing ap16

M. 41/17 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.120; Add. 25,200, f.164b.

252

Pleading
pears from the libel (but only that the parson is suing for "rakings," or
only, say, for "hay tithes"), Prohibition lies. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition has
no responsibility to say the rakings are honest. If the libel says "raking,"
the surmise need only, as it were, point to the ecclesiastical suit. If it says
"hay tithes," the surmise need only say that the real object of the suit is
"rakings" (not "honest rakings"), tithes on the main crop having been
paid. If this is a correct reconstruction of Popham's position, it disagrees
with the earlier opinion above. (Granting that the parishioner never needs
to plead his honesty unless the ecclesiastical libel expressly accuses him
of dishonesty, it would remain a question whether the parson may introduce a plea of fraud later on. I.e.: Assume the parson sues for "rakings"
merely. The surmise, and accordingly the declaration, rest on de jure exemption. May the parson now plead fraud and force the parishioner to
traverse? Probably, sed quaere.)
It is not clear that the rest of the judges accepted Popham's position in
full, though they came to the same result. Kempe, the Clerk of the Court
(clerks were often consulted as to "precedents"), said that he had never
seen an averment of the sort Bacon said was necessary. Justice Fenner
agreed that it was not necessary to aver that the rakings in question were
not willfully dispersed. These opinions do not imply, however, that rakings were exempt de jure, or at any rate that the plaintiff in this case could
escape the prescription he stood on. Therefore they do not have to imply
anything as to the burden of pleading in a de jure -exemption case. I.e.:
They might mean only that to surmise a modus as applicable to honest
rakings is to assert clearly enough, though not quite directly, that the rakings in question are honest . (A modus alleged to apply to dishonest rakings
would obviously be held unreasonable. Therefore expressly applying the
modus to honest rakings has the more title to count as claiming honesty for
those in question.) Whereas Kempe and Fenner maybe meant to follow
Popham and maybe not, Justice Gawdy explicitly stuck with the case as it
was--a modus case. For he said in so many words that the averment Bacon found lacking was implied in the surmise. Gawdy attached importance to the plaintiff's saying the parson's suit was against the custom
alleged. I.e.: In addition to claiming exemption only for honest rakings
and thereby implying that those in question were honest, the plaintiff used
further language to reinforce that implication. He said there was a custom
discharging honest rakings and then added that the ecclesiastical suit went
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against that custom. The addition surely goes to imply that the suit is for
rakings which are honest.
A further speech in the report, labeled tota Curia, says generally that it
is always the parson's job to allege willful dispersion. Possibly the generalization was meant to reach the de jure exemption case which Pophan
wanted to see in the case at hand. But taken conservatively Greene v.
Hunne does not have to rule that case or overrule the opinion above.
Besides the rakings, the surmise in Greene v. Hunne claimed several
other prescriptions and exemptions for other products, to all of which Bacon took exception. One such exception goes to the burden of pleading,
as distinct from substantive criteria for a valid modus. Inter alia, the parishioner was sued for herbage consumed by cattle. He claimed that the
pasture land in question was used for breeding cattle for his dairy and
plough, and therefore exempt de jure. Bacon did not dispute the underlying point of law: pasture consumed by breeding-stock and their calves
was not tithable insofar as the calves were replacements or additions for
the dairy herd or the farmer's supply of draught animals. The surmise did
not say, however, that the animals who consumed the grass in question
were in fact used as dairy -- or draught -- replacements. Bacon argued
that this was a defect in the surmise. Popham and Gawdy replied that
there was no defect: It was up to the parson to allege anything about the
actual employment of the animals that would remove them from the exemption.
There are numerous cases testifying to the reality behind this exchange. Parsons were trying hard to collect their share from the expanding livestock business. They had no claim on "replacement and
expansion capital," by means of which the "tithe-base" would be maintained or increased, but they had every right to collect in respect of animals bred and raised for sale to butchers or other farmers. Parishioners
had a natural tithe-dodge in the inherent uncertainty of an animal's destiny. At a given moment -- say when he is sued for tithes from 1590 -- a
farmer could say with factual truthfulness and fraudulent intent that the
cattle who ate the grass in question over the last year were either cows
temporarily out of milk-production or replacement-stock. The next moment -- say as soon as the suit against him is prohibited -- he sells off
some steers, as of course he had every intention of doing. If the parson
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wants to go to the trouble of a suit (or another suit), he can presumably
recover something. "Go ahead and sue me," says the farmer (knowing
that besides the steers he sold he has ten more to sell.) Maybe the parson
knows that too and decides to wait. Maybe he waits until not even honest
men can remember whether Farmer Brown raised any cattle for sale year
before last. In short, livestock operations -- in a predominantly mixed
and small-scale agricultural economy -- were much more likely to slip
through the tithe-net than field-crops.
The exchange between Bacon and the Justices in Greene v. Hunne,
though nominally on a point of form, should be considered against this
background. It is not entirely clear from the surface of the report what
Bacon was asking for. I suspect that the Justices may have reacted adversely because it was not entirely clear to them. Bacon said that a
farmer claiming his "breeding-stock and replacement capital" exemption
should allege that the animals in the "replacement capital" category were
actually used as such. I do not see how that could be asked for literally,
since young animals honestly or dishonestly assigned to the "replacement" category would not as yet have been put to the dairy or draught
uses for which they were purportedly intended. It would make sense,
however, to require the parishioner to speak with more particularity than
the Justices were ready to insist on. He might be asked to spell out his
situation as follows: "All the animals that used the pasture fall into the
classes (a) breeding-stock (b) immature beasts bred from the farmer's
own stock (c) adult animals already in use for dairy or draught purposes;
none of the animals that used the pasture (a) have been sold (b) are old
enough to be used for dairy or draught purposes but have not actually
been so employed." If farmer could not say just that truthfully -- or undertake the risk of proving just that -- then he should not have a general
Prohibition. He should rather be driven to plead the truth to the end of
obtaining a Prohibition covering only as much as he was really entitled to.
As things stood -- with the approval of the Court (for although only Popham and Gawdy speak to this point, the Prohibition was finally upheld
in toto) -- a general Prohibition could be had merely by saying in effect, "I
claim the breeding-stock/replacement-capital exemption." If the parson
had not already anticipated that claim in his libel (by alleging that the pasture was used by animals which had been sold and/or adult animals not
employed for "pail or plough" and limiting his suit to the herbage consumed by these animals), his only course would presumably be to plead
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specially to the declaration -- that so many animals fell outside the exemption. That course throws the burden of knowing something about the
farmer's livestock operations onto the parson. (We know too little about
16th-century trials to say confidently that it throws the burden of proof
onto him, but it probably has at least that tendency. Unless the parson
could maintain that there was no basis for claiming the exemption at all,
he would be driven to make a factual statement about the use made of a
specified number of animals. Since juries retained the right to draw on
their own knowledge, we cannot say the parson would be put strictly in
the position of having to produce evidence or risk a directed verdict,
though in practice his position might not be very different from that. The
institution of special verdicts might relieve some of the strain on the parson. I.e.: Failure to sustain such a statement as "The farmer sold nine
steers" might lead to nothing worse than a special verdict for six steers.
Nevertheless, some shift in the real distribution of trouble and risk would
be likely to follow the burden of pleading.)
In sum, Bacon was probably suggesting a rule of more than formal significance -- a rule that might have been of real help to parsons in a contentious area of tithe law. Besides merely reacting negatively, probably
without much consideration and without extended explanation on Bacon's part, the Justices said one thing -- in effect, that Bacon's theory was
untenable because homebred animals might die before they were "apt" for
dairy or plough. That does not seem much of an objection to requiring
more particularized pleading in the form I spell out above. It does, however, point to the kind of complication that might arise once one demanded that plaintiff-in-Prohibition do more than claim his exemption
generally. It might make a question of law whether the pasture consumed
by beasts who die young should be within the exemption (because the
animals might have been used as replacement-stock if they had lived) or
outside it (because they were not so used.) The Justices plainly preferred
the first alternative (surely correctly, I should think). I assume that answer
in the proposed form above (i.e., that home-bred young beasts are exempt
if they are not sold, whether they live or die). But if Bacon's proposal
were taken a little differently and more literally -- as demanding an allegation that all users of the pasture either were already or might still become replacements -- then the beasts who died young would not be
covered in terms. If they were not to be taxed, as they should not be, they
would have to be brought within the language of the surmise by interpre-
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tation, at the expense of argument and doubt. To generalize the point:
The simpler the surmise, the fewer problems; demand particularity and
problems will arise as to how much particularity, what kind, and whether
certain cases (such as the beasts who die young) fit the formula arrived at;
where the complex land use means that tithe claims will often have to be
settled on a partial or pro rata basis in the end, the simplest surmise -- the
least problematic way to turn the ecclesiastical suit off and let the common law unscramble the matter -- is a generic claim to the "breedingstock/replacement-capital" exemption.
One much later brief report17 goes to the "burden of pleading" in suits
for rakings. It confirms the first Elizabethan opinion a above, rather than
the apparent (but uncertain) meaning of Greene v. Hunne: plaintiff-in-Prohibition must allege that he rakings were "sparsim" involuntarily. If there
is any doubt that that was a pleading-duty, a well-advised pleader would
still be careful to assert his innocence and most did.
Another nota in the reports 18 makes what may be regarded as a
burden-of-pleading distinction for another situation. As laid down, the
rule is: It is enough for plaintiff-in-Prohibition to surmise that he exposed
("exposuit") corn-tithes; but in the case of wool-tithes or the like "exposuit" by
itself is not enough, for the manner of setting forth must be shown. The reality behind this is that paying tithes of field-crops -- grain and hay -- was
a stereotyped and easily monitored operation; contra for other sorts of
products. Harvest was a notorious annual event. When a man cut his
grain or hay, it was his duty to shock or stack it in some manner and to set
the parson's 1/10th apart from the rest in the field, so that the parson
could see for himself whether he was allotted his honest share. That -"exposing" the tithe -- was all. There was no common law duty to deliver
the tithe to the parson, prepare it in a particularly convenient form, or expressly notify the parson that it was ready. (One was not, of course, to
cheat -- as by separating the tithe pro forma and then carrying it off to
one's barn before the parson had a reasonable time to view it over against
the 9/10ths and pick it up, or by obstructing the parson's access to the
field.) This system obviously would not work for other products: Things
like milk and eggs came on every day; lambs and calves were born at this
time and that; wool was harvested when the farmer happened to shear,
17
18

Cicill v. Scott. P. 3 Car. C.P. Littleton, 31.
H. 43 Eliz. C.P. Lansd. 1058, f.3.
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possibly some of his sheep now and others later, and even where shearing
time was as regular an event as corn harvest there was no analogue of the
natural process of mowing, drying, raking, stacking -- a process extending
over days in one highly visible place. It was therefore necessary, in the
case of animal products, to put more burden on the parishioner. Custom
often did the job by prescribing a time, place. and manner of payment.
Otherwise, it was the parishioner's responsibility to inform the parson
when a tithable product was available and to give him a reasonable
chance to see that he was getting his fair share.
Our holding follows the allocation of substantive responsibility in the
matter of pleading: If the parishioner's duty is only to "expose" in the
sense explained above, he need only say exposuit. But where his duty
cannot be reduced to the duty to "expose," exposuit is not enough. He
must (as the report says) "show how" -- i.e., tell what he actually did by
way of paying or proffering the tithe -- and also (the report is again explicit) make it appear that it was "in such manner as the parson could take
them" -- i.e., that the mode of payment or proffer recited gave the parson
a reasonable chance to judge what he had coming and take possession of
what he was offered. It is in the latter situation that the pleading point is
of interest. In the case of corn and the like, the opinion comes to saying
that the word exposuit by its meaning describes what the parishioner
claims he did (which by the law is all he needs to do.) By the same token,
exposuit does not describe any process of paying or proffering such things
as wool (and hence does not imply satisfaction of legal duty.) If exposuit
were taken more loosely, as a way of saying "paid or proffered in a legally
sufficient manner," then our opinion holds that no such general surmise
would justify a Prohibition. The parishioner-plaintiff may not say only
that, leaving it to the parson-defendant to plead to the generality. (I can
only imagine its being pleaded to by the special kind of traverse commonly used to get around the objection to affirmative matter in a negative
pleading -- positive statement of the alleged truth followed by an absque
hoc denying the other side's plea expressly. E.g.: "The parishioner did not
notify me that he had sheared his sheep at the time it was done or allow
me to see the newly sheared wool, absque hoc that he exposuit the wool
as alleged." As the holding stands no such pleading would be required.
The parishioner would state concretely traversable facts and make the demurrable claim that the steps to pay or proffer he went through were legally sufficient.)
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Finally, we should note a way in which the exposuit opinion is puzzling -- not for its content, but its existence. When could one have a Prohibition for corn tithes by surmising exposuit, or for wool tithes by
surmising payment/proffer in a spelled-out manner? In the most standard
case, the answer is "Never." I.e.: A parishioner could not prohibit a tithe
suit by saying he had paid the tithes, for that was a perfectly cognizable
and acceptable plea in the ecclesiastical court. How then could the question to which the opinion relates come up at common law? The answer, I
suspect, lies in the nature of certain modi. Some modi, as we have seen,
required extra work on one product in consideration of exemption for another. Thus a man might have occasion to say he exposuit his tithe-hay
(in a form superior to what was obligatory, e.g., in bound sheaves) in
consideration of some other tithe. Secondly, modi for "small tithes"
tended to be only specifications as to how the duty should be performed.
E.g.: A man sued for wool tithes surmises that by custom he is to pay
wool tithes at Easter and that he paid them at that time. This is not to surmise payment merely (which would fail to state a cause of Prohibition),
plus the additional fact of performance according to the modus. For there
is no common law duty to pay tithes at any specific time, but whenever
shearing occurs. A custom specifying Easter is therefore a modus like
any other -- determinable at common law as to its truth, meaning. and validity. It meets the consideration test for modi because there is a benefit
to the parson in assuring him his tithe at a definite time and relieving him
of the trouble of claiming and collecting the product at scattered times.
(So held with respect to some of the prescriptions in Greene v. Hunne
above, for example.) Therefore, men could have occasion to say exposuit
or "paid or proffered" in surmises as an adjunct to claiming certain types
of modi. Our holding says that exposuit is not the right expression. It at
least suggests that "paid or proffered" by itself might be inadequate,
though probably surmising just that in conjunction with claiming a
"specifying" modus would be enough. ("This is the customary mode of
payment and I have paid" may be taken as implying "I have paid in accord with the custom, which, if the custom is reasonable in itself, is a sufficient discharge of my legal duty.") Finally, we should inquire whether
ecclesiastical courts ought to have final authority to decide pleas of payment of "small tithes." I.e.: Suppose the parishioner pleads payment of
wool tithes in the ecclesiastical court. Suppose the ecclesiastical court decides that he did not give the parson adequate notice of the product's
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availability or a reasonable chance to see and take his due. Should the parishioner be able to challenge that decision by Prohibition? Quaere.

D.
Defensive Pleading
Summary: These cases are on plaintiffs’ exceptions to the defendant’s
manner of traversing declarations. On the basis of few cases, nothing like
a bias in favor of plaintiffs-in-Prohibition can be seen. Most refined logical objections to traverses were probably recognized as plaintiffs’ attempt
to escape from a weak factual case, and such attempts were not treated indulgently.
* * *
The cases above ask what standard of pleading plaintiff-in-Prohibition
should be held to. In a few other cases, pleading points arose from defensive pleas. In Hockleton v. Prince, 19 a man being sued for tithes of eggs
surmised (and subsequently declared) a modus of the sort commonly
claimed for “small tithes” -- not so much a commutation as a customary
way of computing what was due. In this case, the alleged custom was to
compute the egg tithe from the number of chickens kept by the farmer
(three eggs per cock and two eggs per hen.) To the declaration setting
forth this modus, the parson pleaded as follows: Before bringing his suit
for tithes in kind (i.e. ten per cent of the eggs produced), he demanded
payment according to the customary method of computation, absque hoc
that the plaintiff was ready and offered to pay, as the plaintiff alleges. To
this plea, the parishioner-plaintiff demurred, for two reasons: (a) It is repugnant to sue for tithes in kind and then plead that one had demanded
tithes according to the custom; (b) the traverse (i.e., the negation of a
point in the plaintiff’s plea introduced by absque hoc) is bad because it
goes to deny a subordinate clause. (The plaintiff said that the customary
computation-method existed, and that he was being sued for tithes in kind
although he was ready and offered to pay according to the custom. The
defendant’s traverse went, not to the whole sentence, but to the “al-

19

M. 37/38 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,201, f.796.

260

Pleading
though" clause.) The Court upheld the demurrer, giving judgment for the
plaintiff.
By common law standards of good pleading, the decision seems correct. Off-hand it may seem a little rough on the parson, if we imagine the
human situation. Assuming the parson to be telling the truth. the story
would go as follows: The parson demands eggs according to the custom.
For same reason, the parishioner refuses to pay. "Very well," says the
parson, "I'll sue you for tithes in kind." When he cools off and takes some
legal advice, the parson sees that he has no chance of breaking the custom. He needs a plea that will "take back" his ill-conceived suit for tithes
in kind but still insist that his just tithe was withheld. Why not let him so
plead? Why not let a jury say whether the customary tithe was offered?
There are, I think, two difficulties in that: (a) Juries had no business deciding the bare question whether tithes had been paid or offered. That
question was within ecclesiastical competence. Upholding the Prohibition would not be ruinous for the parson, because he could start a new
ecclesiastical suit for the customary tithe, pursuant to which the ecclesiastical judge could decide whether the parishioner had satisfied his duty
by a proper offer to pay. (b) If the jury said an offer had been made, the
Prohibition should presumably stand. But suppose it said no offer had
been made. What then? The suit for tithes in kind could hardly be sent
back by Consultation. For even if the parishioner wrongfully refused to
pay the customary tithe, he ought not to be liable for tithes in kind.
Therefore a "fancy" solution would be needed -- a qualified Consultation
in effect requiring the ecclesiastical court to pretend that the suit before it
was for the customary tithes. It is much simpler just to uphold the Prohibition on pleading grounds, as the Court did.
In Austin v. Clifton et al.,20 a traverse was challenged on a nicety of
pleading, but upheld. A man had charged some land to answer for his
taxes and public duties -- viz., at least to pay his Parliamentary fifteenths
and 5/ per annum to the poor. The real issue in this case was whether,
over and above those encumbrances, the land was charged to pay any surplus profits it produced for maintenance of the church. The churchwardens sued the landholder for such surplus profits. To have a Prohibition,
20

M. 10 Jac. K.B. 2 Bulstrode, 20.
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he set out the encumbrances for fifteenths and the poor and said that he
was to have any surplus to his own use. The churchwardens pleaded as
follows: The surplus profits were to go for repair of the church, absque
hoc that they were for the plaintiff's own use. The plaintiff demurred to
this plea, arguing that the traverse (absque hoc. etc.) was bad. (The point
is, I think, a refined one. The plaintiff's counsel made two arguments:
that a traverse "waives" a plea in bar, and that the traverse here was directed at an "inducement" to the plaintiff's plea rather than the thing itself. Perhaps the following restatement catches the point: If we think of
the affirmation as "waived," the churchwardens have no case. I.e.:
Whether or not the plaintiff has the surplus to his own use, the churchwardens have no claim to it unless it is for repair of the church. In other
words, the churchwardens must say something positive to make out a
claim. The negation -- absque hoc, etc. -- could not stand on its own feet.
But a good traverse must be able to stand on its own feet. A traverse in
the absque hoc form may be explained by affirmative language, but must
by itself deny the adversary's statement in such a way as to destroy his
case. The negation must "go to the heart." Thus, its effect must not be
merely to deny an introductory statement or conclusion, either of which
could be falsified without destroying the adversary's case. Here the
plaintiff's claim to prohibit the churchwardens from collecting the surplus
profits could be valid even though he was not entitled to the profits for his
own use.) The Court overruled this objection to the defendant's plea,
pouncing on its evident weakness: What could the defendant traverse, the
judges asked, except the claim that the profits were to go to the plaintiff's
own use? (This point may perhaps be spelled out as follows: The affirmation could not stand by itself as a plea in bar, because it implicitly denies
that the plaintiff has the profits to his own use. An explicit negation -- an
absque hoc -- was therefore necessary. A mere negation -- without the
accompanying affirmation -- could have been employed, but it would
have negated the same thing, the only thing there is to negate, and would
do so in less useful form than the present plea, which shows the positive
basis for the churchwardens' ecclesiastical suit.) I conclude that the decision was correct in the purest pleading terms. I.e.: The Court did not
overlook a doubtful pleading in the interest of justice; it overruled a fancy
argument against a plea that could not be improved on. The report says
that judgement was given against the plaintiff. I.e.: He was apparently
stuck with his demurrer, so that the real dispute never reached a jury. In
the light of the cases above in which defendants were allowed or encour-
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aged to waive demurrers, that course may seem a little rigorous -- in this
case on plaintiff-in-Prohibition. Possibly the plaintiff showed his hand all
too clearly in taking a far-fetched demurrer -- i.e., suggested to the
judges' intuition that he had no serious hope of winning on the facts.
The report of Dr. Bowles's Case21 does not give the Court's decision,
but it serves to illustrate further the kinds of objections to defendants'
pleas that could be made. In this case, a parishioner claimed the temporary tithe exemption for recently reclaimed land provided by 2/3 Edw.6.
The parson wanted to plead that the land in question had not been reclaimed from unproductivity so as to qualify for the exemption. He said
the land was "fructuosa et non stirrilis [sic]." The plaintiff objected that
the proper plea would have been "The land was fruitful, absque hoc that it
was sterile." I.e.: The plaintiff having said "sterile" or the equivalent, the
defendant was bound to contradict him expressly. It would have presumably have been all right to say "It was not sterile" tout court. But having
used one word -- "fruitful" -- which only by implication contradicted the
plaintiff, the expressly negative language -- "not sterile" -- must be set off
in an absque hoc clause. It would be interesting to know whether the
Court allowed this point of elegance. The report says that the plaintiff
moved his objection to the defendant's plea, not that he demurred. Assuming that it is not a mere manner of speaking -- i.e., that there really
was no demurrer -- what did the plaintiff hope to gain? If the plaintiff
persuaded the judges, would they do any more than delay the trial until
the defendant amended his plea? One suspects a dilatory intention.
In Rochett v. Gomershall,22 a parson sued for tithes of furze. He said in
his libel that he was suing for furze used as fuel (furze which the parishioner "convertebat in focale and combustible.") The parishioner surmised
and declared that the furze had been burned in his "house of husbandry,"
and that furze so used was exempt from tithes by custom (upon the usual
consideration when such discharges were claimed by prescription -- because heating the "house of husbandry" contributed to maintaining the
"tithe-base"). The parson then pleaded as follows: The furze in question

21
22

P. 22 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5148, f.18.
P. 7 Car. C.P. Littleton. 367.

263

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
was sold, absque hoc that it was burned in the parishioner's house as alleged. The parishioner demurred.
In support of the demurrer, counsel argued that the plea and the libel
conflicted: Having sued for furze burned, he now buttressed his denial
that it was burned as domestic fuel by saying it was sold. It was also argued that allowing the plea would be unfair to the parishioner. According
to counsel, there were in fact two customs in the village, one covering
furze burned domestically, and the other covering furze sold. (If you are
reluctant to believe counsel on a statement of fact outside the record, it is
enough to say, "Suppose there were two such customs"). The parishioner, being sued in terms for furze burned, naturally invoked the custom
discharging furze burned as domestic fuel. If he had been sued for furze
sold, he would have (or "Who knows but he might have?") invoked the
other custom.
This argument sounds convincing, but the Court turned it down. In
fact, I think, the Court was right. I suppose there is a sense in which the
"cleaner" plea would have been a mere denial of the plaintiff's statement
that the furze was consumed in his house. The appearance of conformity
between the parson's libel and his pleading would thereby be preserved.
But the pleading as it stands puts that question -- the only question raised
by the parishioner -- in issue. The appearance of unfairness to the parishioner seems to me specious. Let us grant his version of the facts: Of
the furze cut, some was burned in the parishioner's house; some
was sold; none was burned anywhere else; tithes of furze sold were
discharged by a separate modus. Now, trial of the issue raised by the defendant's plea as it stands could lead to any of the following results: (a)
No furze cut was sold; all was burned in the parishioner's house. (Upshot:
Prohibition stands.) (b) None sold; none burned in house -- i.e., all
burned by the parishioner elsewhere. (Consultation) (c) Some sold; all
the rest burned in house. (Result indeterminate. Either Consultation
quoad the furze sold -- in which case the ecclesiastical court may decide
whether the libel extends to furze sold; or Prohibition stands -- because
the common law decides that the libel only extends to furze burned by the
parishioner.) The following points should be observed in connection with
these possibilities: (i) The problem of what to do here only arises if one of
several possible verdicts is returned. Why not get a verdict first and
"cross that bridge when we come to it"? (ii) The libel is genuinely ambiguous. It can be read as a suit for "furze burned by the parishioner, i.e.,
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not sold," or as a suit for "furze taken out of the state of nature and converted to use as fuel, whether directly by the parishioner or by his harvesting and selling it as a fuel-product." The parishioner argued that he
was entitled to read the libel in the first way, but that is not clear. He
would at least have been better advised to allow for the other reading -i.e., to claim the separate modus for furze sold if he had in fact sold some.
(iii) An excellent case can be made for allowing the ecclesiastical judge to
resolve the ambiguity in the libel. Surely "What does the libel mean?" is
an ecclesiastical question. We have, however, left the common law court
to decide that question, should it consider the meaning of the libel openand-shut and the risk of its being over-extended by the ecclesiastical court
excessive -- in which case the parson would be driven to start a new suit
for furze sold. (Justice Hutton said expressly that in his opinion the libel
was good for furze sold -- i.e., that it should be read in the second sense
above.) (iv) Should the case go back to the ecclesiastical court quoad
furze sold, the parishioner ought presumably to be allowed to rely on the
separate modus applicable to that special class, notwithstanding his failure
to rely on it in seeking a Prohibition. (Though he ought to have read the
libel correctly, surely his failure to is understandable.) Could he have a
new Prohibition based on that modus either because the ecclesiastical
court would not allow him to plead it or because a custom subject to common law trial was at issue? 50 Edw. 3 would raise a problem here, though
perhaps not an insuperable one. (There is no indication that the Court
thought about this contingency.) (d) Some was sold; some burned in
house; some burned elsewhere by the parishioner. (Consultation as to that
burned elsewhere by the parishioner; as to the rest, same questions as
above.) (e) All sold. (Same questions.)
In sum, it seems to me that the demurrer should have been overruled,
as it was, because the defendant's plea pointed as well as the complicated
structure of the case permitted to a resolution on the merits. The alternative plea, a simple denial, could ultimately have been less in the parishioner's own interest. (If the jury said "No, the furze was not burned in his
house," a straight Consultation would probably have been unavoidable.
Yet it would have been ambiguous what the jury meant by "the furze."
All the furze cut? Only the furze burned by the parishioner? The common law would have less opportunity to consider whether the libel could
reasonably be construed as extending to furze sold and to grant or withhold Consultation accordingly.) Having overruled the demurrer in
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Rochett v. Gomershall, the Court granted Consultation. The effect of the
demurrer was to admit that all the furze was sold and none burned in the
parishioner's house. No question of waiving the demurrer was raised. If
there was any chance of blocking the Consultation on the ground that the
libel extended only to furze burned by the parishioner, I imagined the
chances would have been better on motion after a verdict establishing the
same truth. In this case as in others, demurring to pick holes in an absque
hoc plea has a look of desperation.
In our last case on defensive pleas,23 a tithe suit was prohibited on the
standard ground that the bounds of parishes were in question. To get a
Prohibition on that ground, the parishioner had to say that the parson suing him claimed that the land was in A., whereas in fact it was in B.,
wherefore the bounds of parishes were in question. In this case, the parson- defendant answered such a statement with: The land is in A., absque
hoc that it is in B. The plaintiff's counsel excepted to this traverse (without, apparently, demurring). All the report says is that the Court overruled
the exception and upheld the traverse. I can see no reason for doing otherwise. What would be a better plea? Simply "It is not in B." could presumably lead to a verdict for the defendant if the jury thought it was in C.
(but not A.). But the defendant ought not to have a verdict unless the land
is in A., his parish which is what he offers to prove by pleading as he
did. Again, one suspects that shooting at the pleading was a forlorn hope
or a delaying tactic.24

23
24

H. 12 Car. C.P. Harg. 23, f.6.
In connection with the cases on defensive pleading, we may note one in which, instead of the
plaintiff demurring to a traverse, the defendant demurred to a replication (plaintiff's plea
responding to defendant's "confession and avoidance.") Matingley v. Martyn (P.8 Jac. K.B.
Jones, 257) is deferred for its principal point. The case was decided in the defendant's favor on
substantive grounds. That conclusion was reinforced by a pleading point against the plaintiff.
Full explanation is impossible without going into the complexities of the case. In effect: the
Court held that an absque hoc traverse (of the defendant's plea, by the plaintiff) was bad on
several grounds, essentially because it did not cleanly negate the central point of the preceding
plea. Refined pleading considerations were used to shoot down a traverse -- but in a tangled case
where, with some difficulty, the Court had managed to persuade itself to go for the defendant on
the substance. Two judges inclined the other way on the merits were presumably willing to
overlook or get around the objections to the traverse.

266

VII.
Consultation on Motion
Summary: In practice, Consultations on motion were very common.
Before ca. 1590, there was probably some doubt about the propriety of
reversing Prohibitions without formal pleading, but on several occasions
in the '80's the practice of doing so was upheld in general terms, and
thereafter it was hardly questioned. Firm criteria as to when Consultation
on motion should be considered and when full pleading should be insisted
on where never evolved. The Jacobean courts probably assumed the freest discretion to act on motion, even when doing so required information
from outside the record.
* * *
We have seen numerous instances above of Consultation granted on
motion It was common enough for Prohibitions to be granted when they
should not have been -- on too hasty consideration or without adversary
debate. In that event, the defendant could in practice move for Consultation. In cases within 2/3 Edw.6, properly granted Prohibition were required by statute to be reversed by Consultation for failure of preliminary
proof. Consultations pursuant to the statute were ordinarily obtained on
motion, as the statute surely demanded. 50 Edw.3, roughly speaking,
banned more than one Prohibition in the same suit. Parties were allowed
to move for Consultation on the ground that the record showed they had
been once prohibited and then erroneously prohibited again, after the first
Prohibition had been undone by Consultation. In short, Consultations on
motion were a reality.
In theory, however, Consultations on motion could be questioned.
Ruling out that maneuver would drive the defendant to plead to the declaration upon Attachment, a more cumbrous way to the end of arguing that
the Prohibition was misgranted and should be undone. In addition to being more cumbrous for both parties, that course was more dangerous, especially for defendants, because of the possibility of being caught in an
admission. It would be foolish, no doubt, to allow that effect in some circumstances, and possible not to. Even so, once one is in the toils of common law pleading there is a risk of getting caught. The courts would at
the least have had to devise forms of excepting specially in deliberate
pleading -- i.e., for raising special objections without fatal admissions.
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Time would have been consumed in arguing over niceties. (We have just
witnessed some dubious efforts to shoot down the defendant on pleading
points. Increasing the role of formal pleading for the defendant would
surely have multiplied such attempts.) In every way, Consultations on
motion were a useful economy. Nevertheless, a theoretical case against
them can be made: A Prohibition is a writ. Once granted (one may argue), a Prohibition is like any other writ -- i.e., like a Chancery writ. Once
a writ had gone forth against you, you are committed to the process that
emanates from it -- in the case of a Prohibition, to the choice of obeying,
or else disobeying, suffering Attachment, and challenging the Attachment
in due form. If a writ of Novel Disseisin issues against you, you may not
go around to the back door and claim the it should never have issued -however convincing your reasons. You must abide the process on the
writ -- appear, plead, etc. Why should a Prohibition be any different?
This argument, as I say, is theoretical. It may have been given passing
consideration in the late-16th century. Thereafter, the Consultation on
motion was an established institution. The scope of the procedure sometimes came in question, however. The shadow of the theoretical argument against it perhaps did not disappear. Sometimes the courts hesitated
as to whether to allow legal exceptions to Prohibitions on motion, or to
insist that the defendant demur. They could not accept the motion as a
fully respectable equivalent of the demurrer-in-law. Secondly, since Consultations on motion were basically accepted, defendants sometimes tried
to push them too far -- or arguably too far. That is to say, they sometimes tried to smuggle in a few facts outside the record and move for
Consultation so long as no one on the other side was heard to contradict
those facts. The question then arose whether under any conditions Consultations could be granted on motion on the basis of facts not appearing
of record. (Such facts as failure of proof within six months or a prior
Consultation in the same case of course appeared by the record of the
Court.) We turn now to a number of cases on the propriety of granting a
Consultation on mere motion.
Three Elizabethan holdings come to sustaining the general proposition
that Consultations upon motion are permissible. In none of the reports is
the theoretical argument against them spelled out. The holdings appear,
however, to be responses thereto. I conclude that in the 1580’s it was se-

268

Consultation on Motion
riously, though unsuccessfully, argued that Consultation may never be
granted on motion, but only after demurrer or trial.
The first report comes in the case of Sutton v. Dowse (1583).1 In this
case, a Consultation was sought on motion and in the end denied on the
merits. (We may omit the substance here.) The reporter adds that the
judges also agreed that motions for Consultation are appropriate: A defendant who wants to except to the sufficiency of a surmise on its face
does not need to demur, "but as amicus curiae he shall shew the same to
the Court, and the Court shall discharge him." For the judges to have
agreed on this publicly, the opposite -- need for a demurrer in all circumstances--must have been urged on the plaintiff's side.
The plaintiff's lawyer in Sutton v. Dowse was Coke. It was presumably he who advanced the general argument against Consultations on motion. Our next report 2 shows him going the other way. (Of course there
is no contradiction. In Sutton v. Dowse he was arguing for his client. In
the later report, he was either arguing for another client or -- more probably --just advising the Court.) According to this report, Coke said to the
Court: "The common course of this Court is and always has been, and the
law is clear thus, that if a man sues in spiritual court and defendant afterwards sues Prohibition and has it allowed, and makes insufficient surmise
and insufficient proof in law to prohibit ...the Court here will grant Consultation although the party does not demur...and that ex officio ..." All
the puisne Justices (Chief Justice Wray being absent) agreed with Coke's
statement of the law.
The following points are to be observed: (a) Coke was speaking to the
Queen's Bench and referring to the established practice of that court.
Sutton v. Dowse was in the Common Pleas, where allowing Consultations on motion may have been less well- established. But however wellestablished the practice was in the Queen's Bench, some objection must
have been made, or some puzzlement expressed, to call forth Coke's re1

2

M.25/26 Eliz. C.P. 1 Leonard, 10 (A M.S. report -- Harl. 6687, f330b -- does not contain the
holding on Consultations on motion in general. Otherwise it agrees with Leonard and adds the
detail that Coke was counsel for the winning side
T. 30 Eliz. Q.B. Harl. 1331, f.53; Harl. 15, f.176. (Quotation from Harl. Harg. states the point
more summarily.)
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marks and the judges' agreement. (b) Coke mentions unproved surmises
as well as legally insufficient ones. This suggests the possibility that
even Consultations on motion for failure of preliminary proof were questioned. The more serious possibility, I think, is that 2/3 Edw.6 was the entering
wedge for Consultations on motion. The statute says that in the event
proof is not supplied within six months defendants-in-Prohibition "shall
upon his or their request and suit without delay have a Consultation
granted." If that language does not absolutely require Consultations on
motion, it comes awfully close. It is possible that a fund of "precedents"
was accumulated in the first instance from motions pursuant to 2/3
Edw.6, in the face of which it was difficult not to entertain motions on
other grounds It seems anomalous to let Defendant A discharge a perfectly good Prohibition on motion for failure of proof -- possibly only after debate on a difficult question of the statute's scope -- while forcing
Defendant B to spend his time and money on formal pleading to point out
an utterly worthless Prohibition. (c) Note the phrase "ex officio" in
Coke's remarks, and "amicus Curiae" in Sutton v. Dowse. The public nature of Prohibitions could redound to the defendant's benefit as well as
the plaintiff's. It would be anomalous to regard only plaintiffs as "informers in the public interest." If plaintiffs qua "informers" should be
free to drag their opponents through three appeals before seeking a Prohibition, or prohibit their own suits, or call on the Court to help them out of
misconceived claims, should defendants not be allowed to inform the
Court of its oversights with a minimum of procedural fuss?
In Bishop of Landaff v. Slugge,3 a Consultation was sought on motion, and again there was apparently some discussion of the propriety of
the procedure. All the reported arguments are on the merits of the motion, and may be omitted, but the Court is said to have agreed unanimously that "the Judges use, if the suggestion be not sufficient to
maintain the Prohibition, to grant a Consultation without any formal demurrer...if the insufficiency of the suggestion be manifest." Coke was arguing against the Consultation on the merits, so if objection to proceeding
3

T.31 Eliz. Q.B. 1 Leonard, 181
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on motion was raised by counsel, it is probably he who raised it, notwithstanding his remarks in the last report.
Beyond the early reports above, there are several cases in which the
question whether to grant, or consider granting, a Consultation on motion
arises, directly or indirectly. In Nicholls v. Small,4 a parishioner was
sued for tithes of his garden produce. He surmised a modus to pay 1d per
year for tithes of his garden. The parson moved that the surmise was bad
for failure to say that the garden in question was "ancient." I.e.: By the
defendant's theory, the modus should be applied to a particular piece of
ground that had always been a garden. It is not a valid modus to pay a
fixed sum for garden produce wherever the garden is planted and however large it is. According to the reporter, the Justices who were present
"seemed to agree" (Justice Clench and Chief Justice Popham were absent.) The reasons for the rule urged by the defendant are good: The
plaintiff relied on a common custom -- a trivial payment, "garden-penny,"
appropriate to a small kitchen-garden. To let such a nominal commutation discharge the product of a greatly expanded garden -- even a commercial truck-farming operation -- would be unfair.
The Court in Nicholls v. Small did not, however, grant a Consultation,
or quash or deny the Prohibition. (It is not clear which it was asked to
do.) Rather, Justice Gawdy said to the defendant's lawyer "Demur on it."
He said this, according to the report, because the plaintiff's attorney offered to stand on the prescription as stated. We do not have in this case a
discussion of Consultation on motion, or any assurance that a Consultation was sought. We do have an instance of advice to demur, or apparent unwillingness to dispose of a bad surmise informally. Why were the
judges disinclined here and now to say "Consultation," or "The Prohibition is null," or "No Prohibition"? I would not attach importance to the
lack of a full Court. Two judges may not have wanted to act themselves,
but they could have put off action by an adjournment. It was not necessary to advise demurring. The report suggests that the plaintiff's stubbornness was decisive. The judges plainly said to the plaintiff's attorney,
"Why don't you amend you surmise and add ancient garden? We'll give
you the chance." He plainly answered, "No, we'll stand on it as it is."
4

M. 42/43 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.265b.
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Why then should Justice Gawdy turn to the defendant's counsel and say
"Demur" (with the implication "We think your chances on a demurrer
would be very good")? Why not say to the plaintiff, "Very well. No
amendment, no Prohibition" (or "If you won't amend, the defendant will
have a Consultation")?
Two explanations seem possible: (a) Plaintiff-in-Prohibition always
has the option of forcing a formal demurrer. Disposition of cases on motion is acceptable if both parties are willing, but the plaintiff may stick by
his guns if he chooses to. (This theory only makes sense if the Prohibition
has already been granted -- as I think it probably had been in Nicholls v.
Small. It is clear that no one had a right to a Prohibition in the first place
without showing cause. Judges might grant a Prohibition when in doubt
about the surmise's merit in order to bring on full debate, but a man certainly had no right to a Prohibition just because he insisted on one. Once
the Prohibition was granted, however, it would be possible policy to say it
will never be quashed or undone on motion without the plaintiff's agreement to an informal mode of proceeding. Such a policy would express
the idea I suggest above -- that a Prohibition is a writ like any other,
hence that a man with a writ in his favor is entitled to hold the other party
to the procedures the writ entails.)
(b) If the Court is in doubt, or thinks that an issue worth debating has
been raised, it should hold out for a demurrer, or at least wait on demurrer
if either one of the parties so prefers. In other words, disposition on motion should be confined to open-and-shut, easy, or practically inconsequential cases -- at least unless both parties clearly agree to "have it out"
pursuant to a motion. (Thus if the Prohibition has been granted. If the
question is whether to grant in the first place, the rule might be as follows: If the judges think a surmise is dubious, but that a full debate
would be desirable, they may grant the Prohibition; but they should do so
with the intent of raising a demurrer; they should not grant a doubtful
Prohibition with the thought of possibly turning around and undoing it on
motion -- at least not without the parties' clear agreement to take the motion as solemnly as a demurrer.) This policy is so much the way of reason that in one sense it must be regarded as inevitable (unlike Policy-a
above). I.e.: If the Court is in serious doubt, it must want full debate for
its own ex officio purposes, not to mention fairness to the parties as private litigants. It should not grant Consultation on a mere ex parte motion
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unless it is very sure the Prohibition ought never to have been granted.
Similarly, it should not confuse casual or unprepared debate on a motion
with full-dress debate. It does not follow, however, that full-dress debate
should be exclusively associated with debate on demurrer. It does not follow that either party should be free to insist on a demurrer on the ground
that he cannot be expected to show his best at any earlier stage. It is reasonable, for the sake of orderliness and conformity with ordinary common law actions, to say that ultimately adequate debate can only take
place on demurrer, but it is not inevitable.
In Nicholls v. Small, the plaintiff does not seem to have been represented by counsel, only by his attorney. (The American usage of "attorney" for any sort of lawyer does not of course apply in present-day
England, much less in the 16th century, when the professional distance
between counsel and such ancillary practitioners as attorneys was greater
than the comparable modern barrister: solicitor distinction. The plaintiff
in Nicholls v. Small was not represented by anyone with the standing or
putative competence to debate the merits of the surmise.) Therefore, if
the Court was in doubt and wanted a debate, it must wait until another occasion. But "Demur" need not follow. Debate on a motion in full court at
a later date, the plaintiff being notified, would do the practical trick. "Demur" may therefore imply a preference for putting full-dress debate in
that context -- a reasonable preference, but not a necessary one (and as we
have seen, demurrers had their disadvantages.)
The final question to ask about Nicholls v. Small is whether it is at all
likely that the judges were in doubt about the merits. The reporter say
they "seemed to agree" with the defendant's counsel, as if they sounded
hesitant. My guess would be that their state of mind fell somewhere between legal doubt and the sense that a visibly deliberate decision would
be practically useful. Modi such as the one the plaintiff's attorney chose
to stand on -- 1d for the garden, whatever its place and size -- look unreasonable from one angle. But they are a little puzzling. Is it not possible
that a man could have paid a fixed sum for his garden from time immemorial while moving the garden about from year to year? So long as the
garden stayed about the same size, is such a custom necessarily unreasonable? Perhaps "garden-penny" can be good without being applied to a
particular "ancient garden." Perhaps it belongs to the parson to show that
a parishioner's gardening has changed so significantly in nature and scale
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that the old commutation is no longer appropriate. So much for the legal
doubts. On the other hand, the judges were at least inclined against the
plaintiff's surmise. They could have been strongly so inclined and still
want a deliberate decision. For suppose they thought that just what the
plaintiff was attempting should be decisively struck down. The attorney
must have had a reason for refusing to amend. The garden must at least
have changed location within memory.
Perhaps more was at stake. Truck-gardening for the London market,
like the cattle business, was a "growth industry" at the end of the 16th
century. Perhaps the plaintiff knew exactly what he was gambling on -viz. making an ancient trivial commutation stick, so as to keep the produce of a commercial operation tithe-free. Perhaps the judges had no
doubt that the gamble ought to fail, but wanted it to fail upon debate, to
set a precedent and discourage other truck-farmers. The important thing
would be a debate -- something to attract attention in the legal community
-- but as a pure "precedent" a judgment upon demurrer would be even
better. Hence, on one construction, there is a reason in the circumstances
of this case -- without implying much beyond it -- for "Demur," in preference to "Move again when counsel for the plaintiff are present." On the
same construction, "Demur" may be thought of as intended for the plaintiff's ears, though addressed to the defendant -- as if to say "We encourage you to demur in order to let us set a strong precedent against the kind
of mischief the plaintiff insists on making against our advice" (to be understood by the plaintiff as "We've warned you that you're headed for a
fall. You'd better reconsider your project of making this modus stick -better take some proper legal advice before you declare. For if you push
ahead you're going to have to fight your case on demurrer against all
odds.")
In Henry v. Soame,5 a Consultation on motion was denied on the
ground that it could not be granted without stepping outside the record.
A parson sued for tithes, some of which the parishioner acknowledged to
be due. Sentence was then given for the parson, apparently with respect to
all the tithes. After the ecclesiastical suit had been prohibited in toto, the
5

P. 4 Jac. K.B. Harl. 1631. f.305.
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parson tried to get a Consultation on motion covering as many of the
tithes as the parishioner had acknowledged. The Court denied the motion
on the ground that it had no way of knowing from the record that the acknowledgment had been made. The parson was told to plead the acknowledgment, after which the Court would give him an answer.
In the most basic sense, the correctness of this sort of decision is beyond doubt. The courts obviously could not assume disputable facts on a
party's say-so. What they could do would be to investigate facts of the
sort that could be easily ascertained informally. Here, the certificate of
the ecclesiastical court, or perhaps careful inspection of the sentence,
would supply the needed information, if the judges were strongly disposed to grant Consultation on the parson's version of the truth. Perhaps
they were not, for their language was hardly encouraging. They did not
tell the parson he would certainly have a partial Consultation if the acknowledgment was duly pleaded and confessed or found in his favor.
They told him to plead, then "we'll see." It is probably not self-evident
that Consultation should lie even though the parishioner had beyond
question acknowledged the tithes in the course of ecclesiastical proceedings. A court might hold that the parishioner was free to dispute whether
the tithes were actually due in Prohibition proceedings, notwithstanding
the acknowledgment and the sentence partially pursuant thereto. If the
judges were uncertain about that point of law, their inclination to wait and
see is the more understandable.
In the later Jacobean Pitt v. Harris,6 a judge's refusal even to consider
a Consultation on motion can perhaps be linked to his suspicion of the
motives and probable justification of the party moving. The ecclesiastical
suit in this case was for tithes of rakings. It was prohibited on the ground
that rakings were exempt de jure unless the parson expressly alleged that
they were fraudulently excessive. On the occasion when the Prohibition
was granted, Coke said that "he did not like such greediness." (In other
words I take it: "I am happy to have this chance to prohibit one of those
greedy parsons who try to squeeze the last drop out of the tithe-payer by
unwarrantable suits for by-products.") On a later day, Serjeant Finch, for
the defendant, told the Court that "the party [parishioner] makes great
6

T. 14 Jac. K.B. 1 Rolle, 379; Harl. 4561, f.222.
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gain by it, for he carries it into his barn." Coke replied, "The Prohibition
is now granted, and therefore plead if you want to have Consultation."
As reported, Finch's remark does not make much sense. Coke's reply,
on the other hand, is a clear refusal to consider a Consultation now, so
that must be what Finch was asking for. I can only suppose that Finch
was in some way saying that the parishioner was fraudulently counting
tithable hay or corn as rakings. Perhaps "he carries it into his barn"
means "he has gathered up his so-called 'rakings' by the cart-load -- obviously they are not honest rakings." It looks as if Finch was introducing
new facts, thus raising the question whether a Consultation should ever be
granted on motion on the basis of facts outside the record. Obviously
such as Consultation could not be granted on Sergeant Finch's bare sayso. He was presumably requesting the Court to take informal verificationmeasures -- either to examine the party or to ask his counsel whether they
would dispute that the rakings were excessive. (As to the latter: Counsel
could be asked "Will you stipulate that the rakings were excessive in fact
and nevertheless try to uphold your Prohibition in this case as stated?" If
they say "Yes," argument on "this case as stated" could proceed on motion for Consultation. I shall show why the plaintiff's counsel might be
willing to make such a stipulation.)
If we visualize a rakings case, Finch's proposal will perhaps not seem
unreasonable: The parson sues for rakings by that name, alleging no
fraud in his libel. The parishioner gets a Prohibition by invoking the de
jure exemption -- merely pointing to the libel. I.e.: He does not allege in
his surmise that the rakings were left behind despite due care and honest
intent. Serjeant Finch now figures that he has two strings to his bow. (1)
An argument -- probably weaker than the argument contra, but, as we
have seen, possible on some authority -- that the parishioner ought to
have alleged that the rakings in question were honest. (2) Strong evidence that they were not in fact honest. His obvious course is to plead the
facts formally. But how sure-fire is that? First, there is the risk that every
parson runs with a jury of tithe-payers -- and perhaps a "greedy" claim to
rakings would run a special risk. But even waiving that, trusting the overwhelming evidence -- will the parson necessarily win even if fraud is established by verdict? Is it arguable that the parson is out of luck in a
rakings case unless he has alleged fraud in his libel? I.e.: May the parson
plead fraud pursuant to a Prohibition when he has neglected to rely on it
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from the outset? Given these legal questions, a motion for Consultation
begins to make sense. Finch would like to make a pleading argument
against the surmise, but he dares not risk everything on that and throw
away his strong facts. Yet he is not sure that the facts will help him.
Why go to the trouble of further pleading? Why not try to convince the
Court -- and, with a little help from the Court, the other party -- that the
facts are not seriously in dispute, that the real questions are of law and
might as well be discussed here and now? It is in everybody's interest to
avoid waste, and waste will be inevitable if formal pleading is insisted
on. For if the plaintiff is forced to declare, Finch will not demur on the
pleading point -- through he might reserve it for a last-minute motion in
arrest of judgment. If the plaintiff is forced to declare, Finch will plead
the fraud.
The plaintiff might then raise the legal issue by demurring to the plea.
But perhaps he will want to try his luck with a jury (assuming reasonably
that the Court will let him take advantage of his legal point on motion if
he loses.) So there would be an unnecessary trial, and in the end a legal
debate on motion anyhow! In sum, it is to Finch's advantage to show his
evidence now and stimulate legal argument on a motion; it is arguably to
the Court's advantage to consider whether the case could not be abbreviated; even if the facts in Finch's favor cannot be established positively by
informal means, the plaintiff may believe enough in his legal case to
stipulate the facts against him and save himself time and risk. For these
reasons, I can see color in a motion for Consultation on a likely construction of the reality.
Coke, however, said "No." He told Finch to plead the facts in his favor.
That is not necessarily to say that the facts would help him -- only that he
had better try that if he wanted to make a case for Consultation. The interesting question upon Coke's opinion is whether it signifies anything
about the general acceptability of Consultations on motion. I would make
three observations: (a) Hostility to Consultations on motion as such cannot be inferred from unwillingness to go outside the record for facts. It is
one thing to entertain such a motion on a pure point of law, sidestepping
demurrer; another thing to take informal steps to establish the facts in order to sidestep a plea in bar. (b) Coke's opinion might be given some
weight as authority against such expeditions outside the record. (c) His
earlier remark on the "greediness" of parsons suing for rakings vitiates the
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opinion as authority even for that. He may have thought that a parson
who first sued for rakings without saying anything about fraud and then
came crying "Fraud" was intrinsically suspect. His first motive was
greed, not an honest belief that the parishioner had cheated him. His afterthought -- finding his hope of bullying the parishioner frustrated by a Prohibition -- was to bring in a claim of fraud by irregular means. Instead of
abiding the consequences of his original decision, he hoped to force the
case into the shape it would have had if he had alleged fraud in his libel.
It is conceivable that in other circumstances Coke would have been less
unfavorable to an "expedition outside the record."
The case of Gilby v. Williams7 is noteworthy as evidence of reluctance
to grant Consultation without formal pleading. The ecclesiastical suit
was of an unusual sort: A vicar alleged that there were two churches in
his parish; for as long as sixty years past, the vicar said services in the two
churches on alternate Sundays; more recently, he had agreed with his parishioners to say services in both churches every Sunday; in return for the
extra work he was to have 40/ [per year, presumably] from each of the
two villages to which the two churches belonged, the sum to be taxed on
the inhabitants. The present suit was against an individual parishioner for
4d representing his share of the tax. A Prohibition was obtained on the
ground that the prescriptive claim in the libel was not founded, as far as
the language of the libel showed , on immemorial usage. I.e: The vicar
claimed the right not to serve both churches every Sunday. He claimed to
have relinquished that right in consideration of the payment for which he
was suing. He claimed the right by usage, but not by immemorial usage.
By the theory of the surmise, (a) the usage must be immemorial for the
right to be valid and (b) the right must be valid for the money to be due.
In the event, the Court reversed the Prohibition by Consultation. It justified doing so without formal pleading as follows: "And for that the suit
was before the prohibition and affirmed in the appeal, a consultation was
granted without inforcing him to appear and plead to the prohibition." It
justified the Consultation on the merits by saying (a) that the suit was in
effect for a "spiritual pension" and, as such, within ecclesiastical jurisdic7

P. 21 Jac. K.B. Croke Jac. 666.
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tion; (b) that the usage for up to sixty years would be presumed immemorial until the contrary was shown. The explicandum here is why the judges
thought it necessary to justify the Consultation on motion by reference to
the plaintiff's delay until after appellate sentence against him. They seem
to say, "We really ought not to undo this Prohibition without pleading, but
we will because the plaintiff has already subjected the defendant to protracted ecclesiastical litigation." Why should they say that, when they
thought the Consultation was due and there was no question of relying on
facts outside the record? Does the judges' conduct militate against Consultations on motion in general?
I suspect it rather militates in favor of the rule "Do not grant Consultation on motion unless you are sure." The very unusualness of this case
probably meant that the judges did not feel quite sure. Their basic view
of the case, I think, was that the vicar's claim appertained by its nature to
the ecclesiastical court, and that therefore the suit should be prohibited
only upon a showing of error. So, that is to say, they would have seen the
case if the Prohibition had been sought as soon as the ecclesiastical suit
was started. As it was, two ecclesiastical courts had made decisions for
the vicar. The error, if it was one, of upholding a non-immemorial prescriptive right had been committed. But whether there was any error is
surely a question of some complexity: (a) For the vicar to have had any
claim to the money, must it have been promised in consideration of relinquishment of his right (not long-standing practice) of alternating
churches? (b) Could such a right exist only by virtue of prescription in
the common law sense (as opposed to the ecclesiastical sense, whereby
sixty years was more than enough to establish titles)? (c) Whatever the
true answer to these question, was resolving them clearly beyond ecclesiastical competence? (d) Granting that it was, and that the answer to the
two preceding question is "Yes" -- even so was there any error? I.e.: Did
the ecclesiastical courts decide not to apply the common law standard of
prescription when confronted with evidence against the usage from more
than sixty years ago? Or did the question simply never come up? Is it error for any ecclesiastical court to give sentence for A when A pleads the
wrong kind of prescriptive title (ecclesiastical-type instead of immemorial), but when there is nothing to suggest that the other party tried to offer evidence going beyond the ecclesiastical period?
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The court in Gilby v. Williams answered the last of these questions: In
the absence of any showing to the contrary, sixty years' usage should be
presumed immemorial. (Possible generalization: to have a Prohibition, it
is not enough to say that your opponent relied on an inadequate prescriptive title in the ecclesiastical court; you must say specifically that he
would not have been able to sustain an adequate one.) Even that point,
however, might be problematic enough to warrant full debate -- ideally,
or in other circumstances. The other question would surely warrant it.
Full debate would not necessarily require pleading. For all that appears
from the report, the plaintiff may not even have been represented by
counsel; the Court may have been justifying Consultation, under the circumstance of the plaintiff's delay, on the defendant's motion merely,
without any adversary debate. I think that unlikely, but the possibility exists. In any event, proportionately as the legal question were complex,
debate in formal setting was the more to be recommended -- in principle.
In practice, the plaintiff had not thought of a Prohibition until losing on
ecclesiastical appeal. When he got around to a Prohibition, he raised a
tangle of issues most disproportionate to the 4d at stake in the suit. (Cf.
the cases above on Prohibition sought after ecclesiastical appeal.)
Gilby v. Williams tends to make Consultation on motion an act of discretion, rather than something ordinarily to be considered in the absence
of distinct reasons against doing so. Parish of Aston v. Castle-Birmidge8
makes the same point with a different emphasis, for here the Court assumed a conscious discretion to grant Consultation on motion on the basis
of facts outside the record. The case was a standard one: Some parishioners were sued for a rate to repair the church. They got a Prohibition on
surmise of a prescriptive discharge in consideration of repairing a chapelof-ease instead. The defendant's normal recourse would have been either
to traverse the prescription or to pick legal holes in it as stated. The defendant (Parish of Aston) was allowed, however, to introduce evidence
upon a motion for Consultation. The evidence was of a sort hardly amenable to contradiction. The Parish showed: (a) an ecclesiastical sentence
from 16 Eliz. requiring the plaintiffs ("men of Castle-Birmidge") To con-

8
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tribute toward repair of the main church; (b) an ecclesiastical sentence of
30 Eliz. requiring certain men of Castle-Birmidge to assume the office of
churchwarden in the main church (whereas in their surmise the plaintiffs
had said that the chapel had its own churchwardens and other privileges -an attempt, common in such cases, to show that the chapel was quasi an
independent parochial church.) Further evidence of the same order,
wholly or partly conflicting, was also introduced (by whichever side): (a)
Five ecclesiastical sentences in favor of the men of Castle-Birmidge. But
all five had been reversed on ecclesiastical appeal! (b) An acquittance
from 11 Eliz. for a contribution made by Castle-Birmidge for the repair of
Aston church, the said acquittance reciting that the money was received
"as a benevolence and not of duty."
In the light of this evidence, the Court granted Consultation. The following points are to be observed: (a) The Court emphasized the discretionary character of its act and the special circumstances of the case:
"...for though the surmise were matter of fact and triable by the jury, yet it
is in discretion of the Court to deny a prohibition, when it appears unto
them that the surmise is not true, and especially in a case of this nature,
when the delay of reparation may turn to a final decay of the Church, and
the intolerable charge of the parishioners both in repairing and in suit, for
the suit in this case had cost already (as was said) three-hundred pounds."
(The uncontradicted statement that the suit had cost that much must be
taken as a further fact outside the record by which the Court was moved.)
(b) The evidence that moved the Court no doubt ought to have moved
a jury. But it is challengeable with respect to its decisiveness and completeness. I.e.: Should the ecclesiastical sentences be given great weight -not to say decisive -- against the alleged prescription? Castle-Birmidge
no doubt relied on usage in all that ecclesiastical litigation, but how much
should ecclesiastical decisions against a prescriptive claim (which perhaps the ecclesiastical court ought not, properly speaking, to try) count
against its "real" validity? Is it significant that so far as appears CastleBirmidge had never attempted a Prohibition before? Granting that the
ecclesiastical decisions deserved great weight, should they outweigh other
evidence of the sort that might be taken into account by a jury (oral testimony and the jurors' own knowledge) but could not be put before the
Court as undisputed truth? In sum, was the Court in Aston v. Castle-Birmidge riding a reasonable hunch too far? Was it assuming a perhaps justi-
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fiable prerogative to step outside the record but abusing it -- for is it true
in this case that a jury could not find for Castle-Birmidge without blatant
fraud or inexcusable credulity?
From the way the Court's opinion goes on, I suspect the judges were
sensitive to the criticism implied in those questions. Their decision is not
quite so crude as saying "No responsible jury could find for Castle-Birmidge, so we will grant a Consultation without trial." Aside from stretching a point to avoid financial hardship on ordinary people and the decay
of churches, the judges seem to me to have softened the edge of their decision in the following ways: (i) Consultation on motion would have been
far less controversial if it could have been argued for on legal grounds.
That was not straightforwardly possible here. There was, however, a sense in
which Castle-Birmidge's claim was less than airtight. The reporter's statement of
the case says that the chapel performed all the functions of a church, including
the sacraments; that it had its own churchwardens; that the "precinct" of the chapel
was regularly perambulated (the Rogation Day perambulation was a standard
parochaial practice); that the Vicar of Aston provided a curate for the chapel;
that the chapel did not have a graveyard, but inhabitants of the "precinct"
were buried at Aston. I take it that all these points appeared from the surmise. They show what Castle-Birmidge was shooting at: to establish its
virtually parochial status. The attempt has one or both of two meanings:
to serve in lieu of a sufficient prescriptive title, or to enforce the "consideration" for the prescriptive discharge. I.e.: Conceivably a true "quasiparish" could claim a de jure exemption from repair rates in the proper
parish to which it belonged. More likely, "quasi-parochial" status would
tend to justify an inference of prescriptive discharge in the absence of sufficient evidence of non-contribution to the "mother church," or in the
presence of evidence of occasional contribution.
On the other side, it was questionable whether contributing to the upkeep of any chapel, however immemorial, was good consideration for discharge from ordinary parish rates. If the chapel was little more than a
place to pray or get in out of the rain, one's chances would not be very
good. In other words, it would not be presumed that regular users of the
parish church were let off scot-free for doing something mainly for their
own benefit and hardly at all for the parish's. If, on the other hand, the
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chapel functioned virtually as a full church, one's chances would be good.
A second church relieved the strain on the main church, or at least enriched the religious facilities of the parish. Maintaining it was therefore a
benefit to the parish as a whole, and the frequenters of the chapel would
derive no great benefit from any rates they were forced to contribute to
the main church. Now, the Court in Aston v. Castle-Birmidge pounced
on the two facts that were not favorable to the plaintiffs: the lack of a
cemetery at Castle-Birmidge and the curate. The former went to show
that Castle-Birmidge was less than a quasi-parish even if it came pretty
close. The latter -- a separate curate -- was no doubt intended by the
plaintiff to elevate the chapel's standing, but then he was only an appointed curate. As the Court said, the Vicar could let the curate go if he
liked and serve the chapel himself. (An endowed or perpetual curate -- a
quasi-benefice attached to a quasi-church -- would have looked better.)
Ergo, said the Court, "they were to all purposes part of the parish of Aston, and therefor de communi Jure, were liable to reparation with the
rest."
7

This remark must not be taken out of context, however. The context
was created by the evidence against Castle-Birmidge whereof the Court
was taking notice. The judges were clearly not saying: "We can forget
the ecclesiastical sentences and other evidence and still dismiss the Prohibition, because Castle-Birmidge has undertaken to show its quasi-parochial status in pleading and failed." Rather, I take them as saying: "We
may in this case grant Consultation on the basis of evidence which
strongly undercuts the prescription, even though it may not destroy it decisively. For besides the apparent weakness of the plaintiffs' jury case,
there is at least reason -- supplied by their own admission -- to question
whether their legal case is strong enough to prevail in the end.
Even if, contrary to the clear reality, their evidence in straight support
of the prescription (non-contribution to the church, contribution to the
chapel) were very strong, there would still be a question whether contributors to a chapel who are free to use the church and must do so for
burial can escape parish rates. Even if we disregard the ecclesiastical sentences, the plaintiffs' attempt to make out quasi-parochial status suggest
the need to -- i.e., that they do not have much straight evidence for the
prescription (such as testimony or documents relating to really old practice.) They trust in its being inferred from the fact that the chapel has
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been an independent 'going concern' in recent times. Yet by their own
admission it is not fully independent, and a jury that wanted to take it as
such and so find the prescriptive title might have to be checked,"
(ii) The Court was careful to give Castle-Birmidge a chance to show its
evidence and to rebut the one piece of favorable evidence it could produce. As the Court said, "the proof lay on their [the plaintiffs'] side' -- i.e.,
in a trial upon a traverse, the plaintiffs would be expected to show something in support of their prescription. In practice (subject to the still-existing problems of the judge's power to prevent a jury from relying on its
own knowledge against the evidence), Aston could sit on its ecclesiastical
sentences, confident that it would win without them if Castle-Birmidge
could produce nothing. Proceeding upon the motion for consultation, the
Court accordingly invited Castle-Birmidge to show what it had. The
court was careful to avoid asking itself simply, "Which party would be
likely to win upon trial?" It also asked the stricter question "Is there any
likelihood that the plaintiffs can sustain the burden of proof?"
Had the plaintiff produced substantial evidence, perhaps the motion
would have been denied in spite of the Court's conviction that the defendant's evidence was much better and more likely to prevail in the end, As
it was, all Castle-Birmidge produced was the acquittance of 11 Eliz.
Against that, the Court made two points: First, the language of the acquittance ("as of benevolence and not of duty") was only the language of the
two receivers who had written it. As the judges said, "...the folly of two
men could not change the right nor bind the parish." Secondly, the acquittance had been pleaded and overruled in the ecclesiastical suit of 16
Eliz. One might add the obvious point that was no doubt understood: The
acquittance went to show that Castle-Birmidge had contributed to Aston,
even though it had claimed not to do so as an obligation, and the claim
had been accepted by two dead-and-gone collectors whose honesty and
knowledge were anyone's guess. Thus, the plaintiffs were invited to show
evidence and produced worthless evidence.
The acquittance need not, of course, exhaust the evidence that the
plaintiffs might ultimately produce. They were in effect allowed to show
their evidence of the type amenable to evaluation by the Court -- documentary evidence. The Consultation could probably not be justified
merely by the plaintiff's lack of convincing prima facie evidence. But it
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could be given weight in the context created by the defendant's good
negative evidence and the legal doubts surrounding the plaintiffs' case.
On the whole, Aston, v. Castle Birmidge: (a) is too special to provide
much of a lead in other cases; (b) does, however, count against the proposition that going outside the record is never justified upon a motion for
Consultation; (c) gives a kind of countenance to the view that every Consultation on motion (save perhaps for such special cases as failure of
proof under 2/3 Edw.6) is an act of discretion, so that the judges need
never go out of their way to justify waiting on the normal course of
pleading.
In the Caroline case of Wood v. Symons,9 the Common Pleas refused
to go beyond the record on a motion for Consultation. The ecclesiastical
suit was for hay tithes. The parishioner surmised that the hay in question
came from "headlands," and that in consideration of paying his regular
hay tithes he was customarily discharged for hay produced on headlands
no larger than was necessary for turning the plough. The parson's counsel
tried to move the Court to grant Consultation without pleading by saying
that in truth the hay in question did not come from legitimate headlands,
but from strips alongside the arable land as wide as the cultivated ground
itself. Counsel got nowhere. The Court told him to join issue or demur,
since the Prohibition was granted.
The last phrase gives one pause because it suggests that there might
have been a basis for denying the Prohibition in the first instance. The report is not good enough to make such basis visible. I would suggest the
following possibilities: (a) The Court would in fact have been willing to
look beyond the record to the truth if the Prohibition had not already been
granted. (In which event, the decision points to different standards as between the two occasions -- initial motion for Prohibition and motion for
Consultation). (b) There was a basis for at least doubting the surmise's
legal sufficiency. I can think of two likely grounds for doubt: (i) The
plaintiff pleaded his modus as applicable only to legitimate headlands -what was actually necessary to turning the plough -- but perhaps did not
say with sufficient specificity that the hay in question came from such
9
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land. (ii) The modus was bad. The alleged consideration was payment of
regular hay tithes, whereas performance of one duty was never consideration for exemption from another. It is more than likely that headland hay
should be regarded as tithe-free de jure, but it can be argued that one who
alleges a modus is stuck with his prescriptive claim. Either of these
grounds might have justified a demurrer, which the Court suggested to
counsel as one of his possible courses. But counsel did not move for
Consultation on legal grounds. His theory may have been like that I ascribe to Finch in Pitt v. Harris above: Consultation could not be confidently moved for (nor a demurrer taken) or legal grounds alone, but legal
questions would or should ultimately be raised when the truth was established by verdict. If the truth is not really likely to be much in dispute,
there is an advantage in establishing it early by informal means or stipulation and getting on to the real problem.
The only other feature of the report is a statement by Chief Justice
Richardson. Richardson said that grassland along the sides of enclosed
arable fields could be discharged of tithes, as well as headlands properly
so-called. I take it: Whereas in open-field agriculture only literal headlands were exempt (de jure, presumably, or else exemptible by the kind
of pseudo-modus that only assured that the parson got hay from other
sources), consolidation of strips might change the picture. A man should
be entitled to ancillary grassland attached to his arable equivalent to what
he would have had in common with others under an open-field system.
But the physical arrangement might be different from what obtained
where there was a long field with ample turning space for large teams
along the two ends. Thus -- I take Richardson to be saying -- the bare "truth"
that counsel wanted to insist on out of order (that the hay did not come
from headlands strictly so-called) would not necessarily permit resolution of the case. The full truth -- how much ancillary grassland there was,
how it came to be arranged as it was -- would come out more reliably by
verdict than by any informal investigation. With the full truth known,
lurking legal questions as to what should be counted as headland hay
could be more intelligently discussed (unless, of course, the defendant
thought he had a sufficient point of law here and now, in which event he
was free to demur.) On this analysis, the Court was not frowning on Consultation on motion as such, nor even on all "expeditions outside the record." It simply thought that the case was not amenable to solution on the
basis of easily ascertained facts and the law.
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In another Caroline case,10 a Prohibition was obtained on 23 Hen. 8,
because the ecclesiastical suit was brought in the Arches instead of a
court of the diocese where the ecclesiastical defendant lived. A Consultation was sought on motion on the ground that the diocesan or sub-diocesan court had remitted jurisdiction to the Arches. Such surrender of
jurisdiction by an inferior court to a superior was permitted in same circumstances by ecclesiastical law. It might make a question whether a
Prohibition pursuant to 23 Hen. 8 could invariably be overcome by showing that such an official "remission" had occurred. But that question
could not be approached until it appeared de facto or by admission on the
pleadings that the remission had taken place. Defendant-in-Prohibition
here was trying to get it established de facto without pleading. He was
asking the Court to go beyond the record, but in a relatively easy and controllable way -- by ascertaining the official act of another court. That is
less than asking for informal establishment of such facts in pais as
whether hay was grown on proper headlands. Nevertheless, the Court
denied the motion, saying that the matter must be pleaded. The decision
counts at least against going outside the record on motion.
The important case of Margaret Hide v. Bishop of Chester11 reveals
a clearcut judicial division over Consultations on motion. In this case,
there was no question of noticing or attempting to ascertain facts outside
the record. The Consultation was sought because the Prohibition on its
face was alleged to have been misgranted. Two judges, Jones and
Whitelocke, thought that the Prohibition ought not to have been granted in
the first place. But they also thought it could not be reversed on motion.
("Although prohibition has been unduly granted, it is not the court's discretion to grant a consultation on motion without answering.") The other
two judges, Richardson and Croke, thought the Prohibition was wellgranted, thus that no Consultation was deserved on the merits. They
thought, moreover, that there was a special reason (explained below) why
a Consultation on motion could not be considered in this case. (I.e.: They
opposed consultation on motion here even conceding that the Prohibition
was bad in its main aspect, for this one had a special aspect.) But

10
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Richardson and Croke went out of their way to disagree with Jones and
Whitelocke on motions for Consultation in general. ("But perhaps in some
cases, when prohibition appears in itself unduly granted, defendant, before appearance having committed no contempt, may move for consultation.")
The Case was as follows in Hide v. Bishop of Chester: William Hide
was a priest of the diocese of Chester. When he died, the Bishop sued
Margaret Hide for a mortuary fee, claiming it due by custom. Margaret's
surmise for a Prohibition (a) recited the statute of 21 Hen. 8, c. 6 (which,
generally speaking, set the mortuary fees that the ecclesiastical authorities
could charge); (b) averred that there was no such custom as the Bishop
was invoking; (c) said that she had paid the lawful mortuary to the parson
of Bunberry. Margaret said also that the Bishop had prosecuted his suit
after the Prohibition was granted. Since the original surmise could not
possibly say that, it is clear that we are dealing with a declaration. The
Bishop was trying to escape on motion, not before any formal pleading,
but after declaration.
This circumstance markedly influenced Richardson and Croke. They
would have considered a Consultation on motion if they had seen anything wrong with the original surmise, as they did not. But as they expressly said, the charge of contempt -- that the Bishop had actually
disregarded the Prohibition -- must be answered. Even if the Prohibition
should never have been granted, he must say something to that. (Probably he must deny it and prove his innocence or else face punishment for
contempt. At the least, he must admit it and argue for his legal innocence. The possibility of his being legally innocent though factually
guilty must be allowed for because of the theory we have encountered
that legally defective Prohibitions are adjudged void ab initio when they
are reversed. A parson who persisted in a tithe suit after a Prohibition
based on a modus would unquestionably have committed a contempt, because the Prohibition unquestionably "ought to have been granted."
Quaere where the Prohibition ought not as a matter of law to have been
granted, though it was. If Richardson and Croke allowed for the latter
possibility (the Bishop's legal innocence) they would have been saying,
"The Prohibition's original validity is too serious a matter to decide on
motion, considering that a man's liability for contempt depends on it -- or
might depend on it, the question as between 'does' and 'might' being it-
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self a serious legal problem." If they did not consider that possibility,
they would only have been saying "However bad the Prohibition is, it
cannot be reversed until the Bishop denies the contempt and clears himself.")
The fact that they were faced with a declaration could mitigate the
opinion of Jones and Whitelocke. I.e.: It would be a plausible rule to say,
"Consultations on motion are perfectly acceptable -- at least if they are
confined to law -- so long as they are made before any pleading. But
once the plaintiff has gone to the trouble of declaring the defendant must
come back with a commensurate plea and may not resort to motion."
Jones and Whitelocke do not make such a distinction, but they may have
intended it. In any event, the case before them did not require a general
condemnation of Consultations on motion, only of motions for Consultation brought too late. On the other side, Richardson and Croke did not
rely on the mere fact that the pleading had proceeded as far as declaration, but rather on the fact that the Bishop's contempt was now an additional issue. They may have meant that Consultation on motion is
"perhaps" permissible before declaration, but never after, though they do
not say that exactly. (The "perhaps" is worth noting. Richardson and
Croke did not give Consultations on motion an overwhelming endorsement.) The substantive question that divided the judges in Hide v. Bishop of
Chester need not detain us here. It should only be noted that they were flatly
divided on a question of some difficulty. That in itself supplies a motive for
waiting on further pleading. (Would the Bishop's counsel -- encouraged
by Jones and Whitelocke and equally discouraged by Richardson and Croke
-- believe enough in the Prohibition's legal insufficiency to demur? Could
they demur to the substance of the Prohibition without confessing the contempt as a fact? Almost certainly, I think, the Bishop would be driven to take
issue on the custom -- assuming he wanted his mortuary enough to carry
on -- thus permitting resolution with a minimum of complexity.) The division of opinion also supplies a reason for waiting: Proportionately as a
legal issue is serious or divisive, there is reason to settle it in the solemn
context of a demurrer. Despite their two-layered difference of opinion in
Hide v. Bishop of Chester, the judges agreed on the result.
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Division of opinion over Consultations on motion appears again in
Netter v. Brett,12 but this time roles were reversed. The judges’ views of
acting on motion corresponded with their opinions of the merits. The
case presented a complicated mixed-will problem, the details of which we
may omit. In brief: A Prohibition had been granted to stop probate of a
will comprising land and goods, and Consultation was moved for. Such
cases were problematic when they occurred in simple form, and here
there were complications arising from the exact way the will was drawn
(in effect, how mixed, or how separable, the devises of personal and real
estate were) and also from the exact way the libel and surmise were cast.
Justices Jones and Berkeley strongly favored a general Consultation,
while Justice Croke was equally vehement for a Consultation quoad the
goods only. (Chief Justice Richardson, who was on his deathbed, did not
participate.) It was Croke who made an issue of proceeding on motion,
with the evident, though entirely respectable, motive of blocking what he
regarded as a bad, precedent-breaking decision until there could be further debate before a fuller Court. Croke did not deny the propriety of
Consultation on motion under any and all conditions, but he came pretty
close to saying that a single judge with serious dissenting views should be
privileged to insist that the parties proceed to formal pleading. (Again, a
highly defensible position. That way of putting it is mine, not Croke’s,
but his insistence on the inadvisability of Consultation on motion in
“doubtful cases” pretty much comes to that -- a cynic would say the
doubts were all Croke's. It should be noted, however, that Croke had plenty
of authority on his side, and a neutral prophet might well have predicted
that in the long run his side would prevail. Croke argued that glibly granting
Consultation on motion would deprive plaintiff-in-Prohibition of the Writ of
Error he would be entitled to if he should lose after full pleading -- for Error
did not lie upon motions for Consultation, no more than on the decisions
to grant Prohibitions which they opened for reconsideration. Croke plainly
thought that if plaintiff-in-Prohibition should lose after pleading in this
court his chances for reversal in Error would be excellent.) Croke argued
12
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further that Consultations on motion should be scrupulously limited to
cases where the mistake of prohibiting lay exposed on the face of the record. He contended that that condition had not been strictly met here.
Apparently the will had been shown to the Court, so that the judges'
sense of the reality was informed by a little more than the record. Croke
thought the bare record -- libel and surmise -- put no obstacle in the way
of upholding the Prohibition for the land, whereas looking at the will created questions about that course which the Court had no right to take account of.
It was Jones, not Berkeley, who expressly disputed Croke's position,
though in Hide v. Bishop of Chester he had opposed Consultations on
motion on principle. Now he defended them with rather cavalier generality. Without taking on the serious problems, including the implicit issue
of judicial comity, raised by Croke, Jones came up with an historical theory: "...anciently in this Court there were no declarations and suggestions
upon prohibitions, but they were granted upon motions. And consultations were granted upon motions without demurrer..." Whatever the historical truth, that was not a very responsible position to take, for
contemporary practice did treat motions for Consultation and formal
pleading as alternatives, and for that very reason the question of which alternative was preferable in particular cases was unavoidable. Whether or
not it was justifiable to proceed on motion in this case, merely to assert
the general respectability and "antiquity" of so doing was hardly to establish that. Indeed, I think it is clear that Jones and Berkeley were too eager
by half to grant a general Consultation.
Even though his position of the moment on motions for Consultation
may have been too conservative, Croke had the moral upper hand in this
case. A remark in Berkeley's opinion gives the point away: The judges
had committed themselves to the King to refrain from blocking probate of
mixed wills. Jones and Berkeley may have been right on the merits of the
case even apart from any weight they actually gave to that commitment,
but I suspect they were reluctant to let a point of procedure frustrate an
opportunity to carry it out by the most expeditious means.
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A final undated case13 from the Common Pleas may be cited to illustrate the situation in which Consultation on motion was most obviously
appropriate. To stop a tithe suit, a parishioner surmised that he had fully
set out his tithes -- period. The Prohibition was granted, plainly erroneously, for it was well-settled that ecclesiastical courts were competent to
entertain and try mere pleas of payment. The parson promptly moved for
Consultation (at least within the same term) and got one. That is all the
report says. I doubt that such a motion would have been denied at any
time in the later-16th and 17th centuries.
As for more complicated situations, the cases show a faintly discernible arc. In the beginning, there was doubt about Consultations on motion. Their general propriety was clearly asserted by the late-Elizabethan
courts. There is a little to suggest that the Jacobean courts may have felt
the freest discretion to grant such motions, even when it required going
beyond the record, but they were also clearest in perceiving their power
as discretionary. The Caroline courts were in general a little more conservative. If easy Consultations are seen as pro-ecclesiastical, Netter v.
Brett is the only sign of deliberate favor to Church interests in the High
Church mood of Charles I's reign, and that case was decided over the vigorous objection of one judge. If willingness to consider motions for Consultation is a symptom of the "public" approach to Prohibition law, then
the Jacobean courts were perhaps the most public-minded -- the most inclined to think of Prohibitions and Consultations as ex officio acts, to be
granted or withdrawn when the judges in their discretion saw fit. Later
and perhaps earlier, the courts' spirit looks a bit more "private" -- more
inclined to want Prohibition cases to be pleaded out like other cases between party and party.
But perhaps the most significant conclusion is the one that Hide v.
Bishop of Chester and Netter v. Brett points to: In the 1630's there was no
agreement about Consultations on motion. Earlier cases were hardly
strong enough to force a consensus.

13
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Partial Prohibitions and Consultations
Summary: Partial and qualified writs were common in practice, and
there was very little question about their appropriateness in general.
Some authority suggests that Prohibition should be total and unqualified,
whereas limitations on the ecclesiastical court might be written into Consultations, but this difference was not consistently observed. The structure
of some fields, such as testamentary law, made the partial writs particularly necessary. The availability of both partial Prohibitions and partial
Consultations sometimes created rather complex specific problems as to
whether and how they should be used. The partial writs allowed the common law courts to exercise a more flexible control over the rest of the legal system than would otherwise have been possible.
* * *
As in practice Consultations on motion were common, so were partial
Prohibitions and Consultations. We have already seen a number of instances. The principle of Consultations on motion was sometimes expressly questioned. Despite their acceptance in practice, the courts were
never wholly satisfied of their legitimacy. Cases where it was problematic whether to grant a motion tended to awaken suspicion of the procedure as such. By contrast, I can see no open vein of skepticism towards
partial Prohibition and Consultations. In numerous cases, it was problematic whether to grant the writs in total or in partial form, if they were to be
granted at all. In such cases, I can find no instances of the judges' asking
themselves outright or almost outright, "Should we be granting these
writs in qualified or partial form? Are they perhaps meant to be all-ornothing procedures?" I suspect, however, that in an implicit sense those
general questions sometimes entered into consideration of the particular
question, "Shall we grant a partial writ in this case?"
I argued above that there is a formalistic set of mind capable of militating against Consultations on motion: a writ is a writ is a writ -- once a
Prohibition has gone forth, however unduly, there is no stopping it until it
is overcome by a verdict against the plaintiff or a successful demurrer. A
parallel objection to partial Prohibitions and Consultations can be framed:
The "nature" of a Prohibition is to stop an on-going suit in a "foreign"
court -- of a Consultation, to erase an existing Prohibition. An ecclesiasti-
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cal suit is an integral thing. as it were. It can only be stopped or notstopped. Having been stopped, the arresting hand can only be removed or
not-removed. In everyday life, a partial inhibition or authorization is of
course perfectly intelligible. ("Stop abusing your wife insofar as you are
actually beating her. but otherwise how you treat her is up to you." "You
may continue dealing with your wife as you like so long as you do not
beat her.") But are Prohibitions and Consultations meant by their "nature" to say that sort of thing? The imperatives to the wife-beater aim at
directing his conduct. They savor of "mandamus." If one were confined
to considering whether or not the man had "jurisdiction" over his wife,
perhaps one would feel constrained to answer "Yes" or "No" -- either he
has no liberty to behave towards her as he ought not to behave towards
other people, or else marriage is a relationship in which such authority is
vested in the husband that one may deplore, but not dispute, his resort to
the rod. But Prohibitions and Consultations concern "jurisdiction."
Should one tell an ecclesiastical court "You may -- or may not -- proceed
'insofar as,' or 'so long as,' or 'quoad'"? Is the common law function not
rather to decide whether the suit belongs where it is and may go on, or
does not belong there and must cease -- either absolutely or until a fact on
which the suit's title to be there depends (e.g., the truth of an alleged custom) is determined? Admittedly, there may be a limit at which a partial
Prohibition or Consultation could be justified without muddying the jurisdiction-regulating function and violating its "yes-or-no" imperative.
One can imagine two easily separable claims lumped together in one ecclesiastical suit -- one plainly appropriate to the ecclesiastical court, the
other manifestly inappropriate. There, sundering by a "Prohibitionquoad" what never ought to have been joined can perhaps be justified.
That would come to saying, "There are really two ecclesiastical suits here,
one prohibitable, the other not. We cannot prevent the ecclesiastical court
from treating two suits as if they were one, but we shall prohibit the prohibitable claim as if it were a separate suit." Where, however, it is not
possible to conceive the situation in those terms -- to think of the ecclesiastical "suit" as several suits in reality -- partial Prohibitions and Consultations should be avoided. For their effect is to dodge the "Yes-or No,"
"Jurisdiction-or-no-Jurisdiction," question which all application for Prohibition and Consultation raise. They would come to directing the conduct
of the ecclesiastical courts -- e.g., by saying" You may decide this case if
you can decide it without settling Issue X one way or the other." (Cf.
"YOU may discipline your wife if you can think of a way to do it without
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beating her.") Reasonable though that may sound, it evades the jurisdiction-regulating function, It is tougher and better to say, e.g., "You may
not touch this suit until Issue X is resolved at law. Then we shall consider
whether to give the suit back to you, to be decided in a manner clearly
consistent with our resolution of X." Or else, per contra, "The suit is
yours to decide as you like. When you have decided it, we may consider
whether your decision was caused by an error within our power to control, and if so we may consider whether to prevent execution of your decision. But for now the suit is yours."
The theoretical argument against partial Prohibitions and Consultation
did not rear its head so overtly as the argument against Consultations on
motion. In some ways it is a less good argument, more of an exercise in
formalism abstracted from common sense. Insisting that a Prohibition be
pleaded to once it is granted can be justified by formalistic talk, but there
is a point in so insisting -- the point of making sure that issues once raised
are debated or tried in the context in which they will receive the most
complete and fair evaluation. Once it is raised, perhaps even a very dubious claim might as well be subjected to the going-over that is most likely
to be thorough. If a partial Prohibition or Consultation looks like the
most sensible way to unsnarl a complicated problem, neat, pseudo-logical
ideas about the writs' "nature" ought not to stand in the way. But
whether a partial writ was the best solution could be problematic. The alternatives above (partial writ, full Prohibition pending common law
resolution of an issue, no Prohibition, or full Consultation with power
to review error reserved) could in some situations be live alternatives.
When the immediate choice was among such alternatives, I think it is
quite possible that a shadow of doubt about the partial writs as such was
in the background. The possibility should be kept in mind when we look
at cases exemplifying qualified writs. The shadow does not show on the
surface; the legitimacy of such writs is not discussed. But perhaps decisions to grant them were half- felt victories over a certain reluctance. In
rather indirect ways, same of the cases suggest as much.
The most interesting and problematic use of partial Prohibitions and
Consultations was in testamentary cases. Let us reserve those for a moment, looking first at other instances.
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One brief early report 1 illustrates a problem incidental to partial writs.
The report says only that Consultation was granted for part of the matter
in question and denied for part, and that ''yet" damages were awarded "according to the statute." A later case -- Lord Riche v. Courmarke, M.36/37
Eliz. Q.B. -- is noted in the MS. as agreeing. "The statute" must be 2/3
Edw.6. A surmise must have been unproved, whereas only part of it was
subject to the proof requirement; or else plaintiff-in-Prohibition combined several claims (e.g., several modi going to different tithes) and
failed to prove only some of them. The problem was whether to allow defendant-in-Prohibition his statutory double damages. I assume the choices
were (a) no double damages (b) double damages pro rata for as much of
the surmise as stood unproved (as distinct from double damages for all -though perhaps the latter cannot be excluded.) The interesting point is that
"no double damages" would seem to have been argued for (n.b. the reporter's "yet".) In such an argument, there is a suggestion of discomfort
with the partial Consultation -- as if the statute could only contemplate
all-or- nothing, as if the partial Consultation were an irregularity that must
raise a problem as to how to apply the punitive damages provision of the
statute.
There is some point in the puzzlement. The statute gave punitive damages against presumptively vexatious Prohibition- bringers. Here, plaintiff-in-Prohibition emerged as not quite a "bad man" -- for his surmise
was not made up out of whole cloth. Whatever might be said about single
costs and damages at common law, are the punitive damages' directed
against any but the unambiguously vexatious -- as opposed to those who
are merely mistaken about their rights or careless about assembling sufficient proof? That, of course, is simply a question about the statute. But
perhaps a question about the partial Consultation hovers. The statute
might be said in an indirect way to warrant all-or-nothing writs If the
statute is conceived as making a distinction between "bad men" who improperly try to stop ecclesiastical suits and "good men" who try to stop
them properly and in the public interest, perhaps it implies a corresponding distinction between the "bad" who wrongfully sue at ecclesiastical
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law and the "good" or "innocent" who properly assert their real rights in
that forum. If the first distinction is "binary", so perhaps is the second. A
man is not "good" in one sense and "bad" in another, but one or the
other in a net sense. It is "bad" to bring a partly appropriate and partly inappropriate ecclesiastical suit, as it is "bad" to bring a partly justified and
partly vexatious Prohibition. (Or else it is "good." in a net sense, to do
either.) In reverse, the dichotomizing effect of the statute might be conceived as reflecting the either-or choice implicit in the nature of the
writs: The statute-makers viewed plaintiffs-in-Prohibitions as either punishable or not-punishable because they thought of Prohibitions and Consultations as either stopping or disobstructing the ecclesiastical suit given
as an "integral thing."
The Court in Broughton v. Prince, however, denied countenance to any
such line of reasoning. That is clearly true if the decision points to pro
rata double damages -- i.e., if it means "where part of the surmise requires proof and is not proved, a Consultation quoad shall be granted and
double damages shall be assessed quoad that part." If the decision points
to awarding defendant-in-Prohibition twice his litigative costs plus other
damages for all, then the significance would be different -- a matter of
saying that although Consultations quoad are legitimate in themselves,
the statutory offense consists in bringing a Prohibition without full
prima facie justification and therefore remains an offense in spite of partial justification.
But that decision would equally go to deny the connection between the
ideas of the statute and the nature of the writs on which the argument
above depends. In any event, the case supplies a de facto instance of a
partial Consultations. Leaving aside the double damages provision, it is
hard to see how 2/3 Edw.6. could be fairly applied without partial Consultations. As it is conceivable to say that the statute does not require
Consultations on motion, so it is conceivable to say that it does not
authorize partial Consultations (but means that proof for part counts
either as proof for all or proof for none.) But those conceivable rules
would be foolish and unlikely. As for Consultations on motion, the statute may have provided an entering wedge for partial Consultations.
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In Buckhurst v. Newnton2 a kind of reluctance to grant partial Consultations appears -- let us say reluctance to grant them on a somewhat speculative basis. A parson sued for wood tithes, viz. for faggots. The
parishioner got a Prohibition on surmise that the faggots in question actually came from exempt timber trees (oak and elm) but that the parson had
falsely pretended in his libel that they were tithable beech and thorn. (It
was assumed in the surmise, and undisputed, that mere sticks from exempt trees -- picked up from the ground, lopped, or the like -- fell within
the exemption, as well as the timber proper. That is a probably sound, but
perhaps not altogether indisputable, proposition.) The parson moved for a
Consultation covering such of the wood as was not oak and elm. The report is condensed, but I would construct his arguments as follows from
the hints it provides: Prohibiting in toto in such a case as this is unfair and
inviting to easy trickery on the parishioner’s part. What is to prevent the
parishioner from making faggots substantially of beech and thorn, but
craftily inserting a stick of oak or elm in every one? The parson might
have no knowledge of the trick and sue for every tenth faggot in the fullest belief that only non-exempt wood was involved. Even if he was
aware of the stratagem, he might be justified in suing for every tenth faggot, on the theory that the amount of oak and elm was so nominal and the
parishioner’s intent so fraudulent that there was no legal need or practical
possibility of claiming the tithe otherwise.
So long, however, as the parishioner claims that exempt wood was involved in the least degree, a Prohibition of some sort is unavoidable. The
question then becomes whether it should be partial or total. If total, the
parson would be vexed and delayed by what might be utterly frivolous
Prohibition proceedings. He would have to prove the truth at common
law, whatever it might be, and in the end would probably do no worse
than partial Consultation. (I.e.: It is unlikely, though not impossible, that
virtually every stick in the faggots would be oak or elm -- in the very nature of woodlands and stick-gathering. The more serious possibilities are:
(a) that the parson will be altogether vindicated, the amount of oak and
elm being at most so trivial, and its distribution so suspect, that the jury
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will give a general verdict for the parson, or else the Court will hold that
one who intermixes a little exempt wood with fraudulent intent is entitled
to no consideration -- in which event, a full Consultation will issue; (b)
that the amount of oak and elm will be found appreciable, or the intermixture of even a small amount will be found innocent, or the Court will hold
that exempt wood remains exempt, however trivial the amount and even
if it is distributed fraudulently -- in which event, the solution must be
Consultation quoad as much of the wood as is not oak and elm.) In these
circumstances. would it not make better sense to grant a partial Prohibition (or, with the same effect, a partial Consultation on motion) right
now? The ecclesiastical court could then proceed at once to what it will
probably be authorized to do in the end -- to figure out how much of the
wood is beech and thorn and, if there is any oak or elm, to make a pro
rata award.
The Court did not reject the idea of a partial Consultation, but refused
to grant one until the parson somehow made his claim more specific. Just
what the judges meant requires interpretation. They said that the parson
must "show the special matter," namely, that the oak and elm are so intermixed "that he cannot do otherwise." I take this as an objection to the
"speculative" way in which the parson's counsel had argued. They had in
effect proposed partial Prohibition as the best general policy in this sort of
case -- owing to the possibility of fraud and the likelihood that there
would turn out to be some sort of intermixture of the two classes of wood,
calling for sorting out and. pro-rating by the ecclesiastical court. The
Court evidently wanted the parson to stand up and say something definite
about this case -- that the amount of oak and elm was trivial, or was
fraudulently distributed, or at least (what the judges specifically suggested) that the mixture in the faggots, whether fraudulent or innocent,
was such that the parson had no practical choice except to sue for every
tenth faggot and ask the courts to figure out whether he was entitled to
that much. So long as there was a possibility that the parishioner had substantially kept the exempt and non-exempt wood apart, or that the parson
could have easily known the approximate proportion of the two kinds and
brought an honest suit for proportionately less than a full tenth, there was
insufficient reason to deny the parishioner a total Prohibition and common law investigation of the truth.
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The disturbing feature of the Court's position is that it comes to a demand for a factual claim. Is it therefore a demand for formal pleading?
I.e.: Was the Court saying, "We cannot give you a partial Consultation on
motion, but if you will plead the facts which you think would entitle you
to one, the chances are good -- assuming of course that those facts are
found or admitted in your favor"? The report does not make it clear
whether or not that is what the Court meant. The alternatives would be:
(a) The Court would act on motion, once the parson made a factual statement applicable to this case, and once that statement was informally verified. (As we have seen, Consultations on motion requiring information
outside the record cannot be entirely ruled out, though they were rare.)
(b) The Court would act on motion without any verification of matter of
fact, but wanted a less "speculative" motion as a matter of form, to furnish a better basis for argument. (I.e., to give the parishioner a chance to
argue against the Consultation even on the assumption that the parson
was telling the truth. If, for example, the parson's claim was only that he
had no way of knowing what fraction of the faggots, if any, consisted of
exempt wood and therefore could only sue for the full tenth, the parishioner should perhaps have an opportunity to defend the full Prohibition,
even though the Court were inclined to a partial Consultation.) The last
possibility is less likely than the other two, but perhaps cannot be excluded in this peculiar kind of case -- peculiar because it is extremely
hard to arrive at a sensible way of handling the timber exemption when
mere sticks were in question. In principle, the judges were anything but
opposed to a partial Consultation. They cited a case (Molyns v. Dawes)
favoring that solution. Their reticence, I think, was lest they be unfair to
a parishioner who really was being needlessly and dishonestly sued for a
full tenth of his faggots. They probably wanted at least informally verified
information that that was not the case -- but at the very least they wanted
the parson to stick his neck out far enough to supply the parishioner with
a hypothetical basis for argument.
In Gresham v. Lucas,3 a modus was surmised, to pay 1d per milk-cow
and 1/2d per mare in satisfaction for all cows, horses, steers, and other
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cattle. A Consultation was granted "dummodo non tractetur" of milkcows, plough-beasts, and animals grazed for domestic use. That is all the
report says. The substantive point was in all probability that the modus
was held unreasonable except as it applied to the milk-cows and mares,
their products and sustenance (milk; calves; colts; herbage consumed by
the breeding-stock and their young insofar as the latter could be counted
as potential replacement-capital or domestic food.) In tithe cases arising
from the troublesome cattle business, a typical problem was whether a
sum calculated as so much per animal of one type (e.g., milk-cows) was a
good modus for all animals (including, e.g., beasts fattened for sale.) The
Court here said "No." Having said so, it did not simply send the suit back
to the ecclesiastical court. (To send the suit back in toto would leave the
parishioner to insist on his modus insofar as it was valid in the ecclesiastical court, as of course he might do successfully. Quaere whether, notwithstanding 50 Edw.3, he could have a new Prohibition on surmise that
the ecclesiastical court had disallowed the modus even for the milkcows.)
Rather, the Court used the partial Consultation to protect all the animals that ought not to pay tithes in kind, whether by virtue of this modus
or de jure. Bringing a badly-founded Prohibition was not penalized. (The
truth of the modus for milk-cows must be assumed for the partial Consultation to be reasonable. Its truth may have been established by verdict, after which a motion for Consultation was made in arrest of judgment. It
may have been conceded by the defendant in connection with a motion
for Consultation before pleading. Finally, it may have been held admitted
by demurrer. In the latter event, it seems to me a special problem arises as
to partial Consultations: The defendant demurs to the legal sufficiency of
a declaration attempting to claim a modus for all cattle calculated as 1d x
the number of milk-cows. The demurrer is upheld. It would seem very
doubtful to take the demurrer as admitting a modus for milk-cows and
their products so calculated. We cannot be sure from the report that the
Court did not do so, but it is unlikely.)
One brief note in the reports4 only goes to support the partial Consultation in the most obvious sort of case: If one sues for tithes of several
4

40 Eliz. C.P. Add. 25,199, f.7b.
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things, and some are not tithable, there may be a Consultation covering
only the tithable products. The very fact that the point is reported may
mean that it was doubted.
In another case,5 a tithe suit for various products was prohibited by
way of preventing the ecclesiastical court from enforcing its two-witness
rule. Specifically: The parishioner surmised that he had pleaded payment
of one tithe (pigeons) in kind, but was in danger of losing because he did
not have two witnesses to prove the fact of payment. The Prohibition was
granted after some discussion of the merits. The parson subsequently
moved for Consultation for the other tithes comprehended in the same
suit, on the ground that the parishioner had not offered proof of payment
(presumably by one witness) for those, as he admittedly had for pigeons.
The partial Consultation -- quoad all except the pigeons -- was granted.
The alternatives would have been: (a) to wait until the payment of pigeons had been tried at common law, then to grant either a total or partial
Consultation, depending on which way the verdict went; (b) a total Consultation now, with the right reserved to consider another Prohibition after
the whole ecclesiastical suit was settled, to the end of preventing execution of any part of the ecclesiastical sentence that could be shown to depend on enforcement of the two-witness rule; (c) regarding the whole
matter as subject to common law trial since the ecclesiastical court had
shown its unwillingness to apply reasonable evidentiary rules. (I. e.: in
his declaration , the parishioner would be allowed to plead to all the tithes
-- payment, modus or whatever -- and all action would be deferred until
after verdict . A partial Consultation might still be necessary in the end,
but it would have been eschewed until it was unavoidable.) None of these
alternatives would have been as sensible practically as the course taken.
All of them would express a bias against partial Consultations (inclination
to avoid them if at all possible ) of which the Court gave no sign.
The last case is pretty close to the limit at which complaint against partial writs would hardly be rational -- for a single suit for several tithes
might as well be several suits. If there was reason to prohibit quoad one
tithe, but no reason whatever quoad the others, the best procedure might
5

P. 41 Eliz. C.P. Add. 25,202, ff. 3 and 4b.
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be a partial Prohibition. But if a total Prohibition got through, undoing it
by partial Consultation is next-best. The motive of the partial Consultation was to return to the ecclesiastical court what belonged to the ecclesiastical court, no strings attached. The motive was not to influence its
conduct, though that might well be the effect. (I.e.: The ecclesiastical
court would be unlikely to insist on the two-witness rule again if the parishioner went on to plead payment of another tithe and offer proof by
one witness, If it did, I doubt that 50 Edw. 3 would protect it against another Prohibition, sed quaere.)
In another sightly later case,6 the same court used a qualified Consultation to direct the ecclesiastical court’s conduct, but in an interestingly restrained manner. The statement of this case is mutilated in the
MS., but the part that concerns us here is clear enough. The ecclesiastical
suit was against a bishop for improperly instituting a clergyman in a living.
It is not clear why a Prohibition was sought and obtained. As soon, in
any event, as the judges thought seriously about the matter, they concluded that the Prohibition was without merit. An attempt was then made
to get the Consultation qualified. The report brings out the motive behind
the attempt: The ecclesiastical suit was expected to lead to sequestration
of the tithes and other profits of the living. (I.e.: The matter of the suit
was whether A had been wrongfully instituted, but the ecclesiastical court
was expected to proceed by cutting the income from the living off from
A, pending settlement of the substance.) It was argued that such a sequestration would affect the interest of the patron, a lay interest with
which the ecclesiastical courts were not supposed to meddle. The reason
for that was that a parson’s receipt of the profits counted as evidence of
his patron’s seisin of the advowson. Cutting off the profits from the clergyman would be like putting the patron out of possession and therefore
nullifying his power to generate rights by adverse possession. Counsel
requested language in the Consultation expressly forbidding any sequestration.
The judges would only go half-way. They agreed with everything
counsel said -- i.e., that a sequestration was likely and would interfere
with the patron’s interest. But they would not write a Consultation saying
6

M. 42/43 Eliz. C.P. Lansd. 1065, f.66.
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in effect "We return this suit to you, but you must not sequester the
profits of the living." Rather, they qualified the Consultation with "dummodo non agatur de iure patronatus." The difference is between overt
and oblique direction of the ecclesiastical court's conduct, between warning the ecclesiastical court and enjoining it. The rejected formula would
have prevented the ecclesiastical court from using a recognized ecclesiastical procedure . The accepted formula only reminded the ecclesiastical
court not to do what it in any case had no business doing. The ecclesiastical court was left to judge for itself whether sequestering the profits
would come to meddling with the partonage. Technically, at any rate,
that was left to the ecclesiastical court. Actually, the judges left little
doubt as to what they meant. For when they turned down counsel's request for more explicit language, they added "...but if they proceed to sequestration notwithstanding that, if they complain to us we will find a
remedy" In sum, the case is evidence of two things: (a) willingness to use
qualified Consultations to direct or almost- direct the behavior of ecclesiastical courts -- as opposed to using them merely to split off an easily detachable part of a conglomerate suit; (b) recognition of the dubious
implication in that use of the qualified Consultation and reluctance to
push it too far -- insistence that in theory a Consultation does, after all,
liberate the ecclesiastical court to do what it likes with the suit before it.
If I read it correctly, Sir William Hall v. Ellis7 illustrates a special use
of the qualified Consultation -- to protect a plaintiff-in-Prohibition from
being caught in a procedural snarl. The ecclesiastical suit was brought by
the farmer of an impropriate rectory to recover a seat in church. His
original libel claimed a seat "in dextra parte Cancellae." Then he added
to his libel, making it "pro primo loco, and principally in dextra parte
Cancellae." The adverse party obtained a Prohibition on surmise that he
and his predecessor in estate of a certain house had always sat "in dextra
parte praedict." The Court held in principle that an impropriate rector or
his farmer had a de jure right to the chief seat (I.e., "first place") in the
chancel, but that another could claim it against him by prescription. In
other words, there would be nothing against the claim plaintiff-in-prohibition probably wanted to make -- a prescriptive claim to the chief seat.
7

T.7 Jac. K.B. Noy, 133.
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A Consultation had to be granted, however, because he had not actually
made that claim. His claim was only to a seat in the right-hand part, and
that was not the object of the ecclesiastical suit as amended. But the Consultation was granted with a quoad. The report does not give the language
of the quoad clause. I assume it went to authorize the ecclesiastical court
to proceed in the case before it (for the chief seat), but is such manner that
it did not contradict the plaintiff's alleged prescriptive title to a seat in the
right-hand part. It is not clear from the report whether the original libel
and corresponding surmise concerned one particular seat or one seat
among several. (If the latter, the original libel would in effect have aimed
at "bumping" the plaintiff -- "If anyone is to be displaced from the right
side of the chancel, it is X., not me.") If a particular seat was in question,
the Consultation as I reconstruct it would give the suit back only pro
forma. If not, it would come to saying "You may not displace the plaintiff from the right side, but you may determine the precedence as among
those entitled to sit there." In sum: Though the report of Hall v. Ellis is
obscure, it would seem to illustrate a rather generous use of the quoad
Consultation. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition strictly speaking had no right to a
writ, for he had shot down a non-existent suit (for a seat -- one in particular or any one -- on the right-hand side.)
But the Court helped him out by not granting a total Consultation.
Very possibly the Court was lenient because the misfiring of the surmise
may not have been entirely his fault, inasmuch as the libel had been
amended. Once the libel had been amended, the surmise ought to have
been amended correspondingly if the plaintiff thought he had a case
against the new-framed ecclesiastical suit, but neglect of that step might
be forgivable. Despite its obscurity, the decision is a suggestive precedent for cases in which a surmise failed to describe the ecclesiastical
suit at which it was aimed. Those cases must be distinguished into two
classes -- (a) those in which a copy of the libel had to be affixed to the
surmise by force of 2/3 Edw. 6, and (b) those in which affixing the libel
was not required. Hall v. Ellis presumably falls in the latter class. At
least within that class, it suggests saving the plaintiff so far as possible by
qualified Consultation. (Whether that technique does him more good than
the alternative one of quashing the Prohibition totaliter and leaving the
ecclesiastical court to proceed "at its peril" is questionable. Cf. cases on
conformity between surmise and libel above.)

305

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
All the cases above involve partial Consultations. Don Siego Serviento v. Jolliff and Tucker and Sir Richard Bingley8 presents us with a
partial Prohibition. In this case, the Spanish Ambassador sued in the Admiralty as "procurator" of Spanish subjects. He sought to recover two
ships belonging to Spaniards. Jolliff and Tucker had allegedly captured
the ships piratically at sea. They had brought them to Ireland. Thereafter
(the libel not specifying where), the ships came into Bingley's hands, who
converted them to his own use. Bingley sought a Prohibition, which the
Court unanimously granted. The Prohibition was confined to as much of
the Admiralty suit as concerned Bingley. The Ambassador was told that
he could proceed against Jolliff and Tucker for the wrongful taking of
the ships at sea, for the libel clearly placed it there. Bingley's receipt and
conversion of the ships, on the other hand, was not laid on the high seas.
The libel did not expressly assign it to any particular place, but suggested
indirectly that it had occurred in Ireland.
Since there was no basis for presuming that Bingley's dealings with
the ships took place at sea, and substantial basis for supposing that they
took place on land, the suit as it concerned him was clearly beyond Admiralty jurisdiction. There was considerable discussion of the merits
(whether the Ambassador suing as "procurator:" should be prohibited, inasmuch as he was not owner of the ships and therefore could not maintain
an ordinary action of Trover for them at common law; whether the Admiralty should be prohibited from determining a claim in the nature of Trover-on-land when the original act of misappropriation was a crime on the
high seas.) Having resolved those questions against the Ambassador, the
Court had no apparent hesitation about splitting the suit up by way of partial Prohibition.
Coke's report of the well-known Fuller's Case9 contains a fully articulated generalization about partial Consultations and Prohibitions and
provides a complex example of the former. The substance of this case
will be discussed later in the study. In brief, the King's Bench sent a
criminal suit against Fuller back to the High Commission because he was
8
9

Hobart, 78. Undated. Jac. C.P.
T. 5 Jac. K.B. 12 Coke, 41.
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being prosecuted for schism -- a major ecclesiastical offense of the sort
that clearly fell within the High Commission's much-debated jurisdiction.
The Consultation was qualified in two ways, however: (a) Fuller was accused of slandering the High Commission, as well as schism. The King's
Bench took the view that any contempt or slander. he had committed
against the High Commission was solely punishable by the common law
courts The Consultation was qualified accordingly: "Quatenus nun agat
de aliquibus scandalis, contemptibus, seu rebus quae ad communem
legem aut per statuta regni nostri Angl sunt punienda et deteminanda."
(b) Fuller's alleged schism and contempt consisted largely or wholly in
things he had said while arguing for his client in a Prohibition case. It
was of course scandalous in the extreme for the High Commission to
prosecute a lawyer for vigorously disputing its jurisdiction in the line of
duty. But so long as he was accused of schism the King's Bench could
not prohibit the prosecution. So, at least, the judges were constrained to
think in this politically charged case of a "radical lawyer." It is probably
fair to say that the second qualification attached to the Consultation was
"the best the Court could do for Fuller." The words were: "Quatenus non
agat de authoriatate et validitate literarum patentium pro causis ecclesiasticis vobis vel aliquibus vestrum direct' aut de expositione et interpretatione statuti de anno primo nuper Reginae, etc." The whole controverted
matter of the High Commission's jurisdiction depended on the meaning
of the clause of the Elizabethan Act of Supremacy that authorized the
court, plus the meaning of letters patent pursuant to the statute by which
the court was constituted. Part of the controversy was whether interpretation of the statute and patents belonged exclusively to the common law
courts. It is hard to say exactly what the second quantenus clause added
to Fuller's Consultation would prevent the High Commission from doing
in the case at hand. If his "schism" consisted in statements about the
meaning of the statute and letters patent, could he be convicted without a
determination that the statements were untrue, and could such a determination be made without violating the qualified Consultation? In any
event, if the tendency of the quatenus clause was to warn rather than enjoin -- to remind the ecclesiastical court where its "peril" lay -- the function was precedented.
Having qualified the Consultation in two ways, the judges in Fuller's
Case proceeded to lay down a general justification of partial Consultations. Their doing so suggests that a doubt was raised by counsel, or at
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least existed in the judges' own minds. As they said , there could not be
serious doubt in view of prior cases. At any rate, having used the partial
Consultation in a visible, political case, the judges understandably wanted
to make it explicit that they were following a perfectly regular procedure.
The generalization as Coke states it was as follows: Where the ecclesiastical suit contains several matters, some prohibitable and some not, standard
procedure is to grant a general Prohibition, and then to undo it in part by
Consultation on motion -- "the writ of consultation with a quoad is frequent and usual, but a prohibition with a quoad is rara avis in terra nigroque simillima cygno." Whether or not there is better reason for
qualifying Consultations than for qualifying Prohibitions, the rule is an
accurate description of practice. We have seen but one black swan above.
If Consultations quoad were common, Consultations ita quoad were
not. This verbal hair is split in one brief report.10 The report does not say
why a partial Consultation was sought or whether it was granted, only
that quoad rather than rather than ita quoad was said to be the correct expression. But the substance can be guessed at from the reported surmise.
A parishioner being sued for tithes of lambs claimed by prescription that
lambs born in Parish A and subsequently pastured in Parish B were
tithable in A. I imagine that it was argued that this amounted to prescribing for total exemption from tithes relating to the lambs in B and was
therefore unlawful. A qualified Consultation was probably sought to allow the parson of B to recover something for the pasturage of the lambs
in his parish, while his suit was stopped quoad the lambs themselves insofar as they were born in A. (De jure, one out of ten lambs born was due
in kind.)
An advantage of the practice recommended in Fuller's Case -- general
Prohibition and partial Consultation , as opposed to partial Prohibition -is brought out by another report. 11 The substance of the case is not reported, only the following: A partial Prohibition was granted. Defendantin-Prohibition then sought a Consultation quoad those parts of the
ecclesiastical suit that had not been prohibited. The Consultation was requested because the ecclesiastical court was allegedly in doubt as to how
10
11

Parson Earle's Case T . 7 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,208, f.51b.
M. 8 Jac. C . P . Add. 25,209, f.205b.
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far the Prohibition extended. In other words, the ecclesiastical court
wanted to be told positively wherein it should proceed, because it did not
understand exactly what it had been prohibited and not prohibited from
doing.
The Common Pleas, however, refused the Consultation--a redundant
Consultation for insurance purposes, we might call it. Without knowing
the circumstances of the case, there is no telling whether the ecclesiastical
court was in legitimate or over-cautious doubt, and whether that made
any difference to the common law judges. But the decision underscores
the advisability of confining quoad clauses to Consultations: A partially
prohibited ecclesiastical court might be reluctant to construe the Prohibition, and hence to proceed in the matters never prohibited. If the decision
in this case -- no Consultations to clear-up partial Prohibitions -- represents a general policy, there is all the more reason to keep Prohibitionsquoad in the rare bird category. That partial Prohibitions continued to
be occasionally granted and that they remained somewhat questionable
appears from the late Lush v. Webb (1641).12 The ecclesiastical suit was
for tithes and offerings. The surmise of a modus covered only the tithes.
The award of a Prohibition quoad the tithes only was striking enough to
report, and for Siderfin to cite one other case (Coleman v. Gilbert) as an
example of the procedure.
The partial Consultation was used in anomalous circumstances in a
case 1612.13 A parson sued for wool tithes, not de jure but by virtue of
an alleged custom more favorable to the parson than common right -- he
claimed to be entitled to 1/10th of the wool "without the view or election
of the party." It is hard to visualize what this customary method of payment would amount to. It goes, in any event, in derogation of the parishioner's ordinary right to take part of his wool and say to the
parson, "Here, I offer you this as your fair tenth of the total crop." The
parson was evidently claiming some sort of right to come to the shearing
place and take his pick, and he was evidently complaining that this had
somehow been made impossible for him. The parishioner got a Prohibition to contest the truth of the alleged custom and proceeded to declare
12
13

P. 17 Car. K.B. 1 Siderfin, 251.
P. 10 Jac. K.B. 1 Bulstrode, 204.
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on his surmise. The parson then demurred and struck out the words "without the view of election of the party." The report leaves it ambiguous
whether he struck out the words -- presumably from his libel, attached to
the surmise and part of the record -- before or after officially entering his
demurrer. But it is clear what he was trying to do in effect: He wanted to
amend his original claim, dropping the unconvincing custom so that the
claim would amount to a straightforward demand for tithes in kind. If
that was his claim, the cause of Prohibition now set forth in the parishioner's declaration would be groundless, and Consultation should lie.
The parson accordingly moved the Court for a general Consultation.
What he got was a qualified one -- quoad tithes in kind due de jure. As to
the custom, the parson was told he must proceed at common law without
amendment of his claim.
This solution was, I think, rather generous to the parson. For what he
got was the go-ahead signal to the ecclesiastical court that he needed.
The partial Consultation would say to the ecclesiastical court, "The suit of
A v. B which we prohibited has now been amended into a straight claim to
tithes in kind. So long as it is that and remains that, you may proceed." A
harsher solution from the parson's point of view would have been no
Consultation. He could justifiably have been told, "You may not change
from a custom-based claim to a de jure claim at this point. The suit we
prohibited is and must remain custom-based. If you want to start a new
ecclesiastical suit for de jure tithes, or to try to persuade the ecclesiastical
court to proceed with an amended version of the existing suit, that is your
business . But we will not help you out by telling the ecclesiastical court
wherein it is safe to proceed in the existing suit." The more lenient solution that the parson wanted (general Consultation) would have had two
disadvantages: (a) It would in principle, no doubt send back the suit as
amended, but the language of a general Consultation ("You may proceed
in the erstwhile-prohibited suit of A v. B") would not communicate the
understood qualification -- "as amended." (b) Suppose the custom cropped
up again in the future. A general Consultation would be a record
against the parishioner. The partial Consultation would count as
a record in his favor so far as any claim by the parson based on
the custom was concerned. If on some future occasion the parson
were to reassert the custom, the parishioner might be able to make
make use of the record in his favor. The Court was right, it seems to me,
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in preventing the parson from escaping by latter-day amendment all consequences of his original suit (including, perhaps, costs) and also in issuing a writ that let the ecclesiastical court know where it stood.
In Gerey's Case,14 a partial Prohibition was issued in somewhat problematic circumstances and with some hesitation. The hesitation may have
extended to whether partial Prohibitions were ever proper procedure. The
statute of 2/3 Edw.6 provided for punitive damages against persons who
withheld due tithes. As the statute was applied, ecclesiastical courts were
allowed to assess double damages. A parson could recover still more
valuable treble damages, but to do that he had to go to the added trouble
of suing an action of Debt at common law for the penalty. In Gerey's
Case, an ecclesiastical court improperly awarded treble damages after
giving sentence for the parson to recover his tithes. A Prohibition was
sought on the ground that the ecclesiastical court had exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the treble damages. That some sort of Prohibition
must be granted was clear, but the Court hesitated between a general one
(prohibiting execution of the sentence altogether) and a special one (prohibiting execution quoad damages above the amount the ecclesiastical
court was entitled to award). The problem in the immediate circumstances arose from doubt as to whether ecclesiastical procedure permitted a definitive sentence to be divided for purposes of execution. I.e.: Did
the ecclesiastical court have the procedural flexibility to obey a Prohibition going only to execution of the unlawful damages? If not, the only
alternatives would have been no Prohibition or a general Prohibition, the
first impossible in fairness to the subject, the latter excessive and unfair to
the parson.
The Court finally decided on a partial Prohibition. Surely that was the
sensible course. If the ecclesiastical court was so tied up in its procedure
that it could not obey the Prohibition except by not executing its sentence
at all, so much the worse for it. A general Prohibition would surely have
prevented the sentence from being executed in toto. (Unless it was undone by partial Consultation. But if the ecclesiastical court could not execute only part of its sentence in obedience to the partial Prohibition,
neither could it do so by way of following a partial Consultation.) The re14

H. 11 Jac. C.P. Moore, 873.
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port suggests that the Court was helped to its conclusion by being convinced that partial Prohibitions were as such legitimate, as if the judges
had some doubt about that apart from the peculiarity of the case at hand.
For several cases are given in the report as cited in favor of the partial
Prohibition. One is an example of a partial Consultation, citation of
which suggests that doubt may have been raised about both writs in partial form. One , so far as appears, goes only to the general propriety of
partial Prohibitions. (Cullier v. Cullier, 37 Eliz.: The ecclesiastical suit
was for defamation -- saying the plaintiff had a bastard. Prohibition was
granted quoad the bastardy, but the ecclesiastical court was permitted to
proceed quoad the defamation. Quaere what this decision would mean.
The object was clearly to prevent the ecclesiastical court from bastardizing someone -- to the possible prejudice of his secular rights, as to inherit
land -- as an incidental effect of a petty suit for words. But how can the
truth of "You had a bastard" be investigated without inquiring into
whether X is the plaintiff's bastard, and how can the defamation suit be
determined without going into the truth of the words? Possibly the Prohibition leaves the ecclesiastical court free only to inquire into whether the
words were spoken -- i.e., to clear the speaker if he never spoke them. I
doubt that it would be left free to rule out truth as a defense -- i.e., to punish the speaker if he spoke the words, regardless of their truth. It would
be interesting to know who brought the Prohibition in Cullier v. Cullier.)
The third citation comes a little closer to Gerey's Case, in that the partial
Prohibition was granted after sentence, with the effect of blocking execution in part. The sentence looks more easily divisible than the excessive
award of damages in Gerey's Case, however. (Took v. Stafford, 2 Jac.
The citation does not state the case very clearly. It would appear that the
ecclesiastical suit and sentence covered several sorts of tithes -- probably
certain tithes in kind, plus sums of money claimed by the parson in lieu of
tithes for agistment. The Prohibition blocked execution for the tithes in
kind but not for the rest, for whatever reason.)
In Hoskins's Case,15 a partial consultation was sought and denied in
circumstances somewhat different from any of the cases above. The re15

Hobart, 115. Undated in Hobart, but clearly the same case as Eve v. Hoskins, M. 13 Jac.,
probably C.P., Lansd. 1172, f.52b. Hobart's report brings out the point better than the MS.,
though they basically agree.
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porter (Hobart, who was probably a judge in the case) seems to have
doubted the decision's correctness. The ecclesiastical suit was for tithes
from a specified area. A Prohibition was obtained on surmise that the
tithes from two- thirds of that area had belonged to Queen Elizabeth, who
had granted them to X, whom plaintiff-in-Prohibition had paid. (The
monarch was "capable of tithes" by prerogative, apart from impropriations. Tithes from land which did not belong to any parish, for example,
were due to the monarch of common right. The basis for the Prohibition
here was presumably that the validity of the royal grant was brought in
question, or else that the bounds of parishes were in question. The mere
claim that the tithes had been paid to the proper person should not warrant
a Prohibition.)
A Consultation was then sought quoad the one-third of the land concerning which the surmise manifestly made no claim. This seemingly
reasonable request was denied, however, on the ground that the Consultation must conform to the libel. The libel was "entire" -- i.e., the ecclesiastical suit aimed at recovering tithes from the area as a whole -- ergo the
Consultation must be "entire" too. Since continuation of the ecclesiastical
suit as originally cast could not be authorized, no Consultation could be
granted. Defendant-in-Prohibition was told to start a new suit for tithes
from the one-third that the surmise said nothing about.
This decision seems to me to go pretty squarely against the grain of
holdings in favor of partial Consultations. I can see no necessary distinction between splitting up an ecclesiastical suit territorially and splitting
one up according to subject matter. I.e.: Parson sues for pigs and lambs.
Parishioner shows cause of Prohibition covering only the pigs. If a Consultation quoad lambs is proper in that case, why not in the principal case
quoad the one-third not covered? There is admittedly a distinction between a partial Consultation that splits up the ecclesiastical suit and a
qualified Consultation of the "quatenus non agatur" type. The latter respects the "entirety" of the ecclesiastical suit as conceived, but indicates
channels within which the ecclesiastical court must stay in handling the
suit. But the former type was precedented as well as the latter (though
not, it should be noted, as numerously, judging by the cases above), and
would seem to present less of a theoretical problem in most respects. Hobart appends a quaere to his report of Hoskins's Case. So far as appears,
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the quaere goes straight to the decision -- i.e., asks "Were we really right
in deciding the case as we did?"
In the Caroline Matingley v. Martyn,16 a partial Consultation was proposed and probably granted. The case was as follows: William and Joan
were prosecuted at ecclesiastical law ex officio (publicly or criminally,
without private complainant) for "suspicious cohabitation" -- i.e., living
together as husband and wife without being married, or at least (as the accusation against them read) without its being known or probable that they
were married, since marriage banns had not been read in their parish and
they had no license dispensing them from banns. William and Joan's essential defense was that they had a marriage license from the Archbishop
of Canterbury. After unsuccessfully trying to plead their defense in the
ecclesiastical court, they got a Prohibition. Their claim to a Prohibition
rested essentially on the statute of 25 Hen. 8, c.21. That act gave the
Archbishop the dispensing powers formerly vested in the Pope. William
and Joan maintained that the ecclesiastical court was pretending that the
statute did not give the Archbishop power to dispense from marriage
banns, or at least that the meaning of the statute was in question, whereas
the exposition of statutes belonged to the common law. In other words
they maintained that insofar as their license was not allowed, the ecclesiastical court was depriving them of a statutory right, or at least purporting
to construe the statute by disallowing a license made pursuant to the
Archbishop's statutory powers.
I think it is fair to cut through the complexities of this case by saying
that the judges at last saw the light and perceived that William and Joan
had no claim. Claims to Prohibitions on the ground that a statute was involved raised special problems in any event. The claim here was particularly flimsy. For one thing, the Archbishop's license was no better by
virtue of the statute than it would have been without it. (Though the statute gave the Archbishop the Pope's dispensing power for all England,
every bishop and archbishop had non-statutory power to dispense from
marriage banns within his diocese or archdiocese. William and Joan
lived in, and their wedding took place within, the Province of Canter16 P.8
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bury.) Secondly, there was nothing to suggest that the ecclesiastical court
actually had done anything that would count as interpreting the statute,
or that it would be required to -- much less that the statute had been misapplied. In other words, even if the license is taken as an exercise of the
Archbishop's statutory power, overruling the license, or refusing to accept it as a sufficient defense to the charge of suspicious cohabitation,
does not ipso facto point to an act of interpreting the statute. The reason
is that the formal sufficiency, meaning , etc., of licenses issued by the
Archbishop pursuant to his statutory powers were clearly within ecclesiastical jurisdiction. I.e.: The ecclesiastical court may not deny that the
Archbishop has licensing power by the statute. It perhaps may not even
entertain questions, if any were to be controverted, about the scope of his
power, But it may certainly consider, nay, decide, whether a statutebased license is in the right form by ecclesiastical standards (as it were,
whether it is on the right kind of paper, signed in the right place, etc.) For
25 Hen.8 did not set up a special manner of licensing -- only transferred
power to issue due ecclesiastical licenses from one ecclesiastical officer
to another. Similarly, marriage licenses invariably had provisoes -- provided that the licensees are not within forbidden degree of consanguinity,
etc. The factual question whether conditions laid down in an ecclesiastical license had been met belonged to the ecclesiastical court, whether the
license was made pursuant to statutory powers or otherwise. In the instant
case, the charge of "suspicious cohabitation" may have been sustainable
without raising any question about the license's validity as an ecclesiastical document -- much less about the statute behind it. For it was an issue
in the case whether the couple's local ecclesiastical authorities had notice
of the license.
To all appearances, what really happened was that William and Joan
got a perfectly good and utterly uncontroverted license from the Archbishop to be married without banns in a designated church in London.
They lived somewhere else, however. It was a question of fact whether
they had given the local authorities where they lived notice of their lawful
marriage, and perhaps a question of law whether cohabiting without giving such notice constituted a crime of "suspicious cohabitation." But all
these questions -- what constituted sufficient notice, whether such criteria
of notice had been met, whether living together without giving due notice
was an ecclesiastical crime even if the couple were married in fact -- were
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perfectly within ecclesiastical competence and perfectly independent of
the statute.
In sum, William and Joan got up a farfetched theory that could lead to
prohibiting every marital suit involving an Archepiscopal dispensation,
whether or not there was the least question as to what powers the statute
gave the Archbishop. William and Joan said that the ecclesiastical court
was proceeding against the statute (i.e., on the pretense that marriage licensing belonged only to the bishops), but there was nothing to suggest
that that was true. Their saying so was only by way of stating their theory. So the judges agreed in the end, holding that there was no present basis for prohibiting, though there might be in the future, upon a showing
that the ecclesiastical court had actually misapplied the statute -- i.e., had
held that the Archbishop had no power to issue such a license.
The road to the above conclusion was circuitous, however. The matter
of qualified Consultations arose along the road. The case was discussed
only after full pleading and demurrer (declaration; plea in bar; replication;
demurrer by the defendant, the ecclesiastical judge). On the first hearing,
Justice Jones favored a Consultation, upholding the demurrer. The rest of
the Court (Richardson, Croke, and Whitelocke) went the other way. Then
the case was reargued, the able Attorney General, William Noy, speaking
for the defendant. Chief Justice Richardson was now converted to
Jones’s opinion. But since the Court was still divided 2-2, outside judges
were called in -- two from the Exchequer (Chief Baron Davenport and
Baron Denham) and two from the Common Pleas (Chief Justice Heath
and Justice Hutton). These advisers favored a Consultation with a qualifying clause -- "ita quod non agatur” of the Archbishop’s statutory powers.
Was their advice taken? The report fails us. We are told that on the occasion of their conference with the four outsiders the King’s Bench judges
reached agreement on the substance as I have outlined it above. That is
to say, Whitelocke and Croke were talked out of their previous opinion.
(On the main question. There was a further pleading question, on which
everyone held for the defendant, and an additional question as to whether
the ex officio proceeding against William and Joan was lawful without
any presentment. On the last question, Croke and Whitelocke thought the
proceeding unlawful, contrary to their colleagues and the outside judges.)
We are not told, however, whether the “ita quod” clause was finally put
into the Consultation.
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The chances are that it was. The proposal to insert it has the look of a
compromise: The outside judges clearly agreed with Richardson and
Jones on the real matter. They were faced with two stubborn hold-outs -two stubborn hold-outs in a thoroughly argued case, where the issue was
broad enough to have a political flavor. Croke and Whitelocke were resisting the ecclesiastical interest and the arguments of the Attorney General. They were also (in my opinion) wrong -- though possibly wrong
from good motives and with some technical justification. (As to the good
motives: Here was a couple being harassed by the churchmen for the curious offense of "suspicious cohabitation," when they were probably doing
nothing immoral. Here were the churchmen, with government assistance,
making a "Federal case" out of this trivial matter -- raising grave and difficult questions about the independence of the ecclesiastical judiciary and
its relation to the statute law. Fair-minded judges -- as well as Puritans
and fornicators -- might well take offense at such a display of Laudianism. As for the technical justification: The pleadings on their face did
claim that the ecclesiastical judge had violated the statute -- unlikely
though it is that that was anything but a pretense.) The outside judges
probably saw themselves in a mediating role -- charged with bringing two
"right" judges and two "wrong" ones together if at all possible. The "ita
quod" clause was in one sense a small sop to offer Croke and Whitelocke,
in another sense a large concession -- the perfect compromise. On the
one hand, it would tell the ecclesiastical court not to do something it was
virtually sure not to do anyhow. On the other hand, it would give Croke
and Whitelocke what they were holding out for in principle -- recognition
that ecclesiastical courts have no intrinsic authority to construe statutes,
are bound by the common law interpretation, and may be prohibited from
meddling with statutes without a showing that they have made a decision
necessarily dependent on misapplication of a statute. It is more likely that
Croke and Whitelocke agreed to the qualified Consultation than that they
were so wholeheartedly converted as to accept a general Consultation. It
is likely that Richardson and Jones would have accepted the "ita quod"
for the sake of unity. We cannot be sure, however. We cannot even be
sure that the case was decided for the defendant, for where the report
stops Croke and Whitelocke were still holding out on the separate question of whether the ecclesiastical suit was lawful at all in the form it took.
That question was not raised by the pleadings. If Croke and Whitelocke
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wanted to insist on it, they were proposing that the "legal truth" be followed, instead of the pleadings -- as in the cases on "misconceived surmises" above. Since, counting the outside judges, they were outvoted, the
chances are that they would not have refused the Consultation on that
ground in the end. (The outside judges were only advisers. I.e: The case
was not formally adjourned into the Exchequer Chamber, to be decided
by all the judges of the three principal courts. But unless their feelings
were very strong indeed, Croke and Whitelocke would in all probability
have accepted the votes of their outside colleagues as binding on them.)
With respect to partial Consultations, two observations on Matingley v.
Martyn should be made: (a) If I reconstruct the drama correctly, qualifying the Consultation was a compromise. Judges who thought the right solution was no Consultation and judges who thought it was a general
Consultation got together on an "ita quod." In one way, recognition of
the qualified Consultation as a legitimate form provided a useful instrument for compromise and similar motives. "We might as well put in a
qualification, just to make sure the ecclesiastical court does not stray out
of bounds" was a possible thing to say -- when doing so would enable a
divided court to act, or when the judges had a skeptical or hostile attitude
toward ecclesiastical proceedings which they were powerless to prohibit.
On the other hand, it seems questionable whether qualified Consultations ought to be granted "just to make sure," to make someone feel better about permitting the ecclesiastical court to continue. The cleaner,
more rigorous course is to decide between no-Consultation and general
Consultation, unless a qualifying clause will genuinely serve to direct the
ecclesiastical court away from misconduct which might require another
Prohibition later on. When there is no real expectation that the ecclesiastical court will exceed its jurisdiction or come into conflict with the common law, the etiquette of a mixed legal system is probably best observed
by leaving the ecclesiastical court alone to do its business, not by surrounding it with warnings and conditions, which themselves may raise
problems of interpretation. In the particular matter of statutes, it is perhaps best to act as if one assumed the ecclesiastical court would apply the
statute correctly -- an assumption hardly contrary to fact in many circumstances.
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(b) Matingley v. Martyn was a fully pleaded case. The qualified Consultation was proposed as a solution upon demurrer. Ordinarily, partial
Consultations were sought on motion before pleading (insofar as they
were sought on purely legal grounds -- i.e., not pursuant, say, to a verdict
finding for the plaintiff quoad one tithe and the defendant quoad another).
That is what the resolutions in Fuller's Case contemplate -- partial Consultations on motion as procedurally preferable to, but not different in effect from, partial Prohibitions. Is there any difference? Arguably,
perhaps. In the first instance or nearly the first instance, one might say,
the Prohibition should be tailored to cover only as much of the ecclesiastical suit as the surmise shows to be prohibitable. If, however, the plaintiff
declares on an "overstated" Prohibition, and the defendant demurs to the
Prohibition as declared on, perhaps the parties have challenged each
other to an "all-or-nothing" contest. The plaintiff has said inter alia that
his Prohibition is not "overstated," the defendant that its "overstatedness"
is among its flaws wherefore a total Consultation should lie. Therefore
partial Consultations should not be granted upon demurrer, or at least
they should be granted more reluctantly than upon early motion. From
the perspective of private litigative warfare, there may be some point in
this argument. Matingley v. Martyn is a precedent contra, but vitiated by
the special need to unjam a divided Court.
Alongside the miscellaneous cases above, we must consider testamentary cases exemplifying qualified writs. I treat these as a special class because they may have been the entering wedge for partial writs in general.
It would have been hard to avoid such writs in testamentary cases. Without the example of testamentary cases, they might have been avoided
elsewhere. It is arguable that simple conglomerate suits should not be
split up by partial Prohibitions or Consultations. (If a parson sues for pigs
and lambs and a modus covering only the pigs is surmised, the effect of
granting a total Prohibition and letting it stand will be to make the parson
start a new suit for lambs. Arguably, people who bring conglomerate suits
undertake to make them stick across the board, or else to go back and sue
separately for separate items.) As for "quatenus non agatur" Consultations, designed to warn or direct the ecclesiastical court -- questions can
be asked about their propriety and utility in enough contexts to raise the
general question whether they were a very good idea. In testamentary
law, however, the division of labor between common law and ecclesiastical courts was such that qualified writs were close to a practical necessity.
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If they had not been needed in that area, perhaps they would have been
less willingly recognized elsewhere. Even so, it was sometimes problematic in testamentary cases themselves whether a partial writ was the right
solution. Let us now turn to cases in the special testamentary group.
In Harvey v. Harvey (1584),17 a qualified Consultation was expressly
sought by the ecclesiastical plaintiff, Clare, who was suing an executor,
Sebastian, for a legacy. Sebastian's essential defense was that the testator
was in debt to him (by a "Statute Staple," a special type of obligation by
which land was made liable to execution to satisfy the debt) and had
given him all his goods by inter vivos gift, so that he had nothing as executor from which to pay legacies. He prohibited the legacy suit on surmise of the Statute Staple and inter vivos gift (both transactions which, if
questioned, were clearly within common law jurisdiction.) Clare then
moved for a Consultation "quatenus non agitur ad validitatem facti [i.e.,
the deed of gift of the goods allegedly made in the testator's life], aut statuti."
Lady Lodge's Case (above) was urged as authority for such a Consultation (by Egerton, who had himself been of counsel in the earlier case.)
But Chief Justice Wray, whose opinion alone is reported, was inclined
against it. His reported words go only to distinguish Lady Lodge's Case,
but his full point needs to be put in somewhat broader terms: There was
a practical reason in the instant case for seeking a Consultation -- albeit
necessarily qualified. At first sight, that may not be apparent, for if the
testator gave all of his goods to Sebastian, how could the ecclesiastical
court do anything for Clare without venturing where it plainly must be
forbidden to go -- i.e., without passing on and invalidating the deed of
gift? The answer (as Wray acknowledged) is that there might be debts
owing to the testator which Sebastian had collected, or could collect, and
out of which the legacy could be paid. The inter vivos gift of all goods
would not operate as an assignment of such debts owing to the testator.
So why not (in effect) Consultation quoad any assets in Sebastian's hands
by virtue of obligations falling due to the estate -- the Prohibition to stand
quoad any property of the testator comprehended in the deed of gift? In
17

P. 26 Eliz. Q.B. 1 Leonard, 20.
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answer to that, Wray turned to the Statute Staple. Sebastian claimed to
have £2000 coming to him by virtue of the Statute. For that large sum, he
had a claim against the estate -- i.e., against anything that came to the estate by virtue of obligations to the testator (offset, I suppose, by any equities arising from the gift -- i.e., a claim against the estate for £2000 minus
the value of the goods, if the gift was intended as, or should be presumed,
a partial satisfaction of the debt, a question presumably resolvable in a
court of equity).
In sum, I believe Wray's point comes to this: The qualified Consultation might be justified if only the gift had been surmised -- for the estate
might still be sufficient to satisfy legacies. Likewise if only the Statute
Staple had been surmised -- for an estate worth £10,000, say, should be
subject to legacy suits even though it was encumbered with a £2000 obligation. But putting the two together, the chance that the estate could satisfy the legacy was extremely marginal -- not theoretically excludable,
but extremely marginal. Better to stop the ecclesiastical suit altogether,
pending common law determination of the gift and Statute, than tempt the
ecclesiastical court (even while forbidding it) to meddle in common law
matters. Given license to award the legacy so long as the gift and Statute
were not questioned, it might soon find itself involved in other issues beyond its depth -- e.g., the validity of obligations to the testator -- raising
the possibility of new Prohibitions (and 50 Edw. 3 problems). Better
avoid "quatenus" Consultations except where there is a real chance that
the ecclesiastical court can settle the matter in its own terms -- where it
only needs to be warned away from questions it is unlikely to touch.
Lady Lodge's Case was very possibly at the opposite pole from
Harvey v. Harvey in the way that matters. I.e.: It may have been the perfect case for a "quatenus" Consultation -- a case in-which the chance of an
ecclesiastical resolution without touching common law ground was better
than good. In specifically distinguishing Lady Lodge, Wray relied: (a)
On the fact that the deed in Lady Lodge constituting the "common law issue" was made by a previous executor, rather than the testator. Quaere
whether that is a distinction without a difference. (B conveys away all the
goods
.
he has as A.'s executor. B makes C his executor and dies. A's
legatee sues C. The ecclesiastical court is told to go ahead "quatenus" it
does not touch B's conveyance. That is Lady Lodge's Case minus further
complications. Wray seems to say the Consultation was justified there
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because the conveyance was B’s. Where X conveys all his goods to Y
and makes Y, his executor and dies (Harvey v. Harvey) Wray seems to
say that the Consultation is less justified, even apart from the additional
factor of the Statute Staple. Why? In the first case, if B.'s own estate was
big enough to satisfy its debts should the ecclesiastical court be free to
charge it with A.'s legacies, either prior or posterior to B.’s legacies?
Quaere.) (b) Though B. in the above outline of Lady Lodge had conveyed
all of A.’s goods away, there might have been debts collectable by A.'s estate out of which A.'s legacies could still be satisfied. In Harvey v.
Harvey, the heavy charge represented by the Statute Staple made that improbable.
One further feature of Harvey v. Harvey should be noted. As of the
time he brought his Prohibition, Sebastian had been excommunicated for
failure to appear and answer Clare’s suit and imprisoned upon De excom municato capiendo. As far as the report indicates, nothing was made of
this circumstance against Sebastian. Wray talks about the differences between his case and Lady Lodge’s in a vein favorable to plaintiff-in-Prohibition. There is nothing to suggest that Sebastian’s title to have and
maintain his full Prohibition was vitiated by his non-appearance and his
delay in suing the Prohibition.
A case of 159018 exemplifies the qualified Prohibition in circumstances we have not heretofore encountered. Prohibitions were sometimes used to prevent ecclesiastical courts from exacting detrimental
testimony from parties by inquisitorial investigation. Such cases, including this one, are discussed in substance in Vol. II of the study. The famous instances concern criminal suits, primarily in the High Commission.
But there are civil instances as well. The general principle to keep in
mind is that inquisitorial procedure was not objectionable -- or at least not
controllable -- as such. Requiring the party to answer interrogatories was
the way ecclesiastical courts did things -- objectionable, or controllable,
only insofar as it took certain unfair forms in criminal suits, or, in civil
18

T. 31-M. 31/32 Eliz. C.P. Add. 25,194, f.6b; Lansd. 1073, f.108 (two nearly identical reports,
giving Anderson’s initial speech); Add. 25,196, ff. 199b and 204 (the second and third hearings
-- of primary importance here; Moore, 906 (brief report, misleading because it does not say that
the Prohibition was qualified).
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suits, at least matrimonial and testamentary suits, insofar as it might tend
to the damage of a man's common law interests.
In our case, the ecclesiastical suit was to revoke administration. The
intestate's wife had been made administratrix; his heir (i.e., real-estate
heir -- his blood relationship to the intestate does not appear) sought to
have administration transferred to him, on the ground that the debts and
credits of the personal estate were bound up with the land he had inherited, in consequence of which he had paid off some of the estate's debts.
There was serious question as to whether ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction to entertain such revocation suits at all, because the statute of 21
Hen. 8, c. 5, sect. ii, severely limited their discretion in awarding administration. The statute as the common law judges understood it was frequently enforced by Prohibition.
In this case, however, the
widow-administratrix did not claim that the suit should be prohibited because it was unlawful by the statute. Rather, she sought a Prohibition on
the ground that she was being compelled to answer improper interrogatories -- questions about the condition of the estate and the intestate's affairs which she claimed were irrelevant for the ecclesiastical court's
purposes, intrinsically "temporal," and apt to extract admissions that
could be used against the estate in common law litigation with the creditors.
Whatever else could be said against them, it was not entirely clear
from the surmise that the questions were irrelevant. Chief Justice Anderson, who alone spoke when the case first came up, was unwilling to conclude out of hand that they were. When the case was discussed again, the
court was inclined to agree that a partial Prohibition was the right solution: tell the ecclesiastical court not to proceed on "points belonging to the
common law" (as the report puts it), otherwise let the suit, including the
interrogation process, go on. In some sense, that must perhaps be considered what plaintiff-in-Prohibition was asking for, since she did not object
to the revocation suit as such or, it would seem, maintain that she should
not be interrogated to any intent. What the form and effect of such a partial Prohibition would be is problematic. Would the Prohibition specify
which questions were so "temporal" that the ecclesiastical court must stay
away from them, whether or not they were relevant, or the ecclesiastical
court considered them relevant, for its purpose? Or would the Prohibition
be cast in general terms and operate only in a minatory way -- in effect,
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"Go ahead and ask questions which you consider essential for your purpose, but be careful about asking anything that is likely to affect common
law interests -- for any inessential questions that trench on our sphere will
put you in danger of violating this Prohibition?"
When the case was taken up a third time, the Court found itself in serious disagreement. Chief Justice Anderson insisted on the ecclesiastical
court's right to ask any questions that were relevant for its purposes,
whether or not they were about "temporal" matters and whether or not
they might lead to detrimental admissions: "If the examination of the
other matters is a necessary circumstance to prove the principal point,
there is no reason to prohibit them. As if it [a suit] were begun there for a
legacy, and defendant pleaded a gift by the testator in his life of all his
goods except those with which he should pay such-and-such a debt -- if
they are at issue on the gift, they may take examination concerning the
gift, and yet the gift is determinable at common law..." (N.b. Anderson's
parallel example. Lady Lodge and Harvey v. Harvey show that the ecclesiastical court could be prohibited quoad an inter vivos gift. Anderson
should not be taken as disputing that.
Rather, his point is as follows: If the ecclesiastical defendant chooses
to rely on such a gift by way of ecclesiastical plea, and does not get a Prohibition, then the ecclesiastical court may make him answer questions
about the gift, even though it is an intrinsically "temporal" matter and
even though admissions capable of being used against him in common
law litigation might be exacted. Justice Periam replied to Anderson
briefly and sharply: "In our case itself, I hold the contrary." I take Periam as not wanting to dispute Anderson's general principle or his parallel
case, but as favoring a strong Prohibition in the instant case -- either general, or qualified so as to rule out the questions about "temporal" matters
specifically. Periam's underlying point must be that the relevance, or
high-degree relevance, of the questions was not evident in the case at
hand. He must have taken the surmise as importing the claim that there
was no "justifying relevance" here. Perhaps he was unable to imagine
any. Therefore the ecclesiastical court should be strongly prohibited,
pending a showing, by pleading to the Prohibition, that the "temporal"
questions were in fact essential. (In Anderson's parallel case, on the
other hand, the relevance of the question is evident.) Anderson, by con-
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trast, was taking the surmise as defective for failure to claim irrelevance,
or lack of "justifying relevance," specifically.
Anderson came back at Periam rather testily: "My case was law before
my age and will be afterwards, and there is a book case circa H[en.]4,
where one sued in the spirituaI court for a mortuary." Justice Walmesley
then intervened to suggest a compromise: "Yes, sir. His case is good law,
and thus is 8 H[en.] 4 and 2 R[ich.] 3. But it seems to me there may be a
special prohibition -- that if it not be pertinent to the cause to surcease,
otherwise to proceed. And Anderson agreed to that in this plea." These remarks are puzzling in that "my case" and "his case" have the look of referring back to Anderson's parallel case (the inter vivos gift), as if Periam
had said "in your case itself' -- i.e., "I dispute your parallel case itself, a
fortiori what you are implying about this one." However, I read the MS,
as clearly "notre," not "votre," and Periam's position makes good sense as
reconstructed above. In any event, Periam and Anderson disagreed about
the case at hand. Walmesley essentially agreed with Anderson, but
thought there was no harm in a weak, or "minatory," Prohibition, to
which Anderson had no objection. The fourth member of the Court, Justice Wyndham, was present, but said nothing on this point.
The Justices went on, however, to discuss whether suits for revocation
of administration ought to take place at all. On this, Periam and Wyndham lined up squarely against Anderson and Walmesley. The first pair
thought that the Henrician legislation regulating administration removed
all basis for revocation suits. (This position amounts to the following:
Anyone entitled to administration by statute should proceed by Prohibition to block the appointment of improper persons. Except for such persons deprived of their statutory right, no one could have any basis for
disputing the ecclesiastical court's appointment -- i.e, seeking to have the
old grant revoked and a new one made. The statute preempted the field -requiring the appointment of certain classes of relatives when persons in
those classes were available, otherwise giving the ecclesiastical court discretion.) Anderson and Walmesley disagreed "strongly." (They would
not, I am sure, have denied that the statute severely limited the ecclesiastical court's discretion, or that the statute was enforceable by Prohibition.
Their position was presumably: (a) that a person entitled by the statute
could if he liked sue for revocation in the ecclesiastical court instead of
bringing a Prohibition: (b) that where neither contender was entitled by
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the statute, the ecclesiastical court was free to allow its original grant of
administration to be challenged on any grounds that would have been appropriate in ecclesiastical law before the statute.) The report only tells us
that the judges were divided over whether the suit for revocation was
proper in the first place -- i.e., does not spell out the counter-positions as I
have done.
The court's further exchange leads to two conclusions: (a) Periam's
view on the ecclesiastical court's power to exact self- betraying "temporal" testimony must have been influenced by his skepticism about the
revocation suit as such. Logically, his opinion on the former question is
independent, and that is the question raised by the surmise. But Periam
hardly needed to worry about whether plaintiff-in-Prohibition had made
out the irrelevance of the questions sufficiently, in view of his position on
the other question. At strongest, he could favor a general Prohibition according to the "legal truth" that the revocation suit ought never to have
been brought. Short of that, he could reason as follows: "It is doubtful
whether the ecclesiastical court should even be entertaining this suit.
Granting that it may, at least so long as no complaint is made in terms, the
claim to revocation must be based on the statute, or else it must be a
mere objection to an exercise of discretion -- for the statute defines the
sole legal reason why anyone in particular should have administration, so
that, at most, the ecclesiastical court is free to reconsider its original act of
discretion. Temporal transactions cannot be relevant for any claim based
on the statute, because the statute only refers to familial relationships to
the intestate. If the claim is not de jure, but a mere request for reconsideration on grounds of equity or convenience, it is not important enough to
justify asking a man to betray his temporal interests. The ecclesiastical
court might like to know about them to the end of assessing its discretionary
act wisely. But so long as that is its only purpose -- so long as it has no strict
legal duty to reconsider at all, or to give any particular weight to this or that
factor -- it cannot be said to need the information to do its legal task, or to
need it so badly that it is entitled to extract it from the party. Therefore ex
hypothesi the questions are not 'relevant' in the proper sense of the word.
Therefore it does not need to be shown that they were irrelevant. 'Temporal' interrogatories should always be banned in revocation-suits."
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(b) Since Wyndham agreed with Periam on the legitimacy of the revocation-suit as such, and since views on that question and views on the
propriety of the interrogatories are likely to have been connected, it follows that Wyndham and Periam were probably united against Walmesley
and Anderson across the board. Therefore, as far as the report takes us,
the Court looks deadlocked. My guess would be that Walmesley's compromise -- the weak quoad Prohibition -- was adopted in the end.
(Moore's report indicates that a Prohibition of some sort was granted.)
No-Prohibition would have suited Anderson, and Walmesley probably
would not have complained. The choice for Periam and Wyndham was a
deadlock resulting in no-Prohibition or a weaker quoad than they would
have preferred. On my reconstruction, the qualified Prohibition -- like the
qualified Consultation in Matingley v. Martyn above -- figures as an instrument of compromise.
Our remaining cases concern a problem we have already touched on -the "mixed will," a single document comprising the two legally separate
transactions of bequeathing personal estate and devising land. In a case
of 1596,19 the ecclesiastical suit was to annul such a will. It does not appear whether the will had been proved, so that the suit aimed at reversing
probate, or whether it aimed to block probate in the first instance. In any
event, the claim in the ecclesiastical suit was that the testator had revoked
the will in question during his life. The ecclesiastical defendant -- presumably the executor named in the disputed will -- sought a Prohibition
on surmise that the ecclesiastical court was on the point of giving sentence to annul the will as a whole (or qua integral document), whereas it
had no authority to allow or disallow a will of land. A partial Prohibition
was granted -- i.e., quoad the devise of land -- without reported dispute.
(The alternatives, for any of which a case can be made, would have been:
a. No-Prohibition -- for an ecclesiastical decision about the document's
authenticity may not be given in evidence in common law litigation about
the land and therefore will not significantly prejudice common law interests, whereas a partial Prohibition is incapable of being meaningfully
obeyed by a court asked to pass on an integral document; upholding or
annulling a will ostensibly quoad the goods only is just as likely to be
19

M. 38/39 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,199, f.23b.
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prejudicial as upholding or annulling it as a whole. b. Total Prohibition,
pending a showing that the will has actually been affirmed or disallowed
in a common law suit, or pending determination of the will's authenticity
pursuant to pleading on the Prohibition itself -- the only sure-fire way to
avoid prejudice to common law interests. c. Total Prohibition, subject to
motion for partial Consultation -- which, apart from being the better procedure in general, allows for at least a brief delay, during which the ecclesiastical court cannot move, and the party who fears for his common law
interests may take steps to assert them; if such steps should actually be
taken, the Court might conceivably notice the fact judicially and withhold
Consultation.)
Our case arose at the next stage -- upon a motion for Consultation
quoad the personal estate. As in the comparable Jacobean case discussed
above (see note 11), the court denied the motion: The ecclesiastical judge
was not prohibited quoad the goods; therefore he need not be authorized
to go ahead to that intent; therefore he should not be. The reality that undercuts that unimpeachable logic came out, however. Godfrey, of counsel, in favor of the motion: "But they there [the ecclesiastical court] being
prohibited as to part will not examine the other part of the will." But the
Chief Justice was obdurate. Popham: "Consultation may not be granted
except where Prohibition is granted to the testament of goods. Therefore
the Prohibition will stand."
We have no way of knowing how timid the typical ecclesiastical court
was. It is not self-evident that a partial Consultation would ease its plight.
But the report suggests a line of reflection: In mixed-will cases, a Prohibition quoad the land operated in practice (so Godfrey said) like a general
Prohibition. Did the courts anticipate that effect and therefore deliberately use partial Prohibitions, instead of full Prohibitions subject to partial
reversal, in such cases? Did they intend, in other words, to make it hard
for ecclesiastical courts to do anything with mixed wills, but without taking the bull by the horns -- i.e., without granting and upholding full Prohibitions until the document's authenticity was settled at common law? Was
there any advantage in not taking the bull by the horns, except for the
"public relations" or "etiquette" advantage in not ordering ecclesiastical
courts to desist from doing what they had an unquestionable right to do?
Possibly there was an advantage in mere vagueness -- in Prohibitions that
may in effect have said to the ecclesiastical court "Go ahead, but watch
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your step." Circumstances might have a lot to do with how hard the ecclesiastical court took the warning. Estates are enormously various. Imagine
on the one hand a mixed will devising thousands of acres and bequeathing large legacies, on the other hand a will involving trivial legacies and a
few acres. A Prohibition quoad terram might provoke different reactions
in the two cases -- in the first, reluctance to act, the sense of having been
warned against infringing common law interests, combined with virtual
certainty that the devise of real-estate would be challenged in common
law litigation; in the second, awareness that the common law interests involved were of slight value and that delay would work mainly to deprive
some poor servant or spinster daughter of a little legacy.
In other words, the ecclesiastical court in our case may have been balking, not because quoad -Prohibitions were intrinsically impossible to
obey, or any harder to follow than quoad -Consultations. It may have
been balking because common law interests were involved and because
the Prohibition conveyed just the message it was meant to under the surface -- "We can't prohibit you from annulling this will with a pro forma
statement that you are only doing so quoad bona, but before you do that
look the situation over. Consider the magnitude of the values and who
would gain and lose by delay in settling the personal estate." Godfrey
may have been making the move that offered desperate hope to his client
interested in the personal estate. One can imagine him saying to his civilian counterpart, "Let me try to pursuade the Queen's Bench that a quoadConsultation is a harmless or logical complement to a quoad -Prohibition,
a desirable clarification of an intrinsically hard-to-follow order. If you
can come armed with a Consultation, the ecclesiastical court will probably be deprived of its pretext for delaying sentence to annul the will, and
then we can promptly get our client appointed administrator of the personal estate."
On this construction, the Court in rejecting the motion prevented its
perfectly conscious policy from being subverted by a clever lawyer.
When we take up mixed-will cases from the substantive-law point of
view, I think the need to look behind the legal surface to the real difficulties of handling such cases fairly will appear. The construction above is
speculative, but it looks to the large-looming reality -- the immense variety of estates, confronted by cumbrously divided jurisdiction and categories of jurisdictional law that took no account of that variety. Partial writs
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were a necessity in that situation; we have explored a sense in which the
partial Prohibition -- as distinct from the generally superior partial Consultation -- may have provided an inelegant but useful way-out.
The Marquis of Winchester’s Case20 involved the large estate of a nobleman, whose mixed will substantially disinherited his legal heir in favor
of bastard children named executors. In the event, probate was prohibited
totaliter, and the executors’ attempt to get a partial Consultation quoad
bona was turned down, pending the outcome of common law litigation
over the land. The reason for the decision was that the Marquis’s sanity
was challenged. The Court thought that the possibility of a conflicting or
prejudicial ecclesiastical decision on the question of his sanity should be
headed off. It seems to be implied that a partial Consultation would have
been granted if there had been no sanity issue -- i.e., if plaintiff-in-prohibition had merely sought to stop probate pending litigation over the land,
without claiming in his surmise that the marquis was insane and thereby
showing how he hoped to break the will. Quaere if some other specific
reason for contesting the will -- such as the revocation in the testator’s
lifetime in the last case -- had been laid. An ecclesiastical decision on a
Marquis’s sanity, in a case well-flavored with high-society scandal, is
surely the sort of thing that would get around, to the prejudice of other
litigation reopening the same issue -- more so, no doubt, than a decision
on some such duller question as whether the will had been revoked, superseded by a later document, or the like. On the other hand, given the
size of the estate and the certainty of common law litigation, the judges
may have welcomed a good reason to stop the ecclesiastical court altogether, and might have made do with a less good one had there been
need.
From a procedural point of view, Winchester’s Case is interesting for
the maneuvers that led up to the conclusion. When Prohibition was first
sought, the Court was inclined to grant a partial writ. Coke, representing
plaintiff-in-Prohibition, immediately urged the Court to grant a full Prohibition subject to motion for partial Consultation. He said that that procedure was the Court’s usage and cited Lloyd v. Lloyd as a case in point.
20

P. 41 Eliz. Q.B. 6 Coke, 23. Hetley, 120; Add. 25,203, ff.59 and 61.
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Others at the Bar confirmed Coke’s memory of Lloyd v. Lloyd, and the
judges thereupon followed his advice. Good Form was not the only beneficiary of Coke’s quick victory on this point. For when, on a later day
the same term, Serjeant Williams came to move for partial Consultation,
he was turned down. In considering Williams' motion, the Court took up
the effect of the insanity issue, as it had not done on the first hearing. The
insanity was laid in the surmise, but Serjeant Heale, who spoke for the
original motion for Prohibition, did not, so far as the reports show, say
anything about it. He did not need to, for the mixed will by itself was reason enough for some sort of Prohibition. When the court offered a partial
Prohibition, Coke intervened with his point of form -- not with the argument that the Prohibition should be total in this case because of the insanity issue. If he had brought that up at once, Serjeant Williams might have
been saved the trouble of his motion. One cannot be sure about the motives and strategy. Perhaps Coke decided to shoot for a full Prohibition on
the point of form first, because if that worked he would gain time to prepare his arguments on the point of substance. The other side might in the
meantime decide that a partial Consultation was not worth pushing for.
Conceivably such intervening events as actual commencement of a suit
for the land could affect both the other side’s thinking and the Court’s.
Coke’s argument from the usage of the court in Winchester’s Case is
contradicted by our last case above. That case at least furnishes an individual counter-example. If there is anything to my argument that partial
prohibitions may have had positive advantages in mixed-will cases, one
would expect them to be common enough to constitute a counter-usage.
That the Court’s first instinct was to grant a quoad -Prohibition suggests
there was previous practice that way. The non-testamentary cases above
show that in general there was practice both ways, though Coke’s fullProhibition-subject-to-motion procedure should probably be regarded as
preferred. On balance, it may have been more favorable to plaintiffs-inProhibition. A full Prohibition is a bird in the hand. The other side may
have trouble wresting it away -- as in Winchester’s Case -- even though
in theory, or ceteris paribus, he is entitled to an automatic Consultation
quoad bona. Cf., however, the argument above that some plaintiffs-inProhibition may have been better off with nominally partial Prohibitions.
If the ecclesiastical court had been prohibited only quoad terram in Winchester’s Case, one wonders whether it would have dared go ahead -- say
to pronounce the nobleman sane and put his bastard favorites in posses-
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sion of vast quantities of goods, while the legitimate heir and representative of the family -- the more likely favorite with a jury -- stood an
excellent chance of breaking the will at common law. Godfrey in the last
case may have been right -- partial Prohibitions were sometimes as good
as full ones, with the added advantage of being Consultation-proof.
In almost all mixed-will cases, the propriety of partial writs is in some
way an implicit issue. Except for the two cases just discussed -- on the
relative claims of partial Prohibitions and partial Consultations -- I shall
treat such cases later, under substantive law. On the one hand, mixed-will
cases naturally suggested partial writs, in one form or the other, and provided some of the precedents for such writs as a generally appropriate
procedure. On the other hand, the suggestion was sometimes rejected -i.e., sometimes it was argued that partial writs were precisely not the way
to handle such cases, without necessarily denying their appropriateness in
other contexts. Such arguments sound to a degree in procedure, but in
their more major aspect go to the function of Prohibitions and modes of
justifying them. For that reason, further mixed-will cases are deferred.
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IX.
Joint Prohibitions
Summary: The Elizabethan courts permitted parties with identical
complaints to join in Prohibition at the surmise stage. The Jacobean
King's Bench turned against joint Prohibitions, but 17th-century holdings
in general are mixed, and the legitimacy of joinder was never firmly settled. The better opinion at all times was that joint plaintiffs-in-Prohibition
must declare separately if the case progressed to formal pleading. Joint
Prohibitions were most likely to be allowed when the ecclesiastical suit
joined the plaintiffs-in-Prohibition as defendants.
* * *
Over the last several topics, we have been essentially concerned with
the degree of procedural flexibility to be admitted into Prohibition law.
In general, the public stake in preserving correct jurisdictional lines made
for flexibility -- for relaxing, within limits, conventions of "art" and logic
that might have been more insisted on in strictly private litigation at common law. Such instruments as Consultations on motion and partial writs
may be seen as ways of doing the special work of jurisdiction control sensibly and efficiently, in the face of a certain feeling, perhaps, that such
flexible instruments were not quite good form and not absolutely necessary. A few other manifestations of procedural flexibility remain to be inspected.
One question under that rubric concerns the power of parties to join in
suing Prohibitions. To take the simplest example: Suppose separate tithe
suits are started against several parishioners, all of whom want to claim
the same local modus. May the parishioners make themselves joint parties to one surmise and stop all the ecclesiastical suits by a single Prohibition ? Other attempts to bring suits arose from different situations, but the
characteristic issue is the same: When individuals are similarly aggrieved
and want to make what amounts to the same claim, may they pool their
resources? May they save themselves money and time by a joint suit -and thereby save the courts the trouble of dealing repetitiously with identical cases and the risk of handling them inconsistently? The advantages
of permitting it are obvious. On the other side, it may be argued that "by
nature" litigation is individualistic. Joint suits by persons strictly "one in
law" or "one in interest" (e.g., husband and wife; joint-tenants) were un-
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questionably appropriate. But a joint suit by persons who simply happen
to have the same case to make is more problematic. When A sues B and
C separately, is it fair to A to let B and C entrust their legal fortunes to a
common bottom? Is A not entitled to gamble on the "hazards of individualism," the possibility that B and C will take different steps in what each
supposes to be his interest -- e.g., that B will hire a good lawyer and C a
bad one; that B will lose interest and be nonsuited while C persists; that B
will adventure an unsuccessful demurrer while C takes a traverse; that if
both go to trial, one will be more conscientious in assembling evidence
than the other; that B will make a procedural mistake (such as failing to
prove his surmise in a Prohibition case) while C dots all the i's ? It must,
no doubt, be conceded that identical cases should be handled the same
way in the same context (e.g., if identical declarations come up on demurrer separately). Apart from the simple judicial duty to handle like cases
alike, more complicated procedural routes to consistency my be legitimate. (E.g.: If a modus is found bad as between Parson and Parishioner
Jones, should Parishioner Smith's Prohibition on the same modus be denied, or reversed by Consultation on motion, upon a showing of the verdict against Jones? If a local modus is found good by verdict as between
Parson and Jones, may Parson be attached without a separate Prohibition
when he sues Smith for the same tithes in the same locality? A few cases
on such points as these are discussed below.) But whatever the courts
may or must do to insure consistency, the argument continues, the private
litigant is entitled to whatever "breaks" he may get from proceeding separately against several identically positioned adversaries. Like other forms
of "sporting" fairness to the litigant, this one has to do, however decisively or indecisively, with the larger ends of justice. Though identical
cases should come out the same way in general, perhaps that is only true
when several parties in the same position show equal zeal and care in taking advantage of their position. Perhaps permitting easy joinder tends
too much to protect people from their own indifference, folly, and temptation to compromise. (Cf. the sense in which several people conspiring to
do something wrongful may seem a little different and a little worse than
several people simply doing the same wrongful thing. In the case of a
joint suit -- as distinct from a conspiracy to do wrong -- it is hard to object
to the economic pooling of resources. I.e.: It is hard to defend a party's sporting
chance to defeat some of his identically placed adversaries by exposing
them to charges they cannot bear as individuals. But an objection can be
made to the pooling of moral resources. It is possible to imagine paro-
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chial situations in which bringing a joint Prohibition would have a flavor
of conspiracy: Suppose there are one or two parishioners with more to
lose than others if tithes in kind are exacted and/or a more virulent desire
than others to "get the parson." Suppose they go to work on other parishioners and persuade them to withhold their tithes and defy the parson to
sue, proposing a joint Prohibition and agreeing to foot the bill. If the joint
Prohibition is permitted and succeeds on the merits, it is likely that some
will escape their tithes who would not as individuals have thought it
worthwhile to try, or who for the sake of friendly relations with the parson might have paid up or settled in the end. Once in a common bottom,
there will probably be no motive for individuals to get out, and the difficulty of doing so is in any event likely to be considerable. A parochial
common bottom might well be promoted and maintained by a few men
with a special interest in the nominally worthy public end of upholding
the locality's immemorial manner of tithing.)
A final argument against joint Prohibitions specifically is that a joint
surmise cannot conform to several libels. If the prohibo must correspond
strictly to the prohibendum -- if a misnomer or miscopied figure in a surmise will cause the Prohibition to miss the target it is obviously aimed at
-- should a surmise aimed at stopping A v. B not refer solely to A v. B,
not to A v. B, A v. C, etc.? That this point is pettifogging -- that it makes
less sense than even pedantic insistence on care in reciting the ecclesiastical suit to which the surmise relates -- does not necessarily rule it out.
We turn now to the cases on joint suits for Prohibition. In the early Sir
Gilbert Gerrard v. Sherrington,1 joinder was forbidden in relatively innocuous circumstances. Gerrard sued for tithes (as farmer of a rectory)
against (a) Sherrington and (b) a servant of Sherrington's. He either
brought two wholly separate libels or stated his claim against the two men
twice-over in distinct parts of the same libel. In any event, the Court held
that Sherrington and his servant must make separate surmises. There is
nothing to suggest that the claims against Sherrington and the servant
were in any substantive way distinct -- i.e., that Gerrard was doing anything but suing the legal occupier of land who was responsible for paying
the tithes, plus an employee of the legal occupier who was immediately
1

P. 2 0 Eliz. Q.B. 1 Leonard, 286.
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responsible for the wrongful act of not setting the tithes out. Not letting a
master and servant join to stop a suit that was all one in effect could be a
strong precedent against joinder as between less closely related parties -e.g., two parishioners. (It is just possible that there was a touch of politics
in the Court's disposition to be tough on Sherrington and his servant. Sir
Gilbert Gerrard was an important courtier. He sued as farmer of an impropriate rectory owned by the Queen. His lawyer, Solicitor General
Egerton, argued against the Prohibition on the ground that the Queen's
farmer's suit -- like, no doubt, the Queen's own -- could not lawfully be
prohibited. Having rejected Egerton's substantive argument, the judges
may not have been disinclined to give his well-connected, prerogative-invoking client a technical consolation-prize.)
In our next case, a decade and a half later,2 joinder in Prohibition was
upheld. Bartue sued Wodrofe and Coke for tithes. It does not appear
how separate the ecclesiastical suits or claims against them were kept.
The situation, in any event, was this: Wodrofe and Coke both wanted to
take advantage of a tithe exemption enjoyed by certain land when it was
in monastic hands. The allegedly exempt land had been leased to one
Pastor by the erstwhile abbot for a term of 99 years. Pastor then subleased the land to Wodrofe for 60 years. Wodrofe granted part of the land
to Coke for the remainder of his 60-year term. Thus it would appear that
Wodrofe and Coke were sued as occupiers in respect of different parcels
of land -- Wodrofe for the part he had not granted to Coke; Coke for the
other part. They joined in Prohibition because they relied on exactly the
same exemption. Godfrey, counsel for Bartue, showed some authority
against joinder and attempted to argue that it was only permissible when
people were sued in respect of true joint obligations (as if two joint-tenants were sued for tithes from their land). The reports have the Court rejecting Godfrey's argument with a simple statement that the joinder was
good (MS: "good enough"). Conceding that, Godfrey showed that either
Coke or Wodrofe was dead and moved that the Prohibition abate. The
Court again turned him down: "Nothing is to be recovered by them except
to be discharged, and the death of one will not abate the Prohibition."
2

Wodrofe and Coke V. Bartue, H. 36 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,196, f.321; Owen, 13 (sub nom William
Bartue's case.
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(MS.) In other words, though a properly brought joint suit with a "positive" objective -- recovery of damages or the like -- would fail by the
death of one partner and require recommencement as the survivor's individual suit, that is not true of a Prohibition with the "negative" aim of establishing a tithe exemption.
A year later,3 the Common Pleas was confronted with the question
whether two parishioners sued separately for tithes may join in Prohibition to take advantage of a single local modus. The question is reported
simply as "moved at the bar" -- i.e., it does not appear whether there was
an "actual controversy," as opposed to a request for an advisory opinion.
In any event, the Court was split, with the majority of those present favoring the joinder. Justices Walmesley and Beaumont thought it "clearly"
appropriate: ". . .their title to be discharged by the custom is joint, although the suits are several, as all the tenants in ancient demesne should
join in Monstraverunt although they are severally distrained." (The privileged tenants of ancient demesne manors could protect themselves against
being distrained for services beyond what the custom of the manor permitted by writ of Monstraverunt. The parallel is closely in point because
ancient demesne tenants joining in Monstraverunt, like the parishioners
joining in Prohibition here, would be seeking to enforce the custom of a
local unit -- the manor in one case, the parish in the other.) Justice Walmesley went on to invoke the "public" theory of Prohibitions in support of
joinder: "The offense is to the Queen and her Crown, and that is not several." (In other words, one might say, the object of Prohibitions is to protect the public interest in proper lines of jurisdiction; if several
inappropriate ecclesiastical suits are going on at once, it makes no difference in what manner the common law Court is informed thereof -- by one
joint surmise or several surmises.) Justice Owen, however, disagreed
with Walmesley and Beaumont, insisting on the formalistic point that
only the ecclesiastical suit "as is" can be prohibited: ". . .the suit is the
cause of the prohibition, and that [the suit] is several." Since Chief Justice Anderson was absent, we cannot be sure that a majority of the Court
would accept joint Prohibitions by a number of parishioners relying on
the same custom.

3

H. 37 Eliz. C.P. Add. 25,200. f.100.
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A year later,4 the same two judges who favored the joint Prohibition in
the last report struck down a less defensible attempt at joinder. This time,
two parishioners without identical claims tried to economize by bringing
a joint Prohibition. It appeared from their surmise itself that one of them
claimed to pay 5/ in satisfaction of all tithes, while the other claimed to
pay 4/. Justices Walmsley and Beaumont, alone in court, quickly granted
a motion to quash the joint action. A limit was drawn: the suits against
these two parishioners might equally offend the Queen, but nothing less
than an identical claim -- a claim based on a single custom of whose
benefit all parishioners are as it were "joint tenants" -- would justify a
joint Prohibition.
In Shepard v. Metcalfe,5 two Queen's Bench judges (Popham and Fenner) reaffirmed the second holding in Wodrofe and Coke v. Bartue above:
once a joint suit for Prohibition is properly commenced, it may continue
even though the partnership breaks up. That is all the reports give -- the
opinion that the withdrawal, nonsuit, or death of one joint-plaintiff-inProhibition will not bar his fellows or require them to start over. The feasibility of joint Prohibitions obviously gains with their immunity to
breakdown. Permitting joint suits to change easily into individual ones
implies a departure from common law formalism, as does permitting such
suits in the first place.
In Stevenson et al. v.______,6 the Common Pleas reendorsed joint
Prohibitions upon an explicit challenge to them, drawing at the same time
a limit to collectivism. In this case, the ecclesiastical court proceeded ex
officio against a number of non-resident landholders of a certain parish, to
the end of holding them liable for rates to repair the church. The landholders were all in the same boat, in that they all wanted to challenge the
ecclesiastical authorities' right to make non-residents contribute to the upkeep of a church from which they got no benefit, and to claim that the attempt to rate them proceeded from an unlawful piece of ecclesiastical
legislation. They accordingly got a joint Prohibition. Yelverton, moving
4
5
6

P. 38 Eliz. C.P. Harg. 7, f. 195.
M. 38/39 Eliz. Q.B. Moore, 461: Harl. 1631, f. 152b; Lansd. 1059, f. 256b.
M. 41/42 Eliz. C.P. Lansd. 1065, f. 32b. Lansd. 1172. f. 54b, is a brief report of only the holding
on joint Prohibitions in this case.

338

Joint Prohibition
for Consultation at the Bar, took exception to the joint prohibition, as well
as to the substance of the plaintiff's claim. The judges were in doubt and
divided on the substance of the plaintiffs' claim, but they agreed,
promptly and in general terms, that the joint suit was legitimate. Justice
Daniel cited a Darcy's Case as upholding joint Prohibitions. The judges
added, however, that the joint plaintiffs must declare separately upon attachment. In other words, the surmise may be joint, but if and when the
case proceeds to formal pleading the partners must act as individuals.
There would consequently be an outside chance in the long run of the
several plaintiffs' cases being differently pleaded and responded to.
An undated report, certainly Elizabethan,7 upholds the joint Prohibition in especially strong terms. Several occupiers of land in the Forest of
Gisborne joined to assert a modus applicable to tithes throughout the Forest. The Court accepted the joinder although the joint plaintiffs were sued
by separate libels in the ecclesiastical court. It justified the joinder by
express reference to the public character of Prohibitions, i.e., their exemption from the individualistic canons of mere private litigation: ". . . for the
Prohibition is no action, but an ex officio act on information, and there is
neither plaintiff nor defendant nor pleading in Prohibition." The last
clause amounts to saying that "plaintiff, defendant, and pleading" come in
only at the next stage -- Attachment on Prohibition. At the earlier stage,
there are only "informers" pro and con, and they may speak in any "natural" form (as opposed to the "artificial" style of pleading.) The report
goes on to say that the joint plaintiffs in the instant case declared separately. We have, therefore, a practice-precedent to support the rule, stated
judicially elsewhere, that though "informing" may be joint, "pleading"
must be individual.
Basically, the Elizabethan authority supports joint Prohibitions,
stronger support coming from the Common Pleas than from the Queen's
Bench. The Jacobean King's Bench turned the other way. In Burges and
Dixon v. Ashton,8 it clearly repudiated joint Prohibitions, though with lenient effect in the event. Two tithe-payers joined to take advantage of the
7
8

Harl. 4817, f. 162. The dated cases surrounding this and other undated ones in the series are all
from ca. the 1590's, mostly C.P.
T. 6 Jac. K.B. Yelverton, 128.
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same local modus. Upon motion for Consultation, the Court agreed unanimously that the Prohibition should never have been granted in joint form.
The judges clearly embraced "formalistic individualism": The two parishioners were sued by separate libels, ergo they must seek separate Prohibitions; "the tortious vexation of the one does not extend to the other."
Nevertheless, the judges denied the motion for Consultation. They consciously treated the case like a "misconceived surmise": The joint surmise
was bad; the plaintiffs should have been told then and there to start over
as individuals. Since, however, the Prohibition had been granted, and
since it appeared to the Court that both parishioners had good grounds for
individual Prohibitions, Consultation was denied. The two parishioners
were told to declare separately (as Stevenson et al. says they should do in
any case).
In Barnard et al. v. Little,9 two terms later, three joint plaintiffs managed to keep their partnership going too long. They were punished accordingly. Here, the plaintiffs made their surmises jointly and went on to
declare jointly. Upon demurrer, the Court granted Consultation. The
Court's language makes it clear that the joinder was considered bad ab
initio, though perhaps it was only fatal because it survived through the
declaration stage. There were three libels, the judges said, ergo there
must be three Prohibitions (leaving the implication, as the last case does,
that a joint Prohibition might be justified if the ecclesiastical plaintiff had
comprehended his separable claims against several persons into a single
libel). The report does not say what kind of common claim caused the
three plaintiffs-in-Prohibition to join. Justice Fenner did not participate in
this decision, but the judges present were unanimous.
Two Common Pleas holdings, just slightly later than the two from the
King's Bench above, reaffirm the former court's acceptance of joint Prohibitions. The first report10 is of a per Curiam opinion: Tithe-payers may
join to take advantage of a common local modus, but they must declare
separately. "Public theory" language was used to support the point: ". . .
9
10

H. 6 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,215, f. 55. Noy. 131, (undated) looks like a less good report of the same
case.
T. 7 Jac. C.P. Harg. 52, f. 14b. (The opinion is incorporated into the report of a Somer's Case,
on a quite different point.)
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the Prohibition is only to give notice to the court." Essentially the same
point is repeated in the Court's resolution of Hopkins, Smyth, et al.11 It
appears that the libel in this case was joint in the sense of "conglomerate,"
"one document comprising similar claims against a number of tithe-payers." It may be easier to justify a joint Prohibition in that case than where
there are fully distinct libels. Even so, the Court in Hopkins, Smyth, et al.
reiterated that the joint plaintiffs must declare separately. A Sir Francis
Drurye's Case was cited in support of the holding in Hopkins, Smyth, et
al. The reporter adds a note on a Bugg's Case from the same term (M. 8
Jac.), where it was argued that one Prohibition should be directed against
two joint ecclesiastical plaintiffs, but that plaintiffs-in-Prohibition should
declare against them separately. That goes to support distinguishing the
surmise stage from the declaration stage. The undated Parker's Case,12
probably roughly contemporary with the two reports above, reaffirms the
joint-Prohibition-separate-declaration rule (where the Prohibition aimed
at taking advantage of the tithe exemption for reclaimed land under 2/3
Edw. 6).
In Cotes and Succerman v. Warner,13 the King's Bench was confronted with two of its seemingly contradictory precedents. One side
urged Burges and Dixon v. Ashton against the joint Prohibition. The
other side urged Wodrofe and Coke v. Bartue in its favor. Actually,
Cotes and Succerman was not quite like any earlier case. The following
features are to be noted: (a) Cotes and Succerman were both sued by the
same ecclesiastical libel. (b) They were sued for tithes of hay cut from
certain fenland, of which they made no pretense to be owners -- i.e., for
hay taken by virtue of a right of common. (c) They claimed in their joint
surmise to be beneficiaries of a quondam monastic exemption: A monastery was seised of the fen and prescribed in exemption from tithes for itself, its tenants, farmers, and occupiers. The exemption was preserved by
the Statute of Monasteries. Cotes and Succerman had houses near the
fen, the occupiers of which had always taken hay from the fen by way of
common. They claimed, therefore, to be "occupiers" within the prescription, even though they had nothing in the soil of the fen. (d) Having got a
11
12
13

M. 8 Jac. C.P. Harg. 15, f. 225.
Brownlow and Goldesborough, 7.
M. 9 Jac. K.B. Harg. 32, f. 99.
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joint Prohibition on that surmise, Cotes and Succerman went on to declare jointly. The parson then pleaded over (in effect disputing the monastery's seisin and the prescription and that Cotes and Succerman were
"occupiers" within the prescription if it was true). It is only at this point
that the legitimacy of the joint surmise and declaration was discussed.
The procedural form in which the question was raised does not appear
from the report (plaintiff's demurrer to the plea in bar? latter-day motion
for Consultation?).
The parson contested the substantive sufficiency of the Prohibition as
well as the joinder (the former on the ground that a pernor of profits by
way of common is not an "occupier" within the meaning of the prescription). The judges' remarks in our report are largely on the joinder, though
as much as is said on the other point is favorable to Cotes and Succerman
-- i.e., to taking "occupier" broadly. (It is not irrelevant to note that, for the
Court's disinclination to jump on a point of procedure at a late state
might be explained by its belief that the plaintiffs were substantively in
the right.)
On the joinder, Justice Yelverton was strong for Cotes and Succerman.
He had "no question" but that they might join. His reasoning seems to go
as follows: It is significant, but not decisive, that one libel was brought
against both men. What is decisive is that the libel did not show on its
face that their "interests and titles" were separate. I take that to mean in
effect that the libel should be construed against the parson. If the libel
were merely "conglomerate," the joinder would be bad. But if for all that
appeared the parson might be suing with respect to a single act of taking
hay, jointly performed by the two men -- or if so far as the parson was
concerned they might have been "joint tenants" of one and the same pretended right or non-right to withhold tithes -- then the joinder is good.
(My second formulation is awkward, but perhaps necessary to make the
point. I think it is clear that Cotes and Succerman did actually have separate "interests and titles" within Yelverton's meaning. I.e.: Each had a
house; each took hay by right of common appurtenant to his house; each
claimed to take it tithe-free by virtue of an exemption applicable to the
occupier of his particular house; in principle, Cotes might have a valid
right of common and concomitant tithe-exemption, while Succerman's
claim to the same sort of right might be invalid. I therefore take Yelverton to refer solely to the way the libel is drawn and the assumptions on
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the parson's part it implies. The difference would be between libels in the
following alternative forms: Libel 1 - "C is an inhabitant and land-occupier of my parish, and has cut hay in the fen, and has not rendered tithes
thereof as the law requires; S is also an inhabitant, etc.," Libel 2 - "C and
S are inhabitants of my parish and have cut hay in the fen, etc." By
Yelverton's opinion, C and S may join in Prohibition if the libel is like
Libel 2, contra if it is like Libel 1. The opinion comes to this: A parson
who sues several parishioners in one tithe suit risks a joint Prohibition unless he is careful to show that his libel is not a true joint suit, but a mere
conglomerate of several individual suits, analogous to a single suit against
one parishioner for several different tithes.
Justice Williams agreed with Yelverton, perhaps with slightly different
emphasis: The ecclesiastical suit is against both, "but if the interest had
appeared to be several they ought to have had several prohibitions."
There may be difference between the two judges, coming to the difference between "the joint ecclesiastical suit is a sort of prima facie justification for the joint Prohibition" (Yelverton) and "It makes no difference
whether the ecclesiastical suit is upon one libel or several; joint Prohibition can only be justified by the absence of anything in the libel to suggest
that the two parishioners' 'interests' are separate'' (Williams). Chief Justice Fleming's words on the joinder are "if you have a joint libel they
shall join in prohibition, because there it does not appear that they have
several interests." If there are any hairs worth splitting as among the Justices' opinions, Fleming seems stronger than Yelverton on the matter (as
if to say, "A joint libel always implies that so far as the parson is concerned the parishioners' interests are not several"). But his "if" suggests
that he wanted to see the ecclesiastical record before making a decision.
(It is perfectly possible that the other judges were speaking hypothetically, not with certain knowledge of the shape of the ecclesiastical suit.)
In any event, the case was adjourned, so that we have no reported decision.
In sum, Cotes and Succerman v. Warner at least goes to qualify the
generalized disapproval of joint Prohibitions that might be incautiously
projected from Burges and Dixon v. Ashton. It also tends to qualify any
wholly generalized distinction between the surmise stage and the declaration stage. On the other hand, the judges showed no inclination to follow
the theory implicit in Wodrofe and Coke v. Bartue, as counsel urged them
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to: That two persons claiming the same merely "negative" monastic discharge may always join. The cases are probably distinguishable: Wodrofe and Coke were closer "in interest" than Cotes and Succerman
because Wodrofe was Coke's lessor of part of the land affected. I.e.: If
Blackacre as a whole was exempt, Blackacre minus X (what Coke had)
was certainly in the same boat as the rest of Blackacre (what Wodrofe retained). By contrast, Cotes could have had a good right of common and
Succerman a bad one.
In all the cases we have looked at so far, two or three people with related but technically distinct claims attempted to join. The case of the Parishioners of Begger's Barton14 presents a different situation -- the true
"group Prohibition." The report is unfortunately too brief to do much
with. We are told that plaintiffs-in-Prohibition were the parishioners generally. They surmised that the vicar had a piece of land in satisfaction of
certain tithes. The Court thought that Prohibition lay because "every parishioner will take advantage." The way that it is put suggests that the
doubt was the "standing to sue" of parishioners who were not objects of
ecclesiastical proceedings. It is most unlikely that there was a libel out
against every single parishioner. The chances are that some parishioners
were sued for their tithes, whereupon all the parishioners got together in a
Prohibition. The Court held that this form of proceeding was acceptable,
since all the parishioners had an interest in upholding the modus. Is it not
anomalous to admit this sort of joint Prohibition, but to frown on joinder
by actual parties to ecclesiastical suits wishing to make the same claim?
Yet the Court that was liberal towards the Parishioners of Beggar's Barton was the King's Bench, the Court that tended to frown on private joinder.
In Kadwalder et al. v. Bryan, 15 the Caroline King's Bench ruled out a
joint Prohibition. Kadwalder and confrere based their Prohibition on 23
Hen. 8, c. 9, complaining that they had been sued in the wrong ecclesiastical court. (For defamation. Nothing appears as to whether there were
two libels, or, in the more likely event that there was only one, as to
whether and how the two people were associated in defamatory conduct.)
14
15

H. 12 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,213, f. 169.
M. 5 Car., K.B. Add. 25,213, f. 169.
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The case was pleaded to a legal issue: declaration, plea in bar, demurrer
by the plaintiffs to the plea. Omitting the reasons why, the Court thought
the plaintiffs had no case -- i.e., that the plea in bar was perfectly good,
the points urged in support of the demurrer largely frivolous. Strongly
disposed to grant a Consultation anyhow, the Court added that the joint
Prohibition was not good because the plaintiffs' "griefs" were several.
Under the circumstances, the decision does not mean much. The implications are worth reflecting on, however. Suppose A. and B are sued in
Diocese X by the same libel but with respect to acts or offenses that
could, if necessary, be made the object of separate suits. If both live in X,
there is obviously no basis for Prohibition under 23 Hen. 8. The other
possibilities are (1) that A lives in X but B does not, or vice versa; (2) that
neither lives in X. The existence of the first possibility recommends insisting on separate Prohibitions. I.e.: If identity of "title" is required to
justify a joint Prohibition, A and B should not be permitted to join, because there is a possibility that one is entitled to a Prohibition and the
other not. However, even if it is true that A lives in X and B does not, the
ecclesiastical suit "as is" should be stopped. I.e.: It should be stopped qua
joint suit. Do A and B not have a truly joint interest in stopping that suit?
Do they not suffer a joint "grief' by being so sued, even though one
would have no grievance if he were sued separately? In sum, it seems to
me that cases arising on 23 H. 8 pose a special dilemma with respect to
joint Prohibitions. Our case, however, counts against the argument that
could be made in favor of joinder.
In Wood and Carvener v. Symons16 (treated above for its other points),
the Caroline Common Pleas discussed joint Prohibitions. Defendant-inProhibition made nothing of the fact that the surmise in question was
joint, but persuaded the Court on other grounds that no Prohibition should
be granted. Chief Justice Richardson brought up the joinder of his own
motion, implying that joint Prohibitions were bad in general. Yelverton,
of counsel with plaintiffs-in-Prohibition, argued that when the ecclesiastical suit is joint, the Prohibition may be joint too. Such, he said, was the
King's Bench rule. He also invoked the "public theory" argument for
joinder -- that a Prohibition is not a simple private suit, but in one aspect
"for the King," and therefore not subject to the individualism of mere
16

M. 5 Car. C.P. Hetley, 147.
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civil litigation. Two Justices, Hutton and Harvey, then laid down the
well-precedented rule that joinder at the surmise stage is permissible, but
not at the declaration stage (not necessarily confining joint surmises to
cases where the ecclesiastical suit is joint). Richardson, however, held
out against joinder generally. A wrongful ecclesiastical suit, he argued -albeit a joint suit -- wrongs the several parties individually; consequently,
their surmises complaining of such wrong must be separate and individual. He expressly rejected Yelverton's invocation of the public aspect of
Prohibitions: ". . . it is as the sute of the party is" -- i.e., in the most basic
respect, a Prohibition is just another lawsuit, an individualistic matter. Finally, Richardson was frank about one disadvantage of joinder: "It is
against the profit of the Court to suffer many to joyn. . ." He then adds:".
. . and it is usual in the case of customs of a parish in debate, to order proceedings in the two prohibitions, and that to bind all the parish and parson." I would construe the last remark as follows: If several parishioners
are sued for tithes and want to invoke the same local modus, the practice
is to insist on at least two separate Prohibitions -- i.e., not to permit all the
parishioners to join in a single one. If both come out the same way -validating or invalidating the modus -- then the decisions will be given
collateral effect as res judicata for or against other parishioners (see below for cases on such "collateral effect"). Regardless of whether
Richardson was right about the practice, there is some point in insisting
on two separate Prohibitions -- by way of "double check" -- if one is
thinking about settling a matter so as to bind non-parties. Wood and
Carverner v. Symons principally testifies to the unsettledness of basic
questions about the joint Prohibition as late as 1629.
A final scrap of late evidence is conservatively favorable to joint Prohibitions. In 1641,17 two Common Pleas Justices, Reeve and Foster, said
that parishioners jointly sued for tithes may join in Prohibition if they rely
on the same modus. Contra if they want to allege different modi.

17

H. 16 Car. C.P. March, 94.
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X.
The "Logical Individualism" of Prohibitions
A.
Miscellaneous Problems
Summary: For the general theme which these cases share, see immediately below. In some contexts, the "public stake'' in Prohibitions was
strong enough to keep Prohibitions alive in altered circumstances. For
example, courts were inclined to hold that the death of a party destroyed
an outstanding Prohibition, so that his executor could not take advantage
of it. The death of the King was held to "abate" Prohibitions in the
King's Bench if formal pleading had not taken place. On the other hand,
the courts did not insist altogether strictly that only the "party grieved" in
the narrowest sense had standing to sue a Prohibition.
* * *
The "individualism" implied in such resistance as there was to joint
Prohibitions crops up in an extended sense in a few other situations. In
the narrowest focus, a Prohibition can be seen as an "arresting" or "braking" mechanism applied by one man, in consideration of harm done or
threatened to him, directed solely against the particular thing doing or
threatening such harm -- viz. an on-going, improper "foreign" suit, or
such part of an on-going suit as affects that man. This narrow view, at
odds with he "public" conception of Prohibitions, was tested in its implications in a few cases other than those on joinder. The most interesting
cases of this type are those on the "collateral effect" of Prohibitions and
Consultations -- i.e., those which ask whether the specific, inter-party act
of stopping A.'s ecclesiastical suit against B. can ever affect C's right, or
the future rights of A. and B. Before taking up the "collateral effect" cases,
however, let us look at a few miscellaneous ones in the same general area.
Suppose one ecclesiastical suit is brought for several things -- e.g.,
tithes of several different products. A hyper-purist might argue that each
item in the libel should be met by a fully separate surmise. Is a man sued
by a conglomerate libel for wheat, oats, and barley not thrice grieved?
Three prongs being stuck in him, should he not take three separate steps - three several Prohibition suits -- to remove them one by one? (He may,
of course, have good grounds for extracting one prong but not the others,
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or different reasons for getting off different hooks.) We have seen plenty
of examples to show that such "hyper-purism" is not to be taken seriously. Ecclesiastical defendants normally responded to conglomerate libels with conglomerate, itemized surmises. Partial Prohibitions and
Consultations made it possible to deal with the situation where only part
of the surmise was legally or factually sustainable. There is, however, one
early holding expressly permitting conglomerate surmises, which suggests that the "hyper-purist" position was once urged. The holding, reported without context,1 is simply that if A. libels against B. for several
things, B may have one or several Prohibitions, as he prefers.
Another problem arises from the death of a party. Suppose A. sues B.
for tithes and B. gets a Prohibition. Before proceedings on the Prohibition
have reached a conclusion, B. dies. If the Prohibition is conceived as doing just one thing -- stopping the suit A. v. B.-- is it not meaningless the
moment B is dead? There is no longer an A. v. B, because there is no
longer such a person as B. Therefore the ecclesiastical court cannot be
considered "frozen," or under inhibition, with respect to A. v. B. Therefore, -- for the practical consequence -- the ecclesiastical court is free to
proceed against B.'s executor without requiring a new libel, if that is permissible under its own rules. If it does so proceed, the executor must get
a new Prohibition in his own name to stop the ecclesiastical court again.
In a couple of cases, the courts accepted that line of reasoning. In
Bowyer's Case,2 a parishioner being sued for tithes got a Prohibition and
died pending the same. Bowyer was his executor. The case arose on the
parson's motion for Consultation. I think it is clear that the Court's whole
doubt was whether a Consultation was necessary and appropriate in such
circumstances. The judges decided it was not necessary, but still appropriate. I.e.: They agreed that as of the testator's death there was no longer
any Prohibition in force -- nothing to stop the ecclesiastical court from
proceeding against the executor if it saw fit. Therefore no Consultation
was necessary. Nevertheless, the judges were willing to grant a Consultation -- presumably, as in other instances we have seen of "non-necessary" Consultations, to let the ecclesiastical court know where it stood in
1
2

M. 26/27 Eliz. C.P. Incorporated in the undated report of another case -- Noy, 131.
T. 41 Eliz. C.P. Lansd. 1065, f.20b (the fuller report); Harl. 3209, f.6.
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somewhat doubtful circumstances. The fuller report of the case says
clearly that a Consultation was granted. (The briefer one only gives the
negative holding -- that the Prohibition died with its bringer.) In the fuller
report, Justice Walmesley speaks separately, emphasizing that the Consultation was not necessary, that the ecclesiastical court should be able to
tell that the Prohibition had lost its force just by reading it carefully. I
imagine that Walmesley was uneasy with the Consultation, even though
he apparently agreed to it. Given the negative holding, however, the Consultation was probably the right step. If the Prohibition was dead, the executor could not prosecute it to a conclusion. Giving the ecclesiastical
court a nudge would stimulate it to act against the executor if it intended
to, whereupon he could get a new Prohibition capable of determination.
(I cannot believe that 50 Edw.3 would be an obstacle to a second Prohibition on the same libel in such circumstances.) Without a Consultation, the
ecclesiastical court might dangle in doubt. The best reason for denying a
"non-necessary" Consultation is a positive intention to inhibit the ecclesiastical court without doing so directly -- where the ecclesiastical claim
looks fishy, or where delay (e.g., waiting on a common law suit for the
land in a mixed will case) might be salutary. One respectable motive of
that sort is imaginable in Bowyer's Case -- to encourage a new ecclesiastical suit against he executor, in contrast to proceeding against him on the
libel originally laid against the testator. Such a preference is conceivable,
but the very granting of the Consultation indicates that it was not actually
felt.
The inconvenience of trying to get along without a Consultation in
such cases comes out in Goodiar (or Goodyear) v. Master and Fellows
of the College of Manchester.3 A Prohibition having been granted in a
tithe suit, motion for Consultation based on 2/3 Edw.6 was denied (because the surmise of a lease was held not subject to the proof requirement.)
Later, the Court was informed that the original
plaintiff-in-Prohibition was dead. Defendant's counsel plainly wanted a
Consultation. The judges at first told him that no Consultation was necessary -- the Prohibition had died with its bringer, therefore the ecclesiastical court was free to proceed. Counsel insisted, however, that the
3

H. 43 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.296 (Discussed above for its other point.
there does not contain the present point.

349

The other report cited

The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law
ecclesiastical court would not actually proceed without direction. The
judges therefore agreed to transmit a ruling to the ecclesiastical court, certifying that in their opinion it was at liberty to proceed. The principle that
Consultations should not be granted without need was preserved, while
the effect of a Consultation was achieved. (We shall see below other
examples of special, flexible forms -- ways around the dichotomous
choice between Prohibition and Consultation.) The Court said expressly
in Goodiar v. Master and Fellows that the executor could have a new Prohibition if he was proceeded against. I.e.: There was no 50 Edw.3 problem. Along with Bowyer’s Case, Goodiar v. Master and Fellows rejects
one possibility: regarding the Prohibition as in force despite the plaintiff‘s
death, and the executor as competent to plead thereon. (Cf. the rule above
-- most notably in Woodruff and Coke v. Bartue -- that death of one party
to a joint Prohibition does not terminate it. Could that rule be used as the
basis for arguing that death of a single plaintiff need not terminate the
Prohibition quoad his executor?) Bowyer’s Case and Goodiar v. Master
and Fellows clash on the acceptability of a Consultation, the later case endorsing a more puristic position.
One Caroline report4 relates to the inverse situation: death of defendant-in-Prohibition. All that is reported is Justice Yelverton’s recital of
what he understood to be King’s Bench usage, as follows: Death of the
defendant, like death of the plaintiff, terminates the Prohibition. Therefore
the defendant’s executors are free to proceed. A ruling authorizing the
ecclesiastical court to proceed (as opposed to a proper Consultation) will
be made. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition may have a new Prohibition against the
executors if he likes. This usage is entirely consistent with Goodiar v.
Master and Fellows. There is no reason to suppose the King’s Bench
ever departed from the holdings in that case. Yelverton’s bringing up the
King’s Bench usage in the Common Pleas suggests that the latter court
had no settled way of dealing with death-of-a-party cases.
Another Caroline case5 presents a different situation in which it was
problematic whether a Prohibition was terminated -- the death of the
4
5

M. 4 Car. C.P. Littleton, 155.
P. 2 Car. K.B. Harg. 30, f.218; Latch. 144. sub. nom. Watkin’s Case, undated. I think there is no
question but that the two reports are of the same case. There are detailed differences in the
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King, rather than of a party. A legacy suit was prohibited in James I's
lifetime. The King died before there was any Attachment and pleading
thereon. The issue was whether there was a Prohibition now in force,
upon which the plaintiff could have Attachment and plead, or whether he
needed to start over with a new Prohibition. The Court held that a new
Prohibition was necessary. That result was reached by an unusual combination of strands -- the public character of Prohibitions on the one hand;
on the other, technical purism.
The King's death did not terminate ordinary lawsuits between party
and party. The Court held, however, that a Prohibition in and of itself is
not such a lawsuit. In its predominant aspect, it is merely a royal order,
and therefore dies with the King. Admittedly, the naked Prohibition -- the
royal order -- is the base from which proper inter-party rights are generated. Thus, the judges agreed, if proceedings had gone as far as Attachment in King James' reign, the monarch's death would have had no
effect. Contra as things stood.
The fact that a Prohibition (unlike Attachment-on- Prohibition) was not
a returnable writ counted against regarding the mere issuance of a Prohibition as commencing a proper lawsuit. I.e: A Prohibition was unidirectional. It went out against the ecclesiastical court and ecclesiastical
plaintiff, but its delivery -- signifying that one party had "engaged" the
other in litigative combat -- was not certified back into the King's Bench.
In principle, plaintiff-in-Prohibition only "went after" defendant -- sought
to "engage" him -- by complaining that he had violated the King's Prohibition. Therefore Attachments grounded on that complaint were returnable, while Prohibitions were not. Counsel in our case (according to the
MS) tried to turn the very unreturnability of Prohibitions the other way -into a reason for regarding a true lawsuit as existing before Attachment.
As I understand it, the argument goes this way: As a rule, a lawsuit exists
when a writ is returned -- when it is of record that a writ has gone out and
reached its object. But that is the criterion for "when a lawsuit exists"
only when the writ is returnable. In the case of an unreturnable Prohibition, that criterion makes no sense. In the case of an unreturnable writ,
points covered, but the issue and result are the same. Latch does not usually date his cases, but
they are all early Caroline. My discussion conflates the two reports.
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the only feasible criterion for "when a lawsuit exists" is "when the Prohibition itself is entered of record." But counsel got nowhere with that.
Neither did they succeed with the argument that plaintiff-in-Prohibition
may be nonsuited before Attachment -- ergo there must be a suit. Justices
Dodderidge and Jones denied the premise: There is no such thing as a
nonsuit in Prohibition before Attachment.
Finally, comparison was made with Common Pleas practice. The
judges admitted that things were different there. In principle, the Common Pleas did not have the same freedom and power to grant Prohibitions
as the King's Bench. Only the King's Bench had a kind of plena potestas
to protect the "royal dignity," however that worshipful interest was offended and however notice of the offense reached its ears. In principle,
the Common Pleas was only entitled to protect its own narrower interest
in its own jurisdiction. We shall encounter this distinction again. In practice it did not come to much, for by procedural rigmarole the Common
Pleas was able to handle Prohibition cases virtually to the same extent
and in the same way as the King's Bench. But the very rigmarole created
a sense in which a bare Prohibition in the Common Pleas had more of the
marks of an inter-party lawsuit than a bare Prohibition in the King's
Bench. The judges in our case conceded that a Common Pleas Prohibition might not or probably would not be discontinued by the King's death
prior to Attachment. Nevertheless, the King's Bench must stick to its
own ways.
The decision represents no very significant triumph for the public theory of Prohibitions over the private. It uses the former to introduce an
avoidable procedural nicety and inconsistency as between the two principal courts. It evades the sense in which Prohibitions were in fact private
proceedings from the start, however much they were also public proceedings and as such free from some of the canons of common law correctness. The decision hardly seems consistent with those above on the death
of a party. If a naked prohibition is so much the King's action that it dies
with him, how is it enough the plaintiff's to surcease with his death? If
there is no inter-party lawsuit before Attachment, why may not the original plaintiff's executor start one by attaching the supposed violator of a
standing royal order? However, our decision stands, the only one on its
subject. If you expect the King to die, hurry and get your Attachment, or
else proceed in the Common Pleas.
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The abating effect of King James' death on King's Bench Prohibitions
had in fact already been upheld in two cases. One, Trumpley v. Maio (P.
1 Car. K.B., cited in Dickes v. Brown following, not independently reported), decided just that: if there had been no declaration or return on an
Attachment, Prohibitions evaporate when the King dies. The second
case, Dickes et uxor v. Brown6 I am taking out of chronological order
because it involves notable points of procedure beyond the matter of the
King's death. In this case, a legacy suit was prohibited by the executor in
P.22 Jac. (spring, 1625). He had lost in the court of first instance and
lodged an appeal when he decided to desert his appeal and turn to the
common law. Between the issuance of the Prohibition and M. 1 Car.
(autumn, 1625), there had been no further proceedings -- no declaration
or return. Now Calthrop, of counsel for the legatees (defendants-in-Prohibition), came and moved for Consultation. He argued for a Consultation
partly because the Prohibition had abated, citing Trumpley v. Maio. The
opposite view -- that the King's death does not affect outstanding Prohibitions -- was unsuccessfully urged by the executor's counsel. Calthrop also
argued for Consultation on the merits -- i.e, on the ground that the Prohibition ought never to have been granted (a strong substantive contention,
in the light of other cases on the same point -- the merits are discussed
elsewhere.) Here is the point to note: By the "abatement" theory there
was no Prohibition in being to be undone by Consultation; nevertheless, a
Consultation was sought, no doubt because the ecclesiastical court would
not move without one despite the King's death, or at least because the
legatees did not believe it would go ahead and wind up a long-pending
matter without positive authorization. Likewise, by the "abatement" theory, the ecclesiastical court ought to be encouraged to resume proceedings (with the help of a Consultation, if the judges could be persuaded
that it was necessary and not too illogical to grant one) whether or not the
Prohibition ought to be reversed on the merits; nevertheless, counsel went
to the merits.

6

M. 1 Car. K.B. 3 Bulstrode, 314; Benloe, 139 and 170 (sub. nom. Browne v.
(Dixye v. Brown.) Balustrode is the report that gives the full unfolding of the case
The other reports agree as far as they go, except that Benloe's two reports are dated
respectively (Noy is undated). It is perfectly possible that the case was started
dragged on into ensuing terms, though Bulstrode does not indicate that.
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The Court's initial reaction was not adverse to a Consultation. It did
not grant one immediately, however, but assigned a day for the other
party to show cause why the writ should not issue. On that day, plaintiffin-Prohibition came and admitted that his Jacobean Prohibition was dead.
But instead of arguing against a Consultation even so, he simply moved
for a new Prohibition. He grounded his motion, not upon the merits of
the original surmise, but on the bare fact that a Prohibition had been
granted. I.e: He contended that the Prohibition should be presumed
granted for good reason, and should therefore be automatically renewed
to get over the technicality of its "abatement," even though the Court
could not at present see the justification for prohibiting. The effect of this
ingenious idea would be to take positive advantage of the King's death to
cut off a Consultation on motion. I.e: In the lifetime of one King, defendant-in-Prohibition could move that the Prohibition was erroneously
granted and pray Consultation without formal pleading; he might not succeed, even if he seemed to have a good case in substance, but he was entitled to try. Now it was urged in effect that the Court ought not to look
back on the decision to grant a Prohibition made in a former King's reign,
but presume that the decision was right pending demurrer.
It seems to me that that theory deserved to be dismissed out of hand,
but the report suggests that it may not have been dealt with quite that simply. At any rate, counsel for defendants-in-Prohibition seem to have
taken it seriously. For instead of attacking the theory itself, they tried to
show that the Jacobean Prohibition was not only ill-granted as a matter of
law, but granted by procedural inadvertence. (As if to say, "Perhaps the
Court is not entitled to look back on the merits of a judicial act of the last
King's reign, but it is not obliged to renew an abated Prohibition automatically if that Prohibition was a mere mistake, not an intended judgment of
law at all.") Specifically, the prohibition was said to have been granted as
a result of failure of notice to the defendant: When the Prohibition was
originally sought, the Court, following common practice, took no immediate action except to assign a day for the defendants to show cause
against it; they were never notified that a Prohibition was being sought or
that the day to show cause had been set; when they failed to appear, the
Prohibition issued automatically. That in itself would not necessarily undercut the plaintiff's claim to have the Prohibition renewed without question, counsel implied, (such failures of notice were probably common),
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had he done anything to follow up the Prohibition, so that the defendants
could see that he meant to persist and move for the Consultation which
they thought they were entitled to on the merits. Under all the circumstances as they were, they thought they should have a Consultation now.
Whether the defendants needed to go to such lengths to win the judges
to their side is unclear. In any event, they were pretty successful. Justice
Dodderidge took the plaintiff to task for his conduct generally -- first for
appealing and only then seeking a Prohibition, now for trying to get his
substantively worthless Prohibition renewed in such a way as to force formal common law proceedings on the defendants, delaying them still
longer, until they should have spent more on litigation than their legacy
came to. The rest of the judges agreed with Dodderidge that there was no
cause of Prohibition on the merits as the surmise stood. They accordingly
agreed that Consultation would be granted unless the plaintiff came up
with a more satisfactory surmise by an assigned day; meanwhile, the ecclesiastical court was ruled free to proceed. Under the circumstances, that
solution may seem tender to the plaintiff, but it is explicable by the substantive issue. (The plaintiff had predicated his Prohibition on a plainly
bad legal theory -- that ecclesiastical courts were not competent to try
whether an estate had been used up paying debts and could therefore not
meet legacies. The judges realized, however, that in such cases an executor might be in a position to claim that evidence tending to show that the
estate was exhausted had been improperly excluded by the ecclesiastical
court -- probably a good ground for Prohibition. Despite his questionable
behavior, the executor was given a last chance to switch his surmise to a
better theory before being cut off by Consultation, since there was a fair
chance that he might have the requisite facts on his side to do so.) In sum,
Dickes et uxor v. Brown confirms that bare Prohibitions die with the
King, supports "non-necessary" Consultations, and provides a complex
instance of the use of judicial discretion when plaintiff-in-Prohibition delayed unconscionably.
One further case, 7 different from any of those above, may be considered as testing "narrow-gauge individualism" in Prohibition law. In this
case, two churchwardens in their official capacity sued a parishioner for a
7

H.7 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,208, f.91b.
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repair rate. The parishioner lost in the first instance and appealed. Pending the appeal, one of the churchwardens released the claim. The parishioner got a Prohibition on the ground that the ecclesiastical court was
going to proceed to judgment in spite of the release. The other churchwarden -- the one who did not participate in the release -- challenged the Prohibition by demurrer. His contention was substantive: Churchwardens
together -- let alone one of them -- may not release a claim that belongs to
the parish. The other side contradicted that proposition, but also made a
procedural argument: Whether or not the release was a valid transaction,
the original ecclesiastical suit was brought by both churchwardens. Both
were prohibited -- i.e., the suit as originally conceived, A. and B. v. C., is
what was prohibited. Now one churchwarden was proceeding upon the
Prohibition, seeking Consultation. The other one de facto was not prosecuting the defense against the Prohibition, whether or not he could do so
in the face of his release. In effect, withdrawal of one ecclesiastical plaintiff/prohibitee discontinued the suit (presumably driving the other churchwarden to start all over in the ecclesiastical court if he hoped to collect the
money in spite of the release.) Counsel reinforced this point by saying
that the two churchwardens brought the suit in their own names -- not, in
terms, for the parish -- and would consequently be in a position to recover
costs and damages to their own use.
In the event, the Court settled this case without regard to the arguments
made by either side. The judges agreed unanimously that the Prohibition
should never have been granted, and therefore that Consultation should be
granted now. They reached that conclusion without making any decision
about the release's validity. Rather, they held that there was simply no basis for taking the suit away from the ecclesiastical court. The question of
the release's validity was amenable to adjudication there. In other words,
it was not a "common law issue." At least, there was no basis for prohibiting without a definitive and erroneous sentence (and I imagine not even
then, since the power of churchwardens to bind the parish was probably a
purely ecclesiastical question.) Having taken this view of the case -- "going by the legal truth," rather than by the shape of the case as the parties'
actions and arguments defined it -- the judges had no occasion to rule on
the plaintiff's procedural contentions. The Court handled the case as if
the non-releasing churchwarden had moved as amicus curiae for dismissal of an improperly granted Prohibition. His standing to demur in the
face of his partner's withdrawal could be sidestepped (if indeed it is
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worth worrying about.) For our present purposes, the case is of interest
only for the occurrence of an unavailing argument in an "individualistic"
vein.
A couple of cases test the "individualism" of prohibitions by way of
"standing to sue." In a narrowly private focus, A. should be allowed to
stop an ecclesiastical suit only if it is against himself. In less narrow, but
still private, terms, a man whose interests are threatened by a suit against
someone other than himself might be allowed to prohibit that suit. In
public terms, anyone, interested or disinterested as an individual, should
be able to prohibit an ecclesiastical suit brought "in contempt of the
King's jurisdiction." The early case of Love (or Land) v. Pigott8 accepts
the private vocabulary, but extends "standing to sue" beyond the party
grieved by improper proceedings against himself. In that case, the following rule was stated and said to be supported by several precedents: A.
leases land to B. for years. B, as the occupier, is sued for tithes. A, the reversioner, may prohibit that suit. B's payment of tithes in kind -- either
because he prefers paying to pressing his defense or because he loses a
fully contested suit in the ecclesiastical court -- could of course make it
more difficult for A. to establish a modus or other exemption in a later
prohibition suit. The same can be said about any two parishioners in any
situation depending on a local custom: one's non-resistance to an ecclesiastical claim, or loss in the ecclesiastical court, could make things harder
for the other later on. Habits of mind formed by property law probably
made it easy to say that the reversioner may prohibit a suit against the lessee -- to "protect the freehold" against harm to the property and its value
done or suffered by a temporary tenant. Would Parishioner B. have
stood a chance to prohibit a suit against Parishioner A.?
The only case that bears directly on that question9 does not provide a
very satisfactory answer. In this case, a tithe suit was prohibited by a parishioner other than the one against whom it was brought. The substantive ground of the Prohibition was that the parson had no de jure title to a
full tenth of the fish caught in a seaside parish. Hence a custom limiting
his take to a certain percent of the fishermen's share and wholly exempt8
9

P. 29 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 56; Moore, 915.
H. 45 Eliz. C.P. Lansd. 1058, f.57.
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ing the boat-owners' share was claimed to be perfectly valid and a reason
to stop the parson's suit for a full tenth. That is to say, the basis for the
Prohibition was one of which any parishioner engaged in fishing might
have occasion to take advantage. The parson moved for Consultation because plaintiff-in-Prohibition was not personally party to the ecclesiastical suit. To this motion, Justice Walmesley replied: "The spiritual judge
may advise himself whether to proceed." In other words, Walmesley
would not grant a Consultation on motion to prevent a non-party form
prohibiting an ecclesiastical suit. On the other hand, he would not say
that Parishioner B has standing to prohibit a suit against Parishioner A by
invoking the common law and a parish-wide custom. Rather, Walmesley
left it up to the ecclesiastical court whether to obey the Prohibition or to
proceed (on the theory that the Prohibition was null owing to the plaintiff's want of standing.) He must have expected that the ecclesiastical
court would not proceed in such doubtful circumstances. The parson's
lawyer, having failed with his procedural motion, turned his attention to
persuading Walmesley that the Prohibition should be reversed for substantive insufficiency. He did not get anywhere, for Walmesley simply
disagreed with him concerning the tithability of fish. The judge's views
on the substance perhaps color his procedural opinion: In this case, Walmesley saw what he considered a plainly unwarranted tithe suit. Its unwarrantedness was basically a matter of law, not of a custom which might
or might not be true. To favor a Consultation on mere motion in such circumstances would have taken convictions strongly opposed to non-party
Prohibitions. We can only conclude that Justice Walmesley was not that
opposed to them, and not so ready to support them in all appropriate circumstances as to speak generally in their favor. His solution hardly seems
a happy one in general. If cases in point had arisen, the courts ought
either to have decided that non-party Prohibitions were unacceptable as a
rule, or to have let such Prohibitions stand in language that would have
said plainly "Do not proceed."
One final miscellaneous case on the "logical individualism," or "oneto-oneness," of Prohibitions10 presents the following mixed-up situation:
A parson sued for tithes of milk from 60 cows. That suit was prohibited
10

M. 28/29 Eliz. Q.B. Harl. 1331, f.40.
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in the Common Pleas. That Prohibition was then undone by a Consultation covering 40 cows. The substantive reason for Consultation is not
reported. The substitution of "40" for "60" must be taken as a clerical error, for otherwise our case makes no sense. I.e.: It cannot have been an intended partial Consultation, or if it was the language did not show it by
some such expression as "quoad 40 cows." The parishioner then sought
another Prohibition, this time in the Queen's Bench. All the report tells
us is (a) that the question was moved whether the ecclesiastical court was
free to proceed; (b) that the question was adjourned, suggesting that the
judges found it doubtful; (c) that the better opinion as the reporter gathered it held that the ecclesiastical court was entitled to proceed. I take the
puzzle to be as follows: The id to be prohibited is "suit pertaining to 60
cows." Idipsum is prohibited (surmise relates correctly to the libel.) A
Consultation issues apparently referring to a non-entity ("suit for 40
cows".) Is the id -prohibited not-disprohibited? (If so, there is no need for
a new Prohibition. Defendant-in-Prohibition is attachable on the existing
prohibition in the event the ecclesiastical court should proceed by color of
the Consultation. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition should go back to the Common
Pleas and follow up his Prohibition. The Queen's Bench has no business
taking action unless the ecclesiastical court is committing a new offense -i.e., not the offense of violating an outstanding Prohibition, but that of
proceeding quoad 40 cows contrary to an alleged modus or whatever.)
Strict logic, or "individualism," would say that there is no dis-prohibition,
with those consequences. (A Prohibition can only prohibit an on-going
suit -- e.g., it cannot prohibit "A v. B" when there is no such living person
as B; likewise, a Consultation can only wipe out a Prohibition in esse -e.g., it cannot wipe out a prohibition referring to a libel for 60 cows except by aiming unambiguously at that Prohibition.) The "better opinion"
of the Court was perhaps more sensible. In one sense, there seems to be
no reason to refuse a new Prohibition, with the effect of stopping the ecclesiastical court from entertaining a suit which it had not been clearly
told to entertain quoad the 40 cows, but might well believe it was authorized to proceed in to at least that intent. In all probability, the Common
Pleas meant to authorize continuation of the original suit for 60 cows, but
it had so confused things that perhaps the best measure was to stop proceedings until the mess was cleared up, by starting over if necessary. On
the other hand, the judges may well have wanted an excuse to send the
plaintiff back to the Common Pleas, where the mess was created. He
complicated it by coming to the Queen's Bench, instead of to where the
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record was, hence where an informed and economical solution might be
worked out. If my reconstruction of the problem is correct, there was a
pretty convincing technical argument for refusing a "redundant" Prohibition and so driving the plaintiff back to the Common Pleas where, if he
had a real complaint, it made sense for him to stay. (Court-switching inevitably suggests sharp maneuvering. It is not unlikely that plaintiff-inProhibition here had no real case, but hoped to take advantage of a slip.
I.e.: If he had gone back to the Common Pleas, some such simple step as
correcting the Consultation from "40" to "60" might have finished him.)
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B.
Collateral Effect of Prohibitions
Summary: Although policy was never firmly settled on this matter, the courts were
inclined to be liberal in granting Attachment and other special remedies to remove the
necessity for multiple Prohibitions to stop virtually identical ecclesiastical suits.

The

tendency, perhaps stronger in Elizabeth’s reign than later, was to avoid extreme
“individualism” to the end of preventing vexatious litigation.
* * *
We may now turn to cases directly on the “collateral effect” of Prohibitions. One group
concerns the availability of Attachment in slightly irregular circumstances. Normally, a
defendant-in-Prohibition was attached because he ostensibly violated one specific
Prohibition, going to one specific ecclesiastical suit. There is, however, good authority for
not insisting on that link between Prohibition and Attachment in every case -- i.e., for
permitting Attachment and procedures pursuant thereto without a Prohibition precisely in
point.
In Stafford’s Case,

11

a parson sued for tithe-milk and was prohibited on surmise of a

modus. Then the parson brought a new libel against the same parishioner for the same tithes
and the same time-period. He made one alteration, however: In the second libel he claimed
the milk from a smaller number of cows than in the first. The parishioner then prayed for
Attachment upon his existing Prohibition -- as opposed to putting in a new surmise going
directly to the new libel. The Court granted the attachment: “…for otherwise a prohibition
should be granted to no purpose.”
12

Two reports of Sharington (or Swarrington) v. Fleetwood

give two different but

related rules. (a) The MS. gives the following as a unanimous holding of the Court: If
Parson sues Parishioner A. for tithes and is prohibited on grounds of a local modus, he will

11
12

P. 30 Eliz. C.P. 1 Leonard, 111.

M. 37/38 Eliz. Court uncertain. Lansd. 1059, f.340b; Moore, 599. (Lansd. 1059 is a version of Moore’s
reports, varying from the printed version and containing numerous additional cases.)
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be attached if he sues Parishioner B. for the same tithes, provided that A.’s Prohibition-suit
is undetermined. (N.B. the proviso.) (b) According to the printed report, all the judges held
that if a parson sues A. for tithes of 1590, he will be attached if he starts a new suit for the
same tithes from 1591, provided the first Prohibition-suit is undetermined. It is perfectly
likely that both rules were laid down in the same case, perhaps one by way of decision and
the other by way of dictum.
In a nearly contemporary Queen’s Bench case,

13

a parson sued one parishioner for tithe-

hay and was prohibited on surmise of a modus. The parson then dropped that suit and sued a
second parishioner for the same tithes. When the second suit was prohibited, he dropped it
and went after a third parishioner.

After five parishioners had obtained separate

Prohibitions, Serjeant Yelverton, evidently representing a sixth, moved the Court as follows:
“Inasmuch as his client was a poor man, and not able to afford the expenses of a Prohibition,
and also inasmuch as the suit in the Court Christian was commenced against all of them
upon one and same cause, solely for vexation, and to make every parishioner of the parish
either be condemned there or sue Prohibition here, the charge of which amounts to four
marks at least, whereas perhaps the tithe owed to the plaintiff by each of them is worth no
more than 2d., and the prescription being all one for all the parishioners, he prays that the
Court here will award that the said plaintiff render a reply or issuable plea to some [ascuns -perhaps ‘any, at least one’] of the said Prohibitions, and that he not proceed against his client
nor against any other of his parishioners in Court Christian until that suit is determined
here.”
The Court replied as follows: “The Justices hold it reasonable that Attachment should
issue against the party to make him come in person, and then upon his examination to
commit him to prison if it seems just; and to make examination whether there is a
prescription throughout the whole parish to discharge tithes, and so to order that he proceed
solely upon one of the Prohibitions, and that he relinquish the suits in Court Christian against
the others.” The quotations speak for themselves and amply demonstrate why a narrowly
individualistic relationship between Prohibition and Attachment would have been untenable.

13

P. 38 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,198, f.132b.
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Shortly later, however,

14

two Common Pleas judges were in disagreement over whether

one may be attached for doing anything except exactly what he is prohibited from doing. No
context is reported, no indications of a “hardship case.” All the report says is that Justice
Glanville thought Attachment lies when, pending a Prohibition, the defendant-in-Prohibition
libels de novo; whereas Justice Walmesley held the contrary -- that a new Prohibition must
be obtained.
15

In Downes v. Hackesby,

Coke’s King’s Bench appears to have reversed one of the

rules laid down in Sharington v. Fleetwood. For the Court agreed that suing for tithes from
1611 is acceptable even though a suit for the same tithes from 1610 is or was prohibited. I
say “is or was” because the report does not distinguish between a determined Prohibition for
the earlier year and an undetermined one. In any event, Attachment was sought and denied,
and the Court used general language about taking “inhibitions” strictly.
One undated report,

16

probably late-Elizabethan and probably from the Common Pleas,

comes to a compromise position. The holding says: (a) Attachment lies without a new
Prohibition if the parson starts a new suit for tithes of the same year. (b) But if -- pending a
Prohibition for tithes of 1600 -- the parson sues for tithes of 1601, he will not be attached at
once. Rather, he will be ordered not to sue (i.e., restrained by special order, not a new
Prohibition, from pressing his second suit) until the first Prohibition is tried. If, however, he
violates the order and prosecutes anyhow, he will be attached.
In sum, one must conclude that the matter of a party’s attachability outside the
circumstances in which Attachment was manifestly appropriate was never firmly settled.
The Elizabethan Queen’s Bench took a strong position, allowing one Prohibition to generate
Attachment collaterally in several situations. But the Common Pleas was not persuaded to
go so far, and the Jacobean King’s Bench seems to have drawn back to some extent.
Alongside the cases on Attachment, we may consider an attempt to use the restraining
order to the same effect -- i.e., to insure determination of outstanding Prohibitions and

14
15
16

P. 41 Eliz. C.P. Add. 25,202, f.5.
M. 12 Jac. K.B. 2 Bulstrode, 289.
Harl. 4817, f.205b.
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obviate the need for repeated Prohibitions in closely related cases. In the case of the
17

Parishioners of Rolvenden,
churchwardens.

the controversy was over the manner of choosing

The Ecclesiastical Canons of 1604 purported to insure the power of

incumbent clergymen to appoint parish officers. Numerous Prohibitions were brought to
prevent enforcement of the Canons in the face of parochial customs. In Rolvenden, the
alleged custom was for the parishioners to elect one churchwarden and the vicar to appoint
the other. The vicar, claiming by virtue of the Canons to appoint both churchwardens,
proceeded to name two men. The parishioners proceeded to elect one man in accord with
what they claimed to be the custom. The bishop qua ecclesiastical judge then inaugurated
proceedings against the parishioners to compel them to obey the Canons -- i.e., to accept
both of the vicar’s appointees and give up their own. A Prohibition, based on the custom,
was granted to stop those proceedings. Then the bishop changed tactics. Instead of either
dropping the matter or contesting the Prohibition, he instituted a new suit: One of the vicar’s
appointees (presumably his second choice, that one being recognizable as the parishelectee’s competitor) was cited into the ecclesiastical court to show cause why he should not
exercise the office -- obviously a pro forma maneuver intended to get the controversial
churchwarden “into action” by virtue of a court order, exposing anyone who resisted him to
harassment for contempt, while the Prohibition hung nominally obeyed and perpetually
untried.
At this point an attempt was made (apparently by the parishioners as a body) to stop the
second suit without a new Prohibition.

The King’s Bench was asked to order the

ecclesiastical court not to proceed in the pseudo-suit against the vicar’s appointee while the
existing Prohibition was outstanding. Counsel maintained that the second suit did not need
to be prohibited separately because it was a mere dependency of the suit already prohibited.
I.e.: Determining the existing Prohibition would decide whether there was any title to
compel the vicar’s second appointee to exercise the office. Such was the polite, legalistic
way of calling attention to a patent subterfuge. But despite the glaring circumstances the
Court refused the motion for a special order. The judges said that they would order a party
not to proceed in the ecclesiastical court in a comparable situation -- i.e., where someone
17

P. 5 Jac. K.B. Lansd. 1111, f. 366.
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tried to start a new suit dependent on another suit already arrested by an unresolved
Prohibition. (E.g. -- presumably -- if the vicar qua private complainant had proceeded
against his appointee to compel him to exercise his office, he could be restrained by mere
order.) But the judges considered themselves powerless to bind the ecclesiastical court itself
by a restraining order. They needed to bind it in this case, where the ecclesiastical court was
proceeding ex officio. Therefore the motion was denied and the parishioners told to get a
Prohibition, which they did.

I think there is no doubt but that they had a right to a

Prohibition for the specific purpose of stopping the suit against the vicar’s appointee, quite
without regard to the prior Prohibition. In other words, the second Prohibition was good on
its own merits. It was not generated by the first. The only way to have given the first
Prohibition “collateral effect” would have been to grant the special restraining order.
Although that course was rejected in the circumstances of this, case, it was given sanction by
way of dictum for use against a private party.
In another case, Wells v. Agar,

18

an outstanding unresolved Prohibition was simply used

as the ground for another Prohibition -- as opposed to a reason for avoiding multiple
Prohibitions. As far as can be made out from a scanty report, the case was as follows: A.
prohibited a tithe-suit on surmise that the ecclesiastical plaintiff was not parson of the parish
in question. (Nothing in the report explains the situation. There are many reasons why it
might be claimed that someone suing as Parson of Dale was not legally or actually such.)
Later, B., another inhabitant of the same parish as A., was sued for tithes by the same
clergyman. B. sought and obtained a Prohibition, apparently by alleging nothing more than
that he was in the same case as A. I.e.: I take it that B. did not spell out whatever basis there
was for claiming that the ecclesiastical plaintiff was not parson of the relevant parish.
Rather, he relied on the bare fact that there was an unresolved Prohibition outstanding in an
exactly analogous case. Although the Prohibition was granted, Chief Justice Fleming is
reported to have had some (unexplained) doubt. It may be arguable that the better course for
one in B.’s shoes would be to pray Attachment or a restraining order, avoiding multiple
Prohibitions and the possibility of conflicting resolutions.

18

M. 8 Jac. K.B. Lansd. 1172, f.168.
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The last case points to another variety that is mainly conspicuous by its absence from the
reports -- what we may call the res judicata or estoppel case. The cases immediately above
deal with unresolved Prohibitions stopping suits intimately related to suits subsequently
commenced. They tend to involve vexatious suit-dropping -- suing A., then as soon as he
gets a Prohibition, dropping that suit and proceeding against B. on an indistinguishable
claim, hoping to catch someone who would rather pay up than litigate. What then about the
determined Prohibition (and the corresponding vexation of losing and trying again, possibly
against a less resistant or economically weaker adversary)?

A. is sued and brings a

Prohibition; the parties proceed to issue of law or fact; A. wins; B. is sued upon an
indistinguishable claim. Should B. have a Prohibition merely by surmising the prior result -as opposed to alleging his substantive reasons for a Prohibition and using the prior result as
evidence (in the case of a verdict) or as a judicial precedent? Or should B. have still stronger
remedies -- Attachment or restraining order, without a separate Prohibition? Contrariwise,
suppose A. in the above sequence loses and B. is sued upon an indistinguishable claim. B.
obtains a Prohibition on the same surmise as A. formerly made. Should his adversary be
able to undo the Prohibition on motion by showing the verdict and/or judgment in A.’s case?
If he does not or may not seek a Consultation on motion, should he be able to plead such
verdict and/or judgment as res judicata, as opposed to pleading the merits? One might guess
about the detailed answers to these questions, but there is no point in doing so in the absence
of relevant cases. It is of course unsurprising that the cases raising such questions do not
occur frequently. It will rarely be worth a loser’s while to try again, even if there is nothing
except the strong de facto chance of losing again to restrain him. It seems to me, however,
that such attempts -- mere vexatious gambling on “better luck next time” – were even rarer
than one would predict. Their rarity suggests that parties in easily-recurrent situations -typically parsons and parishioners in tithe disputes -- expected that the courts would give res
judicata effect to earlier decisions precisely in point.
19

There is one relevant case to be considered here, however. Pottinger v. Johnson

involved a parson’s attempt to take advantage of an earlier verdict. Parson Johnson sued
Aubrey for hay-tithes from the second cutting of a meadow. Aubrey surmised a custom -19

P. 43 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f. 324.
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viz., that when they cut the hay the first time they make it into cocks of “perfect hay,” and in
consideration of rendering first-crop hay in better form than the law requires are discharged
form tithes for the second crop. Johnson and Aubrey took issue on the custom, and the jury
found it true as alleged. Later, Johnson sued another parishioner, Pottinger, for tithes of
first-crop hay. However, he did not sue simply for his de jure tithes. Rather he sued for his
customary tithe, according to the earlier verdict -- viz., cocks of “perfect hay.” Pottinger got
a Prohibition on surmise of a different custom -- that first-crop hay was customarily rendered
in the form of grass-cocks (less than “perfect hay,” less thoroughly treated, but still arranged
in a manner somewhat more convenient to the parson than bare legal duty required). Thus,
the form of the Johnson-Pottinger litigation was: Parson sues for what he has coming to him
by virtue of an admitted modus -- e.g., 6d. per acre for corn; parishioner seeks a Prohibition
on the ground that the modus is different -- e.g., 4d. per acre. There was some doubt (raised
in the case) as to whether such a ground for Prohibition was good in itself. I.e.: It was
arguable that when a parson waives tithes in kind and sues upon a modus, the ecclesiastical
court is competent to decide between that modus and an alternative one alleged by the
parishioner. The Court in the instant case rejected that argument, however.
For the matter of present concern: Pottinger having got his Prohibition on surmise of an
alternative modus, Johnson moved for Consultation. His main ground was that his modus -the “perfect hay” -- was found by verdict inter himself and Aubrey, wherefore Pottinger was
estopped to claim an alternative modus. He added a reinforcing ground: Pottinger himself
had been a foreman of the jury that found for Aubrey!
The Court denied the motion for Consultation. But the decision was put on narrow
enough grounds to leave room for the underlying idea of Johnson’s motion -- invoking a
verdict in a prior case to estop plaintiff-in-Prohibition. In this case, the Court could see no
inconsistency between the verdict for Aubrey and Pottinger’s present claim. The verdict for
Aubrey would still be correct though Pottinger’s version of the custom -- grass-cocks -- were
true. In other words, Aubrey’s jury (and its foreman) should not be taken as saying only
what it need say: “Second-crop hay is tithe-free, in consideration of the benefit to the parson
in the customary manner of rendering the first crop.” What the customary manner was,
grass-cocks or hay-cocks -- whether Aubrey stated the custom correctly and whether or not
he had been doing more for the parson than he needed to -- was beside the point. On the
other hand, the Court at least did not deny that Johnson’s motion might have been granted in
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other circumstances. E.g.: Suppose Pottinger were sued for second-crop hay and surmised a
wholly different modus -- say 1d. per acre for second-crop hay. Or suppose that he claimed
de jure exemption for the second crop instead of a modus. Or suppose he were sued for firstcrop hay upon Aubrey’s modus and claimed that he only owed the hay in de jure form -neither in grass-cocks nor hay-cocks. All those hypothetical cases strike me as tricky. All
one can say is that Pottinger v. Johnson does not in terms rule out taking advantage of a
custom established by verdict in the parson’s favor by way of motion for Consultation.
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XI.
Flexible Forms of Procedure
Summary: In the area of Prohibition law, the courts showed reasonable willingness to invent variant forms, or modify the usual ones for special purposes -- e.g., orders other than Prohibitions and Consultations,
slightly irregular uses of the ordinary writs. There is, however, very little
authority favoring the most obvious supplement to Prohibitions -- the
Mandamus, or positive order to a "foreign" court. There was probably
scope for such forms of procedural flexibility as amendment of pleadings
and advisory opinions, but the reports give little evidence of them.
* * *
We have seen in several ways that the forms of procedure in Prohibition law were allowed to develop considerable pliability. A spare and
rigid model can be made out in the background -- wherein the only entities are Prohibition and Consultation, the Stop-sign and the Go-sign. But
those simple entities were permitted to develop their variations to meet
the variety of occasions. E.g.: We have seen Prohibitions quoad and Consultations quatenus; joint Prohibitions and "non-necessary" Consultations.
We have seen the instrument of Attachment stretched from a mere dependency of Prohibition into a device for preventing sharp practice and
the multiplication of similar suits. Finally, we have seen occasional use of
additional instruments -- restraining order in lieu of Prohibitions; rulings
amounting to informal authorizations to proceed in place of proper Consultations. There remain a few further cases illustrating the flexible use
and supplementation of the standard procedural forms.
An early report 1 presents a variant form of Prohibition which we have
not encountered elsewhere -- the Prohibition Si ita sit. All the report
gives is a statement at the Bar: that if no libel is shown, such a conditional
Prohibition may be granted ("Si ita sit = "If such an ecclesiastical suit as
the surmise recites is going on".) It is unclear whether this form was a
way around 2/3 Edw. 6, or only applicable to cases outside the statute. I.e.:
2/3 Edw. 6 required a copy of the libel to be attached to the surmise. The

1

Harl. 5143, f.225. Undated. C.P. (Nothing in Harl. 5143 appears to be later than 20 Eliz.)
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present opinion may mean that a conditional Prohibition could be granted
even when that requirement was ignored. On the other hand, it may mean
that where there is no statutory restriction on the Court's power to grant a
Prohibition, the Si ita sit form should be used unless the libel is voluntarily shown to back up the surmise.
In an Admiralty case of 1590,2 a man entitled to a Prohibition was required, owing to special circumstances, to give security against using his
Prohibition to evade justice. In this case, a Scot sought to stop an improper contact suit against him in the Admiralty. The Court held that a
friendly alien was as much entitled to a Prohibition in appropriate circumstances as an Englishman. However, the danger existed that the Scotsman
would escape answering on the contract at common law if the Admiralty
were simply prohibited. His ship had been attached by Admiralty procedure to insure his response there. If the Admiralty were simply told
"Hands off" and the attachment consequently undone, the alien could easily take his ship and sail beyond the reach of English justice. Therefore
the Court ordered that he put in bail to assure his appearance if his adversary sued him on the contract at common law. If he would not give such
security, the Court said, a Consultation would be granted.
Another Elizabethan holding3 accommodates the Consultation to a
situation in which a purist might consider the writ unnecessary or not exactly appropriate. The report simply states the rule that where a plaintiffin-Prohibition is non-suited or will not declare, Consultation will be
granted. No discrimination is made between the two points at which failure to prosecute might occur: (a) before a writ of Attachment is issued (b)
after Attachment but before declaration thereon. Either way, the rule is
manifestly sensible. The alternative would be to leave it up to the ecclesiastical court whether to proceed after a lapse of time and failure to prosecute. Two ill consequences would ensue: (a) As in other doubtful
situations, ecclesiastical courts could not be expected to proceed without
Consultation. Possibly, left to its own devices, the ecclesiastical court
would eventually proceed in the absence of any sign of intention to prosecute. But a man obviously ought not to be able to delay ecclesiastical jus2
3

_____ v. Edwards. M. 32/33 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,200, f.33.
H. 43 Eliz. C.P. Lansd. 1058, f.3.
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tice for a considerable time merely by getting a Prohibition and then doing nothing to sustain it or to expedite a determination. (b) Once the ecclesiastical court made up its mind to proceed by reason of
non-prosecution, it would commit a prima facie violation of the outstanding Prohibition. Attachment following thereupon, the undue delay and
non-prosecution would have to be pleaded to justify proceeding in the
face of the Prohibition. The common law court would have to deliberate
as to how soon the ecclesiastical court is entitled to conclude that a Prohibition has been dropped. If the common law court decided for defendantin-Prohibition in such a context, it would presumably end by granting
Consultation anyhow. It is obviously simpler and better to grant Consultation on motion at any early stage, upon a showing that the Prohibition
has not been followed up with reasonable promptitude.
The very occurrence of the report, however, suggests that the matter
may have been in some doubt. A puristic argument contra is possible: A
bare Prohibition -- as distinct from the returnable, plea-engendering Attachment -- is "by nature" a warning or hypothetical imperative. It says,
"Do not proceed in this case unless you are willing to risk Attachment and
justify your disobedience." Therefore one who believes a Prohibition is
not going to be insisted on, or that so much time has elapsed that insisting
on it can no longer be justified, should go ahead and disobey, testing his
belief. The risk falls on the ecclesiastical plaintiff and ecclesiastical court.
They should not be helped out by a premature Consultation. (Cf. the discussion above as to whether a Prohibition before Attachment is a "real
lawsuit" because the plaintiff is capable of being non-suited).
In connection with the last case, a brief later report4 may be noted: A
holding that if after issue is joined plaintiff-in-Prohibition does not prosecute for a year and does not have the case officially continued on the juryroll, it is in the Court's discretion whether to allow the case to go on. That
being the case, an ecclesiastical court would hardly want to decide on its
own initiative that it was free to proceed. Consultation would have been
less necessary if there had been an automatic cut-off date.

4

M. 5 Car. C.P. Hetley, 148.
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Another case 5 is best seen as an unsuccessful attempt to introduce
flexibility into Attachment proceedings. In this case, the elder of two sons
died intestate. The younger son and the father each sued in the ecclesiastical court to obtain appointment as administrator. The younger son got a
Prohibition on surmise that the ecclesiastical court was on the point of
granting administration to the father. His theory was that the governing
statute left the ecclesiastical judge no discretion but to choose the younger
brother, as between those two relatives of the intestate. That theory was
not discussed judicially until the younger son moved for Attachment
upon a showing that the ecclesiastical court had proceeded in spite
of the Prohibition. When it was discussed, Chief Justice Popham held
(without being contradicted by any other judge) that it was without merit
-- i.e., that appointment of the father was permissible if not obligatory.
Nevertheless, Attachment was granted because the Prohibition had admittedly
been disobeyed (with the effect of forcing the father to plead to the
Prohibition if he wanted Consultation.) Attachment was normally "of
course." We have seen the motion for Attachment above in exceptional
circumstances -- e.g., when B. seeks to have an ecclesiastical plaintiff
attached upon A's Prohibition because he has sued B. on an indistinguishable
claim. In the instant case, I assume that the motion for Attachment was
by agreement of the parties. The father hoped to avoid pleading. The other
side agreed to move for Attachment specially in order to raise the legal issue at once. The father's hope, and perhaps the son's as well, was that
Attachment would simply be denied if the Prohibition was groundless, so
that the ecclesiastical court could safely proceed without further ado. The
Court, however, refused to go along with the irregular procedure. At the
same time, it was willing to speak to the merits upon the motion for Attachment, showing the parties where they stood and probably de facto obviating further litigation.
There are a few instances of special orders. Prohibitions nisi were
common. The writ would be granted on the plaintiff's ex parte applica5

H. 43 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.296.
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tion, but a day given for the defendant to show cause against the Prohibition. In Harris v. Wiseman,6 the defendant did not have proper notice of
the Prohibition nisi against him. He appeared one day late and showed
that the surmise failed to state a good claim, but by then the Prohibition
had become final. The Court granted a Supersedeas to stay the Prohibition, thus removing the need for so much as a motion for Consultation.
One report7 tells us that it was King's Bench practice never to grant or
hear motions for Prohibitions on the last day of term, but that a temporary
stay of ecclesiastical proceedings until the next term could be moved for
and granted on the last day.
Another case 8 presents a special order overriding a Consultation. A
man prohibited a suit, and then apparently failed to follow up his Prohibition. "Long after," he got a new Prohibition directed at the same libel but
based on different grounds. (I would suppose the ecclesiastical court had
at last resumed proceedings on the libel, making its own judgment that
the first Prohibition had been dropped.) Being informed of the prior unprosecuted Prohibition, the Court undid the second Prohibition by Consultation. But then, on motion by the plaintiff's counsel (the formidable
pair of Coke and future-Chief Baron Walter), the Court ordered, in spite
of the Consultation, that the plaintiff plead on the second Prohibition, the
matter to "grow to a demurrer." I.e.: The Court in effect reversed its prior
grant of a Consultation on motion, on condition that the second Prohibition
be prosecuted so as to face a demurrer. I would suppose a special order
was directed to the ecclesiastical court, staying it until the forthcoming
demurrer was determined. I would also suppose that the Court meant to
give defendant-in-Prohibition a choice: (a) Demur to the substance of the
second Prohibition. (The plaintiff was given no chance to go back to the
first.) (b) Plead the matter above -- the prior Prohibition and non-prosecution. (In which case, the plaintiff must demur, raising the legal question
whether a suit once prohibited on one ground can be prohibited again on
another ground after non-prosecution of the first Prohibition. I take it that
the plaintiff was not free to go off on some other course -- notably, to
deny that there was an earlier Prohibition, or that undue time had elapsed

6
7
8

T. 19 Jac. C.P. Winch, 19.
Early Car. K.B. Latch, 7.
Cliffe v. ____ P. 41 Eliz. Probably Q.B. Lansd. 1172, f.55.
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without prosecution thereon.) My construction proceeds from the assumption
that the Court meant to be fair to the defendant while going back on a decision
in his favor, and that is the reason why allowing the matter to "grow to a
demurrer" is insisted on. In effect, I argue, the Court was inventing a new
procedure for a specific situation -- where the judges think better of a
Consultation on motion. We have seen that Consultations on motion were
accepted with some skepticism. When a man has a Prohibition in his favor,
even if off-hand the judges doubt that it should have been granted, should he
have the right to battle for it in full panoply -- viz. upon demurrer? Here, as
always when they granted Consultation on motion, the judges had said "no"
to that. Being moved to reconsider whether the Consultation on motion
was right in this case, they decided that the question was doubtful enough
to justify formal debate on demurrer. They accordingly reversed their action
on motion, but in such a way as to insure that the defendant could raise
the same point as he raised by motion if he saw fit. Otherwise, he could
contest the legal sufficiency of the Prohibition, without fear that other
matter on the plaintiff's side (the claim in the first Prohibition) would be
used against him. The report is scanty, but such would seem to be its
thrust. If my construction is right, it provides a strong instance of procedural flexibility.
A couple of cases introduce the Mandamus, or positive order, to an ecclesiastical court. Alongside the hundreds of Prohibitions, there is very
little evidence of such positive injunctions. It is perhaps arguable that the
Prohibition was a sufficient instrument: May the common law courts concern themselves with what goes on in the ecclesiastical courts except insofar as the latter exceed their jurisdiction and expose themselves to
Prohibition? Is refusal to take jurisdiction on the part of an ecclesiastical
court not inherently a judgment of ecclesiastical law, right or wrong -- as
opposed to an offense to the "royal dignity" and the secular rights of the
subject? Admittedly, "negative" Prohibitions could have a pretty "positive" thrust (e.g., the quatenus Prohibition -- or Prohibition offset by partial Consultation -- virtually directing the ecclesiastical court to handle a
case in a particular way.) But for that very reason, where is the need for
any further commanding-power?
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I imagine some such arguments were made or assumed in Bishopp's
Case,9 through only the contrary side and the judges' opinion are reported. In this case, Bishopp was elected churchwarden and presented to
the diocesan official (officer of the ecclesiastical court) for administration
of the oath required before one could exercise the office of churchwarden.
The official refused. The reasons for his refusal are not reported, but in
all probability there was a dispute between the parish and the ecclesiastical authorities over the method of election. (Numerous Prohibition cases
reflect such disputes.) Bishopp therefore sought a Mandamus to require administration of the oath. The matter in question was rather an administrative function than a judicial act, though the two are not easily separable in
the 17th century. (In the ecclesiastical world, as in the lay, "administrative"
acts were commonly performed by "courts." In this case, Chief Justice
Montague found it as natural to speak of the ecclesiastical court's power to
swear in churchwardens as he would have to speak of its power to entertain
a tithe suit.) In support of the writ, it was argued: (a) That there were precedents
for ordering ecclesiastical courts to permit executors to probate wills -- a
function that is in a sense "administrative," but trenches on the judicial, for
probate suits were commonly contested and sometimes prohibited. (b) That
ecclesiastical authorities had sometimes been ordered to do their duty in purely
non-judicial con- texts -- e.g., a Bishop was once ordered to send some chrism
to a Dean to enable him to perform baptism. (c) That the Mandamus (a relatively
new procedure in common practice) was generally legitimate in lay contexts -e.g., to require local officials to do their duty.
Chief Justice Montague favored the Mandamus. His language shows
that he thought of the power to prohibit as leading to the power to order
positively (as opposed to thinking of the Prohibition as an exclusive and
sufficient instrument): The King's Bench has jurisdiction over the misfeasance and non-feasance of ecclesiastical judges. (As if to say, "If we can
prohibit the ecclesiastical courts from handling cases which they wrongfully undertake -- or from handling them quatenus they propose to do so
in a certain way -- why should we not command them to take up matters
9

T. 17 Jac. K.B. 2 Rolle, 106.
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properly brought before them and dispose of the same as the law requires?") Secondly, Montague thought that the common law had sufficient
interest in the present matter to justify intervention: Churchwardens are necessary officers. The statutes take note of them. Though within ecclesiastical
jurisdiction, the office is intrinsically "temporal." Though the ecclesiastical court has jurisdiction, it is a "contempt" to misuse it (as -- he probably
meant to imply -- an ecclesiastical court may in a sense have jurisdiction
of a lawsuit, but still be prohibited on account of its conduct -- e.g., insisting on the two-witness rule. As it were, misuse of one's jurisdiction is all
one, whether by misfeasance or non-feasance. Montague might have
added that many Prohibition cases went to show that ecclesiastical jurisdiction over churchwardens was controllable by common law standards.)
Finally, Montague argued for the general legitimacy of the Mandamus, citing the leading Bagg's Case (reported 11 Coke, 93b).
The other judges seemed to the reporter to agree with Montague -- but
only seemed to. A day was given for the ecclesiastical official to show
cause against the Mandamus, and nothing more is heard of the case.
Some doubt seems still to hover around the positive counterpart to Prohibitions. Even in the circumstances of Bishopp's Case, it is perhaps arguable
that the power to prohibit was enough. Could Bishopp have engendered a
prohibitable suit by undertaking to exercise his office without oath? Was
there perhaps a rival candidate for churchwarden whose swearing-in
could be prohibited? So in the case of the executor who is not allowed to
prove the will. Before rushing to approve the Mandamus in that case, we
should consider the likelihood of its occurring and the likelihood of real
interests' being insufficiently protected by Prohibitions alone. We should
wait on real cases.
One such occurred during the Interregnum. In this case, 10 a man made
a will disposing of goods in Virginia. The executors named in the will refused to assume administration. Testator's next of kin sued for the letters
of administration they were entitled to by statute in the event of intestacy
10

M. 1658. Upper Bench. 2 Siderfin, 114.
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or failure of executors. For some reason, the Prerogative Court (Interregnum
equivalent of the ecclesiastical court) refused. A Mandamus was unanimously granted, the Court repeating Montague's language to the effect
that misfeasance and non-feasance are indistinguishable. For the rest:
The rarity of Mandamus cases indicates in itself that situations to which
the Prohibition was inadequate were unlikely to occur. Although there is
a little authority for positive orders at the margin where the judicial function fades into the administrative, there is none for casually using the
Mandamus where some form of Prohibition would do the job.
A few further topics of procedural law are only very lightly touched by
reported cases. There is, for example, little evidence on the courts' liberality in permitting the amendment of surmises and formal pleadings.
Their willingness to "go by the truth" in cases of variant verdicts and misconceived claims and to construe pleadings favorably points to a liberality
of spirit of which easy amendment might be another expression. On the
other hand, that very willingness may have tended to make amendment
unnecessary. But a couple of cases give evidence of its occurrence. A Jacobean nota11 states that as a general rule there are no costs for defendant-in-Prohibition to recover, but that if the plaintiff is given leave to
amend his declaration appropriate costs will be awarded to the defendant.
The generality seems surprising: Even if the defendant wins upon demurrer or by verdict he recovers no costs? The qualification, in any event,
shows that insufficient declarations were sometimes amended.
A late case12 provides a direct instance of leave to amend a surmise. A
man was sued on a contract in the Admiralty and wanted to prohibit on
the ground that the contract was made on land. But not wanting to admit
that there was any such contract, he drew his surmise in hypothetical
form: if there was any such contract, it was made on land. The Court held
the surmise bad for uncertainty. I.e.; If there was no contract, there was
no basis for complaining that the Admiral was entertaining a suit on a
contract outside his jurisdiction. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition was confined to
either claiming in the Admiralty that there was no contract whatever or
prohibiting upon a "certain" surmise. (He would not, I think, actually
11
12

P. 17 Jac. K.B. Harg. 30, f.13b.
H. 21 Car. K.B. Style, 1.
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make a damaging admission in saying, fictitiously if necessary, that the
contract was made on land. To rebut the Prohibition, the other side would
have to show that the contract was made at sea, which necessarily involves
showing that a contract was made. If defendant-in-Prohibition could not show
that, the Prohibition would stand. If he proved that a contract was made, but
on land, he would still lose. He would then be driven to sue on the contract at common law, in which case I can see nothing to prevent the present
plaintiff-in-Prohibition from pleading "No contract" and having the matter
tried de novo. I do not think a statement in a successful surmise could be
used against him in another action.) However, instead of denying the
Prohibition, the Court in this case ordered that the surmise be amended to
the proper form.
Another procedural flexibility worth noting is the advisory opinion. In
general, 16th and 17th-century courts, like medieval courts, did not rigidly insist on talking only about "actual cases and controversies." We
have seen instances of willingness to discuss the merits of a case more
broadly than the issue immediately to be decided required -- to let the parties know where they stood. Among the many reports we have dealt with,
there may be concealed instances of advisory opinions proper -- i.e., judicial answers to questions put to the Court from the Bar where there was
no actual case before it. Wallipole's Case13 is an explicit instance. In this
case, the King's Bench was asked whether the 1604 Canons could be enforced against the local custom quoad the election of a parish clerk. I.e.:
Did the Church have complete control over this office, so that it was free
to make a rule giving the power of appointment to the minister, whether
or not the clerk had been chosen by the laity in the past? In accord with
most opinion, the Court said "No" -- the office is essentially lay, and customs of lay election should prevail against the Canon. The Court was
quite willing to express itself even though, as the report shows, no
Prohibition was sought and contested, or could be sought and contested, by those who had moved the Court for its opinion. For there
13

H. 22 Jac. K.B. Benloe 142.
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was no ecclesiastical suit pending. Under these circumstances, the judges
said, they could not grant a Prohibition. That point seems axiomatic, but
the very fact that it was made suggests that an irregular device may have
been proposed: perhaps an anticipatory Prohibition, directed to someone
whom the minister had appointed clerk and to the local ecclesiastical
court, cutting off any proceedings to install that appointee or discipline a
rival parish-electee before such proceedings had begun. The situation was
perhaps one in which some sort of Mandamus could have been considered
(surely a better form than an "anticipatory Prohibition"), if avoiding litigation
is desirable and fabricated litigation is dubious. The Court, however, went
the straight path, bringing its advisory opinion down to earth and eschewing
irregular forms: The parties and judges agreed that an appropriate ecclesiastical suit (its exact nature does not appear) would be commenced, and that
a Prohibition would be brought thereupon and pleaded to issue. Insofar as
the suit thus created would depend on the point of law already discussed, the
Court had tipped its hand.
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XII.
Miscellaneous Cases on Procedure
A number of reports contain points on Prohibition procedure which do
not fit any of the categories above. They may be noted, as follows:
(1) Sir Gilbert Gerrard v. Sherrington. P.20 Eliz. Q.B. 1 Leonard,
286. (Discussed above for its main point.) Plaintiff- in-Prohibition delivered his surmise by attorney. It was objected that he ought to have appeared in court in person. Held unanimously: Acting by attorney was
good enough (although the clerks said that delivery of surmises by attorney had not been the practice for twenty years.) Note that this case comes
at the beginning of the period when Prohibitions became extremely common. Ability to act by attorney is an obvious convenience to plaintiffs
and may have been contributed to the frequency of Prohibitions.
(2) Nash and Usher v. Mollins. M. 32/33 Eliz. Q.B. 1 Leonard, 240.
Apart from the substance of this case, the reporter notes that when the
Prohibition came to trial, no evidence was given to prove that defendantin-Prohibition prosecuted in the ecclesiastical court in the face of the Prohibition. Nevertheless, the jury found for the plaintiff. This nota is
important for explaining the theory and reality of Attachment proceed-.
ings. As we have seen, Prohibitions could not be formally contested as
such. Pleading to issue only occurred upon Attachment. In principle, one
was attached for violating a Prohibition. Therefore, in principle, it should
be an issue in every pleaded case whether such a violation had in fact occurred. If defendant-in- Prohibition did not admit as much in his pleading
(by demurrer or plea in Bar), it was an open issue for the jury (i.e., among
the material facts covered by a general traverse.) In reality, however, it is
clear enough that Prohibitions were not commonly violated. Defendants
simply did not dispute the nominally alleged violation when their purpose
was to have the factual issue raised by the Prohibition tried in the only
possible place -- at common law. The present report, however, is the only
explicit evidence I have found on this point. It comes from fairly early in
the history of heavy Prohibition practice. The reporter, a student perhaps,
noticed that no evidence of violation was offered at a trial pursuant to Attachment -- i.e., that one logically necessary element in the plaintiff's
contested factual claim was entirely unproved. He noticed that the jury
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nevertheless found for the plaintiff -- i.e, returned a general verdict in his
favor, founded exclusively on evidence going to the substantive factual
dispute (whether certain land was discharged from tithes in the hands of a
quondam monastery.) He noticed, presumably, that the defendant and
judge made no objection. In principle, I suppose one might say, the jury
was free to find of its own knowledge that the Prohibition had been "violated" when the jury had reasonable grounds for thinking that the really
material facts were such as would warrant the Prohibition. (We have seen
indications enough that juries were not left free to find such "really material facts" against the evidence or without evidence, even though the
jury's theoretical duty to stick by the evidence and means of controlling
juries were still underdeveloped.)
(3) In connection with the last case: Facy v. Lange. M. 15 Car. K.B.
Croke, Car., 559; Jones, 447. This case shows that actual violation of a
Prohibition sometimes occurred and could be made a real issue for the
jury: A tithe suit was prohibited on grounds of a modus. The jury found
two issues for the plaintiff; (a) His modus was true; (b) He was actually
prosecuted in the ecclesiastical court after delivery of the Prohibition. In
consequence of the second finding, the jury awarded the plaintiff £15
damages and costs.
The question for the Court was whether the award of damages and
costs was lawful. After some discussion and inspection of precedents, the
judges held that damages were lawful, in consideration of the wrongfulprosecution and driving the plaintiff to his Attachment. The following
observations may be made: (a) The report gives no indication as to
whether any special form of pleading on the plaintiff's part was necessary
to raise an "actual violation" issue. It is possible that between the early
case above and this one pleading rules evolved whereby an actual violation could be and had to be alleged in a special way, distinct from the
nominal violation needed to justify Attachment. The latter may have
come to be pleadable in meaningless "common form" language. All I can
say is that I have no evidence on this. (b) Assuming there was no special
way of pleading an "actual violation," it was presumably up to the plaintiff to bring in evidence going to show one, and the jury's duty to say
"Yes" or "No", with reasonable respect for the evidence, when such violation was made a real issue. (c) The fact that the damage award gave the
Court trouble tends to confirm that actual violations were rare. I.e.: The
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Courts saw verdicts for the plaintiff-in attachment-on-Prohibition all the
time. In theory, such verdicts implied a violation. But it was unheard of
to give damages to the plaintiff, as if he were really the victim of unlawful
conduct by the other party. Obviously he almost never was in fact, despite the pretense. When an actual-violation case occurred, the judges
had to search for precedents on damages. The reports suggest they found
just one -- 7 Jac. C.P. (d) Against the damage award, counsel argued for
the principle that violation of a Prohibition is damage only to the King -wherefore a fine is appropriate, but not private damages. The argument
may be placed among unsuccessful tributes to the "public theory" of Prohibitions, for the Court rejected it.
(4) In connection with trials and evidence: Sir Henry Carewe v.
. P. 18 Jac. C.P. Harg. 30, f.76. It was surmised in a tithe suit that
the parson enjoyed a piece of land in lieu of the tithes. This modus was
tried "at the Bar" in Westminster Hall. (Such trials before the full court,
as opposed to trials in the country at Nisi prius, were clearly exceptional - how exceptional in Prohibition cases I cannot say.) Plaintiff-in-Prohibition's evidence went to show that his land had always been tithe-free, and
that it was the common opinion ("and that was not ancient in time") that
the parson's enjoyment of the piece of land mentioned was the consideration for the discharge. The jury found for the plaintiff. That it was permitted to on such evidence struck the reporter as notable, perhaps
surprising ("...the cause was but slenderly proved..."). The language of
the report suggests that the Court may have positively encouraged the
jury to infer that the consideration related to the discharge, for the report
states the upshot of the case in the form of a rule of law, as if the judges
said as much ("...when the land...has been always discharged... it is to be
presumed that it was by a lawful discharge, although one may not plead
this discharge simply of itself without alleging a cause for it.") As stated,
that would seem to go even beyond the case -- i.e., to suggest that the jury
should be permitted or encouraged to find for the plaintiff even if no evidence relating the consideration to the discharge were produced. Quaere
what a higher standard of proof would require, except for "common opinion" of a somewhat more ancient vintage. Proof of a specific transaction,
whereby the parson agreed to take the land instead of the tithes, would
tend to defeat the immemorialness of the usage. Yet something of the
sort seems to be what the reporter found missing, for he notes that the
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plaintiff "gave in evidence nothing of the original to the parson's predecessor."
(5) This and the following two cases in connection with juries in Prohibition cases: M. 12 Jac. K.B. Harg. 30, f.173b. A modus was laid in
the Manor of Dale, to pay something to the Rector of S. at the Church of
S. on such a day. The venue from which the jury was taken was solely
the manor. It was moved in arrest of judgment that the venue should have
been the manor plus S., the place of payment. Counsel so moving conceded that venue within the manor alone would be correct if the custom
had been stated simply as a duty to pay the Rector of S. -- i.e., if no specific place of payment outside the manor had been alleged. The Court
was inclined to hold that there was a mistrial owing to incorrect venue,
but adjourned the matter to advise. Quaere whether the Court's hesitation implies any inclination to be less fussy about venue in Prohibition
cases than in other comparable cases. (A custom of a manor requiring
performance of a duty outside the manor must be a rarity in any other
context. Logic of one sort suggests that only inhabitants of the manor
would know its custom, which is strictly the thing in dispute. Inhabitants
of the parish at large would provide a check on any tendency manorial
tenants might have to find a favorable custom dishonestly -- for they
could say whether the payment at S. was in fact habitually made, and if it
was not infer that there was no such custom. Logic of another sort suggests that venue should relate to all necessary parts of the matter to be established -- e.g., where a man was stabbed and where he died, for without
a felonious assault in A. there would be no murder, and likewise no murder unless he actually died in B. Quaere whether that logic really applies
here. The Court's inclination to follow it anyhow perhaps implies a wish
to be fair to the parson.)
(6) M.7 Jac. C.P. Harl. 4817, f.205b. Held: Defendant-in-Prohibition
may not sue a Venire facias upon issue joined in Prohibition unless there
is a default of record on the plaintiff's part. I.e.: In the first instance, it is
the plaintiff's responsibility to have a jury summoned to try an issue of
fact upon a Prohibition. The defendant may take steps to get a jury only
after the plaintiff has delayed for a certain time. The rule imports a slight
advantage for, say, the tithe- payer who has obtained a Prohibition on a
shaky modus. The parson cannot take steps to get a trial the moment is-
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sue is joined. I do not know what kind of delay would occur before a default would be entered on record against the plaintiff.
(7) Read v. Hide. M. 10 Jac. C.P. Add. 25,210, f.8b. Issue was joined
on the truth of a modus. The trial (exceptionally) took place "at the Bar"
in Westminster Hall. One prospective juror was challenged because he
had been on the jury in an earlier case between the same parties "upon
such a matter in the same place." (It is not clear from the last phrase
whether the two cases were exactly the same in the sense of "same parties, same tithes, same modus, different year." Even if the relationship
was not that exact, the report is possibly evidence of a reopened question
of fact. I.e.: There were evidently two at least similar and overlapping
cases, both of which came to trial. There is no sign that either party tried
to claim a res judicata or estoppel.) A second juror was challenged because he was tenant of one of the parties. Held: "Because these challenges do not touch them in their credit, they themselves were examined
on their oath, etc." Quaere whether they only examined as to whether the
facts alleged by the challenger were true, or as to whether they were actually
prejudiced. If the former, then the challenges were legally good. The
tenant raises no problem: If a tenant cannot be expected to be free of bias
in his landlord's favor, then he should be excluded. The juror in an earlier case is more interesting: Insofar as modi could be retried between
the same parties, or the same parson and another parishioner, is it so clear
that one man should never serve on more than one jury? How far should
one go to make sure the modus was considered de novo each time? The
point of examining them on their oath only when the challenge does not
"touch them in their credit" is that otherwise they would be exposed to
self-incrimination.
(8) Baker v. Brent and Robinson. T.41 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25, 203, f.87.
We have encountered a few cases showing that Prohibitions could be
granted by the Chancery as well as the principal common law courts. This
case is of interest because it illustrates the mode of cooperation between
the Chancery and common law courts with respect to a Prohibition. Although the Chancery and the common law had their differences, there
was in general a tradition of cooperation and mutual respect. Issues appropriate to common law trial were regularly "farmed out" by the Chancellor. That occurred in Baker v. Brent and Robinson. We may omit the
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substance of the case (a complicated matter on ecclesiastical livings.)
The original Prohibition was granted by the Chancery, and the parties
pleaded to issue there. Being at issue on the facts, the case was remitted
to the Queen's Bench for jury trial. The jury returned a special verdict.
The plaintiff moved that on the facts as found the Prohibition ought to stand.
He so moved in the Queen's Bench. After elaborate debate by counsel,
the judges held in favor of the plaintiff's motion. The point to note is that
more than fact-finding was delegated to the common law. Although the
Prohibition was granted by the Chancery, the Queen's Bench both found
the facts and decided the legal questions on which the case depended. It
was axiomatic that legal questions incidental to equity cases should be decided by the common law courts insofar as they were questions of common law (usually about the rules of property.) With regard to
Prohibitions, the Chancellor shared common law jurisdiction with his
brethren of the other courts. Nevertheless, this case suggests, farming out
a fact issue for trial carried such power even though here, in contrast to
equity cases, the legal issues were not beyond the Chancellor's putative
competence.
(9) Hutton's Case. Hobart, 15. Undated. Jac. C.P., after 1613, on the
virtually certain assumption that the report was actually written by Hobart. (The reporter writes "we".) The procedural point raised in this case
is whether the central common law courts can ever be obliged to stand
aside in favor of a franchisal court with power to issue Prohibitions. The
case in brief was as follows: Hutton, owner of an advowson, presented a
clerk to the Bishop. The Bishop refused him. Hutton appealed to the
Archbishop of York, who ordered the Bishop either to institute the clerk
or appear and show cause. Upon his default, the Archbishop instituted
Hutton's clerk himself, and he was accordingly inducted into the living.
The Bishop and one King then sued in the Delegates to nullify the Archbishop's acts on the technical ground that they were done outside the
Archdiocese, in London. (King, the rival candidate for the living, is described by the report as a "great scholar" presented by King James, Hutton's rival for the right to present. He may be Henry King, the poet and
future Bishop of Chichester, or another of the same distinguished family.)
Hutton now sought a Prohibition. The Court thought he should have it,
because induction was a temporal act, triable at common law. I.e.: Hutton's clerk, being inducted, could not be dislodged by challenging the
preliminary "spiritual" act of institution in an ecclesiastical court. That
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probably means the only way to get him out would be for King James to
sue Hutton in Quare impedit, pursuant to which the "spiritual" issue
would be determined with civilian advice or by certificate of an ecclesiastical judge.
The procedural wrinkle rests on those foundation. As it happened, the
church in question was within the jurisdiction of the Duchy of Lancaster.
Presumably any common law action to try the matter should be brought
before the Duchy Court, which had general jurisdiction, including power
to issue Prohibitions. To complicate matters, Hutton had already commenced a Quare impedit in Lancaster (presumably against the Bishop.)
He apparently intended to claim his Prohibition partly on the ground that
a common law writ going to the same matter as the ecclesiastical suit was
actually hanging. The Court, however, instructed him very firmly not to
do that (probably requiring amendment of the surmise). For Hutton had
got his clerk inducted and therefore had no title to a Quare impedit (the
purpose of which was to complain of interference with a patron's right,
preventing him from putting his clerk in.) In short, Hutton must not seek
a Prohibition because a Quare impedit was hanging, when on his own
showing Quare impedit with himself as plaintiff did not lie. He must rest
solely on the common law's jurisdiction over induction. Therefore it was
not arguable -- not relevant to argue -- that Hutton should have brought
his Prohibition in the Duchy of Lancaster because it depended on a suit
hanging there. Nevertheless, the Court spoke to the objection that the Prohibition should have been brought in Lancaster. I.e.: It was argued -- or
assumed to be arguable -- that where the proper mode of trying the matter
would he a suit in Lancaster (presumably Quare impedit with Hutton as
defendant), the Prohibition should have been sought here. The Court rejected that argument, however, in language broadly affirmative of the
central courts' comprehensive responsibility to protect all forms of common law jurisdiction, not only their own: "...the title of the advowson is
not hereby questioned [if that were questioned Lancaster would have jurisdiction]; but the intrusion upon the common law (whereof this Court
hath general care) is to be restrained ..."
One other feature of this case is of interest: "This act of Court [the
Prohibition] was complained of to the King, and he signified his pleasure
both by Sir Thomas Lake [Secretary of State from 1616, an important
courtier before then] and the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, that he
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would have a consultation granted: but we answered His Majesty by letter, that we could not do it by the law, and in the end, after many passages
to and fro, it was left, and so it stood." This is a rare and damning instance of royal interference in an individual suit aimed directly at dictating the result (as distinct from: a. Royal interference aimed at influencing
the policy of the courts, but without reference to specific pending cases;
b. Royal interference by writ of Rege inconsulto, aimed at delaying a suit
to insure adequate representation of the King's interests. The judges -not led by Coke, but by his successor at the Common Pleas, Sir Henry
Hobart -- struck by their guns and prevailed.
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